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This thesis explores recent U.S. bilateral aid to Mexico through the Mérida Initiative 
(MI), a $2.3 billion assistance commitment on the part of the United States (U.S.) 
officially justified as helping Mexico build its capacity to take on violent drug cartels 
and thereby improve security in both countries. There has been a good amount of 
engaging work on the MI. However this extant literature has not undertaken detailed 
policy analysis of the aid programme, leading to conclusions that it is a fresh approach 
to the Mexican counternarcotics (CN) challenge, or that CN is a ‘fig leaf’ for the U.S. 
to pursue other ‘real’ goals. This is a core gap in the literature this project seeks to fill. 
Through policy analysis, I make an empirically supported argument that Mérida is a 
component of a far more ambitious policy agenda to regionalise security with Mexico 
more generally. This involves stabilising Mexico itself, not least in response to serious 
drug-related violence. However the U.S. also aims to improve its own security by 
giving greater ‘depth’ to its borders, and seeks protect the political economy of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) from variegated security threats. In 
this way, recent U.S. policy in Mexico is both derivative of its wider grand strategic 
traditions in stabilising key political economies in line with its interests, and 
representative of some distinct developments stemming from the deeply integrated 
U.S.-Mexican economy as part of NAFTA. To assure U.S. interests accrued to it 
through the increasingly holistic North American economy, the U.S. has used the MI 
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The Mérida Initiative in U.S.-Mexican Relations 
“What does seem clear is that the person who killed and mutilated these three poor 
women is the same person, said Pedro Negrete. Well, find him and put an end to this 
goddam business, said the mayor. But discreetly, if I may make one request, without 
sending anyone into a panic, said the man from the chamber of commerce.”1 
 
 
The Puzzle and Research Aims 
 
The MI was announced in October 2007 by the administrations of President George 
W. Bush and President Felipé Calderón. Initially it was envisioned as a three year, 
$1.4 billion commitment on the part of the U.S. to Mexico2 to help the latter’s fight 
against drug trafficking and the violent groups or ‘cartels’ who engaged in it.3 In that 
announcement, the U.S. and Mexican administrations stated they would, “make it a 
priority to break the power and impunity of drug and criminal organizations that 
threaten the health and public safety of their citizens and the stability and security of 
the region.”4 Funds were appropriated through the MI in 2008, with the vast majority 
in terms of amounts taken up by military equipment,5 but also facilitating greatly 
increased levels of training for Mexican security forces, police, and judiciary.6 This 
complemented increased security spending by Mexico. It also supported a militarised 
strategy undertaken by Calderón that involved the widespread deployment of 
Mexico’s military.7 The administration of President Obama continued and deepened 
the policy beyond the original commitment, and total appropriations for the MI now 
stand at around $2.3 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 2014, with more likely to come.8 
Although Obama’s administration shifted the aid towards institutional support and 
away from expensive military equipment, the stated rationale has remained the same. 
It is currently officially described as being a bilateral partnership designed to, “fight 
organized crime and associated violence while furthering respect for human rights and 
the rule of law.”9  
                                                
1 Roberto Bolaño 2666 (Picador, 2009) p.471 
2 In its early years, the Mérida Initiative also included aid for Central American countries, but this 
became separately administered.  
3 There are a lot of definitional debates involved in Mexico’s security crisis. There is some reluctance to 
use the nomenclature ‘cartel’ for the groups that traffic and produce drugs through and in Mexico, 
because they do not work together or set prices. I will use it throughout the project for ease of reference, 
and to differentiate myself from official U.S. descriptors of these groups. 
4 U.S. Department of State Joint Statement on the Mérida Initiative (Washington D.C. 22nd October, 
2007)  
5 Based on figures used by Security Assistance Monitor, which is an invaluable tool for researchers of 
U.S. security aid, almost 80% of the aid between 2008-2010 was military / police based. Note that the 
figures here are from the U.S. Department of State Budget Requests and differ slightly from official 
Mérida Initiative appropriations figures (provided in Chapter Five), however the ratio remains similar. 
6 See Chapters Five and Six.  
7 For an excellent brief overview of the adoption of Calderón’s strategy and its fallout, see Paul Kenny 
and Mónica Serrano ‘Transition to Dystopia’ in Paul Kenny and Mónica Serrano with Arturo 
Sotomayor (eds.) Mexico’s Security Failure: Collapse into Criminal Violence (Routledge, 2011) p.72-
80 
8 Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida 
Initiative and Beyond (Congressional Research Service, April 2014) p.7 
9 U.S. Department of State ‘Merida Initiative’ http://www.state.gov/j/inl/merida/ Accessed 19.08.14 
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In essence the aim of this project is to explore and uncover the intentions of U.S. 
policy with regard to the MI. The initial spark for this aim is quite simple - the aid has 
now continued for almost seven years, and yet on its key stated performance 
indicators, it has spectacularly - and tragically - come up short. With regard to the 
security of Mexican citizens, the casualty figures in Mexico over the course of the MI 
are catastrophic. Whilst there is a good deal of controversy about statistics for 
homicide in Mexico, not least as the country’s impunity rate is consistently reported as 
being at over 90%,10 by any measure the loss of life since Calderón launched his 
crackdown in 2006 is shocking. Perhaps the best indicator of this is the jump in the 
overall homicide rate from 8.1 per 100,000 in 2007 to 23.1 in 2011.11 Overall, there 
were 121,683 homicides in Mexico from 2007-2012 (the Calderón administration’s 
years in power), a total, as Molloy points out, that compares with countries stricken by 
                                                
10 There are a number of issues that should invite caution with the data on drug-related killings. 
According to several estimations, Mexico’s criminal impunity rate is staggering. Heinle, Rodriguez 
Ferreira and Shirk state that only 25% of crimes are even reported, whilst 98% go ‘unpunished’. See    
Kimberly Heinle, Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira and David A. Shirk Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and 
Analysis Through 2013 Justice in Mexico Project (University of San Diego, April 2014) p.13 This 
statistic is backed by a number of sources. In 2010, El Universal reported that only 5% of drug 
executions had even been properly investigated. In 2012 the United Nations (UN) estimated that 95% of 
those arrested for crimes in Mexico since Calderón took power have walked free due to lack of 
investigative rigour and the Mexican inquisitorial justice system. As an indicative example of why this 
problem persists, in 2011 there were just 14 homicide prosecutors working on a backlog of over 8,000 
murders in Ciudad Juárez. Apportioning detailed categorisation of murders in this context seems, 
basically, arbitrary, and a definitive total of ‘drug murders’ amongst the homicide total appears elusive 
at best. See Otero, Silvia ‘No investigan 95% de muertes en “guerra”’ El Universal (June 21st, 2010) 
http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/689120.html Accessed 10.01.12; Pedro Matías ‘Impunidad en 
México alcanza 95%, alerta oficina de la ONU’ Proceso (20th January, 2012) 
http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=295536 Accessed 29.01.12; Sandra Rodríguez Nieto ‘Abandonan 
Indagatoria del Asesinato de reportero gráfico de El Diario’ El Diario de Juárez (September 16th , 2011) 
http://www.diario.com.mx/notas.php?f=2011/09/16&id=9dabdfa852a0c14534cbef63d91e6048 
Accessed 17.09.11 Thus, whilst the Calderón government released database figures for homicides tied 
to organized crime during its tenure , they are extremely suspect in their assertions of detail. These 
problems, which continue into the administration of Enrique Peña Nieto, are summarised in Alejandro 
Hope ‘Why the Mexican Govt’s Murder Count is Worse than Useless’ Insight Crime February 18th, 
2013, accessed February 19th, 2013 http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/mexican-govts-murder-
count-worse-useless Accessed 03.03.13  
11 Heinle et al Drug Violence in Mexico p.6-7 This is based on overall figures for homicide the Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI). These numbers have been dropping under the Péna Nieto 
administration, but as per the footnote above, this still remains troublesome.  
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11 
warfare and internal instabilty.12 The sickening practises of the cartels and their 
associates are also a complicating factor that likely means this is an undercount.13  
 
With regard to the stated aim to ‘respect human rights’, complaints against the 
Mexican military increased in tandem with the MI and their widespread deployment 
across Mexico. This took place alongside continuing human rights problems in the 
Mexican police force.14 Notwithstanding the inherent difficulty in trying to measure 
the amount of narcotics entering a country (let alone measuring the impact of a 
particular policy on that flow), the MI continues the larger tragedy of the U.S. ‘War on 
Drugs’ as a supply-side policy that has failed to effect the amount entering the U.S. 
enough to be successful in harming availability.15 A large number of cartel ‘kingpins’ 
                                                
12 Molly Molloy ‘The Mexican Undead: Towards a New History of the ‘Drug War’ Killing Fields’ 
Small Wars Journal (Aug 21st, 2013) http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-mexican-undead-toward-
a-new-history-of-the-“drug-war”-killing-fields Accessed 22.08.13 For example, the (likely low) tally of 
civilians fatalities in the war in Iraq provided by the respected Iraq Body Count put the total between 
2003-2012 at 123, 781. Current UN estimates for the dead in Syria in a brutal civil war are 191,000 
plus, although over a shorter time period. Iraq Body Count ‘Iraqi Deaths from Violence in 2012’ Iraq 
Body Count https://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2012/ Accessed 21.08.14; John Heilprin 
‘UN: Death Toll from Syrian Civil War Tops 191,000’ USA Today (August 22nd, 2014) 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/08/22/united-nations-syria-death-toll/14429549/ 
Accessed 22.08.14 However this is not to compare the nature of violence and level of instability in these 
cases - suicide bombings are not a regular occurrence in Mexico City as they are in Baghdad. 
13 Bodies have been disappeared in various ways. The regular discovery of mass graves (narcofosas) is 
common enough to suggest there are likely many more undiscovered, whilst acidic destruction has also 
been used. The targeting of migrants from Central America means an extremely vulnerable group may 
also be being missed in official tallies of the dead. For example, Randal C. Archibold ‘Victims of 
Massacre in Mexico Said to be Migrants’ The New York Times (August 25th, 2010) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/26/world/americas/26mexico.html?_r=0 Accessed 12.07.14 The Peña 
Nieto administration released documents showing 25,000 had gone missing under Calderón’s 
leadership, though it did try to walk back that figure. William Booth ‘Mexico’s Crime Wave has Left 
About 25,000 Missing, Government Documents Show’ The Washington Post, (November 29th, 2012) 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-29/world/35584943_1_mexico-city-mexican-government-
human-rights Accessed 30.11.12 Mexico has just posted record numbers of kidnappings. Joshua 
Partlow ‘Kidnappings in Mexico Surge to the Highest Number on Record’ The Washington Post 
(August 15th, 2014) http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/kidnappings-in-mexico-surge-
to-the-highest-number-on-record/2014/08/15/3f8ee2d2-1e6e-11e4-82f9-2cd6fa8da5c4_story.html 
Accessed 15.08.14 
14 Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission - Commisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos 
(CNDH) - reported 1,800 complaints against the military in 2009, an 890% increase on 2006. This is 
likely to underestimate the problem given these are just those complaints reported. Seelke and Finklea 
Merida Initiative and Beyond (April 2014) p.27 The problems in Mexico’s police force are more 
endemic and deep-seated, with wide-spread torture and large problems with corruption. See, for 
example, U.S. Department of State Mexico 2013 Human Rights Report (Washington D.C., 2014); 
Amnesty International ‘Known Abusers, but Victims Ignored: Torture and Ill-Treatment in Mexico’ 
Amnesty International (2012); Amnesty International ‘Out of Control: Torture and Other Ill Treatment 
in Mexico’ Amnesty International (2014)  
15 Being an illegal activity, the drug trade is extremely difficult to gain reliable information on, from 
production onwards. U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY2014: Volume I Drug and Chemical Control 
(March, 2014) p.21 In the past, the U.S. agencies tasked with interdicting drugs have talked up how 
interdiction up to the U.S. border has helped drive up price, lessen purity, and thereby decrease the use 
of drugs. Attributing any of these effects to a particular policy, however, is extremely problematic. In 
any case, critics have pointed out that enough drugs still enter the U.S. to satisfy demand. In 1997 a U.S. 
official estimated it only took nine large tractor-trailers full of cocaine to enter the U.S. to satisfy 
demand for a year. Peter Andreas Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide 2nd. edn. (Cornell 
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have been taken out by Mexican security forces, which the U.S. has proclaimed as 
success indicator, but experts - and even government officials - have posited this may 
have helped increase violence, and certainly has not significantly reduced it with 
regard to fatalities.16 Most alarmingly, the very state institutions that the U.S. is 
seeking to work with through the MI are highly involved in all levels of the drug 
trade.17 Finally, on the issue of Mexican stability, in 2013 Peña Nieto deployed troops 
to the state of Michoacán to deal with rising violence, the state where Calderón first 
initiated his crackdown almost seven years earlier.18 Given this context, the main 
animator of this thesis is why the policy continues at all.  
 
Extant Literature & Key Arguments 
There are various explanations for the puzzle identified. Despite being numerous and 
variegated, they fall essentially into two broad positions. Firstly, there is a widespread 
literature that accepts the official rationale for the MI as a new, bilateral, CN 
partnership. Secondly, a more critical literature states that in fact CN is a smaller issue 
compared to, or even a pretext for, a deeper goal to insulate Mexico’s neoliberal 
political economy within NAFTA, especially from potential change from Mexican 
society. The first welcomes the policy but insists Mexico’s security issues are 
compounded, needing time and ingenuity in policy to work through. The second 
suggests the policy is, from the U.S. perspective, largely successful in its broader aims. 
There are useful insights within both broad positions. However the extant literature 
has not engaged in a deep policy analysis of the MI.  
 
This project aims to fill that gap. It contends that once we open up the MI to such 
analysis, it becomes necessary to reconsider what the policy is intended to do. Policy 
documentation and official justification shows how the MI is aimed at a wider set of 
objectives, aiming to build the capacity of the Mexican state to produce and maintain 
security in a number of areas, including both CN and counterterrorism (CT). However, 
this material also makes clear that there is a wider goal to engage Mexico and pull it 
into a U.S.-designed North American security architecture that seeks to better protect 
the U.S. homeland and the North American political economy. Whilst Mexico’s drug 
related security crisis itself has become increasingly concerning to U.S. policymakers 
as it has deepened, it has also provided the most successful access point through which 
the U.S. can achieve its more expansive aims. Mérida is a key policy constituent of a 
                                                
Publishing, 2009) p. 75 Finally, the MI has never had particularly clear success indicators on this issue. 
Seelke and Finklea Merida Initiative and Beyond p.25-26 
16 See Eduardo Guerrero-Gutierrez ‘Security, Drugs, and Violence in Mexico: A Survey’ 7th North 
American Forum (Washington D.C., 2011) p.66-67 Indeed the Peña Nieto administration made this 
very assertion itself, before continuing the policy. 
17 The evidence for this is irrefutable and multi-scalar, inter-secting with human rights issues. 
Corruption exists at the highest level of the state to the lowest. I discuss this further below. 
18 Vanda Felbab-Brown Calderón’s Caldron: Lessons from Mexico’s Battle Against  
Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez, and Michoacán (Brookings Institute, 
September, 2011) p. 24-30; Joshua Partlow ‘Mexican Army Has Taken Control of Major Port in Effort 
to Combat Drug Cartel’ The Washington Post (December 1st, 2013) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/mexican-army-has-taken-control-of-major-port-
in-effort-to-combat-drug-cartel/2013/11/30/ee768458-523b-11e3-9ee6-2580086d8254_story.html 
Accessed 09.08.14; Nacha Cattan and Eric Martin ’22 Killed in Western Mexico Shoouthout in Test for 
Pena Nieto’ Bloomberg (July 24th, 2013) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-24/22-killed-in-
western-mexico-shootout-in-test-for-pena-nieto.html Accessed 07.08.14  
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broader strategy to create a regional security framework, which I term ‘NAFTA-land 
Security’. I employ this term as it captures something distinct about both the NAFTA-
zone as a regional entity, and encapsulates the fact that a lot of what the U.S. is doing 
in terms of policy in Mexico effectively extends the concept and strategies of 
Homeland Security (HS) to the perimeters of the North American political economic 
region. 
 
Thus, the concept of ‘NAFTA-land’ helps make clear that the passage of the free trade 
agreement created a distinct political economic space, which can be defined as a 
region subject to regional dynamics. Of course, North American regionalism pre-dates 
NAFTA. Geography dictated that as the U.S. developed it needed to consider security 
issues arising from its neighbours, and security relations ebbed and flowed through 
direct competition and war to cooperation and integration. Similarly Mexico and 
Canada were early sites of U.S. economic expansionism beyond its borders. 
Paraphrasing Anderson, North America has always been subject to processes and 
dynamics of regionalism.19 However, what NAFTA effectively did was to 
‘offficialise’ North America as a region. It was explicitly regionalist in its aims and 
intentions, seeking to create a regional economic market. Since that time, the NAFTA 
zone has become a strategically important trilateral production hub within global 
capitalism. High levels of economic integration and regionalisation have driven this 
development along. NAFTA-land Security represents a security response to these 
realities: an explicit effort to create a regional security architecture for the NAFTA 
zone. Whilst Canada was already able and willing to play a role in this regional 
arrangement, Mexico was less so. Thus NAFTA-land Security is significantly being 
built through exporting the concepts and capabilities of HS to the region’s southern 
partner. What the NAFTA-land terminology helps make clear is the bespoke regional 
effort by the U.S to extend HS concepts to NAFTA’s perimeters. Contemporary 
security aid to Mexico can only be understood with a careful but deliberate focus on 
North American regionalism and NAFTA as a distinct regional arrangement, and 
acknowledgement that U.S. strategic thinking is in a very important sense distinctly 
regional in seeking to protect and secure the NAFTA space.  
 
This argument though begs deeper questions about why the U.S. pursuing such a 
strategy. There is a concomitant depth to the answer here that pre-exists but intersects 
with regional dynamics. I therefore preempt the policy analysis and its findings with a 
theoretical and historical discussion of U.S. foreign policy generally, and its relations 
with Mexico specifically. Taking a historical-materialist approach, I argue for the 
centrality of U.S. interests in securing and maintaining its position of primacy within a 
liberal international order, based on U.S. hegemony within open markets and 
globalised capitalism that it has done much to self-construct. This apex position 
affords the U.S. significant material and economic benefit within that hegemonic 
system, whilst also benefitting other core powers and transnational capital, but 
necessitates and pushes significant involvement in international affairs to maintain the 
order and its stability generally. More specifically, in the global South,20 the U.S. has 
                                                
19 Anderson states that North America has always been integrating, however this does not capture 
disintegrative periods and other complexities in the region. Greg Anderson ‘Security and Sovereignty in 
Post 9/11 North America’ Review of International Political Economy 19, 5 (2012)  
20 I follow Blakeley’s use of ‘North and South’ here in understanding them as a useful way to 
differentiate between those states in the Global North that are generally rich and share liberal (in the 
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sought to maintain stability and openness to investment and extraction through heavy 
and often quite brutal involvement, again to the benefit of the U.S.’ continued 
primacy, its capital and transnational capital, and other core powers. This is especially 
true in Latin America, which since the Monroe Doctrine has been viewed as the U.S. 
‘backyard’ and within its direct sphere of influence.21 On one level, Mexico represents 
an interesting case for U.S. foreign policy in this context. Whilst the U.S. went to war 
with Mexico for territory in 1846 -1848, and directly intervened in its Revolution 
(1910-1920), for most of the 20th Century U.S. involvement in Mexico was relatively 
limited. However following severe economic ructions in the 1980s the U.S. directly 
guided Mexico’s opening up to a less statist, liberalised economy, more welcome to 
foreign (and U.S.) investment and trade, changes then “locked in”, as Ikenberry puts it, 
through NAFTA.22  
 
This was part of a more global development as the U.S. led the shift from broadly 
Keynesian capitalism to what is popularly termed ‘neoliberalism’ in the 1980s and 
1990s, spreading capital’s reaches in the process as the result of the collapse of the 
USSR. However, U.S. policy towards Mexico again provides an intriguing case within 
these wider developments. The implementation of NAFTA and the MI fit into U.S. 
grand strategic designs concerning the creation and maintenance of open markets that 
are stable and secure. Crucially, the level and pervasiveness of Mexico’s drug-related 
security crisis has become a destabilising force within Mexico’s political economy. 
The MI can thus be connected to the continuity within U.S. foreign relations in 
seeking to stabilise key political economies to ensure continued investment and 
extraction. The U.S.-Mexican economic relationship has always been close, and 
though the level of interaction has waxed and waned, key U.S. interests have straddled 
recent history, fundamentally based around securing Mexico as an open and stable 
economic ‘partner’.23 However, the levels of U.S. involvement in Mexico have been 
strongest where its economy has been most integrated with Mexico’s, and where the 
subsequent interests created have been most threatened. There was a great level of 
economic interaction with Mexico prior to and during the latter’s revolutionary period, 
                                                
broad political sense) political systems, and those in the South that are generally poorer, whilst 
appreciating that it is a broad-brush term that covers over important nuances and shifting global trends. 
However ‘North and South’ also allows one to capture how there are disparities of wealth within the 
North and South also, as well as between them. Ruth Blakeley State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The 
North in the South (Routledge, 2009) p.2-3 As countries traditionally understood as part of the South 
rise and grow economically the U.S. has for the most part attempted to pull them into the wider liberal 
order. However there has also been a keenness to assert and maintain dominance, with financial power 
being used to assert the rules of the game, and a temptation in some quarters to confront the exemplar of 
the rising economic powers, China. On financial power, see, for example, Peter Gowan The Global 
Gamble: Washington’s Faustian Bid for World Dominance (Verso, 1999) On the neoconservative 
desire to confront China more robustly (not exactly followed through in Bush’s presidency) see The 
Project for the New American Century ‘Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and 
Resources For a New Century’ Project for the New American Century (September, 2000) p.19 
21 On an official level, as U.S. ambitions in Latin America predate the famous Doctrine. For a fantastic 
overview of these ambitions, see Lars Shoultz Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy 
Toward Latin America (Harvard University Press, 1998) Of course U.S. influence is argued to be 
waning in Latin America following the ‘pink tide’ of democratically elected leaders following more 
statist development courses and collapse of the (neoliberal) Washington Consensus in macroeconomics. 
22 G. John Ikenberry After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After 
Major Wars (Princeton University Press, 2000) p.240-244 
23 Albeit the ‘partnership’ has been historically balanced towards the interests of the U.S. 
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and U.S. involvement in and with Mexico was high. Currently, with economic 
integration with Mexico again at high-levels due to regionalisation processes 
connected to NAFTA, U.S. involvement on security questions is once again increased, 
reflecting the interest in securing and stabilising a strategically important political 
economy. 
 
The security logic borne out of Mexico’s neighbourly proximity has also been given 
added impetus by the events of 9/11 and renewed U.S. focus on what it has termed its 
HS. This post 9/11 HS focus has revolved around deep rethinks on how the U.S. 
achieves its own security. This goes beyond the physical security of the U.S. 
mainland. The U.S. has become increasingly concerned about how it secures open 
global economic chains, and its own openness to capital, goods, and people that are 
integral to its strategic success and global hegemony. This has been challenging as 
various transnational threats have been empowered by the same increasingly open and 
interconnected global trends of economic globalisation. The attempted solution to 
what is perceived as a new security environment has been to ‘push U.S. borders 
outward’ and defend HS ‘in depth’ through cooperation with other nations, and 
capacity building of allies’ security institutions. However, it is here where we see the 
specificity of NAFTA-land Security most clearly. In North America the effort has 
been especially rigorous due to the depth of economic integration, and thus the U.S. 
has sought to create a regional security solution that pushes a security perimeter to 
NAFTA’s border. The MI fundamentally interlocks with these aims. Thus, economic 
interactions and interests within NAFTA provide a push towards protecting that North 
American political economy - or NAFTA-land - itself. Therefore, three interacting 
logics underpin the MI and the effort to coordinate with Mexico to improve its wider 
security capacities within NAFTA land Security; stabilise Mexico and insulate its 
political economy from internal and external threats (to include drug-related violence), 
give greater depth to U.S. borders to better secure its own HS, and regionalise security 
arrangements across North America to gird its political economy against threats.  
 
The final question that emerges through this project’s aims and arguments is whether 
the MI, and the wider aim to drive to regionalise security, can be said to be ‘working’? 
This takes me back to the original basis of the puzzle, the continuing instability and 
violence in Mexico itself. This is in fact the most complex question within the research 
project. The answer, at one level, is provided in the policy analysis itself and the 
argument already sketched out. The U.S. has succeeded in involving itself in Mexican 
security at an unprecedented level, and the integrative agenda, both on (intertwined) 
issues of economics and security, is in good health. Mexican security forces and 
policymakers are being actively convinced to adopt and adapt to U.S. security aims 
and practises. The continuance of the policy makes perfect sense on this level, and can 
be seen as a success. We need to consider the policy from the perspective of the U.S., 
and therefore we need to ask what kind of security the U.S. is striving to achieve. 
Despite the stated concern for ‘citizen security’ and counterdrug rationales, the 
overriding aim is the creation of a regional security framework where the most 
important aim is protecting the political economy of Mexico and, by extension, North 
America. Again, NAFTA-land Security helps us to capture this strategic logic - the 
security of the North American political economic free trade arrangement and 
economic / strategic interests within it outweighs and encapsulates (but does not erase) 
efforts to improve ‘citizen security’ or CN in the limited sense of harm reduction. This 
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is the thesis’ key original finding. Nonetheless there are impediments to even this aim, 
not least the continued instability in Mexico. It also becomes legitimate and necessary 








Why has the United States continued to provide security assistance to Mexico even as 
the security situation has deteriorated on a number of indices? 
 
Research Question  
What are the aims of the United States in its increased provision of military, police, 




! Why is the U.S. seeking to regionalise security with Mexico under NAFTA-land 
Security arrangements? 
! How important are CN concerns in this effort? 




Chapter Structure  
 
The remainder of this chapter will focus on how the research is designed, its 
originality, methodology and some key concepts, through which I introduce the 
contemporary context of U.S. policy. From then on the project proceeds in this 
fashion: 
 
Chapter Two - Literature Review: A Drug War Rationale, or a Drug War Pretext?  
This chapter provides a detailed overview of the extant literature on the MI. I divide it 
into two broad groups, those who see Mérida as animated by a drug-war rationale, and 
those who the CN element as a pretext for the securing of other goals, namely the 
protection of Mexico’s unequal economy from potential change from below. I also 
look at how both groups have connected Mérida to North American economic 
integration. I identify some of the gaps in the extant literature, including how it has not 
satisfactorily related the Mérida policy to the wider context of North American 
integration or theorised U.S. interests in Mexico within that context. This omission 
stems from the key gap in the extant literature, in that it has not looked at the policy 
itself in detail.  
 
Chapter Three - Theorising U.S. Interests and the Projection of Security in Mexico 
This chapter starts to build my case for looking at the MI more holistically with a 
focus on its context. It starts with basic building blocks with an extensive discussion of 
the state, how the state has interests, and how those interests are formulated. I take in 
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insights from across International Relations’ (IR) theoretical spectrum and use them to 
construct my own conceptions, based on a critical realist ontology and a historical-
materialist approach. I then move onto U.S. foreign policy specifically, and show how 
it revolves around a consistent grand strategy designed to ensure U.S. primacy through 
the hegemonic construction and maintenance a liberal capitalist international order. 
This allows me to trace the connections and continuities with regard to U.S. foreign 
policy in and with Mexico. In turn I also show how this bilateral relationship (like 
most) is in some crucial ways unique. Most important here is the sharing of a 2000-
mile border, and the deep integration catalysed by NAFTA. I explore how these facts 
have created distinct interests, and inspired contingent policies to meet them based on 
the regionalisation of security under ‘NAFTA-land Security’ arrangements.  
 
Chapter Four - ‘…So Close to the United States…’ The U.S.-Mexican Relationship 
in History 
In this chapter I show how the U.S. has sought the core interests of openness and 
stability identified in Chapter Three in Mexico over the course of the twentieth 
century. I discuss how the U.S. intervened in the course of the Mexican Revolution to 
try and influence events in a favourable direction for U.S. interests - stability, and a 
regime open to U.S. investment and trade. I look at how Mexico remained a stable if 
proudly sovereign partner during the Cold War, and explore how Mexico’s profound 
economic crisis allowed the U.S. the space and opportunity to open it up to more trade, 
investment, and U.S. influence, a process culminating in NAFTA. I weave key issue 
areas, not least narcotics, through this narrative. The goal here is to establish the 
continuity of interests in Mexico that are congruent with deep trends within U.S. 
foreign policy. I finish the narrative with the beginning of heightened U.S. 
involvement in Mexico’s security. 
 
Chapter Five - The SPP and the Logic of NAFTA-land Security  
 
This chapter builds from the point of NAFTA’s adoption to continue the empirical 
argument, and interweave it with the theoretical claims. Examining the fallout from 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it shows how concepts of layered security and security 
projection began to be employed in an effort to secure both the U.S. mainland and the 
open economic chains crucial to U.S. strategic success. Within North America these 
questions were especially profound due both to neighbourliness, and the deleterious 
effects 9/11 had within the North American political economy. Almost immediately 
the U.S. response was based around extending a security perimeter around North 
America to both better protect both the U.S., and the U.S.’ interests within the North 
American economy. Several policies were employed to achieve this. The Security and 
Prosperity Partnership (SPP) is key to revealing the regional security goals, but was 
complemented by other programmes. The chapter also discusses how Mexico and its 
part in the North American economy remain vital to U.S. strategy and is in fact set to 
become more important. This sets the stage for the policy analysis of the MI, which 
should be seen within NAFTA-land Security logics. 
 
Chapter Six - Mérida Initiative Policy Analysis  
This chapter is a detailed analysis of the MI itself. It is based first and foremost on 
publicly available official material used to show that the MI is openly more than a CN 
programme, and instead part of a drive to create North American security. Thus I 
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make explicit connections between the logic of NAFTA-land Security and the MI. 
This involves a consideration of some of the indicative policy ‘on the ground’. 
Crucially I show how the MI connects up a number of different interlocking 
programmes all aimed at improving regional security in North America.  
 
Conclusions - Is Mérida Working? 
I conclude by summarising the key findings of the research, which answer the research 
questions set out above. The MI continues as a core component of the NAFTA-land 
Security construction process. However, is that process working with regard to its 
goals to improve security and stability in North America? I suggest, that the U.S.’ 
wider aim to integrate Mexico into NAFTA-land security arrangements has thus far 
been successful in terms of the inculcation of Mexico as an active NAFTA-land 
Security partner. Nonetheless I explore the limitations of this, based around the 
irrefutable fact that Mexican security remains fragile on a number of indices. I use this 
as a base to suggest looking at the policy from a normative perspective, and consider 
how it remains a troubling approach for human rights and civil-military relations in 
Mexico. I look at what the research has been unable to consider due to limitations of 
space and focus, and the prospect for future research. 
 
 
Research Design: Ontology, Methodology, Scope and Limitations 
 
Ontology & Epistemology 
There are of course some assumptions within the broad summary of this research 
project above that I need to unpack. As Archer states, it is necessary to be clear about 
the ontological commitments within a research project, as they will impact upon the 
“explanatory” methodology employed.24 As Stoker and Furlong put it questions of 
ontology and epistemology are a “skin” shaping the approach of research.25 This thesis 
proceeds with a philosophically (as opposed to IR)26 realist ontology, in that I 
understand there to be social phenomena prior and separate to our involvement in 
them and understanding of them,27 and that these phenomena include (unobservable in 
and of themselves but nonetheless real) social structures that strongly influence social 
behaviour.28 This is important because with regard to the explanatory basis of this 
project, I am arguing for the key role of interests in motivating U.S. action. Interests, 
as I explore further in Chapter Three, spring in large part from complex social 
structures constituted by material and ideational elements. In essence, deeper, 
unobservable, and complex causal processes are at work in helping to create U.S. 
                                                
24 Margaret S. Archer Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach (Cambridge University 
Press, 1995) p.4 
25 Paul Furlong and David Marsh ‘A Skin not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political 
Science’ in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker [eds.] Theory and Methods in Political Science 3rd edn. 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) p.184 
26 An always important distinction to make in IR projects that predicate themselves on philosophical 
realism. I use Realists / Realism when talking about IR theoreticians, realists / realism in the 
philosophical sense. This is something I extend to ‘liberal’ in a general, political-philsophical sense, and 
‘Liberal’ in IR theory. 
27 Andrew Sayer Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach 2nd edn. Revised (Routledge, 2010 
[1984]) p.viii 
28 ibid p.4 
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policy. Such an understanding stems from, and necessitates, my use of a “deep 
ontology”, predicated on a critical realist philosophy of social science.29 In getting at 
the why questions of this project, a depth ontology is necessary, because observables 
can only tell us so much.30 This is important for the theoretical work I do in this 
project to establish the causal role of U.S. interests in the MI and NAFTA-land 
Security. 
 
Thus, whilst my project is largely an empirical attempt to highlight and explain the 
‘surface phenomena’, i.e. observable U.S. policy, it proceeds with an implicit 
understanding that these phenomena occur as the result of complex and contingent 
interactions of multi-causal inputs on a number of levels, that include (but are not 
limited to) ideology, discourses, rules, norms, economic interests, historical events, 
personalities and so on. Much of this becomes congealed within social structures that 
‘push and pull’ actors (in this case U.S. policymakers) in certain directions, but of 
course all action requires agency, and structures are not fully determinative of how 
agency is employed. Again this is directly important in my theoretical discussion in 
Chapter Three that forms an integral part of the explanatory power of this thesis. Thus, 
my understanding of structure and agency is informed by Archer’s realist 
morphogenetic approach, whereby structure and agency are neither prioritised 
ontologically, nor conflated, but instead seen as distinct strata irreducible to one 
another. This allows me to look at the interplay between structure and agency involved 
in social action. The project focuses its explanatory elements on the interests of the 
U.S. state, which exist in that challenging space at the mechanistic nexus between 
structure and agency.31  Policy in pursuit of interests is both structurally and agentially 
informed, and thus in the theoretical element of the project I draw on established 
theory and observable U.S. behaviour and connect it to meta-theoretical discussion 
about structures and interests, and try to make conclusions. I then carry these forward 
into the empirical section of the project, which is a deep policy analysis of U.S.-
Mexican relations and the MI implicitly (rather than explicitly applying, say, Archer’s 
approach, or critical realism, throughout the policy analysis).  
 
This is important because my argument and originality depends on my claims that this 
project represents a stronger empirical argument about the MI, and its core section 
revolves around empirically evidenced claims. In establishing how I consider interests 
to work in a macro-theoretical sense within a critical realist ontology I distance myself 
from a naïve ontological empiricism in recognising initially that these observables 
                                                
29 Milja Kurki Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008) p.11 
30 ibid p.118 
31 Archer Realist Social Theory p.14-16 Without tumbling too far down the rabbit hole, we should of 
course acknowledge that social structures are just that - socially constructed (albeit within material 
conditions). However I am looking at U.S. foreign policy now and thus social structures are a pre-
existing fact prior to actors, however they came to be. I don’t need to follow the approach in the project 
itself as the focus is on establishing interests as emergently causal in their emanation from social 
structures. Plus others have stated the fact that structures and agency are not co-constitutive but 
irreducible with distinct properties. See Jonathan Joseph ‘Philosophy in International Relations: A 
Scientific Realist Approach’ Millennium - Journal of International Studies 35, 2 (2007) p.356; Douglas 
V. Porpora ‘The Four Concepts of Social Structure’ in Margaret Archer, Roy Bhaskar, Andrew Collier, 
Tony Lawson and Alan Norrie [eds.] Critical Realism: Essential Readings (Routledge, 1998) p. 339-
355 
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spring in large part from unobservable phenomena. However, some deeper questions 
associated with the post-positivist turn in IR around ‘knowledge claims’32 and the 
relationship between ontology and epistemology in terms of how we “hook up” to 
independent reality33 interject themselves here. Critical realism proceeds with the 
understanding that an independent reality we can produce (competing) knowledge 
claims about does exist, but those knowledge claims can only ever be made based on 
subjective experience and within a pre-existing social position as part of wider social 
reality. We are therefore implicated in the world, too, and not neutral in our 
observations.34 Plus our claims they are always fallible. How then is my argument 
stronger given my pre-configured social position, implication in the world, and 
inherent fallibility?  
 
Our subjective access to the world and implication within it this is precisely why we 
need scientific inquiry to help us try to bridge the gap between independent reality and 
subjective experience, and intersubjective shared meanings and knowledge that do not 
equate with reality.35 In comparison to the privileging of ideas, discourses, and shared 
meanings in constructivist or poststructural accounts, or of empirical observables in 
positivist ones, critical realist ontology asks why some constructions have more power 
than others, and asserts that this is because of the enabling and constraining powers of 
a complex and stratified independent reality with observable and unobservable causal 
depths.36 Thus some knowledge claims are also stronger than others precisely because 
they measure up to this independent reality (or a particular referent or object) in more 
convincing (but still fallible) ways, something we can get at through judgmental 
rationalism.37 This project therefore proceeds from these ontological and 
epistemological commitments to suggest it can offer a convincing appraisal of the case 
and questions it is concerned with. It does this through a deep and extensive case study 
policy analysis, using a historiography that draws heavily on primary documentation 
and historical narrative, informed by a prior explanatory theoretical discussion that 
posits, through informed critique, inference and argumentation, the links between U.S. 
interests, social structures, and its foreign policy. These of course are sketches across 




                                                
32 Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Zalewski, Marysia [eds.] International Theory: Postivism and Beyond 
(Cambridge University Press, 1996) Milja Kurki and Colin Wight ‘International Relations and Social 
Science’ in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith [eds.] International Relations Theories: 
Discipline and Diversity Third Edition (Oxford University Press, 2013) p. 20-32 Kurki and Wight refer 
to the post-positivist turn as the fourth debate in IR, which they see as ongoing. 
33 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science 
and its Implications for the Study of World Politics (Routledge, 2011) p.26-32 
34 Critical realism is thus epistemologically relative and encourages plurality in method. 
35 Kathryn Dean, Jonathan Joseph, John Michael Roberts and Colin Wight ‘Realism, Marxism and 
Method’ in Kathryn Dean, Jonathan Joseph, John Michael Roberts and Colin Wight Realism, 
Philosophy and Social Science (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) p.3  
36 Joseph ‘Philosophy in International Relations’ p.354 
37 Colin Wight Agents, Structures and International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 
p.37-45; Colin Wight ‘MetaCampbell: the Epistemological Problematics of Perspectivism’ Review of 
International Studies 25, 2 (1999); Garry Potter & Jose Lopez ‘General Introduction: After 
Postmodernism The New Millennium’ in Jose Lopez & Gary Potter After Postmodernism: An 
Introduction to Critical Realism (The Athlone Press, 2001) p.27-38 
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Initial Concepts: Ontology, Causality, and Interests 
As should already be clear, the aims of the project are quite tightly focused, with a 
clear but limited explanandum - U.S. aid to Mexico. Also, I have already stated that 
U.S. interests are key in what I consider to be the explanans of that aid. They are 
therefore conceptualised as causal. Although causality has enjoyed recent reappraisal 
in IR,38 placing interests at the centre of the research in an explanatory, causal capacity 
is likely to raise some red flags. IRs’ dominant paradigms - (Neo) Realism (Neo) 
Liberalism - have been charged with flattening out ‘interests’ to a degree that they 
become unhelpful generalities (e.g. ‘security’) that ignores the social aspect involved 
in their formulation.39 There is a (soft) positivist or Humean aspect here, in that some 
structural Realists especially have constructed law-like regularities around what a 
state’s interests are given anarchic conditions.40 However, some of the sharpest work 
identifying the problems in Realism has in turn reduced interests to epiphenomenons 
of ideas held by actors and / or provided by ideational structures. In this way, actors 
define their interests, a process that can lead to the gradual creation of inter-subjective 
meanings and ideational structures that constrain and compel actions. Material factors 
here are under-theorised or even left out, with the power of the ideational itself 
holding the trump card, for example in the axiom that, “security is what actors make 
it”.41 Thereby structures are hollowed out and reduced to ideational constituents, 
voluntarism is risked, and our ability to assess the mechanisms that exist between 
structure and agency is denuded.42 
 
In Chapter Three I proceed with the understanding that in some sense interests are ‘out 
                                                
38 Kurki Causation in International Relations; Erika Cudworth and Stephen Hobden ‘Of Parts and 
Wholes: International Relations Beyond the Human’ Millennium: Journal of International Studies 41, 3 
(2013); Nazya Fiaz ‘ Constructivism Meets Critical Realism: Explaining Pakistan’s State Practice in the 
Aftermath of 9/11’ European Journal of International Relations 20, 2 (2014); Andrew Bennett ‘The 
Mother of all isms: Causal Mechanisms and Structured Pluralism in International Relations Theory’ 
European Journal of International Relations 19,3 (2013) 
39 For example, see Martha Finnemore National Interests in International Society  (Cornell University, 
1996); Jutta Weldes Constructing National Interests: The United Sates and the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(University of Minnesotta Press, 1999); Peter J. Katzenstein The Culture of National Security: Norms 
and Identity in World Politics (Colombia University Press, 1996); David Campbell Writing Security: 
United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity Rev Edn. (University of Minnesota Press, 
1998); Richard Jackson Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics, and Counter-Terrorism 
(Manchester University Press, 2012) Also see Kurki’s discussion in Causation in International 
Relations p.126-127 I contend this charge is truer of structural or Neo- variants of Realism and 
Liberalism, rather than their classical antecedents, and contemporary neo-classical Realism has taken 
some steps to overcome it. I examine this further in Chapter Three. 
40 See above footnote. For example, see Mearsheimer’s five assumptions about international relations 
(A, or more accurately the interaction of A1, A2, A3 etc.) and claims about self-interested, aggressive 
(and tragic) state behaviour (tends to = B) that flows from them. John Mearsheimer The Tragedy of 
Great Power Politics (W.W. Norton & Company, 2001) p.30-31 However, like many of his neo-Realist 
peers, in actuality Mearsheimer uses these as guides and places a much bigger role on domestic politics 
than the theoretical assumptions suggest, especially regarding his work on U.S. foreign policy. Again, 
also see Kurki’s discussion on rational choice within structural Realism and game theory modelling. 
Kurki Causation in International Relations p.106-108  
41 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003) p.48 
42 I go onto make these points in greater detail in the thesis, but see Doug Stokes  ‘Ideas and Avocados: 
Ontologising Critical Terrorism Studies’ International Relations 23, 85 (2009); Douglas V. Porpora 
‘Critical Terrorism Studies: A Political Economic Approach Grounded in Critical Realism’ Critical 
Studies on Terrorism 4, 1 (April, 2011); Kurki Causation in International Relations p.137, 
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there’ as they are materially and ideationally constituted and are given by real and 
complex social structures and actors positions within them. These structures, and 
interests embedded within them, pre-date individual actors.43 Interests have an 
emergent causal power in that actors are compelled to try to identify them (albeit 
through subjective processes) and act to try and achieve them. The process of 
achieving interests is therefore social and subjective. However although actors can 
misidentify interests, or may indeed miss them altogether (hence their emergent rather 
than determinative character), this will involve long-term and/or short-term costs and / 
or (at least) consequences as a result of structural realities.44 Interests, then, are 
understood as crucial mechanistically, and since critical realism sets out much of its 
methodological basis in, “identifying and describing the mechanisms through which 
things work”45 I focus on them in an explanatory sense. This does not mean interests 
are deterministic; instead they are contingent, and dependent upon historical 
specificities at any one given time.46 In addition when we investigate the social we are 
dealing with an open causal system, in which any number of myriad factors can 
interrelate with any number of others. However, the use of a ‘deep ontology’ that 
recognises “the reality and causal nature of such aspects of social life as rules, norms, 
ideas, reasons, discourses, as well as, importantly ‘structures of social relations’”47 can 
help situate interests as mechanisms within a rich explanatory context.  
 
Historical Materialist Framework 
With these points in mind, the project will proceed with a broadly historical materialist 
theoretical underpinning. I consider economic factors, and social relations within 
capitalism, as crucial (but not determining) elements in the firmament of social life. 
Both historical materialism, and a view of causation based in a critical realist 
philosophy of science, lend themselves to historical narrative as the method for 
revealing the interacting mechanisms by way of explanation.48 This is especially true 
of the unobservable elements that may make up these mechanisms, as we can only 
come to know them through their effects, and hence may only get at them through a 
mixture of theoretical abstraction, hypothesising, and empirical observation of the 
effects themselves.49 As I detail further below, in this case this means analysing policy 
and making connections to historical-materialist theory that places interests at the 
centre of U.S. policymaking, whereby the observable elements bolster that theory.  
In this I will be following a broadly culturally Marxist approach, in line with a more 
Gramscian, Poulantzian, or latterly Jessopian outlook that attempts to account for 
social life without reducing it to the economic.  
 
This is especially true of the way I conceptualise the state, in that I see it as an 
institutional structure reflecting a complex historical balance of social forces that 
nonetheless has crucial functional roles within capitalist social relations, rather than 
merely an instrument of capitalist class power. This is key to interest formation for 
states. Again this will be established further in the Chapter Three’s theoretical 
                                                
43 Joseph ‘Philosophy in International Relations’ 
44 Wendt Social Theory p.56-57;  
45 Porpora ‘Critical Terrorism Studies’ p.42 
46 ibid 
47 Kurki Causation in International Relations p.11 
48 Porpora ‘Critical Terrorism Studies’ p.42 
49 Wight Agents, Structures and International Relations p.52, 60-61 
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discussion. I show how contemporary U.S. policy in Mexico fits into existing 
historical-materialist or Marxian theories of U.S. foreign policy especially, and more 
broadly those that see the U.S. state’s aims as being set on the macro-level by the drive 
to secure and maintain international primacy. This means I also utilise and take 
seriously Realist theories, especially neo-classical Realist work,50 as well as historical 
work from the revisionist school of U.S. foreign relations and the insights of IR 
constructivists.51  
 
Design, Methodology and Scope of Study: From Theory to Policy Analysis  
My work here and in Chapter Three supplies the explanatory basis of the project. 
However it also further justifies the empirical core of the thesis. Whilst I hold these 
ontological commitments, this is at heart an empirical project, and simplifications will 
therefore be made. The theoretical chapter serves to establish these simplifiers so I can 
busy myself with the empirical work in Chapters 4 to 6, moving from complexity to 
clarity through the chapter. Whilst the roots of U.S. foreign policy and the MI may be 
profoundly intricate, the policy itself is quite clear in its aims, and connects quite 
clearly both to historical continuities in U.S. foreign policy, and ‘newer’ strategic 
interests within North America. The design of the project is employed precisely to 
highlight these links and strongly make these arguments, through historical narrative 
and policy analysis. This project is a focused qualitative case study, with a tight set of 
aims that are for the most part bounded within that case study and its literature. I am 
not intending to construct a new theory of U.S. foreign policy, or even modify existing 
ones, from this singular case study (which would in any case be an ambitious and 
fairly unprecedented research design!) Instead I intend to move down from concepts 
and theory to the case study, in order to employ them to examine the case study 
itself.52  
 
Within that a number of methods are employed, in line with methodological variety 
stemming from critical realism.53 The first task methodologically involves making 
clear some key concepts that underpin the theory used, and animate the whole work 
(something I have already begun). U.S. foreign policy, as a complex social 
phenomenon, is constructed through all number of inputs. As Sayer contends, this 
reality in social science, “throws a huge burden onto abstraction - the activity of 
                                                
50 Neoclassical realism essentially tries to construct theories of foreign policy, rather than IR, by looking 
at both ‘unit-level variables’ and international structure. Whilst I think the ontology and method could 
be modified further, the work produced is extremely interesting. I especially engage with Christopher 
Layne, whose reinvigoration of Appleman William’s ‘Open Door Thesis’ is a challenging and 
interesting work for historical materialists in IR. I also enter into discussion with the work of 
Christopher Dueck. 
51 The Revisionist school of U.S. diplomatic history, most famously associated with William Appleman 
Williams, but also including Walter LaFaber and Gabriel Kolko, built its work around the central 
premise that underlying logic of U.S. foreign policy was political-economic expansion (and not idealism 
or containment, though these could be believed by actors to be their motivations). Whilst foundational 
on the left, alongside Layne’s work the school has also received renewed wider ‘mainstream’ attention 
through the scathing critiques of American empire and militarism by Andrew Bacevich (see footnote 
60).  
52 However I do think some interesting but tentative wider conclusions about the direction of U.S. 
foreign policy can be drawn from my findings, of which more below. 
53 Douglas V. Porpora ‘Do Realists Run Regressions’ in Lopez and Potter After Postmodernism p.543-
559 
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identify particular constituents and their effects.”54 I start at this point below therefore, 
drawing out a little more on some key causal concepts, and some terms that it is 
important to make clearer at the outset. After reviewing the extant literature, I flesh out 
my macro-theoretical / conceptual positions further still, focusing on the state, its 
interests, and subsequent foreign policy and grand strategy. This provides the basis for 
pulling together a defensible theory of U.S. foreign policy and applying it in a broad 
way to Mexico. This allows me to make clear the continuities and contingencies 
involved in NAFTA-land Security. Moving back and forth between the theoretical and 
empirical is of course an inevitable part of all research, but with regard to the 
contingencies I am making theoretical points ‘ground up’ from the case findings, more 
in tune with formal case study methods.55 
 
I then move onto the empirical section of the thesis. In Chapters Four to Six I employ 
several methodological tools to help me interrogate the history of U.S.-Mexican 
relations, the MI, and the NAFTA-land Security project. The aim here is to use 
historical narrative and what may be termed a ‘depth policy analysis’ to draw out a 
convincing explanatory case in keeping with the broadly critical realist ontological 
commitments of the thesis, and the historical materialist theoretical framework. I am 
keen to show ‘in actuality’ how interests (stemming from social structures 
significantly based around capitalist socio-economic relations) act as underlying 
causal mechanisms and drivers that can help explain policy efforts and outcomes. I do 
this through strongly evidentially backed inference.56 For example in, Chapter Four, I 
use established work and primary documentation in a broad historiography to show 
that core U.S. strategic interests in the stability and openness of Mexico’s political 
economy have largely guided its bilateral relations and policies. Extending the 
historical narrative into ‘the present day’. I trace connections between these 
established U.S. interests in Mexican political economic stability, whilst highlighting 
the deepening of those interests through economic regionalisation after NAFTA. I 
show the evidence that NAFTA provoked an almost instantaneous increased U.S. 
involvement in Mexico’s security affairs. However, as Chapter Five shows, the 
formation of NAFTA-land Security policies was catalysed by 9/11 and its aftermath; 
effectively a huge contingency in the historical narrative. The strategic importance and 
vulnerability of North American economic interdependence was in large part revealed 
to U.S. policymakers through the terrorist attacks. Again, historical narrative allows 
me to show the complex developmental process leading to NAFTA-land Security, 
taking in contingencies and complications to offer a rich explanatory milieu, whilst 
holding onto the historical materialist insight that U.S. interests stemming from 
capitalist social relations have acted as a core driver for its policies.   
 
Thus, whilst the work in these chapters focuses on U.S. interests in a clear and 
straightforward manner, the theoretical and ontological depth of Chapter Three that 
shows the complex roots of these interests forms its backdrop. However, providing 
evidence for the centrality of U.S. strategic interests is harder to do with contemporary 
security policies, simply because the material available is different in content, form, 
                                                
54 Sayer Method in Social Science p.2 
55 Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen Process Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines 
(University of Michigan, 2013) p.3, p.146-157 
56 Beach and Pedersen Process Tracing Methods: p.1-5 
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and scope, and is lacking the benefit of historical hindsight and insight. Chapters Five 
and Six continue the core commitments of the thesis, but employ a depth policy 
analysis alongside a narrative overview of the development of NAFTA-land Security, 
the MI, and the connections between them. In this depth analysis, I utilise a wealth of 
primary and secondary documentation. This includes official U.S. government sources 
-  Budget justifications, policy justification documents and fact sheets, speeches, 
Congressional testimony, diplomatic cables released by the whistle-blowing website 
WikiLeaks, departmental budget requests, departmental fact sheets and so on - but also 
secondary sources such as NGO and think-tanks reports, and U.S. and Mexican news 
sources. The depth element in this analysis is in the sheer amount of data collected and 
critically evaluated, and, just as importantly, the linking up of these different pieces of 
direct evidence. For example, in revealing how a particular U.S. training course 
provides a particular skill to a Mexican security institution, that links to a particular 
piece of Mérida aid, and a particular aim expressed by the original plans for the SPP, I 
provide a piece of evidence that a wider regional security logic underpins the MI. The 
depth analysis does this expansively and repeatedly, linking back the details of the MI 
to U.S. regional security aims expressed after 9/11, connecting non-Mérida 
programmes to the goals of the MI, and connecting MI effects to the expansion and 
success of complementary programmes and aims, to build an overall picture of 
NAFTA-land Security construction. In turn, I link this back to core strategic U.S. 
interests. In conjunction with the historical narrative, the cumulative effect of this is a 
strengthened empirical case that U.S. interests inform a NAFTA-land Security project 
that the MI is part of. Thus, I offer a stronger appraisal of what the MI is intended to 
do and why it is intended to do it, by the test of judgmental rationalism. 
 
Limits and Pitfalls of the Method 
The advantages to primary documentation are in the access it gives to official 
policymaking, though this is dependent on providing as much material as possible with 
a critical-analytical eye. However there are also limitations and pitfalls. Importantly 
relying on official sources can risk the researcher accepting what they ‘say’ is 
important, as opposed to what they mean, or really represent. In addition, without clear 
access to the thoughts and deliberations behind policy decisions, weight can be given 
to documents that are in fact not as important, or vice-versa important documents can 
be missed. Finally, NAFTA-land Security and the MI itself are ongoing, contemporary 
policies, and thus information is both not always easy to come by, and will not be the 
‘complete picture’ (if there ever will be one).57 To illustrate, as one anonymous 
reviewer reminded me, the emphasis on terrorism could’ve been included within the 
justification materials for the original MI in order to convince, or perhaps cajole, 
Congress members into supporting the measure. I have attempted to overcome these 
issues by, first and foremost, taking a generalised critical attitude to the primary 
documentation, but more importantly seeking to verify findings across sources. The 
empirical work is rooted in the level of detail and cross-referencing provided, with 
clear connections drawn between stated policy, detailed policy documentation, 
diplomatic cables, policy on the ground, and so on, i.e. making sure as many sources 
as possible say the same thing in a variety of policy-level contexts - from justification 
to application. Only once these links are established do I make stronger claims about 
                                                
57 Some of the issues with primary documentation are covered in Ariadne Vromen ‘Debating Methods: 
Rediscovering Qualitative Approaches’ in Marsh and Stoker Theory and Methods p.261-265 
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the deeper links to U.S. interests, trends in its foreign policy, and the overall aims of 
the MI and NAFTA-land Security.  
 
WikiLeaks and Method: Methodological and Ethical Considerations 
The use of WikiLeaks cables is key within the primary documentation used. However 
I use it to complement the other primary documentation, as opposed to seeing it as an 
evidential panacea. They are not that in any case. Whilst at times the cables are more 
direct in their assertion, for example, of U.S. aims, they are by no means radically 
different from the aims stated ‘in public’ in official documentation, and by officials. 
There were some issues with WikiLeaks from an ethical perspective, as (apparently in 
a fit of pique) all 200,000 plus cables were dumped onto the internet without 
redaction, with personal information that may have put individuals in Afghanistan at 
risk. This does not overly affect my project as I am looking at Mexico of course, 
however I have not used cables referring to the human rights information requests the 
U.S. Department of State (DoS) runs of Mexican institutions and individuals because 





Structure, Interests, and the State 
I have already made key claims about how I conceptualise interests above, and 
Chapter Three revolves around discussing them at length. However some reiterative 
and preparatory pointers are worth stating here. It is also crucial to establish how the 
state has interests - a decidedly more complex question. Actors have interests, as well 
as a generational role in defining them, as a result of their positions within those real 
structures. For a crude example, I could decide it’s in my interest to stop writing this 
PhD three weeks prior to submission, but there would be very real costs involved, and 
a very high likelihood that it most certainly is not. Those costs would reputational, 
social, and economic as I fail to complete a task that an institution and individuals 
have helped me to do, mark myself out as a quitter and failure in the eyes of my peers 
(and future employers), and hurt my earning potential by closing off what I have 
trained for - a result different for me in relation to another PhD candidate who may 
have independent inherited wealth, for example, or for someone whose family could 
not support them as mine could.58 Hence these consequences and costs would be 
influenced in good part by complex material-ideational social structures within 
capitalist social relations.  
 
However, I am of course an individual actor. For the U.S. state things get trickier. I 
conceptualise the U.S. state is an emergent actor, made to act by policymakers as 
agents, but with interests that are not reducible to the thoughts of, or shared meanings 
between, those policymakers. Those interests were formed as the result of processes 
within its (capitalist) political and economic development, congealing around ensuring 
that foreign markets were open to the U.S. continued economic expansion. As U.S. 
economic expansion increasingly globalised, so U.S. grand strategy increasingly 
                                                
58 Stretching the example further, this does not mean I could not follow an alternative path that could 
lead to success. The same holds for states that shift policy priorities. However the costs and the limits to 
this would be real. 
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settled (despite fierce debates) around a broad consensus in securing an open, liberal, 
capitalist order across the world, underpinned by the U.S’ power. The U.S. fully 
engaged in this grand strategy after World War II, embracing its unrivalled global 
position. Not only did the strategy largely secure and augment that position, it also 
deepened and proliferated its interests in its continuation, associated spread of its 
economic interests, and the interests of capital more holistically. The U.S. set about 
furthering the expansion of global capitalism through the 20th Century and into the 21st 
under its aegis, benefitting itself whilst also guaranteeing the interests of other core 
powers and increasingly transnational capital. This, therefore, is a hegemonic 
arrangement, as set out in further detail below. Powerful social structures have 
privileged or necessitated certain strategic choices that have led to this reality, and 
continue to do so. The material impulses within capitalist social relations are key here, 
but exist in amalgam with more ideational tendencies in U.S. foreign policy that 
identify the U.S. as an indispensible leader in international affairs with a superior, 
exportable political-economic system. A grand strategic culture that attempts to 
preserve and justify U.S. primacy and power internationally has emerged from this, 
and is deeply intertwined with the U.S. state, prefiguring, but sustained and modified 
by actors within and without of the state’s “institutional ensemble”.59  
 
Thus, consistency in U.S. foreign policy can be explained on several interconnected 
levels. Firstly vested interests that spring from wider social structures of capitalist 
production and social relations confront the state, and a level of consistency can be 
understood as U.S. policymakers attempting to meet those interests and avoid the costs 
of not meeting them (albeit through subjective processes). Secondly, certain actors and 
certain strategies are privileged - and again those structures that the state is nested in 
mean these are strategies meeting the needs of capital more generally (and not 
necessarily complementary and by no means exclusively) powerful capitalist 
economic interests.60 Thirdly over time the U.S. grand strategy of liberal order 
building and the promotion of global capitalism has itself taken on structural 
properties, and a relatively insulated policy elite helps ensure its continuation, whilst 
                                                
59 Bob Jessop State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach (Polity Press, 2008) p.5 I follow Bacevich 
in seeing a culture that believes in and seeks to maintain exceptionalism and primacy within U.S. 
foreign policy, both in material and moral terms, as still dominant in the U.S. foreign policy-making 
elite. Andrew Bacevich American Empire: The Realities & Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Harvard 
University Press, 2002); Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War (Metropolitan Books, 
2010) It sets parameters on certain actions whilst facilitating others (and hence I see it more explicitly 
structurally than Bacevich). However it can be modified (what Archer calls “structural elaboration”), 
and even perhaps undergo fundamental change. In terms of modifications within that structure, witness 
the unilateralist drive and incredible belief in the ability of American power to shape international 
outcomes of the Bush administration (still aimed at maintaining primacy) versus the more multilateralist 
agenda of the Obama Presidency, and its apparent (though contested) conclusion that U.S. power is not 
infinite and must be used sparingly (also still aimed at maintaining primacy). See Mann’s works on 
these Presidencies for an overview of their differences and the debates within them. James Mann Rise of 
the Vulcans: A History of Bush’s War Cabinet (Penguin, 2004); The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the 
White House to Redefine American Power (Viking, 2012) Indeed Obama’s ‘Realism’ has drawn praise 
from those who have critiqued this culture from a Realist perspective. See Stephen Walt ‘Is Obama 
More of a Realist Than I Am?’ Foreign Policy  (August 19th 2014) 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/08/19/is_barack_obama_more_of_a_realist_than_i_am_ste
phen_m_walt_iraq_russia_gaza?utm_content=bufferb6bf9&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.c
om&utm_campaign=buffer Accessed 20.08.14  
60 Bob Jessop State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in their Place (Polity Press, 1990) p.9-10 
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dissenters and alternative policies are shut out in various ways. Fourthly, and this is 
important, to a good degree this grand strategy ‘delivers the goods’. It secures U.S. 
interests, secures’ the U.S. “global advantage”, has led to unprecedented relative 
prosperity (though its fruits are not shared equally on a domestic level) and, for the 
most part, has augmented U.S. power.61 As I will show, U.S. interests in Mexican 
political stability, and the security of the integrated NAFTA economy, which relate to 
these consistencies, are key to explaining U.S. security aid to Mexico.  
 
Primacy, Hegemony, Empire (… and Power) 
Grouping these concepts together may seem strange and ambitious given how much 
energy could go into unpacking them. However, in doing so here my main aim is 
definitional. I want to make clear how I use these terms, which are inter-related in 
many ways, as I am not examining hegemony or primacy in U.S. foreign policy on a 
macro-scale. Nonetheless, they do of course relate in important ways to the case under 
inspection, and they are absolutely integral to contemporary understandings of U.S. 
foreign policy. Thus, in the project I try to use ‘primacy’ as a descriptor of the U.S. 
current position in the international system, as far and away the most powerful state on 
a number of indices. ‘Primacy’ and ‘hegemony’ are not straightforwardly 
interchangeable in this positional sense, however. Whilst U.S. primacy is a 
contemporary fact, I see hegemony as a much more complex term. My understanding 
of hegemony is informed by the neo-Gramscian work within IR, whereby it is a seen 
as an unequal set of relations between states, with one state, the U.S., in a hegemonic 
position, i.e. is able to most bend international events and systems to its will through a 
consensual acceptance of its leadership within a capitalist, liberal global order.62 
Global economic relations are key here, as is the U.S. global role as guarantor within 
them. However, this is underpinned by its relative (economic and military) power vis-
à-vis other states, and therefore coercive force bulwarks hegemony. Hegemony can 
thus be understood as the method by which the U.S. assures its primacy. Therefore 
whilst referring to the U.S. as hegemonic or as the hegemon in international relations 
is perfectly acceptable, I try to only do so when ‘primacy’ is not sufficient to capture 
the point. Again, this is mostly relevant in Chapter Three.  
 
This brings me on to empire, and power. In referring to hegemony as in part a method 
I have flagged that my understanding of the U.S. current international status is 
hegemonic rather than imperial. I base this on a number of points. Firstly, I contend 
that if we are to keep hold of the meaning of ‘empire’ and not stretch it to breaking 
point, we need to hang onto the idea of territoriality and political control as being key 
to its definitional basis.63 This is contested of course. Bromley, referencing Brown, 
                                                
61 For a very thorough account of the advantages accrued to the U.S. as hegemon see Carla Norloff 
America’s Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation (Cambridge University 
Press, 2010) Norloff does not see hegemony in a neo-Gramscian sense, see below. 
62 This school of thought is most associated with Robert W. Cox, for example Robert W. Cox with 
Timothy J. Sinclair Approaches to World Order (Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
Also see inter alia Stephen Gill American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge 
University Press, 1990); William I. Robinson Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, 
and Hegemony (Cambridge University Press, 1996); Jonathan Joseph Hegemony: A Realist Analysis 
(Routledge, 2002) Of course large differences span these works. 
63 John Agnew Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power (Temple University Press, 2005) p.1 It is 
precisely for this reason that the genuinely imperial attempt by the U.S. under the Bush administration 
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states an imperial system is one in which the autonomy of states to direct their own 
affairs is contingent upon the whims of a stronger, imperial power.64 For example, 
South and Central America’s development has historically been contingent on the 
direct involvement, policies and decisions of the United States. For Michael Cox, 
(describing Britain’s imperalism), “The real issue […] was not the means they 
employed to secure the outcomes they wanted, but the outcomes themselves.”65 As 
just one example then, territorial conquest was not necessary for the U.S. to direct the 
‘developmental’ policies of nations like Chile in the manner it desired.66  By these 
definitions, the US certainly engages in imperial behaviour, and historically operated 
close to an imperial system within its self-defined ‘sphere of influence’ in Latin 
America (especially Central America), but does it follow that it continues to have an 
established empire? As Barkawi and Laffey put it, “Where then are we to locate the 
break between US imperialism and Empire?”67 I suggest, however, that these 
descriptions could, and should, be just as easily defined as expressions of relative 
power rather than the results of U.S. empire. It would open up a Pandora’s Box of 
little empires were we to suggest that a state’s ability to use power to achieve results 
within other states is always imperial in the sense of operating an empire. 
 
We are better off thinking of U.S. primacy as secured through hegemony rather than 
empire, in part for these negating reasons, in part for the more supportive reasons I 
outlined above.68 Hegemony also captures how challenges to the U.S., both from states 
and more widely from civil society, can exist outside of direct control and be 
countered by the U.S. in ways that do and do not involve coercive power. As Agnew 
puts it, the U.S.’ hegemonic techniques revolve around pulling states and peoples into 
its orbit through, “convincing, cajoling, and coercing them that they should want what 
you want.”69 Thus it can work in ways that responds to its critiques with its own 
positive claims in areas like development, international ethics, international security, 
and so on - not just through the ‘barrel of a gun’ as it were. In important senses we can 
see this hegemonic dynamic in North America, where Canada and increasingly 
Mexico have tied their developmental policies and immediate futures to the U.S., and 
Mexico is now becoming part of a regional security strategy largely implemented by 
the U.S. Understanding the U.S. as a hegemon within a liberal capitalist order allows 
us to be flexible enough to also suggest that that this arrangement has some important 
imperial aspects (for example extensive lily-pad basing and the establishment of 
                                                
to control Iraq and its political future was so distinctive and provoked such renewed academic interest 
in U.S. empire. 
64 Simon Bromley ‘Universalism and Difference in International Society’ in William Brown, Simon 
Bromley and Suma Athreye [eds.] Ordering the International: History, Change and Transformation 
(Open University, 2004) p.84 
65 Michael Cox ‘The Empire’s Back in Town: Or America’s Imperial Temptation - Again’ Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 32,1 (2003) p.17 
66 William Blum Killing Hope: US Military & CIA Interventions Since World War II (Zed Books, 1986) 
p.206-215 and Naomi Klein The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (Penguin, 2008) p.64-
6 & 75-97 
67 Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey ‘Retrieving The Imperial: Empire and International Relations’ 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 31,1 (2002) p.125 I have used these points in other work.  
68 Interestingly Cox does consider the U.S. to operate an empire. Robert W. Cox ‘Beyond Empire and 
Terror: Critical Reflections on the Political Economy of World Order’ New Political Economy 9, 3 
(September 2004) p.308-309 He also outlines growing challenges to U.S. hegemony and that empire.  
69 Agnew Hegemony p.2 My emphasis. 
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global rules and norms constructed or emanating from the U.S., that it then often 
refuses to be bound by itself). It also allows us to more effectively examine the latent 
or emergent imperial tendencies that are directly expressed to differing degrees, from 
economic pressure to direct military intervention, within U.S. hegemomy without 
reducing everything to a matter of direct force and relative power.70 Again this has 
implications for my case here. 
 
This brings us to power. Power is both what the U.S.’ aims to secure and augment as 
part of maintaining and securing its primacy, and what allows it to set about doing so. 
The more direct relevancy of these important definitional concepts further emerges 
here. Again, Mexico is an interesting case for thinking about U.S. hegemony and 
power. Why has Mexico attached itself to the U.S. economically under NAFTA, and is 
now increasingly doing the same on security issues under NAFTA-land Security? 
Whilst this project does not focus in detail on how this has developed, it does show 
how over time Mexico has increasingly been enveloped within economic relations 
where the U.S. exerts incredible influence in Mexico’s political economy. We see this 
in the two parts of the study’s empirical element; Chapter Four shows how U.S.-
Mexican relations are bookended by two periods of deliberately constructed extensive 
U.S. influence upon and within Mexico, Chapters Five and Six show how the U.S. is 
now integrating Mexico into a regional security framework. There is undoubtedly a 
power relation at work here. However whilst coercion has at times been applied upon 
Mexico, to understand the contemporary closeness of this relationship we should think 
about how other forms of power within U.S. hegemony have created a situation 
whereby Mexican elites increasingly think of their interests as tied to the U.S.’71 They 
want, in some sense, what the U.S. wants, and to a good degree buy into the 
construction of regional security, rather than being coerced into NAFTA-land Security 
by an imperialistic U.S. The hegemonic and power dynamics here are diffuse and 
complex.     
 
This requires a considered, nuanced, but brief appraisal of U.S. power within its 
hegemony. Following Mabee, who in turn draws on Barnett and Duvall, I see power 
within a four-prong typology, whereby the U.S. can draw upon power that is 
compulsory (coercive power that allows the U.S. to directly change realities), 
institutional (power within institutions to set actor preferences and rules / norms 
largely - but not totally - in line with the U.S.’ interests), structural (U.S. relative 
                                                
70 Under Bush, this extended actual invasion and political control. Bush’s policies of course triggered a 
resurgence in academic and wider work on whether the U.S. was an empire, and critiques and defences 
of U.S. imperialism. For example Cox ‘The Empire’s Back in Town’; Victor Davis Hanson ‘A Funny 
Sort of Empire’ National Review Online (November 27th, 2002) 
http://www.nationalreview.com/hanson/hanson112702.asp Accessed 31.08.14; Max Boot ‘The Most 
Realistic Response to Terrorism is for America to Embrace its Imperial Role’ The Weekly Standard 
(15th October, 2001) 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000%5C000%5C000%5C318qpvmc.asp 
Accessed 31.08.14; G. John Ikenberry Liberal Order & Imperial Ambition: Essays on American Power 
and World Politics (Polity Press, 2006); Bacevich American Empire; Chalmers Johnson The Sorrows of 
Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (Metropolitan Books, 2004); Alejandro Colás 
and Richard Saull [eds.] The War on Terrorism and the American ‘Empire’ After the Cold War 
(Routledge, 2006) 
71 With important limits of course, for example Mexico’s refusal to support the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 
2003.  
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power within IR and the global economy, allowing it relative room for manoeuvre) 
and productive (discourses creating a particular enabling / constraining identity for the 
U.S. within IR). These allow it to achieve ends directly, and / or maintain its 
hegemonic position and the promulgation of the liberal capitalist hegemonic order.72 
Within hegemony all four power types interact and (ideally) complement one another, 
although overall structural power within the global capitalist economic order that it has 
done much to self-construct underpins U.S. primacy and hegemony in its current form. 
It sets parameters for others, and indeed attunes state interests and the interest of 
ostensibly ‘national capitals’ into buying into U.S. hegemony, which allows others to 
benefit, but returns the most gains to the U.S. itself. There are also of course 
complexities here and operative reality it is not as smooth as all this, for example the 
use of compulsory / military power may signal and / or cataylse the decline in other 
types of power.73 
 
With regard to Mexico’s acceding to a developmental path fundamentally tied to the 
U.S. through NAFTA, we can see the different components of U.S. power within its 
hegemony interacting. Elements of compulsory power were applied when the U.S. 
‘guided’ the restructuring of Mexico’s political economy along more neoliberal lines 
following its profound economic crisis in the 1980s. However the U.S.’ favoured 
structural position within the global economy, and (associated!) institutional power 
within international financial institutions (IFIs) underpinned that compulsory power 
and its ability to guide this process. Within Mexico itself the political fallout of an 
economy in freefall had facilitated the ascendance of technocratic elite to lead the one 
party state under the Partido Institucional Revolucionario (PRI). Much of this elite 
bought into the wider emergent consensus around broadly neoliberal development and 
changing from macroeconomic structures, in Mexico’s case built around import-
substitution-industrialisation (ISI), as well as the fact they and Mexico’s wider 
economic elite were able to benefit from the glut of deregulation and privitisation of 
much of Mexico’s large state sector. Thus productive power associated with the U.S.’ 
ideological influence was also involved, intersecting with some of the more material 
logics within capitalism, and Mexican domestic politics. Mexico, or its policymaking 
and economic elite at least, in some part bought into U.S. restructuring, though their 
choices were constrained by their own economic crisis. The developments in this 
period culminated in the signing of NAFTA in 1994. 
 
NAFTA was effectively a game-changer, ‘locking in’ Mexico’s macroeconomic 
changes and tying Mexico to a deregulated, export-led development plan with a 
greatly changed role for the state. This has created an institutional-structural 
logic in North America, where economic interconnections and bilateral, even 
trilateral forms of production have increased, and vested interests for all three 
states, and their national elites, capitals, firms and individuals, have been created 
or deepened.74 On the other hand threats to those interests have simultaneously 
                                                
72 Bryan Mabee Understanding American Power: The Changing World of US Foreign Policy (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013) p.60-81 Mabee also uses Mann’s typology of political, military, economic and 
ideological power to strengthen his conception of U.S. power. 
73 A much made argument in the wake of Bush’s presidency and adventures in Iraq. Ikenberry Liberal 
Order & Imperial Ambition 
74 Many have also lost out or not benefitted in these developments, or fail to see enough ‘national’ 
interest within economic integration, and some have challenged the trilateral consensus. See Jeffrey 
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developed or become increasingly pressing - with the drug related security crisis 
especially pertinent, and the protection of the North American space has become 
a core interest for those same actors. NAFTA-land Security is the contingent, 
specific response, and Mexico has once again significantly bought into it. Thus 
Mexican elites have acquiesced or even championed these policies, partly in 
response to power realities, partly as a result of the more subtle ways U.S. power 
works in foreign relations, but also (and relatedly to the second point) 
significantly due to their own interests and the genuine challenges Mexico faces. 
In a regional microcosm of hegemony more generally, the U.S. has constructed, 
through its power, a framework that benefits others whilst benefitting itself 
disproportionately. It does not need to provide much coercion to augment this 
framework with a security aspect by encouraging Mexico to participate in 
NAFTA-land Security, but that does not mean other types of power within 
hegemony are not at work here. I will show this in more detail at points in the 
thesis, but build it out a little in a final key concept.  
 
NAFTA-land Security, Security Projection and U.S. Hegemony 
As elucidated above,I use NAFTA-land Security as a catch-all for the U.S.’ 
overarching policy goal (which the MI forms a part of) to regionalise and integrate 
security approaches within and around the NAFTA-zone, effectively creating a 
NAFTA security perimeter that protects the North American economy, helps stabilise 
Mexico, and bolsters U.S. HS. NAFTA-land Security is fundamentally multi-purpose 
in this regard. It facilitates cooperation to tackle drug cartels. It aims to improve 
Mexico’s CT abilities and southern border security. It builds Mexico’s institutional 
capacity in judicial areas and intelligence capability, whilst encouraging it to engage in 
maritime and aviation security on a bigger scale. It also links up with more global aims 
to secure supply chains, control what and who enters the U.S, and improve U.S. HS 
through ‘layered defence’ security approaches, all of which can be summarised as 
security projection, and all of which requires cooperation with partners and the 
building of partner capacity through the kind of aid imparted to Mexico on a large 
scale in the MI. However, throughout the thesis it must be kept in mind that the U.S. is 
not just a global hegemon, but also a regional hegemon within NAFTA. The security 
capabilities that the U.S. seeks to impart to Mexico are also in significant part sought 
by Mexico itself (especially on CN), but the U.S. is most concerned about accruing its 
own security gains. Mexico might engage in NAFTA-land Security, but does not do so 
under conditions of its own choosing. The hegemonic reality of NAFTA means 
Mexico must in some sense acquiesce to U.S. preferences. Again, this is not 
something I am able to build in great theoretical and empirical clarity due to 
                                                
Ayres & Laura Macdonald ‘Introduction: North America in Question’ in Jeffrey Ayres & Laura 
Macdonald North America in Question: Regional Integration in an Era of Economic Turbulence 
(University of Toronto Press, 2012) p.14-15; Teresa Healy ‘North American Community from Above 
and Below: Working Class Perspectives on Economic Integration and Crisis’ in ibid p.145-170; Rosalba 
Icaza ‘(Re)Thinking the ‘New’ North America Through Women’s Citizenship Stuggles in Mexico’ in 
ibid p.309-333; Timothy A. Wise; Hilda Saalazar & Laura Carlsen Confronting Globalization: 
Economic Integration and Popular Resistance in Mexico (Kumarian Press, 2003) Of course the Ejército 
Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) effectively preempted NAFTA in actually beginning in their 
resistance movement as it came into effect. Watt and Zepeda make a convincing case that Mexico’s 
continuing inequality, deepened through neoliberalism, is a generative force in Mexico’s drug violence. 
Peter Watt and Roberto Zepeda Drug War Mexico: Politics, Neoliberalism and Violence in the New 
Narcoeconomy (Zed Books, 2012)  
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limitations of space and the thesis’ aims, but it is important to keep in mind that it is 
key to the concept of NAFTA-land Security. It operates from and within unequal 





The originality of this project lies in its use of a deep and detailed analysis of the MI 
and policy that is connected to it. The extant literature that has examined the MI has 
not engaged in such an analysis. The depth of my argument here is therefore unique. 
Through a deliberative examination of official (and unofficial, in terms of public 
availability) U.S. documentation, I am not only able to reveal elements of the MI that 
have not been sufficiently highlighted, but through this process make conclusions and 
connections that do not feature in the existing work on this policy, or U.S.-Mexico 
relations more generally. My overall assessment of the Initiative, therefore, is distinct 
from the existing literature in several ways. I clearly show how it is a multi-purpose 
security package designed to improve Mexican state capabilities in meeting variegated 
security threats. Therefore it goes beyond ‘CN’. Crucially, however, I include the 
violence within Mexico that is associated with drug trafficking as amongst the security 
threats that the U.S. seeks to tackle. I am able to contest that it is Mexico’s political 
economic stability that is most concerning to U.S. policymakers, without resorting to 
seeing the ‘drug war’ as a convenient pretext for U.S. intervention in Mexico to meet 
these ‘real’ goals. This does not mean, however, that CN has not provided the most 
successful access point for U.S. involvement in Mexico’s overall security affairs. It 
has, as I will go on to show. 
 
Thus, my project’s findings and argument are clearly demarcated from existing work 
on the MI. More substantively, though, this focus on the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the policy 
itself, and my subsequent methodological decision to engage in historical narrative and 
depth analysis, opens up other paths of originality. It allows me to draw out and 
highlight connections to wider strategies within U.S. policymaking and relations with 
Mexico, within North America, and on a global level. Tracing U.S. policy through 
history, I can highlight very clear continuations in the U.S.’ relations with Mexico 
based around its interests in Mexico remaining a politically stable and economically 
open (interests that have been met to various degrees in various specific temporal 
contexts), and therefore show how Mexico’s current instability is a real concern for 
the U.S. I show how this is clearly connected to deeply rooted predilections for 
intervening in other nation’s security within U.S. foreign policy, and that itself is 
predicated on protecting U.S. interests in openness of other countries to capital 
investment, accumulation and extraction. Since Mexico’s current instability is 
significantly the result of its drug related security crisis, U.S. aid within the MI to 
tackle trafficking, reduce corruption and confront cartels is a direct but rather unique 
expression of this wider strategy. This connection has not been highlighted in the 
current literature, even in the critical work (often informed by historical materialist 
theory) that instead effectively separates ‘drug issues’ from the U.S.’ ‘real goals’.  
 
The originality also goes beyond this to consider connected but quite novel 
expressions of U.S. interest seeking within North America more holistically. Placing 
the MI in its historical context, and analysing the policy and the process of its 
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formulation in depth, shows clearly that it is not as overwhelmingly ‘new’ as many 
have claimed in its aims and approach,75 nor is it just about U.S.-Mexican security 
relations. Instead it is intimately implicated within a wider goal to regionalise security 
in North America, which itself is an progressively pressing concern for the U.S. as the 
North American economy integrates further in trade, investment and production, and 
thereby becomes increasingly integral to the U.S.’ own continued economic success 
and international primacy. North American cross-border trade, production and 
investment is at unprecedented level and continues to grow, and this requires that 
Mexico’s political economy be stable and secure for investors, that novel approaches 
to internal border security deter and detect potential ‘transnational threats’ (like 
terrorism and drug smuggling linked to instability) whilst expediting licit movement, 
and that the North American economic zone itself is protected and secured. This is not 
a groundbreaking argument in and of itself, but in the way this project reveals the 
practises and the policy - which includes the MI -that is being put into place to directly 
achieve these goals, it stands out from both the literature on the MI and North 
American integration more generally. Additionally, through this, I am able in part to 
move beyond to highlight important new directions in the U.S.’ foreign policy, grand 
strategy and political economy. I contend that the project shows that North America is 
becoming increasingly important to U.S. strategic thinking. 
 
                                                
75 I establish this trope in the Literature Review 
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Chapter Two 




This chapter summarises the extant literature on the MI, its foreign policy aims, and 
how these relate to U.S. interests. I have divided this literature into two broad groups. 
Much of the existing literature has worked with an acceptance that the provision of 
aid is primarily motivated by a ‘drug war rationale’, whereby the U.S. effort to 
interdict illegal drugs is a genuine one. Whilst it is by no means homogenous, this 
literature sees the primary U.S. aim as stemming drug flows and, more importantly, 
associated levels of violence Mexico, by denuding the cartels’ ability to operate 
through both robust enforcement at the border and in Mexico, and mitigation of some 
of the political / social / economic contextual conditions that are argued to empower 
them. However a smaller set of literature is more skeptical of this rationale, and even 
posits that in fact official justifications provide a pretext for, or obscure, differing 
aims behind U.S. policy. These are based in the protection and stabilisation of 
Mexico’s neoliberal political economy, tied to NAFTA from forces that seek to 
challenge or change it. Often these forces are seen as stemming from civil society or 
social movements. Thus violence and insecurity in Mexico does not unitarily flow 
around drugs, but in fact a portion of it is directed from the state towards certain 
sections of civil society. Whilst there are of course many quite significant 
permutations within these two positions, they differ most significantly from one 
another.  
 
For the most part I will be reviewing this literature, delineating the differences 
between analyses, and drawing out key themes and conclusions. Of course the wider 
and more substantive aim in doing this is to begin to highlight the gaps in the existing 
work on the MI and to construct the space for my own analysis of the policy, its 
intent, and whether it can be said to be ‘working’. The first focus in this chapter is 
really to look at what existing research makes of the MI in terms of its intentions, 
which then of course colours whatever conclusions one reaches about the policies 
efficacy for the U.S. However, in doing this I am going to speak to other questions 
that naturally intrude on this limited aim. We cannot avoid, for example, seeing how 
the differing strands of the current literature actually define the nature of the violence 
in Mexico, pinpoint where it is coming from, or choose what violence to focus on. 
There is also the controversial and thorny question of whether the U.S.-supported 
strategy is causing or at least exacerbating the increased violence in Mexico. This gets 
pulled in again to what the intention of the policy is, as the more critical literature sees 
some of the violence of the Mexican state as functional. These are complex questions, 
and again they do have some important implications for this thesis’ more central aims. 
It is important though to repeat those central aims revolve around uncovering what the 
MI and associated bilateral security policy is intended to do. 
 
Broad Points 
The deviation in the extant literature already identified has roots in theoretical 
differences, and specifically divergent conceptions of the state and state interests. Put 
simply, those who posit a ‘drug-war rationale’ implicitly work with a reified version 
of the state and treat its interests as rather unproblematic and pre-given, in line with 
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the dominant theories of IR and their underlying assumptions. Thus they separate 
state foreign policy interests from their societies to a great degree. Additionally, in 
line with Liberal or Neoliberal IR theory, both the U.S. and Mexican states are argued 
to have interests in mutual security, mutual economic development and growth, and 
the mutual well being of their citizens. The state’s interests broadly equate to the 
nation’s or country’s interests, in terms of its populations. Critical analysts work with 
a more complex picture in line with more critical IR theory, in which the state is made 
up of social actors, and its foreign policy interests cannot be separated from that 
societal level. Moreover both in U.S. foreign policy and Mexican domestic policy this 
literature often works in broadly Marxian terms, whereby state actors represent class 
interests in a capitalist economy, and thus we cannot simply assume shared interests 
within society or between the U.S. and Mexico. There is broad convergence amongst 
the existing Critical literature that both the U.S. and Mexican interests revolve around 
elite class interests in sustaining a neoliberal economic order in Mexico that is 
radically unequal and favours the U.S. disproportionately.1  
 
This chapter will also go onto consider the wider set of literature concerning U.S.-
Mexican integration. Again in line with established Neo-Liberal IR theory, many 
observers of North American politics and integration suggest that cooperation within 
the economic arena through the formal institutions of NAFTA appears to be ‘spilling 
into’ other areas of policy,2 not least a more symbiotic approach to targeting drug 
traffickers, and indeed military-to-military relationships beyond CN.3 Some voices in 
the extant literature, meanwhile, also connect Mérida to economic coalescence and 
NAFTA. However they suggest a wider security rationale for the policy that goes 
beyond drugs - or in the more critical framing, uses drugs as a pretext - to include 
threats like terrorism, political violence and - again in the more critical understandings  
- the prospect of social unrest and change. They explicitly connect Mérida to the SPP, 
a much more ambitious integrative North American security project borne from the 
post 9/11 fallout and Global War on Terror (GWOT). They argue this was designed to 
protect NAFTA’s political economy from a wide set of threats to maintain the 




This chapter proceeds in three sections. Firstly I look at the existing literature on 
Mérida specifically. Dividing the current research and work into two wide sections - 
one that accepts a ‘drug war rationale’ for Mérida, and one that posits a ‘drug war 
pretext’ - I summarise the key arguments and draw out key points, continuities, and 
                                                
1 Much of the Critical literature thus works within the larger body of literature that considers the turn to 
neoliberal economic tenets since the 1970s as a state/class project to reclaim and increase capitalist 
class power (amongst numerous examples, David Harvey A Brief History of Neoliberalism  (Penguin, 
2005); Naomi Klein The Shock Doctrine Penguin, 2007); Jamie Peck Constructions of Neoliberal 
Reason (Oxford University Press, 2010); Ruth Blakeley, State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The 
North in the South (Routledge, 2009) 
2 Robert O. Keohane After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton University Press, 1984) p.8 As Keohane points out, this Neo-Liberal assumption follows 
established Liberal Institutionalist theory. 
3 See Roderic Ai Camp Armed Forces and Drugs: Public Perceptions and Institutional Challenges in 
Eric L.Olsen, David A.Shirk & Andrew Selee (eds.) Shared Responsibility: U.S. Mexican Policy 
Options for Confronting Organized Crime (Woodrow Wilson Mexico Institute, Oct 2010)  
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differences. Of course using such a broad brush to put a wide array of work into two 
groups risks homogenising disparate voices and missing differences within the 
groups, so I show how the debate is not merely reducible to merely two schools of 
thought. There is an especially lively difference in the ‘drug war rationale’ literature 
between those who see drug violence as a social problem as opposed to those who 
saw it as a novel military challenge, for example. However to fully capture the debate 
I also conclude this section of the Review by looking at some outlying literature that 
either straddles or does not quite fit the two macro positions. These outliers in fact 
nicely lead into the second section, which broadens out the discussion to include some 
of the wider literature on North American integration and its progress, and where 
Mérida fits into this ongoing process.4 Finally I conclude by starting to briefly 
identify gaps left by the extant literature, and the debates it opens up. I make a case 
that we need to think carefully about state interests in IR to consider what U.S. aims 
are. I also contend there needs to be both a stronger situating of current bilateral 
policy in the history of U.S.-Mexican relations, and, as an analytical starting point, a 
policy analysis of Mérida that is far more in-depth. 
 
 
Existing Analysis of the Mérida Initiative 
 
A Drug War Rationale 
Building on the prohibition and criminalisation of drugs that had of course been in 
place in the United States for the best part of the 20th Century, in 1971 President 
Nixon declared narcotics to be ‘Public Enemy number one” and the ‘War on Drugs’ 
became a popularised term.5 Although Nixon had closed the border with Mexico to 
pressure the country to improve its interdiction efforts in Operation Intercept in 1969, 
and drug trafficking investigation had formed part of the murkier underworld of U.S. 
intelligence and foreign policy for some time,6 CN began to be more overtly pulled 
into national security strategies over the coming years. In 1973 the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) was formed. In 1981 Congress gave the U.S. military the 
power to aid civilian law enforcement agencies inside and outside the U.S., and in 
1986 President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 221, which 
designated drugs as a National Security threat.7 U.S. troops participated in CN 
operations in Bolivia in 1986, and budgets increased for military involvement in CN. 
In 1989 the Pentagon became the lead agency for CN intelligence, and the U.S. 
invaded Panama to remove Manuel Noriega and try him for drug trafficking. U.S. aid 
for CN in a host of countries increased through the 1990s; Plan Colombia was 
launched with a drug war justification in 2000, and in 2007 the U.S. jointly 
announced the MI alongside Mexico, again justified in CN terms. Despite the Obama 
                                                
4 I do consider this a continuing process, but withhold judgment for now as to how fast or slow it is 
developing, and why. 
5 Perhaps lost in the history though is the fact Nixon’s early anti-drug budgets actually spent more 
money on harm reduction than the supply side solutions and criminalisation that would come to be so 
negatively associated with the ‘War on Drugs’. See Michael F. Walther ‘Insanity: Four Decades of 
U.S. Counterdrug Strategy’ Strategic Studies Institute (December, 2012) p.4 
6 See Douglas Valentine’s history of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Douglas Valentine The Strength 
of the Wolf: The Secret History of America’s War on Drugs (Verso, 2004) 
7 Meanwhile the CIA was aiding the Contras to smuggle drugs into the U.S. to help fund their insurgent 
activities in Nicaragua. 
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administration distancing itself from the term ‘War on Drugs’, large amounts of CN 
aid continues to flow to a number of countries around the globe.8 
 
The majority of analysts see the MI within this ‘War on Drugs’ foreign policy 
paradigm of the United States. The need to interdict drugs in this case is also given 
extra impetus by the disturbing levels of violence in Mexico itself, and the failure of 
Mexican agencies to stem that violence and provide security in large areas of the 
country.9 There is some debate here though around the nature of the problem within 
Mexico, which affects how the policy’s intention and efficacy is seen. I have therefore 
divided my summary of those who see the MI primarily in these terms into two-sub-
sections: Crime-Based and Military-Based. This reflects a distinction between those 
who maintain that Mexico’s drug problems remain criminal in scope, and those who 
posit that the violence and tactics of cartel or drug trafficking organisations / 
transnational criminal organistations (DTOs / TCOs)10 now in fact resemble a 
criminal or “narco” insurgency. Unremarkably, there is a level of fluidity and a 
number of grey areas between the two positions, but there is certainly enough of a 
distinction to warrant separating them initially.  It should also be noted that this 
reflects a wider policy debate in Washington11 and in military policy and academia12 
about how to classify the violence in Mexico, and indeed the language of the Military-
based analysts mirrors official U.S. training documents.  
 
However, despite this distinction, many of the core conclusions of both sets of 
literature cut across them. They share similar assumptions on the violence being 
overwhelmingly drug-related, similar conclusions as to what is producing that 
violence, and, importantly for us, what U.S. and Mexican interests are at stake as a 
result. There are also shared conclusions that U.S. policy is primarily aimed at 
tackling DTO power and associated violence and trafficking. They also share a close 
evaluation of what explains the failure of the policy to stem violence thus far, and 
indeed how U.S. policies can be attuned to greater success. The distinguishing feature 
between the two is very much focused on the issue of the definition of the Mexican 
                                                
8 Amongst others, the reports of the U.S. DoS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs (INL) make this clear. For example the FY2013 report discusses CN aid programmes in Africa, 
the Western Hemisphere, Asia, Europe, and Eurasia. U.S. Department of State Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Program and Budget Guide: Fiscal Year 2013 Budget 
(Washington D.C., 2013)     
9 Paul Kenny, Mónica Serrano and Arturo Sotomayor (eds.) Mexico’s Security Failure: Collapse into 
Criminal Violence (Routledge, 2011) 
10 DTO and TCO have been variously applied by the U.S. government to Mexico’s trafficking groups. 
Recently TCO has become a standardised term.  
11 For example, see the various efforts of Congressmen McCaul (R-TX) and Mack (R-FL) to officially 
designate DTOs as terrorists and Mexico’s drug violence as an insurgency, which met with 
considerable opposition. Geoffrey Ramsey ‘US Congressman Repeats Call to Designate Mexican Drug 
Gangs as 'Terrorists' Insight Crime (October 5th, 2011) http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/us-
congressman-repeats-calls-to-designate-mexican-drug-gangs-as-terrorists Accessed 25.05.13; 
‘Enhanced Border Security Act’ H.R. 3401 Proposed Bill, 112th Congress  
 (2011) http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr3401 Accessed 13.05.13  
12 See the debate between Bunker and Rexton Kan on whether ‘insurgency’ is a useful or accurate term 
to apply to Mexican drug violence. (e.g. Paul Rexton Kan ‘What We’re Getting Wrong About Mexico’ 
Parameters 41, 2 (Summer 2011) Again the debate appears settled officially in calling cartels TCOs, 
although ‘narco-terrorists’ appears to be still popular in military training courses. 
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“problem”13 and its subsequent treatment, rather than what generates it, or the 
motivation for the U.S. to intervene and help deal with it. I thus focus on the different 
definitions of the problems separately, before moving on to show how the ‘drug war 
rationale’ literature as a whole conceptualises the intention of U.S. policy, and the 
apparent failure of U.S.-Mexican policy to stem the tide of violence. 
 
Crime-Based Definitions 
To differing degrees, work within the Crime-Based literature largely accepts the 
officially provided statistics and analysis on drug-related violence in Mexico. It also 
accepts that the spiking official homicide statistics are predominately the result of 
inter-cartel violence. Thus, despite an acknowledgement that, “Measuring drug-
related violence in Mexico is inherently challenging” due to it being a, “highly 
subjective exercise, prone to substantial guesswork even when done by government 
authorities”,14 there is a tendency to use official information. There is also a shared 
narrative amongst this literature that the majority of the violence, in terms of actual 
homicides, affects those within the drug trade. For example, Shirk uses Mexican 
government data to summarise that, “Explosive clashes and territorial disputes among 
powerful drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have killed more than thirty-five 
thousand people15 since President Felipe Calderón took office in December 2006.”16 
Longmire designates the violence that has been officially deemed to be ,“drug 
related” as falling generally into, “three categories: violence directed against the 
authorities, against other cartels, and against the general public.”17 Dell, again 
working with (different) official Mexican figures, concludes that,  “More than 85 
percent of the violence consists of people involved in the drug trade killing each 
other.”18 
 
However, despite the acceptance that the, “majority of those killed are involved in the 
drug trade”,19 the Crime-Based literature argues that the concomitant instability and 
insecurity generated by drug violence and cartel activity has serious ramifications for 
U.S. interests. Shirk summarises this in four key areas; the ability of unchecked 
                                                
13 ibid 
14 Viridiana Rios & David A. Shirk ‘Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2010’ 
Trans-Border Institute (February, 2011) p.4 
15 Shirk cites official data released by the Mexican government in January 2011 covering December 
2006 to December 2010. This data explicitly tries to isolate murders definitively tied to drug 
trafficking. See Johanna Tuckman ‘Mexico Drugs War Murders Data Mapped’ Guardian (January 14th, 
2011) http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/jan/14/mexico-drug-war-murders-map Accessed 
15.01.11 This official database was updated on 11th January 2012 with official figures on drug-related 
homicides up to September 2011. It added 12, 903 killed to the previous total of 34, 612. The database 
has not been updated since then, forcing analysts to rely on triangulation, interpretation and analysis of 
other data to come up with totals. In any case there were serious flaws with the methodology of the 
original database. 
16 David A. Shirk ‘The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat’ Council of Foreign 
Relations Special Report No. 60 (March 2011) p.3 As we saw in the Introduction this number has since 
spiked. 
17 Sylvia Longmire Cartel: The Coming Invasion of Mexico’s Drug Wars (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 
p.8 
18 Melissa Dell Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug War (2011) Job Market Paper. http://econ-
www.mit.edu/grad/mdell/papers Accessed 18.12.11 p.7 
19 Vanda Felbab-Brown ‘The Violent Drug Market in Mexico and Lessons from Colombia’ Brookings 
Institute Policy Paper No.12 (March 2009) p.1 
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cartels to operate and effect criminal enterprises on the U.S. side of the border which 
harm the health and security of U.S. citizens, the negative economic ramifications of 
insecurity in Mexico that could result in “market collapse” of a crucial economic 
partner, the “destabilizing effect” cartel violence has across Central America, and the 
potential for humanitarian disaster as civilians flee escalating drug conflict.20 These 
core concerns are variously echoed and expanded upon in a number of other studies 
and pieces. For example, O’Neil cites the burgeoning U.S.-Mexican economic 
interdependence threatened by potential, “crime-ridden political and economic 
turmoil”.21 Rexton Kan explores the, “national security challenge” posed by “narco-
refugees”.22 Again emphasising the posited deep link between U.S. border security 
and the MI, as well as the associated War on Drugs, Clarkson states the Initiative, 
“suggests the war on drugs will remain the US priority for security on its southern 
border.”23 Some Crime-Based studies also charge that there is a threat to U.S. national 
security on the border, especially in the form of, ‘spillover violence’ affecting the 
U.S. border regions.24  
 
The basis of this threat to U.S. interests in Mexico, at the border, and into the U.S. is 
the increased scope of cartel power. We should be clear that Crime-based accounts 
often include an explicit rejection of the ‘failed state’, ‘narco-terrorist’ or ‘criminal 
insurgency’ analysis proffered in some of the Military-Based25 circles (of which more 
below).26 Bailey summarises thus, “This [is] not a political- ideological insurgency, 
                                                
20 Shirk ‘The Drug War in Mexico’ p.4-5 My emphasis 
21 Shannon K. O’Neil ‘The Real War in Mexico: How Democracy Can Defeat the Drug Cartels’ 
Foreign Affairs 88, 4 (July/August, 2009) p.77; Also see Shannon K. O’Neil Two Nations Indivisible: 
Mexico, the United States, and the Road Ahead (Oxford University Press, 2013) p.159-164 
22 Paul Rexton Kan ‘Mexico’s ‘Narco-Refugees’: The Looming Challenge for U.S. National Security’ 
Strategic Studies Institute (October 2011) Disturbingly, the U.S. has recently encountered a crisis over 
Central American children and families often fleeing drug-related violence in such countries as 
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. For example see Marta Sánchez-Solar ‘Confronting the Central 
American Refugee Crisis’ CIP Americas Program (June 25th, 2014) 
http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/12441 Accessed 05.07.14 
23 Stephen Clarkson Does North America Exist: Governing the Continent after NAFTA and 9/11 
(University of Toronto Press, 2008) p.400 
24 Sylvia Longmire ‘Border Violence Spillover: A Growing, but Undefined Problem’ Small Wars 
Journal (January 15th, 2013) http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/border-violence-spillover-a-growing-
but-undefined-problem Accessed 31.07.13 However it should be noted that this is a highly debatable 
concept, and there are equal attempts to refute it within the same literature. Indeed, Olsen et al argue 
that it is a distraction that, “has shifted [U.S] federal resources away from the urgent task of disrupting 
the flow of weapons and money to Mexico” Eric L. Olsen, David A. Shirk and Andrew Selee 
‘Introduction’ in Olsen et al Shared Responsibility p.4 Undoubtedly some acts of cross-border violence 
have occurred. However, official reports have discussed the difficulty of defining spillover and its 
limited nature. U.S. GAO Southwest Border Security: Data Are Limited and Concerns Vary about 
Spillover Crime along the Southwest Border (Washington D.C., February 2013) and Kristin M. Finklea 
Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Indentifying and Measuring Spillover Violence (Congressional 
Research Service, 2013)  
25 It should be noted that Rexton-Kan is in fact a military thinker, and is perhaps swimming against the 
tide regarding the conclusions of his peers. 
26 For an excellent and persuasive example, see Paul Kenny & Mónica Serrano ‘Introduction: Security 
Failure Versus State Failure’ in Paul Kenny & Monica Serrano with Arturo Sotomayor (eds) Mexico’s 
Security Failure: Collapse into Criminal Violence (Routledge, 2012) p.1-25 These authors go onto 
insist, “The Mexican state doesn’t confront a drug insurgency aiming to overthrow it. The Mexican 
state faces coalitions of individuals - some of them extremely powerful and violent - whose ultimate 
ambition is to pay taxes to the state, to be able to issue Treasury-registered receipts to their hotels’ 
Paul Ashby: NAFTA-Land Security: The Mérida Initiative, Transnational Threats, and U.S. Security Projection in 
Mexico  
PhD Thesis 
University of Kent 
 
41 
but rather a transnational criminal-industrial complex passing through a particularly 
violent phase.”27 However, there are a number of authors within the Crime-Based 
perspective who are increasingly contending that growing cartel power is beginning to 
represent a threat to the stability and rule of the Mexican state. The cartels’ ability, 
(afforded by huge drug trafficking profits) to heavily arm themselves and to corrupt 
local police and political authorities, is seen as expanding to a point where it can even 
provide an alternative model of criminal rule in specific areas.28 Some cartel tactics 
are seen as at least resembling terrorist or insurgent actions, albeit they are taken in 
pursuit of profit-driven, rather than ideological, motives.29 In terms of the levels of 
violence and criminality, Bailey concludes that, “What in the past had been a chronic 
but tolerable problem of public security has passed the tipping point to become a 
genuine threat to national security and democratic governance.”30 O’Neil concurs that 
there is a threat to Mexico’s fledging democracy, and U.S. interests lie in protecting 
that democracy and aiding Mexico’s political and economic development.31 Kilroy, 
Sumano and Hataley discuss how the existence of heavily armed and well-funded 
cartels “destabilizes” Mexico through their ability to create a “weaker rule of law”.32 
All of this in turn makes it easier for drugs to continue flowing into the U.S., and puts 
pressure on the border. Olsen, Shirk and Wood summarise that the Mexican 
government’s ability to “maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of force” has 
been compromised.33  
 
From this perspective, it is unsurprising that the Crime-Based literature characterises 
the various policies that make up the MI as being differentiated instruments to aid the 
Mexican government to check and decrease cartel power. Essentially, then, U.S. 
policy is aimed to do more or less what U.S. public officials and arms of the executive 
government have stated it is aimed to do. Shirk summarises that the MI seeks to, 
“provide U.S. equipment, training and technical assistance, counternarcotics 
intelligence sharing, and rule of law promotion programs” to Mexico and beyond.34 A 
RAND study undertaken in 2009 asserts that the aid package is aimed, “primarily for 
                                                                                                                                      
customers, to receive a states subsidy for their agricultural businesses. This enemy wants the state to 
function for it….” Paul Kenny and Monica Serrano ‘Conclusion: Authoritarian Evolution’ in ibid p. 
197 However I feel a critique of this from the position we identify below as ‘Military-Based’ would 
likely suggest this sounds effectively like a captured ‘narco-state’. Also, for a very brief nod to the 
failed state narrative in what is not a particularly ‘military’ source see W. Dirk Raat and Michael M. 
Brescia Mexico and the United States: Ambivalent Vistas 4th edn. (University of Georgia Press, 2010) 
p. 235 
27 John Bailey ‘Combating Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Mexico: What are Mexican and 
U.S. Strategies? Are They Working?’ in Olsen et al Shared Responsibility p.329 
28 Vanda Felbab-Brown ‘Calderón’s Caldron: Lessons from Mexico’s Battle Against  
Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez, and Michoacán’ Brookings Institute 
(September, 2011) 
29 Longmire Cartel p.8 
30 Bailey ‘Combating Organized Crime’ p.327 
31 O’Neil ‘The Real War in Mexico’ 
32 Richard J. Kilroy Jr., Aberlado Rodríguez Sumano & Todd S. Hataley, North American Regional 
Security: A Trilateral Framework? (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013) p.140 
33 Eric L. Olsen, David A. Shirk and Duncan Wood ‘Introduction’ in David A. Shirk, Duncan Wood 
and Eric L. Olsen [eds.] Building Resilient Communities in Mexico: Civic Responses to Crime and 
Violence ((Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center and the Justice in Mexico Project at the 
University of San Diego, March 2014) p.2 
34 Shirk ‘The Drug War in Mexico’ p.6 
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technical assistance and equipment to combat drug trafficking,” and as such includes 
police training programmes, the provision of Black Hawk helicopters to, “support 
interdiction and rapid response by Mexican law enforcement agencies”, and 
improvement of intelligence sharing.35 These same voices also summarised the aims 
of the Obama administration’s ‘Beyond Mérida’ renewal of the Initiative announced 
in the 2011 Budget Request in terms that echo official language.36 Olsen and Wilson 
describe the ‘Beyond Mérida’ agenda as being based upon four pillars, two of which 
“refine” the original policies as summarised above, and two of which, “represent a 
new and expanded approach to anti-drug efforts.” They conclude, “While the majority 
of U.S. funding in the first phase of the MI went to expensive equipment, particularly 
aircraft, the new approach shifts the focus toward institution building.”37 The overall 
goal, however, remains the same, namely to, “increase cooperation in the hemispheric 
fight against drug trafficking.”38  
 
Military-Based Definitions 
I have demarcated a separate group of writings as ‘military-based’ within the ‘Drug 
War rationale’ literature. This work tends to see the instability in Mexico as more of a 
‘militarised’ problem, in that cartels utilise military tactics and control space in ways 
often seen as akin to an insurgency. This therefore requires a militarised or 
counterinsurgency (COIN) solution. As with the Crime-Based literature, the violence 
currently gripping Mexico is seen as ‘drug-related’ in these Military-based accounts, 
and official figures are used to support this conclusion. For example, Killebrew 
informs us that, “there have been more than 30,000 deaths tied to drug trafficking in 
recent years”, whilst Cardash et al quote DEA testimony to state there were “almost 
43,000 drug-related deaths in the past five years.”39 Again, this drug-related violence 
represents a threat to U.S. interests. The direct problems again come from the power 
of the cartels, who are stimulating the rising violence, instability and insecurity to 
disrupt the U.S.-Mexican relationship in key areas, much as the Crime-Based authors 
argue. Thus, we see similar references to the impact of the cartels inside the U.S., 
their role in human trafficking, and their involvement in diversifying criminal 
activities.40 Economic issues also feature heavily. Lairsey discusses the potential for 
bi-national trade to be negatively affected, including the crucial supply of crude oil 
from Mexico to the U.S.41 Brands also shares this concern, stating that, “Rising 
political instability could also imperil the $364 billion in annual commerce that 
crosses the U.S.-Mexican border and more than $84 billion in U.S. direct 
                                                
35 Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Benjamin Bahney & Jack K. Riley, Security in Mexico: Implications for 
U.S. Policy Options (RAND Corporation, 2009) p.53 
36 I explore ‘Beyond Mérida’ on Chapter Six. 
37 Eric L. Olsen & Christopher W. Wilson ‘Beyond Merida: The Evolving Approach to Security 
Cooperation’ Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center / Trans-Border Institute (May, 2010) p.3 
38 ibid 
39 Robert Killebrew ‘Criminal Insurgency in the Americas and Beyond’ NDU Prism 2, 3 (June, 2011) 
p.39; Sharon L. Cardash, Frank J. Cillufo & Burt. B. Tussing ‘Mexico and the Triple Threat’ U.S. 
Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership (2011) p.3 The DEA source was speaking in 
October 2011 
40 For example, Martin Edward Andersen ‘A Roadmap for Beating Latin America's Transnational 
Criminal Organizations’ Joint Forces Quarterly 62 (July, 2011); Robert J. Bunker ‘Strategic Threat: 
Narcos and Narcotics Overview’ in p.8-29 in Robert J. Bunker [ed.] Narcos Over the Border: Gangs, 
Cartels and Mercenaries (Routledge, 2011) p.8-29 
41 Johnny M. Lairsey Jr., ‘A Strategy for Mexico?’ Small Wars Journal (June, 2011) p.5 
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investment.”42 However, we are no longer talking about an abnormally high rate of 
criminality giving rise to these threats, but instead conceptualising the cartels as actors 
engaging in an insurgency against the Mexican state.43 
 
Cardash et al conclude that based on the, “available evidence […] one would be hard-
pressed to deny the existence of a narco-insurgency” in Mexico.44 Brands uses the 
same term, and highlights that cartels now regularly use trained “paramilitaries” - the 
prime example being los Zetas45 - to defeat rivals, terrify the civilian population, and, 
crucially, take on the state.46 Bunker and Sullivan argue that this criminal insurgency 
has the potential to transform Mexico into a, “criminal state” or, “narco-democracy,” 
that the cartels could form a, “terrorist-criminal nexus” with other actors, and that 
some cartels even display a competing value system to modern liberal democracy.47 
Manwaring highlights the rise of, “privatized violence” in Mexico, with large and 
small private, “military organizations” employing, “an ambiguous mix of terrorism, 
crime, and conventional war tactics and operations.”48 Turbiville writes of, 
“narcoparamilitaries” who, “surpass Mexico’s federal, state, and municipal law 
enforcement capabilities.”49 Mexico’s cartels are also often featured in wider 
arguments about the increasing threat posed to the U.S. and its allies by TCOs across 
Latin America, and indeed the globe.50 Andersen argues that the rise of TCOs is, 
“morphing what once seemed strictly law enforcement problems into national security 
threats” and that, “the violence they can bring to bear [is] challenging not only a 
growing number of civilian governments and civil societies throughout the 
hemisphere, but also the concept of national sovereignty itself.”51 
 
The Military-Based literature is perhaps more disparate than the Crime-Based, and by 
no means are all of these various motifs accepted universally. There is a prevalent 
narrative within this literature that Mexico is, or is becoming, a ‘failed state’.52 
However this is itself an area of debate, with differing analyses of the timescale and 
                                                
42 Hal Brands Mexico’s Narco-Insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy (Strategic Studies Institute, 
May 2009) p.13 My emphasis 
43 Ioan Grillo El Narco: Inside Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency (Bloomsbury Press, 2011) 
44 Cardash et al ‘Mexico and the Triple Threat’ p.3 
45 Los Zetas were originally hired guns for the Cartel del Golfo, before going independent and gaining 
a reputation as simultaneously Mexico’s most tactically sophisticated and brutal cartel. 
46 Brands ‘Mexico’s Narco-Insurgency’ p.7-11 
47 Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan ‘Cartel Evolution Revisited: Third Phase Cartel Potentials and 
Alternative Futures in Mexico’ in Bunker & Sullivan Narcos Over the Border p.30-54 For a similar 
argument about terrorist-DTO nexus see Cardash et al ‘Mexico and the Triple Threat’ p.3 The 2011 
case of a DEA sting that captured an Iranian agent who was allegedly seeking to establish ties with Los 
Zetas to carry out terrorist actions is taken as evidence of this potentiality. See Charlie Savage and 
Scott Shane ‘Iranians Accused of a Plot to Saudi’s U.S. Envoy’ New York Times (October 11th, 2011) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/us/us-accuses-iranians-of-plotting-to-kill-saudi-
envoy.html?pagewanted=all Accessed 08.05.12 
48 Max. G.Manwaring Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries and Other Modern Mercenaries: New Dynamics in 
Uncomfortable Wars (University of Oklahoma, 2010) p.121-122 
49 Graham H. Turbiville ‘U.S. Military Engagement with Mexico: Uneasy Past and Challenging 
Future’ Joint Special Operations University Report (2010) p.9 
50 For example, Douglas Farah ‘Terrorist-Criminal Pipelines and Criminalized States: Emerging 
Alliances’ NDU Prism 2, 3 (June, 2011); Killebrew ‘Criminal Insurgency’; Andersen ‘Latin America’s 
Transnational Criminal Organizations’ 
51 Andersen ‘Latin America’s Transnational Criminal Organizations’ 
52 As we saw above there are trenchant critiques of this conclusion. See footnote 27. 
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scope of state failure. For example Bunker and Sullivan entertain the notion of 
complete rapid state breakdown,53 whereas Farah contends that it is the 
governmentality of “black-hole” border areas that should concern U.S. planners.54 
Manwaring contends that, “Under President Felipe Calderon, Mexico is responding 
constructively to the threat and can be seen as shifting away from the possibility of 
state failure.”55 However, the Military-Based authors do share the conclusion that the 
Mexican state is under threat, and that this represents a deeper problem for the U.S. 
Whereas Crime-Based scholars tend to see the current threat to the state from cartel 
activity as nascent and localised (as well as overplayed), those writing within this 
literature present it as urgent, widespread, and real. Brands offers that, “In some 
regions—particularly in areas of Chihuahua, Durango, and Sinaloa—the cartels have 
become so powerful as to render government authority nominal or nonexistent.”56 
Manwaring argues that the violence employed by cartels, “tends to create and 
consolidate semiautonomous enclaves (criminal free states) that develop into quasi-
states.”57 Some cartels provide a better example in this regard than others.58 
 
However, despite the fact the Military arguments may define the Mexican problem 
differently in terms of what it represents and the interests threatened, its analysis of 
the MI is similar to that of the Crime-Based literature. Mérida is again seen as a set of 
policies designed to undercut cartel power and influence in various areas. Brands 
contends that, “The central aim of the Merida Initiative is to use U.S. money, training, 
and equipment to strengthen Mexico’s military and law enforcement agencies, 
thereby giving them the capacity to take and hold the initiative in the fight against the 
cartels.”59 Manwaring provides a similar appraisal, “The United States, under the 
Merida Initiative, is providing a 3-year $1.4 billion aid package aimed at helping 
Mexico fight the drug cartels with increased law enforcement training, military 
equipment, and improved bilateral intelligence cooperation.”60 In other words, the 
U.S. is seeking to redress the instability and insecurity plaguing Mexico by tackling 
those forces seen as largely responsible for it. Thus, despite the emphasis on 
‘insurgency’, state failure and so on, there is actually significant correlation between 
the two literatures on this point. We see similar correlations in how they treat the 
current failure of policies to quell drug violence, and in some of the policy 
recommendations they make in light of this failure. 
 
Explaining the ‘Failure’ of Policy in the Drug War Rationale Literature 
The ‘drug war rationale’ literature is broadly supportive of the general direction and 
                                                
53 Bunker & Sullivan ‘Cartel Evolution Revisited’ The failed state narrative is also discussed in Gary 
Hale ‘A “Failed State” in Mexico: Tamaulipas Declares Itself Ungovernable’ James Baker III Institute 
for Public Policy (July 26th, 2011); Ted Galen Carpenter, ‘Mexico: The Rot Deepens’ The Cato 
Institute (March 5th, 2012a) http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/mexico-rot-deepens 
Accessed 28.09.12 
54 Farah “Terrorist-Criminal Pipelines’ p.16 
55 Max G. Manwaring ‘A “New” Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment: The 
Mexican Zetas and Other Private Armies’ Strategic Studies Institute (September, 2009) p.3 
56 Brands ‘Mexico’s Narco-Insurgency’ p.11 
57 Manwaring Pseudo-Militaries and Other Modern Mercenaries p.122 
58 For example the strange La Familia group, which operates in Michoacán. George W.Grayson 
Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State? (Transaction Publishers, 2010) p.197-213 
59 Brands ‘Mexico Narco-Insurgency’ p.2 
60 Manwaring ‘A ”New” Dynamic’ p.34 
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make-up of U.S. policy as embodied in the MI, but this does not mean it is unaware of 
problems and failings that beset it, or that it treats these uncritically. However, it does 
not conceive of these issues (such as the spiraling homicide rate despite increased 
efforts to counter cartels) as particularly difficult questions to puzzle over. Instead, 
they are seen as, variously, the result of the intractable nature of the drug problem in 
Mexico, the history of violence and shifting loyalties between and within the cartels, 
misapplication or inadequacies of certain, specific policies, and the fallout of the 
Mexican government’s unprecedented decision to actively and aggressively ‘take on’ 
the cartels. Thus, much of the explanation provided for the failure of Mexico’s U.S.-
supported strategy to quell violence and increase stability and security is based around 
what actually generates that violence in the first place. There is a sense in a number of 
the examples in the literature of the rise in violence being an inevitability, perhaps in 
some cases even a necessity, of tackling cartel power. It also indicates the need to 
continue and/or refine the current approach in light of the interests at stake, rather 
than pursue a wholesale overhaul or rethink of policy. This is pertinent as many 
within this literature deem more radical (but perhaps desirable) options such as the 
decriminalisation of illegal drugs as not currently politically viable61 or as very much 
a long-term project with its own significant risks.62  
 
This literature, then, explains the failure of U.S. and U.S.-supported policy to temper 
levels of violence in Mexico in two areas - the history and pervasiveness of Mexico’s 
drug problems that preceded Mérida, and the impact (or otherwise) of the policies 
adopted in recent times themselves. Regarding the first of these, there are a number of 
historical narratives that appear in many of the Crime-Based studies, and again these 
also appear in a number of Military-Based arguments. Within these narratives, 
Mexico’s current notoriety as the drug transit country and site of shocking drug 
violence stems from its ‘convenient’ geographical location and 2000-mile border with 
the world’s largest drug consuming nation. These authors point to how these brute 
facts have interacted with specific historical developments over a number of years to 
produce the current situation. The stifling of Caribbean transit routes and the relative 
decline and suppression of the previously dominant Colombian cartels by U.S. 
authorities and allies in the 1980s and 1990s is argued to have increased the 
importance of Mexico as a trafficking conduit, and the power and influence of 
Mexican cartels in the supply chain.63 The break up of old alliances between cartels 
that has occurred since division of the previously homogenous Mexican, “drug 
empire” into distinct areas or plazas in the 1980s are also argued to be major 
progenitors of the current violence.64 A significant role is assigned to Mexico’s 
                                                
61 Dell ‘Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug Networks’ p.39 
62 Shirk ‘The Mexican Drug War’ p.18-19 
63 ibid p.7-8; Luis Astorga and David A. Shirk ‘Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug 
Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context’ in Olsen et al Shared Responsibility p.31-62; Brands 
‘Mexico’s Narco-Insurgency’ p.5 
64 Tony Payan The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, Immigration, and Homeland Security 
(Praeger Security International, 2006) p.28-30; Longmire Cartel p.4-7; Eduardo Guerrero-Gutiérrez 
‘Security, Drugs, and Violence in Mexico: A Survey’ 7th North American Forum (Washington D.C., 
2011) p.27-40 The Mexican drug trade prior to this was effectively run by Miguel Ángel Félix 
Gallardo. He divided his territory up amongst lieutenants due to pressure from the U.S. and Mexican 
authorities in the 1980s. These areas or plazas apparently still largely represent the battlegrounds, and 
core geographical strongholds, of the cartels operating today, though some have fared better than 
others. 
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democratic opening, as the power of the previously dominant PRI dissipated 
following the economic ructions of the 1980s. The PRI are argued to have provided 
an effective, “carte blanche” to traffickers, providing certain lines were not crossed.65 
Corruption of state and police officials was rife, and the state is even said to have 
acted as a kind of final arbiter in drug disputes via “established patron-client 
relationships with drug traffickers.”66 However, the slow decline of the PRI’s 
centralised power grip over the 1980s and 1990s, “destabilized the equilibrium that 
had developed between state actors and organized crime.”67  
 
Thus, whilst the corruption of state officials and institutions fed by cartel profits 
remained (and remains) “endemic”68 it is now argued to be far more chaotic than 
under the PRI. In addition there are both high levels of impunity for a staggeringly 
large number of the most violent crimes69 and a continuing, “Instability and lack of 
coordination […] in federal, state and municipal public security institutions”.70 
Manwaring has argued that, “Weak or corrupt state security institutions, as in Mexico, 
are notoriously unhelpful and tend to be part of the problem - not the solution.”71 
Many of these analysts also place two important ‘economic’ factors into this volatile 
mix. Firstly, the huge increase in border trade engendered by NAFTA, and Mexico’s 
opening to “economic globalization”72 are argued to have naturally increased 
opportunities for cartels to smuggle drug shipments, channel drug money, and 
establish “transnational” connections across the Americas, and beyond.73 As Payan 
notes, the 5 million trucks that cross the U.S.-Mexico border annually (2005 figures) 
cannot all be routinely inspected, and thus large amounts of contraband does get 
through, with cartels, ‘riding the formal NAFTA economy’ to generate increased 
profitability.74 In addition, “Globalization and the ‘dollarization’ of the Mexican 
economy have opened a variety of new fronts for the movement of profits from drug 
                                                
65 This line was apparently crossed in 1985 with the kidnap, torture and murder of U.S. DEA agent 
Enrique Camarena, which prompted a swift response by U.S. authorities. Despite levels of state 
complicity in the murder, Mexican authorities eventually arrested drug kingpins, Ernesto Fonseca 
Carillo, Rafael Caro Quintero and Félix Gallardo. The U.S. renditioned others involved in Camarena’s 
torture and death. Caro Quintero was released by Jalisco’s state court and is now a wanted fugitive in 
the U.S.   
66 O’Neil ‘The Real War in Mexico’ p.63 
67 Astorga & Shirk ‘Drug Trafficking Organizations’ p.33 Also see Brands ‘Mexico’s Narco-
Insurgency’ p.6; O’Neil ‘The Real War in Mexico’ p.63; Juan. D. Lindau ‘The Drug War!s Impact on 
Executive Power, Judicial Reform, and Federalism in Mexico’ Political Science Quarterly 126, 2 
(2011) p.179-180;  
68 Olsen et al ‘Introduction’ p.3 
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Commission, the Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos (CNDH) released statistics that over 
ten years only 98% of crimes had resulted in convictions. See Julieta Martínez, ‘Impunidad obliga a las 
personas a huir: CNDH’ El Universal (February 28th, 2011) 
http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/748364.html Accessed 02.01.12  
70 Guerrero-Gutiérrez ‘Security, Drugs and Violence’ p.9 
71 Manwaring ‘A ‘New’ Dynamic’ p.1 
72 O’Neil ‘Real War in Mexico’ p.64 
73 See ibid p.64-66; Douglas Farah ‘Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling: Challenges for the 
Mérida Initiative’ in Olsen et al Shared Responsibility p.141-166; Farah ‘Terrorist-Criminal Pipelines’; 
David R. Mares & Gustavo Vega Cánovas ‘The U.S.-Mexico Relationship: Toward a New Era?’ 
Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies (2010) http://escholarship.org/uc/item/1kb4c76j Accessed 21.06.11 
p.5-6 
74 Payan The Three U.S.-Mexican Border Wars p.34 
Paul Ashby: NAFTA-Land Security: The Mérida Initiative, Transnational Threats, and U.S. Security Projection in 
Mexico  
PhD Thesis 
University of Kent 
 
47 
cartels and other transnational criminal organizations.”75  
 
Secondly, the pernicious effect of Mexico’s continued relative economic 
underdevelopment, and the economic ructions it suffered in the late 1970s/early 1980s 
and mid-1990s, are argued to be coalescing with the other factors previously 
identified and exacerbating drug-related problems. Shirk argues that the economic 
crisis of 1982 heightened unemployment and criminal activity, and the introduction of 
free market reforms in the wake of that crisis, “pushed many ordinary Mexicans to 
find alternative employment in an expanding underground economy that, by some 
estimates, accounted for 40 percent of all economic activity.” The expansion of 
Mexico’s drug trade coincided with these events.76 Brands contends that, “cartels 
thrive on the resentment that often results” from Mexico’s entrenched poverty rates.77  
Cartels are able to draw loyalty and recruits from this wellspring of disenfranchised, 
impoverished populations with gifts and much sought after employment 
opportunities.78 O’Neil has highlighted that this phenomena is especially troublesome 
as, according to a recent Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) report, Mexico has the third largest inactive youth population79 amongst 
OECD countries. This is especially pronounced for young males, and in areas with 
high levels of drug violence. The implication is that such disaffected young men 
become easy targets for recruiting cartels.80 Bailey perhaps goes furthest in this 
regard, arguing specifically that, “Neo-liberal policies since the mid 1980s have not 
generated a new social contract to replace the populist consensus of the “golden age” 
of growth with stability (1950s–1970s). Rampant, drug-related criminality has thrived 
in this environment.81  
 
Some analysts have also begun to posit that U.S./Mexican policies and strategies may 
be having a causal impact on the increasing levels of violence. The tactic of 
eliminating cartel ‘kingpins’, a key part of Mexican strategy supported by U.S. 
                                                
75 Farah ‘Money Laundering’ p.146 
76 Shirk ‘The Drug War in Mexico’ p.7 
77 His figures - 40% and 18% respectively for basic and extreme levels of poverty - are based on World 
Bank data from 2009. Mexico’s poverty rate is troublingly persistent in the NAFTA era. Using official 
figures from Mexico’s Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social 
(CONEVAL) Wilson and Silva show how poverty rates have declined on both the overall and extreme 
levels between 2010 and 2012 from 46.1 to 45.5% and 11.3 to 9.8% respectively. However the number 
of impoverished Mexicans has increased due to population increases, and income-based poverty is 
rising. Christopher Wilson and Gerardo Silva ‘Mexico’s Latest Poverty Stats’ Wilson Center: Mexico 
Institute http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Poverty_Statistics_Mexico_2013.pdf  
Accessed 07.07.14 The World Bank has charted a steady increase in the ‘Poverty Headcount Ratio at 
National Poverty Line’ in recent years, from 42.9% of the population in 2006, to 52.3% in 2012 The 
World Bank ‘Data: Poverty Headcount Ratio at National Poverty Line (% of Population’ The World 
Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC/countries/MX?display=graph Accessed 
08.09.14   
78 Brands ‘Mexico’s Narco-Insurgency’ p.19-20  
79 Neither employed nor in education, or in the Spanish colloquialism ni estudian, ni trabajan, or ‘ni-
ni’s’ 
80 Shannon K. O’Neil‘Mexico’s NiNis’ Council on Foreign Relations (November 2011) 
http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2011/11/04/mexico’s-ninis/ Accessed 05.11.11; Ioan Grillo ‘Mexico’s Lost 
Youth: Generation Narco’ Time (November 7th, 2010) 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2028912,00.html#ixzz1Z5H2ssA3 Accessed 5.11.11  
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intelligence, training, and equipment transfers, has been argued to increase violence 
as cartels compete for territories vacated by arrested/killed cartel leaders, take 
advantage of increased instability and insecurity, and smaller gangs proliferate in 
power vacuums left by government offensives. Many of these accounts are, 
“qualitative and descriptive” in nature.82 For example, Shirk contends that, “that inter-
cartel dynamics and the government’s chosen strategy to combat organized crime 
groups by targeting top leadership structures has contributed to the fractionalization of 
organized crime groups [and] more severe and disorganized violence.”83 Corcaran 
cites a phenomenon dubbed the ‘cockroach effect’, whereby, “the government 
cracking down in one region will, at best, lead to the criminal actors scurrying to other 
locales. As they set up shop in their new residence, the criminal exiles are no less 
violent than before”.84 Guerrero-Gutiérrez has found more quantitative evidence that 
violence rates increase after the arrest or ‘killing’ of a high-ranking cartel operative.85  
 
These conclusions are not a matter of particular controversy. Indeed similar 
conclusions are often part of the more critically-inclined literature we come onto 
below.86 This literature also demonstrates an awareness that drug violence has 
increased very sharply since Calderón launched his military offensive in Michoacán 
in December 2006, whilst the MI continues. However the response to the more 
negative findings within the ‘drug war rationale’ literature has not been an automatic 
rejection or wide-ranging critique of the U.S. strategy itself. Dell instead argues that 
her research should be used to employ a more informed ‘crackdown’ approach, in line 
with Guerrero-Gutiérrez’s argument that the Mexican government should target 
singular cartels progressively, rather than collectively.87 This ties in with the fact that 
elements of this literature do not treat rising levels of violence and spiraling body 
counts as the key indices of policy success or failure. Olsen et al express this view in 
arguing that, “it is entirely possible that the violence will get worse before it gets 
better, even if public policies have succeeded in weakening the grip of organized 
crime.” They go on to state that violence may decline even as the power of one or a 
group of cartels increases, and its/their ability to corrupt the Mexican state grows 
symbiotically with that power.88 Nonetheless, policy prescriptions in how to better 
tackle cartels are offered. 
 
 
                                                
82 Dell Trafficking Networks p.7 
83 David A Shirk Drug Violence and State Responses in Mexico (Manuscript: University of San Diego, 
2011) p.2 
84 Patrick Corcoran ‘Release of Mexico Murder Stats Reveals Shifting Landscape’ Insight Crime 
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Thus, for many of these analysts, the problems are characterised as simply too 
embedded to respond quickly to the policies that are designed to mitigate them. As 
Olsen et al summarise, “The weakness of Mexico’s domestic security apparatus — 
the ineffectiveness and corruption of police forces, the judiciary, and the entire 
criminal justice system — severely limits the state’s capacity, and requires deep, 
sustained changes over the long term.”89 In addition, whilst remaining supportive of 
the broad thrust of the Mérida programme and the positives of “bilateral and 
multilateral security cooperation”,90 many cite a need for deeper collaboration in 
specific policy areas, and even a refocus of policy, away from traditional ‘supply side’ 
drug policies and towards a more holistic effort that encompasses increased efforts in 
a number of policy areas. Again, Olsen et al charge that the Mexican government’s 
strategy has been too heavily biased towards military interdiction efforts. They go on 
to state: 
 
 On the U.S. side, funding for the Mérida Initiative […] largely  
 appears to reinforce the shortcomings of Mexico’s efforts by  
 underfunding judicial reform while prioritizing the “presence  
 and patrol” strategy used thus far by the military and law  
 enforcement agencies. Moreover, efforts to curb the flow of drug  
 money and weapons south, while significantly enhanced in the  
 last three years, appear to fall far short of weakening the drug  
 trafficking organizations.”91  
  
The more holistic policy proffered would include ‘demand-side’ drug treatment 
programmes in the U.S., a crackdown on firearms smuggling, a serious effort to tackle 
the drug profits laundered in both countries, and so on.92 It would also incorporate 
much bolstered efforts to aid Mexico’s economic development utilising increased 
economic and social programmes, a renewed endeavor to reform Mexico’s judicial 
system to tackle impunity, and the continued strengthening of public institutions in 
the name of efficacy and anti-corruption.93 Despite the fact that the Military-Based 
accounts take, as their starting point, that Mexico is experiencing something akin to 
an insurgency, there is still significant correlation between the two literatures 
regarding the need for a multi-area effort or, “whole-of-government” approach94 that 
would attempt to tackle the “structural” elements of the problem95 as well as a far 
greater focus on specific issues such as money laundering and gun smuggling.96 Thus 
some analysts have been cheered by the Obama Administration’s ‘Beyond Mérida’ 
approach, which they argue takes further steps in this multi-level policy direction, 
incorporating more, “binational collaboration to combat DTOs, greater assistance to 
strengthen the judicial sector, more effective interdiction efforts through twenty-first-
century border controls, and new social programs to revitalize Mexican communities 
                                                
89 ibid p.27 
90 Shirk ‘The Drug War in Mexico’ p.20 
91 Olsen et al ‘Introduction’ p.4 
92 For example, Shirk ‘The Drug War in Mexico’ p.20-26; O’Neil ‘The Real War in Mexico’ p.69-77 
93 Inter alia and for example, ibid; Olsen et al ‘Introduction’ p.28-30 
94 Andersen ‘‘Latin America’s Transnational Criminal Organizations’ 
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affected by crime and violence.”97 
 
The Military-Based literature, unsurprisingly, does give more credence to military 
solutions, including, in logical fashion, the use of COIN tactics. This includes 
deepening current policies, including the military training element, rather than an 
about-turn. Turbiville indicates that, “trained Mexican special operations units, as 
well as a number of other well-trained Mexican forces used in special operations 
roles, are executing many of the direct armed engagement missions against 
narcoparamilitaries” and, “they will be instrumental in effecting any positive change 
in Mexico’s still deteriorating security environment.”98 As Andersen has recognised, 
this military focus in the drug war in Latin America has troubled human rights and 
liberal think-tank organisations such as Washington Office on Latin America 
(WOLA), which foresee a return to the dark past of military control.99 Some analysts 
have also highlighted the threat of potential military overreach in Mexico. Even prior 
to Mérida, Freeman and Sierra highlighted the hazards of increased military aid to 
Mexico.100 More recently, Lindau has written of the re-consolidation of military and 
executive power that is taking place in the drug war context.101 However, this is at the 
sharp end of the debate, and much of the Crime-Based literature falls into the middle 
ground in arguing that the military are likely to play a role (not least because of the 
endemic corruption in the Mexican police), but that it must be balanced with 
economic and social programmes, and that it must be a stopgap whilst institutional 
reform takes place.102 This is part of a wider shared belief across the drug war 
rationale literature that what the U.S. policy in Mexico needs to succeed is renewed 
effort, and time. 
 
Reviewing the Drug War Rationale Literature 
Notwithstanding these debates, and despite the recognition of the problems that beset 
the MI and U.S-Mexican security collaboration on drugs, the fundamental point here 
in terms of what I will attempt to argue in this project is that these analysts are 
focusing on Mérida as a CN-based aid package. To drive the point home, this has 
been done without a deep investigation of the actual policy itself. This is my crucial 
first observation. Bailey sums up the position of much of this literature when it comes 
to the intent of U.S. policy, and is worth quoting at length. He contends that, “With 
respect to the United States, the strategies could be viewed as ‘working’ in the short 
term in the sense that the quality and price of illegal drugs remained relatively stable 
in major urban markets.” He also focuses on spillover violence as a key short-term 
goal (contending there is not enough evidence on this to make a clear judgment). He 
continues, “With respect to longer-term judgments”, based on the longer-term 
reduction of violence, in turn based on the undermining of cartel power by various 
means, “much depends on the performance of institutions and programs that are being 
                                                
97 Shirk ‘The Drug War in Mexico’ p.15 
98 Turbiville ‘U.S. Military Engagement with Mexico’ p.46-47 
99 Andersen ‘‘Latin America’s Transnational Criminal Organizations’ Of course Mexico avoided 
military control during the Cold War. 
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assembled and implemented in the Obama Mérida” (i.e. the Four Pillar approach) 
Bailey contends that if these institutions and programmes can reduce violence in the 
long-term in cities like Ciudad Juárez, then the U.S. would consider Mérida a 
success.103 Clearly then, the policy is seen in CN terms. However, this conclusion is 
based on a narrow examination of actual Mérida policy, not looking particularly 
deeply at some of the available material on policy detail, or connecting the Initiative 
to wider bilateral policies   
 
There are other gaps in the drug war rationale literature, less directly related to the 
central research aims of this project but pertinent nonetheless. Often this literature is 
cautious about deeper linkages between the CN strategy being employed and the 
violence itself. Economic underdevelopment and lack of necessary social spending, 
argued to be contributing to drug violence and resultant insecurity, is divorced from 
its historical and political context. We should see this instead as partly a consequence 
of the U.S. and IMF/World Bank backed project of the PRI in the 1980s (and the 
Partido Acción Nacional [PAN] since 2000) to rollback state economic involvement 
in a number of areas, maintain macroeconomic stability, and encourage attractiveness 
for foreign investment. Related to this, NAFTA’s role in improving the cartels’ hand 
through increased unemployment and further smuggling opportunities is mentioned, 
yet further economic integration and liberalisation are proffered as part of the solution 
to the problem.104 There at least appear to be questions here about how political 
economic policies have fed into Mexico’s security crisis. These issues are perhaps 
thornier than the dominant ‘drug war rationale’ literature has allowed for, and it has 
been left to the Critical literature to explore them. It is to this that we now turn.   
 
A Drug War Pretext 
 
This section summarises the more critical literature around the MI that has posited 
that CN concerns act more as a ‘pretext’ than an overriding motivating factor in U.S. 
policy. I approach this literature in a slightly different fashion to the previous section 
in that I first look at how it describes the nature of the violence currently afflicting 
large areas of Mexico. This literature claims variously that the levels of violence are 
underplayed, that who is committing the violence is oversimplified, and that the 
structural and functional violence of the Mexican state against Mexican civil society, 
in defence of political / class interests, is obscured or ignored. This gives us the 
correct context in which to consider the arguments regarding the U.S.’ involvement in 
this ‘hidden’ side of Mexico’s security crisis and, more importantly, what interests 
may motivate its involvement. This is based around an emphasis on the U.S. desire to 
stabilise Mexico’s open political-economy. Watt and Zepeda crystallise the position 
of much of this literature in stating that, “U.S./Mexico policy would appear to 
prioritise protecting and developing unpopular economic interests, while employing 
heavy-handed military and police methods to deter challenges from social movements 
and civil society, using the convenient pretext of the drug war.”105  
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Violence in Mexico 
According to the Critical literature, violence in Mexico is too multi-faceted to 
summarised as simply ‘drug-related’. The official figures on drug-related homicides 
provided by Mexican and U.S. authorities are treated with huge skepticism in many 
Critical analyses. Using figures obtained by the Mexican newspaper El Universal in 
2010,106 Bowden and Molloy contended that the, “federal government had 
investigated only 5 percent of the first 22,000 executions” and that this was no basis 
on which to claim, as the Mexican government had done, that the majority of those 
killed worked within the drug trade.107 In a study released in August 2013 Molloy 
undertook painstaking research to suggest 130,000 people may have died in the ‘drug 
war’ Calderón launched in December 2006.108 The skepticism is well-founded, given 
that the various datasets used by various official bodies all have conflicting totals and 
inputs which further confuse the picture. An official government database released in 
January 2011 stated there had been 35,000 drug-related deaths, but it did not specify 
how ‘drug-related’ was ascertained. The Mexican government’s office for national 
statistics, INEGI, periodically releases homicide figures, but does not differentiate 
between drug-related and ‘normal’ homicides. In addition, Mexican newspapers keep 
their own, different, tallies.109 In any case, the chronic lack of investigation and levels 
of impunity renders these counts largely meaningless in terms of real detail, indicating 
only the existence of a large-scale problem. The true number of violent deaths, both 
associated with the drug trade or otherwise, could even be higher given wide scale 
under-reporting and practises of the cartels.110  
 
The lack of investigation and clarity about homicide figures and their association to 
the drug trade is disturbing in itself. However, what truly animates these critical 
analyses is the assertion that the automatic designation of violence in Mexico as 
‘drug-related’ and stemming overwhelmingly from the cartels’ actions is obfuscating 
violence committed by other actors, including state actors, in pursuit of various goals. 
Again, this violence is multi-faceted. A prevalent theme is that Mexican state 
                                                                                                                                      
and therefore they unable or not designed to tackle the crisis. This is also due to the Mexican state 
having motives other than stopping drug violence, not least because so much of it is caught up in the 
drug trade according to these accounts. Therefore major and radical alternatives arising from civil 
society are necessary, but often choked off at the source by the very security policies the U.S. and 
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in Focus (October 29th, 2007) http://fpif.org/plan_mexico/ Accessed 23.05.09 
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http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/689120.html Accessed 10.01.12  
107 Charles Bowden & Molly Molloy ‘Who is Behind the 25,000 Deaths in Mexico?’ The Nation (July 
23rd, 2010) http://www.thenation.com/article/37916/who-behind-25000-deaths-mexico?page=0,0 
Accessed 10.01.12  
108 Molly Molloy ‘The Mexican Undead: Towards a New History of the ‘Drug War’ Killing Fields’ 
Small Wars Journal (Aug 21st, 2013) Molloy, who has paid unrivalled attention to this issue and uses a 
triangulation of the overall homicide figures provided by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y 
Geografía (INEGI - http://www.inegi.org.mx) in her tally. This means murders not strictly ‘drug-
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by the government.  
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institutions are not just corrupted by cartels in specific locales, but that the Mexican 
state is intimately involved in the battle for control of drug profits that enter the 
country. Gibler quotes a Mexican journalist who argues there are two ‘drug wars’ in 
Mexico; “la Guerra del Narco,” or the official U.S.-backed government war on 
cartels as described in the majority of the literature, and “la Narcoguerra,” in which 
various state entities and actors, allied with various cartels, fight for control of the 
Mexican drug trade. The second of these wars is real, the other, a spectacle.111 
Bowden uses a similar distinction, though perhaps goes even further in arguing that 
the first drug war simply, “does not exist” and that the “line between the government 
and drug world has never existed.”112 As does much of the critical literature, Mercille 
shares the view that the PRI exercised a level of control over the drug trade prior to 
the 1980s and 90s, and that the breakdown of this control is contributing to violence. 
However, in contrast to the ‘drug war rationale’ approach, he contends that, 
“significant sectors of the Mexican government and security forces are still associated 
with it.”113 Gibler summarises this viewpoint elsewhere by contending: 
 
   …in Mexico, drug trafficking on its present scale is only  
  made possible through the active participation of government  
  employees, elected politicians, army generals and commandos,  
  police chiefs and patrol officers, prison guards, and local and  
  federal judges by protecting one set of drug traffickers from  
  another and, importantly, from incarceration.114  
 
State actors, then, are argued to be committing violent acts in a war for drugs, rather 
than against it. Gibler again cites a Mexican journalist who was subjected to a 
harrowing experience in Reynosa, Tamaulipas, where Los Zetas and El Cartel del 
Golfo (CDG) were vying for supremacy of the border town. The journalist 
encountered Cartel del Golfo operatives brazenly patrolling the streets in SUVs 
mounted with automatic weapons. The local police were acting as lookouts for Golfo 
against Los Zetas. Someone, possibly those police, tipped Golfo operatives off as to 
the journalist’s whereabouts, and he and his partner were subjected to a precise 
beating designed to inflict maximum pain in specific areas, and then questioned by 
men in military style uniform that sported CDG insignia carrying assault rifles and 
grenades.115 Bowden’s descriptions of Juárez convey the sense that the local police, 
who suffer high casualties in the city, are more likely to be killed for being with the 
wrong cartel than for being in the police per se.116 He cites the dramatic increase in 
the murder rate in Juárez after the arrival of the military in 2008, and draws (largely 
implicit) links between the two, due to the army also being a player in the drug battle. 
Campbell echoes these sentiments, contending that, “The thoroughly corrupt federal, 
state, and municipal police in Juárez viewed each other as enemies allied with rival 
                                                
111 John Gibler To Die In Mexico: Dispatches from Inside the Drug War (City Lights Books, 2011) 
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114 John Gibler Mexico Uncovered: Chronicles of Power and Revolt (City Lights Books, 2009) p.56 
115 Gibler To Die in Mexico p.147-158 
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branches of organized crime.”117  
 
In addition to accusations of direct involvement in the drug trade, these more critical 
analysts have documented the dramatic rise in human rights complaints against the 
military and Mexican federal police since Calderón deployed them in 2006. Again, 
Campbell summarises that, “Everywhere Calderón sent the military and federal 
police, the violence increased. In the states of Michoacán, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, 
Durango, and others, the bloody story was the same. Human rights violations and 
homicides […] skyrocketed.”118 This facet of Mexico’s security crisis has been 
recognised in a number of human rights reports that document intimidation, theft, 
torture, extra-judicial killings, rape and disappearances, for which there is an 
extremely low investigation and conviction rate within the military’s internal, 
secretive justice system.119 It has also been documented within the ‘drug war 
rationale’ literature itself, with Brands stating that military abuses, “allegedly include 
extrajudicial executions, illegal detentions, and torture.”120  
 
However, the critical analyses should be set apart from the ‘drug war rationale’ 
literature on this question of Mexican state actors involvement in violence and 
corruption within the ‘drug war’. Much of the ‘drug war pretext’ literature asserts that 
institutional violence has a structural and functional form that serves specific political 
and economic interests, rather than it being an unfortunate side-effect of military 
deployment, or result of institutional weakness or everyday corruption (that can be 
mitigated through Mexican efforts and U.S. training).121 These interests are seen in 
various lights, but often they involve viewing the Mexican state as made up of social 
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actors and indeed, social classes, who seek to protect and further those interests. Most 
crucially, whilst the ‘drug war rationale’ analyses have discussed the entrenched 
poverty and inequality of Mexico, they have not considered that this situation may 
itself stem from a political economic arrangement that is disproportionally beneficial 
to certain actors and classes, and that they would have an interest in maintaining that 
arrangement. Both in the fight for control of drug profits that significantly involves 
the state, and in Mexico’s economic elite using state institutions as a tool of its 
continued power, violence is seen to a good extent to be employed deliberately by 
state actors against sections of the population. 
 
It is helpful to briefly illustrate some instances of functional state violence. Cases are 
presented at multiple levels; from regional and specific incidences with highly 
localised issues, to country-wide examples of the efficacy of state violence on a 
national scale. Gibler highlights examples on both the national and local scale. 
Nationally, the widespread and well-documented use of torture122 by various levels of 
the police, and the Mexican military, is regarded not as an “aberration”, or an 
irregularity of the Mexican system, but instead as a crucial component of the system 
that helps ensure political and economic inequality is sustained through repression of 
elements of society who have the most interest in changing it.123 Gibler also provides 
examples of localised state violence, including a detailed discussion of the ‘Oaxaca 
Uprising’, in which protest groups took over the state capital in relation to a teachers 
strike in 2006. The broad-based protestors were subjected to violence and 
intimidation that culminated in street executions (a U.S. journalist was amongst the 
fatalities) by local and state police and paramilitaries related to the police and the state 
governor. In October 2006 federal police (federales) sent by President Fox cleared the 
protest camps with helicopters and anti-riot tanks, leaving three more dead.124  
 
Whilst protests on this scale have not been seen since, state repression is argued to be 
ongoing across Mexico, but especially in areas with high poverty and inequality, 
which brings with it agitation for change. Thus military intimidation and abuses 
continue in Chiapas, home of the EZLN social movement. This intimidatory 
atmosphere is argued to continue increasingly under the ‘pretext’ of the drug war.125 
Paterson asserts that Guerrero, which was a hotbed of political activism and 
insurgency in the 1970s and remains one of Mexico’s poorest states, has returned to a 
condition of ‘dirty war’ in which political dissidents and activists are intimidated, 
abused, disappeared and killed, again increasingly under a drug war “cloak.”126 For 
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example, he cites the intimidation and surveillance of Me’Phaa indigenous peoples, 
some of whom are due to act as witnesses in a case of military rape in the state, and 
the assassination of four Partido de Revolución Democrática Democratica (PRD - 
Mexico’s largest party of the left) leaders in 2010.127 In July 2011, gunmen 
assassinated activists Isabel Ayala Nava and her sister Reyna Ayala Nava. The former 
was the widow of 70s revolutionary leader Lucio Cabañas, and the murders took 
place as the Guerrero legislature prepared to look at proposals for a truth commission 
investigating alleged crimes in the military’s COIN operations in the 1970s.128 On 
December 7th 2011, two individuals associated with a campesino political group in 
Guerrero’s, Eva Alarcón and Marcial Bautista, were disappeared. “State agents” are 
alleged to be implicated in the disappearance, and several police officers have been 
arrested.129 The fatal police shooting of two students, also in December 2011, as they 
protested the lack of education and employment opportunities in the state, has further 
dramatically highlighted the issues in Guerrero. This is especially pertinent as 
authorities immediately attempted to implicate “outside elements,” (i.e. cartels) for 
the violence, a claim that has since been challenged by Mexico’s National Human 
Rights Commission.130  
 
This kind of violence is ongoing in Mexico. Whole families have been targeted in 
Ciudad Juárez following activism against military abuses, members of the much 
publicized anti drug war protest movement Moviemento por la Paz131 have been 
assassinated, anti-mining protestors have been killed, union leaders and members 
intimidated, and labor strikes broken with federal forces.132 Mexico is currently the 
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deadliest country in the world to practice journalism, with ten journalists killed year 
in 2011 (some of whom had apparently been reporting inconvenient matters for the 
authorities).133 Thus, critical analysts and human rights organisations have continued 
to highlight that there is a strand of violence in Mexico that is not automatically 
related to the battle for drug trafficking advantages and profits. However, the lines 
between drug violence, political violence, economic violence and so on are extremely 
blurry. Cartels may be as interested, if not more, in silencing journalists, intimidating 
restive indigenous communities and assassinating inconvenient activists and political 
leaders as a powerful, abusive military or an embattled Governor. This has become 
especially important with the rise of ‘civilian defence groups’ in Guerrero and 
Michoacán.134 Paterson argues, “Frequently, it is difficult to know where one conflict 
commences and another finishes, or where the murky underworld starts and the 
above-ground political system ends.” He goes on to source a report that claimed 
15,000 ex-soldiers had been arrested for criminality.135 In this complex situation, it 
seems clear at least that heightened levels of drug violence are intersecting and 
interacting with older patterns of repression in Mexico associated with its 
economically unequal history and repressive, autocratic governance.  
 
Interests at Stake: The MI and the U.S.’ Role 
However, the pertinent question for the aims of this project is what U.S. policy is 
intended to do in this context? Put simply, much of the ‘drug war pretext’ literature 
posits that the reason the U.S. provides training and equipment to institutions 
implicated in both drug trafficking and human rights abuses is that it is not seeking to 
produce blanket security and stability in Mexico, but security and stability for a 
particular type of political-economic order. That order - a neoliberal, free-trade based 
regional arrangement ‘locked in’ by NAFTA - is argued to have deeply scarred 
Mexico’s social fabric, exacerbated already entrenched social, political, and economic 
inequality, decimated much of Mexico’s rural economy, produced levels of increased 
unemployment and unstable employment, and generated social movements who 
directly attempt to reverse these trends. On the flipside, it is argued to have greatly 
benefitted both domestic and foreign investment capital and multinational 
corporations, transnational finance capital, the U.S’ regional economic hegemony, 
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and the elites of both countries.136 Crucially, the stability and security required to 
protect such an order makes sections of Mexican civil society that seek to challenge 
or modify the political-economic arrangement targets, rather than beneficiaries, of the 
Mexican security institutions the U.S. is seeking to strengthen.137 For many, this 
means these sections of society are seen as source of instability in U.S. planning. Watt 
contends that organised resistance to continuing and deepening neoliberalism, 
“certainly is the fear of those who drafted the Mérida Initiative, who […], believe the 
only way of preserving the present order is by investing in military training, 
Blackhawk helicopters and sophisticated weaponry.” He further argues that U.S. 
military training should be seen “in the light” of the Mexican state’s, “increasing 
attacks on organisers and activists of the anti-capitalist Zapatista initiative, La otra 
campaña, in Chiapas and the prolonged assault on inhabitants of Oaxaca in 2006”.138 
In these accounts, as Delgado-Ramos and María Romana succinctly put it, for the 
U.S., “It is market security that matters, not the security of the people.”139  
 
Thus, we begin to see in these analyses a rationale for the functionality of violence. It 
is two-tiered and interrelated in nature, having both a domestic, Mexican element, and 
a U.S.-directed element. Critical analysts place differing emphasis on each element. 
On the domestic front, both Gibler and Watt have drawn on the concept developed by 
Mexican sociologist Pablo González Casanova of, “internal colonization” in Mexico, 
whereby structures of colonial rule have remained in the country, only now they 
benefit a metropolitan elite demarked by (real) social, economic, political and indeed 
(perceived) racial ‘advantages’.140 These elites, along with domestic and foreign 
capital owners, have most benefitted from a neoliberal project that has been followed 
in Mexico since the early 1980s as wealth has gravitated to the top sections of 
society.141 Meanwhile, traditionally marginalised sections of society, such as 
indigenous peoples and the large number of Mexico’s poor, have seen their lot worsen 
as rural livelihoods were decimated by cheap U.S agricultural imports encouraged by 
NAFTA, and state subsidies and social programmes were removed as part of the turn 
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to neoliberalism.142 Watt has agued that this ‘internal colonisation’ has, “deepened 
post-1982”.143 Gibler states that through interaction with historical structures of 
repression and inequality, neoliberalism has ensured, “Mexico contains one of the 
greatest, most obscene gulfs between its wealthiest and most destitute citizens of all 
the nations on the planet” and, moreover, “This gulf has both a past and a present 
populating with specific people making deliberate decisions, those who opened the 
gulf on purpose and continue to manage its widening reach, and those who rebel 
against it.”144 In this light, much of the violence committed by state actors that we 
briefly detailed above is seen as a repressive tool to maintain the Mexican elite’s class 
power in Mexico and forestall serious political-economic change stemming from civil 
society. 
 
In sharp contrast to the drug war rationale literature, these critical voices assert that 
the U.S. also plays an active role in sustaining this arrangement within Mexico. This 
conclusion is shared across the drug war pretext literature, although through a 
reflection of a wider debate about the role of states within economic globalisation. For 
Gibler, the U.S. has played a crucial role in fermenting the current situation within 
Mexico through its economic policies, and now seeks to ensure its continuance with 
military aid. The elites of Mexico and U.S. officials are seen as acting in concert in 
the imposition of neoliberalism upon the Mexican people, which is seen as benefitting 
the dual interests of the ruling class and capital in both countries. The state violence 
now required to ensure the stability of the unequal model against understandable 
resistance and unintended instability is also seen as mutually beneficial. It is not a 
case of the U.S.A. dominating Mexico in pursuance purely of its own benefit. Gibler 
instead contends: 
        
  … to reduce state violence in Mexico to a puppet’s moves  
  on behalf of the looming giant is to profoundly misunderstand  
  the nature of both the state and of contemporary imperialism.  
  A tiny elite political class has benefitted tremendously from  
  implementing the mandates of U.S. economic imperialism in  
  Mexico. The number of millionaires and billionaires grows  
  with the number of people dispossessed. The Mexican state  
  exercises forms of internal imperialism that overlap entirely  
  with the dictates of the United States.145 
 
Thus, Gibler’s arguments plug into wider debates about modern imperialism in global 
politics, the role of the United States as a contemporary imperial power, and, indeed, 
the nature of the state in contemporary life and a globalising economy. He eschews 
classic definitions of imperialism that focus on the dominance of one state over 
another. Instead, he follows (explicitly) the work of Hardt and Negri146 and 
(implicitly) that of Robinson,147 in arguing that despite the continuing importance of 
the United States as a, “center of imperial power”, the reality of contemporary 
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imperialism is that it is significantly decoupled from the nation-state and now resides 
in capital and transnational class power. Empire, “stands above, and the nation-state 
serves its will.”148 In this conception, we should view the MI as significantly in 
support of class and capital interests, rather than state interests, and these interests are 
seen as increasingly borderless or ‘transnational’. Seiler has a slightly differing but 
related conclusion, in which, “The strategy of the United States, acting in the interest 
of its dominant class, consists of creating a (global) historic bloc conducive to 
transnational capital accumulation.”149 Again, following Robinson, Seiler argues that 
an emergent transnational capitalist class and its preferred accumulation regime 
(neoliberalism) has not achieved a stable hegemony over the mass of the global 
population, and thus requires a degree of coercion to push through its interests. In this 
context the drug war serves to allow the U.S. to directly intervene in repressive 
support of the “Post-Fordist”, or neoliberal, accumulation model as practiced in 
Mexico.150 
 
Whilst acknowledging the role and advantages afforded to Mexican elites and 
transnational capital through the neoliberal turn, other critical analysts still maintain 
that the U.S. as a state has imperial or hegemonic interests in preserving Mexico’s 
political-economic status quo. Watt argues that it was obvious from the outset that the 
NAFTA agreement, “would privilege the most powerful of the three economies and 
was an attempt to bolster economic and hegemonic control by the United States in 
Mexico and the region.”151 Mercille concurs, arguing that NAFTA and neoliberalism 
in Mexico represent U.S. “hegemonic projects.”152 For Delgado-Ramos and María 
Romana, “The current economic, political, and security model implemented by the 
United States establishes the conditions for indirect but substantial interference on 
behalf of U.S. interests and the interests of its Mexican associates.” These interests 
are conceptualised as state-based in that they are grounded substantially in resource 
extraction, deemed strategically and economically crucial by U.S. planners.153 
Seeking to offer a conception that is able to pull together the various strands of U.S. 
imperial interests, class interests, and the interests of transnational capital, Stokes and 
Raphael contend that the U.S. operates a, “dual logic” approach that allows 
transnational capital and domestic elites significant accumulative advantages, and 
helps strengthen U.S. power and influence vis-à-vis other states by making the elites 
in those states, and transnational capital, reliant on U.S. security provision and 
maintenance of a stable global order.154 In Mexico, this has involved U.S. provision of 
military aid that insulates the ‘co-opted’ domestic elite from the social forces 
unleashed by an unequal neoliberal economy, seeks to ensure a stable environment for 
transnational capital to operate in, and aims to guarantee safe United States access to 
Mexico’s crucial energy reserves.155 
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151 Watt ‘NAFTA 15 Years On’ 
152 Mercille ‘Violent Narco-Cartels’ p.1640 
153 Delgado-Ramos & Romana ‘Political-Economic Factors in U.S. Foreign Policy p.94 
154 Stokes and Raphael Global Energy Security  
155 ibid p.212 
Paul Ashby: NAFTA-Land Security: The Mérida Initiative, Transnational Threats, and U.S. Security Projection in 
Mexico  
PhD Thesis 
University of Kent 
 
61 
Regardless of the debate surrounding the postulated diminishing significance of the 
state or U.S. imperialism, these critical analyses share at their heart a conviction that 
one cannot simply discuss ‘U.S.’ or ‘Mexican’ interests without considering the 
political-economic interests associated with variegated social classes and capital. In 
all the critical conceptions we have covered, the elites of the U.S. and Mexico are 
argued to be benefitting far more than the majority of their domestic populations, 
(especially in Mexico itself) from the current neoliberal, free trade, political-economic 
relationship. Again this contrasts with the more optimistic analysis around NAFTA, 
the MI and wider North American integration. In those takes, the acknowledged 
problems of NAFTA are often said to require deeper, more thoughtful integration and 
opening up of trade and investment opportunities.156 Instead in the ‘drug war pretext’ 
literature, albeit to varying degrees, the powers of the state (economic, political, and 
increasingly police/military) are being used to protect and enhance elite interests, and 
that the unequal effects of NAFTA and neoliberalism are integral to their real 
purpose. As Watt puts it, the current arrangement, “benefits elites […] Rendering the 
population more desperate, reducing services and public spending, aggravating 
society's vulnerability, rewards the powerful with greater political and economic 
dominance.”157 This is a crucial distinction from the literature that posits a ‘drug war 
rationale’ behind the MI, and more substantively speaking benign motives behind the 
integrative agenda with Mexico. 
 
Policy Failure? The Drug War, Neoliberalism and Instability 
In the critical literature, the drug war in Mexico is relegated to secondary significance 
for U.S. planners. Given that the political-economic model in Mexico is argued to 
increase elite political and economic power, and that U.S. and Mexican elites share in 
the spoils of this arrangement (to the detriment of wider populations), the drug war is 
often seen in the critical literature as merely a convenient pretext to intervene in 
pursuit of other goals. However, certain critical analysts have also begun to posit that 
the very neoliberal model that ensures continuing elite power is also significantly 
culpable for the rise in drug violence and relative power of cartels, both involving 
state actors and otherwise. Given that the U.S. is concerned with the ‘instability’ 
provoked by social movements and popular opposition to economic policies that 
benefit its interests (or the interests of its elite, or transnational capital), does this 
literature consider that it may also be concerned by rising drug violence and powerful 
cartels? How far is the stated CN aim of U.S. policy only seen as a pretext within this 
literature? There is a debate here that is worth looking into to clarify where the 
literature stands on this issue, to further demarcate it from ‘drug war rationale’ 
analysis, and, most importantly, to think about how its conclusions on this issue affect 
its assessment of Mérida’s intentions. 
 
Notwithstanding the state and state-implicated abuses to protect a neoliberal political 
economy and the connection between state agents and the drug war, a selection of 
critical arguments also retain a clear sense of the unfolding tragedy in the country that 
is associated with the rise of the cartels. Watt, echoing some of the ‘drug war 
rationale’ literature above, contends that, “the power and influence of the state have 
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weakened in the last two and a half decades to the extent that in some areas drug 
traffickers operate quite freely and are immune to prosecution.”158 Much of the 
explanation for this power shift echoes the more ‘mainstream’ literature - the 
suppression of Carribbean trafficking routes, the demise of the major Colombian 
cartels, Mexico’s democratisation, and the frustrated economic hopes of large 
numbers of the population. All of these are argued to have played their part in 
strengthening cartels’ economic power, and therefore their power to influence events, 
in relation to Mexico’s central state.159 However, the crucial point for the Critical 
analysts is how these factors coalesce with and correspond to Mexico’s U.S. 
supported neoliberal turn in the 1980s. Neoliberal economic reforms are argued to be 
increasing cartel strength through their association with increased poverty, the 
subsequent creation of informal economic sectors, and the increased opportunities 
they have provided for smuggling and money laundering.160 The retreat of the state is 
not only the result of growing cartel power or rampant corruption, but also part of a 
deliberate neoliberal policy choice. Increased ‘neoliberalisation’, or further free trade 
commitments and U.S.-Mexican economic collaboration, is argued to be likely to 
exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, the drug problem.161 Cartels are argued to thrive in 
the ‘neoliberal’ environment, where the state has pulled back and poverty 
entrenched.162 Vulliamy has even argued cartels are a logical outcome of a new 
globalised, neoliberal economic reality - a chimerical fusion of transnational shipping 
firm, social organisation, and ruthless private army.163 The failure to prevent cartels 
acting with impunity and increasing their power through continued drug trafficking 
could be argued to harm U.S. interests, stemming from the fact that the neoliberal 
economy U.S. policy seeks to protect is generating its own security problems.  
 
However, as I have already established, the ‘drug war pretext’ literature does not 
consider the U.S. to be interested in security and stability in Mexico per se, but the 
security and stability of a particular political-economic arrangement. Thus there 
would need to be a discussion within this literature about how cartels threaten 
political-economic stability, not just the security of citizens. There is not a sense of 
this assertion in the majority of this literature. Indeed for many the interests of 
U.S./Mexican elites and the cartels are argued to be complementary, and even if this 
is not argued to be the case, the cartels still play a useful role for U.S. planners. At the 
sharp end of the arguments in this spectrum the continuing drug trade and 
concomitant war is almost perfectly attuned to the interests of powerful class and 
capital factions in the U.S. Gibler asserts that drug trafficking has a level of 
usefulness for elites in both the billions in profits that it generates from sales, which 
inevitably enters the legal economy, and the pretext it provides for forms of social 
control to maintain social inequalities. The failure to tackle illegal drug trafficking in 
Mexico and to create stability as part of a failed drug war:   
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  …it is not a failure, of course; illegality increases the value  
  of the commodity, and illegality allows for massive funding  
  of police and military repression and mechanisms of social  
  control. The drug war is a horrid success of state violence  
  and capitalist accumulation, a cash intoxicated marketplace  
  that simply budgets for murder and political graft to keep  
  things running smoothly.164 
 
There are other similar, if less strident accounts. Mercille cites the head of the UN 
Office on Drugs and Crime Antonio Maria Costa’s claim that drug money had 
provided vital liquid capital to banks that may otherwise have failed during the credit 
crisis, and a number of cases of money laundering by major U.S. banks that resulted 
in little penalty, as evidence of the transfusion of illegal money into the legal 
economy.165 Watt frames the issue slightly differently, arguing that, “the US and 
Mexican governments want control, rather than elimination, of the narcotics trade”, 
not least as the drug trade liquidity is argued to be propping up the Mexican 
economy.166  
 
However, even for those who do not cite tangible rewards to be gained by capital 
interests, there are still advantages for the U.S. in the continued existence of cartels in 
Mexico. For Delgado-Ramos and María Romana, the escalating drug and associated 
crime problems across Latin America afford the U.S. a new opportunity to implement, 
“stabilization-destabilization” programmes in the continent.167 The MI exemplifies 
just such a programme; stabilising markets for capital and resource extraction, whilst 
destabilising civil society and opposition.168 This is an account reflecting the critical 
distinction between ‘market’ and ‘human’ security. Seiler, who acknowledges the 
threat posed by cartels in Mexico to U.S. interests, nevertheless summarises that a 
continuing, “War on Drugs provides the United States as well as the Mexican 
government the perfect excuse for the militarization of society in order to be able to 
remove destabilizing forces, such as the drug trade or counter-hegemonic groups like 
the EZLN.”169 Across all of these accounts, no matter whether they treat the drug 
trade and cartels as a threat, convenient tool, or (as is most often the case) both, the 
U.S. is argued to be focused upon political-economic rather than CN considerations, 
and the cartels are conceptualised as secondary threats behind the social forces that 
threaten economic change.  As Stokes and Raphael put it, the, “the origins of [the 
Mérida Initiative] lie less in an escalated sense of threat regarding drugs than in […] a 
desire to protect the free trade model in Mexico.”170 
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Reviewing the Drug War Pretext Literature 
When considering what impact actual drug violence in Mexico has on U.S. interests, 
much of the ‘drug war pretext’ literature effectively ‘doubles down’ on seeing the 
drug war and CN concerns in Mexico as largely of less importance than, “political-
economic factors” in motivating the MI, and even in places suggests drugs are 
somewhat of a red herring. This understanding of U.S. drug policy is hermetically 
sealed from the ‘true’ political-economic goals within the MI, only coming into 
contact as a cover for policies that actually have ’economic interests’ in mind. Again, 
I will look a little more closely at these conclusions below before we address one 
question at the heart of this project. However some small points can again be made 
preemptively here. Effectively the same gaps exist in this set of literature as did in the 
‘drug war rationale’ research. Despite some important insights that we will need to 
take forward, understanding what ‘U.S.’ interests are in this case still requires 
theoretical exploration and historical examination of U.S. foreign policy and 
specifically bilateral policy with Mexico. This literature also does not engage in 




In this very brief section I highlight a couple of pieces of work that are worth looking 
into in a little more detail outside of the main categories I have delineated above. It is 
important to do this not to only fully capture the range of work on Mérida and avoid 
the potential problem of incompleteness, but also to put my own research into this 
complete picture. These pieces of work also lead us nicely into the final part of this 
Review as we begin to look at the MI in the wider context of North American 
integration. Firstly, Kenny and Serrano’s work on what they deem as ‘Mexico’s 
security failure’ warrants closer interrogation. The thrust of their argument is based 
around the interaction between the Mexican state and cartel activity. Making a deeper 
argument about the nature of the state, they show the fundamental, sedimentary and 
extensive interrelationship between the Mexican state, drug trafficking, and drug 
traffickers at all state levels from local to elite, built up in the years of PRI rule, but 
extending past that and into Mexico’s democratic transition.171 They go on to explore 
the consequences stemming from the breakdown and continuing, violent transfiguring 
processes underway in Mexico within these relationships.172 Thus Mexico’s violence 
is seen as the product of its particular path of state formation.173 Pansters makes a 
similar theoretically-based argument along similar lines in his edited volume on the 
relations between violence and state-making in contemporary Mexico, which also 
contends ‘drug violence’ cannot be easily separated from other forms of violence that 
trace through Mexican development.174  
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Moreover in terms of my aims, Kenny and Serrano tie Calderón’s strategy to ‘take on’ 
the cartels to domestic politics and the effort to undercut the Mexican left, whom in 
2006 had just lost a highly contentious and charged election (by only 0.58%). This 
was connected to a longer-term goal of militarising the Mexican state, and 
‘reconfiguring’ it on an, “authoritarian setting”, whereby “due process and human 
rights were seen as obstacles to the elimination of criminals.”175 In this way, when it 
comes to the nature of Mexico’s crisis and the Mexican administration’s response, 
Kenny and Serrano are more in line with the critical work we saw in the ‘Drug War 
Pretext’ section, whilst treating the security crisis within Mexico as associated 
directly with drug trafficking, and offering an explanatory analysis of this that is more 
rooted in Mexico’s state development and its failure to ‘correct the mutation’ that it 
grew up with; the envelopment of drug trafficking and organised crime within state 
structures.176 It especially focuses on the mistaken policies undertaken in Calderón’s 
‘drug war’, which in the account provided by the authors succeeded only in stirring a 
hornet’s nest and increasing violence.177 Thus whilst their work on U.S. policy is less 
clear, the implication is the U.S. is supporting, and in some sense guiding, a failed 
Mexican policy within a failed drug war paradigm.178 However that paradigm is not 
opened up particularly in terms of why it continues to exist - especially in the face of 
such an apparent failure of policy to achieve its stated goals.179 
 
Kilroy, Sumano and Hataley focus more fixedly on the intentions of U.S. policy, and 
again offer some insights not as easily attuned to the major sections of literature 
above. For the most part they do focus on Mexico’s security crisis within the ‘drug 
war rationale’. However they offer a much broader conception of U.S. aims in this 
regard. Discussing the U.S. War on Drugs in wider terms, they contend: 
 
  Since 9/11, US international drug control and related national 
  security goals have focused on reducing the flow of illicit drugs  
  into the United States; disrupting and dismantling major drug  
  trafficking organizations, strengthening the democratic and law  
  enforcement institutions of partner nations threatened by illegal  
  drugs; and reducing the underlying financial and other support  
  that drug trafficking provides to international terrorist  
  organizations.180  
     
Kilroy et al insist the U.S. is genuinely concerned over the intersection of drug 
trafficking with other transnational threats, not least terrorism.181 The threat of 
transnational actors and ‘narcoterrorists’ is present elsewhere in the extant literature, 
but this study very strongly highlights that that the MI itself goes beyond drug-
trafficking. It also connects the MI with broader U.S. strategic aims to improve 
regional security in North America after 9/11 in line with the priorities of the SPP, the 
trilateral initiative to synergise security and deepen economic integration within the 
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NAFTA zone amongst the three North American countries. Kilroy et al are concerned 
with showing how U.S. attempts to bring Mexico into a wider-ranging security 
framework stretched back before Mérida, and that its concerns included potential 
natural disasters and Mexican domestic terrorism, including political violence from 
the left (which is explicitly linked to the adoption of the MI).182 They connect this to a 
U.S. desire to create a new “defense perimeter” in the wake of 9/11 that would better 
protect the U.S. “homeland” and North America from “external and internal threats”, 
albeit this aim sat (often uneasily) with a continued U.S. focus on its own border 
security.183 This work provides us with a neat segue into the next section, which looks 
at how the extant literature on the MI has placed it within its wider continental 
backdrop: North American integration. There are key differences between the 
literature here, and the view of Kilroy et al is not widely shared.  
 
 
North American Integration and the MI 
 
The MI is situated within wider bilateral and regional dynamics around U.S. Mexican 
relations, and the continuing economic integration in North America engendered by 
NAFTA. There are a number of studies that discuss the prospect of further integration 
within North America to improve or introduce North American governance over 
apparently distinct North American issues. The fallout from 9/11, which hugely 
impacted the NAFTA economy as the usual massive flow of trade was interrupted, 
has spurred an academic discussion reflective of a policy debate concerning how to 
‘secure openness’ - i.e. how to maintain an open and integrated NAFTA economy 
whilst also ensuring that very economy and national borders are secured from 
potential threats.184 This literature was spurred further by the announcement of the 
SPP, which promised security cooperation between Canada, the U.S., and Mexico. 
Much of the literature above also drew connections between NAFTA and the 
generation or deepening of the bilateral drug trafficking problem, for example in the 
increase in licit trade within which drugs can be smuggled, the empowerment of illicit 
transnational actors within integrated economies, or the socioeconomic problems still 
faced by Mexico. The literature on the MI has discussed how NAFTA has thus far 
failed to tackle these problems sufficiently, or how it has deepened such issues 
(depending on the interpretation).  
 
Therefore much of the extant literature that discusses the MI within this wider context 
has included the bilateral aid programme as ‘part of the story’, especially in terms of 
what generates Mexico’s security challenges around drug trafficking. However the 
most significant section of it has often also separated Mérida from wider integrative 
                                                
182 ibid p.148-156 With regard to the domestic terrorism, the authors refer to the sustained and quite 
sophisticated attacks on oil and gas pipelines in 2007. We look at these attacks in more detail in the 
Policy Breakdown chapter. 
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policy proposals between the NAFTA countries  (or lack thereof, again depending on 
the particular interpretation), and treated it as a distinct, bilateral undertaking 
specifically designed to tackle Mexico’s drug-related security crisis. This works 
within or is a part of the ‘drug war rationale’ position identified above. However, 
some of this literature has explicitly made those links between regionalised security 
processes, and the wider priorities as expressed in the SPP. Finally some of the 
‘Pretext’ literature has developed these links even further. In these latter readings 
Mérida is a bilateral continuation or actualisation of the security integration 
envisioned by the SPP respectively, not (just or principally) a specific policy 
development to counter Mexico’s security crisis by tackling Mexican cartels. It is 
worth briefly overviewing some of this literature and looking at the MI from the angle 
of North American integration and its connection to NAFTA.  
 
North American Security Integration: Mérida as Distinct 
The majority of the literature that discusses the MI within the ‘drug war rationale’ 
literature has separated out discussion of North American security integration to focus 
on the former as a CN package. Indeed, given that the SPP / security integration is not 
even mentioned in most of these works, it can be tough to provide a literal overview 
of this trend.185 Mérida is often simply discussed as an improvement in bilateral 
policies against drug trafficking, rather than something more bilaterally (or 
trilaterally) substantive. There are some examples where wider security logics and 
Mérida are discussed side by side that provide indicative points. Shirk has suggested 
that wider regional security drives like the SPP have, “complemented” greater 
bilateral U.S.-Mexican CN cooperation. However we should be clear that Shirk sees 
Mérida in terms of it being an U.S. aid programme to assist, “Mexican military and 
law enforcement in efforts to combat narcotrafficking and organized crime” under the 
Bush administration. The administration of President Obama has updated the 
Initiative to include more civil and social elements, but these are still animated by 
aims to reduce drug violence.186  
 
Another direct comparison is provided by Clarkson. He argues that the U.S. had 
effectively extended its security perimeter to Mexico when the Reagan administration 
made CN a national security issue in 1986.187 Nevertheless he notes some qualitative 
change towards a deeper, “continental security” and a NAFTA security perimeter post 
9/11, albeit one tempered by a continuing focus on the U.S. contiguous ‘border 
security’. He summarises, “Today, the two conceptions coexist in a not necessarily 
coherent tension in which the North American perimeter is the forward line for 
American, Canadian, and Mexican security, while the internal borders remain the 
basic barricade”.188 He seems to suggest some correlation with this wider logic in 
connecting Mérida to discussions on anti-terrorism cooperation,189 and even notes 
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(like Kilroy et al) that anti-terrorist funding formed part of the MI itself.190 Elsewhere, 
however, clear distinctions are drawn between the Initiative and wider integration or 
continental defence. Discussing U.S. Northern Command191 and what Clarkson sees 
as its tentative efforts to bring Mexico into trilateral continental security 
arrangements, he suggests its creation was, “conceived as an administrative change; 
coordinating the continent’s defence with Canada and Mexico was only a secondary 
priority”. Moreover, in line with the ‘drug war rationale literature, Clarkson states, 
‘the Plan Merida for security cooperation […] suggests […] the war on drugs will 
remain the US priority for security on its southern border.”192 More definitively still, 
in his conclusions Clarkson sums up that, “Notwithstanding the much-heralded SPP’s 
three-way approach to many issues of North American governance, the United States’ 
proposal to reinforce Mexican efforts to suppress its narco-traffic cartels was 
negotiated bilaterally as the completely separate Merida Plan”.193  
 
These direct comparisons are few and far between. Thus it is more often in the calling 
for more joined up policies that we best tease out the distinction drawn between 
integrative trends more widely and bilateral CN policies as represented in the MI. In a 
critique of the Mérida policy under Bush and Obama, Pastor proposes tying the ‘CN 
plan’ to his vision for governance in North America, and suggests “If all three 
governments can commit to a broader strategy on drug trafficking and violence, the 
new relationship could be extended to a wider security agenda that includes more 
systematic coordination against terrorism and management of the border”.194 Pastor’s 
argument is that the overall benefits of economic integration are being eroded in part 
by a wrong-headed focus on unilateral security, especially at the border, and thereby 
Mérida is an isolated CN aid package does not tackle this wider problem. O’Neil calls 
for a more thorough and joined up “partnership” with Mexico,195 and for trilateral 
solutions to North America’s security issues.196 The MI is implicitly separated from 
the overall and connected priorities of the now defunct SPP. Bailey and Guillén 
López contend, “Whereas security and law enforcement issues have found a home in 
the Mérida framework, and border issues have found a home within the 21st Century 
Border Initiative framework, economic issues lack a clear venue for discussion.”197 
They also suggest that contemporary border initiatives that are officially tied to the 
MI operate under a, “separate logic that is less tied to the Mérida process”, not least 
because of civil society pressure to either secure (political concerns of large section of 
the population represented by official political bloc) or open (private economic 
interests and border regions themselves) the border.198  
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195 O’Neil Two Nations Indivisible p.155-168 
196 Shannon K O’Neil ‘Good Neighbors’ Foreign Policy (February 17th, 2014) 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/02/17/good_neighbors Accessed 31.07.14 
197 John Bailey and Tonatiuh Guillén-López,‘Making and Managing Policy’ in Peter H. Smith, & 
Andrew Selee [eds.] Mexico and the United States: The Politics of Partnership (Colorado: Lynne 
Reinner Publishers, 2013) p.78 On the 21st Century border effort of the Obama administration. See 
later chapters  
198 ibid p.79 
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North American Security Integration: Mérida as Connected 
As we already saw, Kilroy et al have suggested a deeper connection between the MI 
and a sustained (but patchy and complicated) drive to regionalise security in post 9/11 
North America. They build a chronological case that attempts to show how Mérida is 
an outgrowth of wider policy moves in and between the NAFTA partners (with the 
U.S. as the key arbiter) to ‘trilaterise’ security amongst themselves, or at least 
improve bilateral security. Again this is wider context is part of the reaction to the 
impact 9/11 had on ‘North America’,199 and an effort to ‘square the circle’ by 
securing borders within NAFTA from illicit transit, whilst facilitating licit 
interactions. The SPP is important here. Kilroy et al see the SPP as seeking to, 
“protect, prevent, and respond to external and internal threats to North America” as 
well as improving the internal borders within NAFTA through smarter security and 
expedited licit exchange.200 They contend that on its ‘Security’ branch the SPP can be 
associated with “an all hazards approach” that seeks to prepare for and mitigate 
myriad security threats from pandemics to terror attacks to natural disasters to illegal 
trafficking.201 Further, as Mexican proximity to the U.S. self-evidently pulls it into the 
“US security perimeter”, they assert: 
 
  …changes in the international system after 9/11 […] have  
  allowed a regional convergance towards collaboration and  
  cooperation beyond terrorism and natural disasters The SPP 
  created the possibility for this collaboration and cooperation  
  […] The Mérida Initiative was yet another step in the process 
  of building Mexio’s confidence that identity and sovereignty  
  could be maintained within this cooperative atmosphere,  
  despite the fact that resistance to coming under the US  
  security umbrella […] still existed…202 
 
In this sense the MI can at least be associated with the discussions around the creation 
of a North American or NAFTA “security perimeter”, albeit this effort has proved 
controversial and extremely difficult to achieve in practice, not least in overcoming 
sovereignty concerns and coordination three very different countries with often 
differing priorities.203  
 
Cadena-Roa takes these connections further still.204 His argument is clear and worth 
quoting at length: 
 
                                                
199 However this is an older policy problem and subsequent debate that really dates back to NAFTA’s 
signing (and incorporates dynamics, like immigration from Mexico to the U.S., that predate that too). It 
was given energy and urgency by the 9/11 attacks, as I cover in Chapter Five. 
200 Kilory et al North American Regional Security p.128-129 
201 ibid p.125 As much as 9/11 and the SPP drove U.S. policy, and in turn North America in this 
direction, the authors state trilateral cooperation in Hurricanes Rita and Katrina was key in improving 
security partnerships. ibid p. 132-140 
202 ibid p.148-149 My emphasis 
203 ibid p.169-170 
204 Indeed I could have included this work in the ‘Mérida as the Vehicle’ sub-section below. However 
Cadena-Roa is not as explicit in making the argument that the Initiative operates under a pretext, or at 
least sees CN as a secondary goal, which is partly how I have divided these sections, as becomes clear 
below. 
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  Arguably, the Mérida Initiative is the SPP under another  
  name and in bilateral form. Its unstated objective is to  
  incorporate Mexico into the US security perimeter, thereby 
  gaining Mexico’s cooperation and pulling Mexico’s national 
  security into the U.S. orbit through the sharing of  
  information and collaboration in security and military  
  operations.205  
 
Therefore rather than “separate” efforts, the SPP and MI are intimately linked, “stages 
in a long-term project to draw Mexico into the U.S. security perimeter as a reliable 
partner”.206 As part of a “harmonization” of U.S.-Mexican institutional approaches 
towards security issues and especially CN, Cadena-Roa contends the connections 
between the state and drug traffickers needs to be severed. Going further, he argues 
that as NAFTA ‘locked in’ market liberalisation and insulated it from democratic 
changes in Los Pinos, the MI attempts to solidify U.S.-orientated security approaches 
that are in line with the goals he outlines above. These in turn weaken Mexican 
sovereignty and favour military solutions over developmental ones within Mexico’s 
political economy.207 Cadena-Roa therefore offers some tentative connection between 
economics and security in recent U.S.-Mexico relations.  
 
This brings us to a final point I wanted to highlight in terms of how the literature on 
North American integration handles this issue more widely, as Cadena-Roa is 
somewhat of an exception. There is a tendency to split ‘security imperatives’ from 
‘economic imperatives’ in the literatures that see Mérida as distinct from wider North 
American integration, or only connected to it in genealogical terms. This is in fact a 
trend visible in much of the wider work on North American issues. We have seen that 
those who seek to promote the economic integration of NAFTA have bemoaned the 
harmful focus on unilateralist border security.208 Clearly a distinction between 
security and economic interests is being made here. For Andreas, “the imperatives of 
security and economic integration appear to be on a collision course”.209 The impact 
of 9/11 is crucial here. Díez is quite typical of this academia in assessing that after the 
attacks the U.S. subordinated, “economic and political relations” with its NAFTA 
partners to its own security needs, including increased border control and 
surveillance, in the context of the GWOT.210 Serrano speculates as to whether security 
would then provide the integrative dynamo for North America that was initially 
                                                
205 Jorge Cadena-Roa ‘The Mexican Political Security Crisis: Implications for the North American 
Community’ in Ayres and Macdonald North America p.132 My emphasis 
206 ibid 
207 ibid p.132-133 
208 Pastor North American Idea 
209 Peter Andreas ‘A Tale of Two Borders: The U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico Lines after 9/11’ in 
Peter Andreas and Thomas J.Bierstecker [eds.] The Rebordering of North America: Integration and 
Exclusion in a New Security Context (London: Routledge, 2003) p.19 However Andreas’ thoughts on 
border security and economic interests are a little harder to pin down. In 2003 he also wrote that, 
“Rather than giving up any pretence of controlling borders, or simply shutting down borders in the 
name of security and accepting the astronomical costs, Washington is ambitiously trying to have it both 
ways: Create borders that perform as better security barriers and as efficient economic bridges at the 
same time.” Peter Andreas ‘Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the 21st Century’ 
International Security 28, 2 (Fall, 2003) p.96 I pick this theme up in the following chapter. 
210 Jordi Díez ‘Mexico and North American Security’ in Daniel Drache [ed.] Big Picture Realities: 
Canada and Mexico at the Crossroads (Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2008) 
Paul Ashby: NAFTA-Land Security: The Mérida Initiative, Transnational Threats, and U.S. Security Projection in 
Mexico  
PhD Thesis 
University of Kent 
 
71 
provided by economics in the designs for NAFTA.211 Hussain et al suggest that the 
NAFTA countries face trade-offs in the aftermath of 9/11 between, for example, 
“security- economy” and, “a post–9/11 security regime confronting pre–9/11 trade 
integration”.212 The sense is of two policy directives colliding, or in the language of 
Bailey and Guillén López the separation of issues into “policy baskets”.213 Hussain et 
al ask whether a, “security regime can be built upon pre–9/11 U.S. interests in 
economic regimes”.214 Even in arguing that security and economic considerations do 
not have to clash, an implicit sense of distinctiveness between ‘economics’ and 
‘security’ is maintained in their conception. 
 
  Economic issues were undoubtedly in the forefront of all  
  binational deliberations before 9/11 while security issues are  
  dominant in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. But in recent  
  years, a bundling of the security and economic issues has  
  been emphasized. […] Over time, it is entirely possible to  
  have security and economic considerations reinforce, not  
  mutually exclude, each other.215 
 
There are conclusions, therefore, that see the MI as security based. The U.S.-Mexico 
Chamber of Commerce relate Mérida to the SPP, stating that as the latter “became 
irrelevant” in the light of security challenges on the Southwest border, a “new plan 
was developed where security was the number one priority” - the Mérida Initiative.216 
This distinction between ‘economics’ and ‘security’ is present in much of the 
literature on trends within North America after 9/11, as I explore a little more in 
Chapter Three. Often too ‘security’ in this context means U.S. HS, rather than wider 
security for NAFTA or North America, or U.S. interests within that space.217 
 
North American Security Integration: Mérida as the Vehicle 
Much of the ‘drug war pretext’ literature has distinguished itself again by making the 
case that in fact the MI is not merely an outgrowth of the SPP, but a direct policy 
programme designed to achieve its aims when it comes to U.S.-Mexico security 
relations. Again, in line with the idea that drug interdiction is a ‘pretext’ or only a 
secondary or composite concern - a, “guise” in the words of Carlsen218 - the 
integration of security between the U.S. and Mexico, or more accurately in fact the 
exporting of U.S. security concepts and interests to its neighbour, is the strategic 
underpinning for the MI, as it was for the SPP. Again the motivations for improving 
Mexico’s security capabilities and interoperability with the U.S. (on U.S. terms) is 
seen as having a logic that goes way beyond CN, and / or uses CN to justify itself. In 
much of this literature, as we saw above, civil society and potential politically 
                                                
211 Monica Serrano ‘Integration and Security in North America: Do Good Neighbours Need Good 
Fences?’ International Journal 61, 3 (Summer, 2006) p.621 
212 Imtiaz Hussain, Satya R. Pattnayak & Anil Hira North American Homeland Security: Back to 
Bilateralism? (Preager Security International, 2008) p.2 
213 Bailey and Guillén López ‘Making and Managing Policy’ 
214 Hussain et al Back to Bilaterism p.2 
215 ibid p.53 
216 United States-Mexico Chamber of Commerce ‘Issue Paper 1 - U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation’ 
U.S.-Mexico Chamber of Commerce (August, 2011) p.1 My emphasis 
217 Also see Pastor North American Idea for the most powerful expression of this argument. 
218 Carlsen ‘Plan Mexico’ 
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motivated violent and non-violent groups agitating for social and economic change 
from the neoliberal NAFTA model are often seen as the primary targets of the U.S. 
and Mexican state.219 It is in this context that Mercille and Carlsen quote former 
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) Thomas 
A.Shannon, who in discussing the SPP claimed it, “understands North America as a 
shared economic space and that as a shared economic space we need to protect it . . . 
To a certain extent, we’re armoring NAFTA.”220 They, and others, directly link this 
quote to the actual policies of the MI.221  
 
Grandin widens this argument still further, not only connecting the SPP and the MI, 
but also including security initiatives in Central America and the continuing ‘Plan 
Colombia’ to assert that the U.S is creating a security corridor running from the U.S. 
border to Colombia. According to Grandin, the “objective is to integrate the region’s 
transportation and communications infrastructure, energy production and distribution 
networks, and, most importantly, its military capacities.”222 He suggests this is a 
rearguard strategy designed to shore up what the U.S. ‘has left’ in Latin America in 
terms of political-economic allies after the rise of the new left, and in the wider 
context of U.S. decline. Carlsen makes a similar point arguing that U.S. officials 
recognised shoring up security ties with Mexico would help in, “Washington’s bid to 
recover its influence in a slipping geopolitical context.”223 Stokes and Raphael 
connect Mérida and its forebear the SPP to ‘armoring NAFTA’ in terms of ensuring 
stability for investment from transnational corporations, especially important due to 
the (then) nascent moves towards opening up Mexico’s petroleum and wider energy 
markets to foreign capital.224  
 
Clearly in this understanding economics and security are very much seen as 
complementary rather than separate policy elements. Again the overriding aim is to 
protect or “armor” NAFTA through a regionalised, integrated security framework that 
seeks to protect it from a variety of threats, but especially political or socioeconomic 
change from below. In this reading the MI has provided the vehicle for achieving this 
aim through increasing U.S. control of Mexican security policies in line with U.S. 
priorities. Therefore whilst, “the drug war is an obvious concern for US and Mexican 
officials” as Stokes and Raphael put it, “this aid can be, and is designed to be, used 
for more than simple CN missions”.225 There are obviously some differences in how 
these analysts see the focus of U.S. strategies here. For example, Stokes and Raphael 
point to an “across the board” security approach.226 Carlsen states that, “The goals are 
twofold”. Firstly, upon inception Mérida sought, “to apply the Bush counterterrorism 
model throughout North America and bring Canadian and Mexican national security 
apparatus under closer U.S. control and surveillance”. Secondly the aim was, “to 
                                                
219 Carlsen ‘Armoring NAFTA’; Carlsen ‘Plan Mexico’; Watt & Zepeda’ Drug War Mexico p.193-210 
220 Mercille ‘Violent Narco-Cartels’ p.1645; Carlsen ‘Armoring NAFTA’ p. 17 
221 For example Stokes and Raphael Global Energy Security p.212; Watt and Zepeda Drug War Mexico 
p.210  
222 Greg Grandin ‘Empire’s Senescence: U.S. Policy in Latin America’ New Labor Forum 19, 1 
(Winter, 2010) p. 21  
223 Carlsen ‘Plan Mexico’  
224 Stokes and Raphael Global Energy Security p.209-212 
225 ibid p. 211 
226 ibid p.212 
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protect investment and business throughout the region.”227 What links these accounts, 
however, is the insistence that instead of seeing Mérida as distinct from the SPP and 
its priorities, or just an appurtenance of them, we should see it as a direct successor.  
 
 
Conclusion: Gaps in the Extant Literature 
 
This Literature Review has covered the debate on the MI. There is no doubt that the 
literature covered here offers us unique and useful insights into U.S. policy and its 
aims. However, there are some gaps we can identify, and a space for the work in this 
project to enter into the debate. Firstly, an in-depth study involving an extensive 
policy analysis has not being undertaken with regards to the detail of MI policy. This 
is a clear area where further analysis should be pursued. As I go onto show, a policy 
analysis takes us in some interesting directions, and affords me a greater purchase of 
the expansive, interconnected nature of the Initiative, and how it plugs into wider 
bilateral policy. One thing is immediately clear once we interrogate the detail; Mérida 
goes way beyond CN in its aims to resemble something much more akin to the 
literature that has connected it (however strongly) to the post-9/11 priorities as 
represented by the SPP, but CN is a crucial component within its wider goals. In not 
offering this sort of detailed analysis, much of the extant literature underplays or 
misses key aspects of the aid programme. In this project I will put ‘the meat on the 
bones’ of the argument that Mérida is a multi-purpose security paradigm intimately 
associated with the U.S. effort to project its security around the NAFTA zone, by 
empirically showing the policy detail that supports this conclusion. 
 
However, prior to this effort, I will consider the context of the MI. I will situate it 
within wider U.S. policy and interaction with Mexico, and in turn place that 
discussion in the broader set of policies that make up U.S. strategies in its foreign 
relations.228 Through this I build the context for the argument that the MI has a strong 
familial relationship with the SPP and the integrative push for North American 
security and a NAFTA security perimeter. I draw out just how deep these connections 
are in my policy analysis in Chapters Five and Six. I will show that they are of 
significant depth indeed, amounting to the active construction of NAFTA-land 
Security. Prior event to this, though, we need to understand why these connections can 
- and should - be made. I argue that not only did 9/11 motivate a response that sought 
to deepen North American (and thereby U.S.-Mexican) security ties (contingency), 
but also that the Initiative reflects U.S interests in its bilateral, regional and global 
foreign policies and grand strategy in seeking to maintain the openness and stability 
of Mexico’s political economy to U.S. (and wider) economic interaction and 
penetration (continuity). The extant literature has missed the complex interplay 
between continuity and regional contingency here. 
 
                                                
227 Laura Carlsen ‘NAFTA’s Dangerous Security Agenda’ Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice 
20, 4 (2008) p.443 
228 There are existing focused studies that attempt this. Watt & Zepeda’s Drug War Mexico is probably 
the best example of a holisitic approach that tackles Mexico’s drug related security crisis and U.S. 
foreign policy directly as its main themes. Much of the other work in this Literature Review is - quite 
simply -shorter. Otherwise it not focused on either elements solidly, or talks about the issues 
tangentially as part of arguments with a different focus. 
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Making this argument means dispensing with the distinctions between economics and 
security present in much of the literature on North American integration. Whilst these 
distinctions may at times be in the service of conceptual clarity, they give an 
impression of interests neatly compartmentalised as discrete, differentiated aims. This 
denudes the crucial fused nature of economic-security interests, in which economic 
activity requires continued stability and openness that is often girded by forms of 
power. Meanwhile for its part, the ‘drug war pretext’ literature has underplayed the 
level of threat to U.S. interests from drug trafficking and, moreover, its associated 
violence. As much of the ‘drug war rationale’ literature has contended, Mexican 
stability is at stake in some areas, and the Mexican state is both challenged and 
compromised. I show how this threatens U.S. interests in Mexico. Crucially the level 
of violence associated with drug trafficking in the country is both threatening 
Mexican political-economic stability, and, relatedly, represents a transnational threat 
to the political economy of the NAFTA zone. Thus it is key that we do not think of 
the CN element of Mérida as merely a ‘pretext’, and thereby underplay this crucial 
motivating factor for U.S. policy. I now go onto show where and how this policy is at 
once bilateral and trilateral, regional and more global, contemporary and historically 
rooted, in aims, scope and origin.  
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Theorising U.S. Interests and the Projection of Security in Mexico 
 
“…the state has a variety of tasks whose organization domestically create a whole 





This chapter seeks to offer a theoretical backdrop to this project’s central argument:  
that the MI and its associated programs should be understood as a U.S.-led attempt to 
improve Mexico’s security capabilities in a number of areas, as part of a drive to 
create a regional security framework across (and around) the NAFTA-zone. The 
chapter shows that we can draw connections between this specific regional policy 
aim, driven by the compounding of regional economic interests engendered by 
NAFTA, and wider historically rooted U.S. strategies. The latter are based on equally 
durable U.S. interests, to spread, secure, and stabilise particular political economies 
that are open to global markets, U.S. (and wider foreign) investment, the effective 
exploitation and transportation of primary commodities, and (relatedly of course) free 
trade. In broad terms, this overarching U.S. strategy is what underpins Mérida and the 
‘NAFTA-land Security’ project. Thus, U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico is rooted 
in securing U.S. strategic interests through the maintenance of an open bilateral 
economic relationship. This continues to require that the U.S. helps to ensure the 
security and stability of its southern neighbour. I make an argument that the 
international political economy, which has itself been significantly historically 
moulded by U.S policies seeking to obtain U.S. interests, is the key conditioning 
structure and explanatory tool in understanding why these core interests guide U.S. 
policies over time in both global strategic terms, and in the specific case we are 
studying here.  
 
I therefore focus my argument initially on how these foreign policy interests are 
formed and how they go on to motivate particular actions. This necessarily has to be a 
‘first-cut’ attempt, to borrow Zakaria’s phrase,2 as we try to establish some core 
working concepts around the difficult task of conceptualising the U.S. state and its 
interests. However I make the case for an intimate connection between ‘economic 
interests’ and ‘security interests’ (the quotation marks pre-empt my argument that we 
must see them as coeval rather than distinct) within international structures 
significantly of U.S. design. Once these key concepts are established, I move onto a 
general theory of contemporary U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy. This 
discussion draws on established work to make its case. Having taken some time to 
explore meta-theoretical issues and wider U.S. strategies, we can discuss U.S. 
interests in Mexico specifically. Whilst U.S. involvement in Mexico is long-standing 
and quite consistent, based around the stability of Mexico’s political economy, I show 
how the economic integration the U.S. has sought and gained with Mexico as part of 
                                                
1 Friedrich Kratochwil ‘The Embarrassment of Changes: Neo-Realism as the Science of Realpolitik 
without Politics’ Review of International Studies 19,1 (1993) p. 79 
2 Fareed Zakaria From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton 
University Press, 1998) p.8 
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wider North American economic integration has led to the concentration and 
proliferation of economic ties. This has occurred through increased bilateral 
interconnectedness in trade, investment and even cross-border production, and in turn 
it has increased the need for the U.S to protect those economic interests with security 
policies designed to maintain stability.  
 
However, alongside more traditional concerns with Mexican stability writ large, the 
U.S is increasingly confronting more novel threats. There are increased fears within 
the U.S. state about the potential increased likelihood and impact of terrorism, and 
this has been a key driver for a policy of security projection and North American 
security regionalisation, or ‘NAFTA-land Security’. In addition, NAFTA has also 
increased opportunities for illicit smuggling of a number of ‘commodities’ across and 
between NAFTA’s borders, not least drugs, but also inter alia weapons, counterfeit 
goods, and, tragically, even people. Violence and instability is associated with these 
illicit markets and this further motivates the U.S. policy response. Thus there is 
regional specificity to both the threats within the NAFTA zone, and the U.S. policy 
response to project security to NAFTA’s borders. I attempt to unpack these dynamics 
in U.S. policy here. What is concerning U.S. planners is the potential impact 
transnational threats will have on core U.S. interests in the security and stability of the 
Mexican political economy, and by extension NAFTA’ economy. The MI is part of a 
wider policy response reacting to this concern, partly in line with established U.S. 
strategy to spread and stabilise open market economies in other states in the 
international system, but also intersecting with more regional priorities and the 
attempt to mitigate the threats within Mexico, and thereby within the NAFTA 
economy, by creating a regional ‘NAFTA-land Security’ framework. 
 
Chapter Outline & Aims 
In making this argument, this chapter will proceed in three broad stages. Firstly, I will 
deal with the meta-theoretical issues, and I aim especially to make clear how I 
understand the formulation of U.S. state interests. Through a wide-ranging discussion 
that takes in insights from across IR’s theoretical field, but with an especial focus on 
constructivism, neoclassical realism, and Marxian approaches, I aim to define the 
U.S. state as an emergent actor that possesses interests stemming largely from (but not 
reducible to) the structures of production in both domestic and international political 
economy (IPE). It is important to do this in some detail as much of the discussion 
thereafter in this project revolves around core, durable interests as motivators of U.S. 
policy towards Mexico. In the final part of this section, I bolster the macro-thereotical 
discussion by showing how strategic interests were formed in U.S. economic 
expansion in the 19th Century, and how the U.S. state sought to protect these interests, 
and took it upon itself to further this expansion. Layne’s revitalisation of Appleman 
Williams ‘Open Door’ thesis is useful in outlining the method that the U.S. has 
adopted to realise this aim, but it is important to stress that keeping with a historical-
materialist framework, I emphasise that the Open Door is significantly structurally 
conditioned by interests contoured by the material logics of capitalism and U.S. 
power within them.  
 
Secondly, I demonstrate the existence and power of these structurally informed 
interests in shaping U.S. strategy and policy by entering into a discussion of the broad 
sweeps of U.S. foreign policy, drawing on a range of theoretical work on U.S. foreign 
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policy. I hold that the interests of the U.S., and the foreign policy responding to but 
not wholly determined by those interests, are traceable for much of the history of U.S. 
foreign relations. However from the end of the Second World War through to the 
present (including, crucially, the current period defined as globalisation) we can 
clearly also recognise a more consistent grand strategy based on U.S. liberal order 
building in the capitalist core, and modernised ‘Open Door’ polices in the South. 
Through this strategy U.S. policymakers have sought to achieve U.S. primacy in the 
international system and within the global capitalist economy, and thereby maintain 
relative levels of power within (and to some extent) over those structures. An 
important aspect of this is understanding ‘globalisation’ as not only a blind process of 
expanding capitalism, but also in large part as a U.S. state project pursued for both 
U.S. national interests, and the interests of other “core” powers and transnational 
capital; this is what Stokes coins as the “dual logic” of U.S. foreign policy and grand 
strategy.3 The role of the U.S. state is considered carefully here. 
 
After this general interrogation of interests and U.S. foreign policy more broadly, I 
consider U.S. interests in Mexico itself more closely. These are multi-scalar and we 
need to tease them out whilst maintaining their fundamental interconnectedness. 
Firstly the border with Mexico means the U.S. has geographic security interests in 
ensuring Mexican stability to prevent security threats from crossing that border. In the 
contemporary era this is a controversial and over-hyped threat, but nonetheless 
remains a motivator of policy.4 Secondly, the U.S. has core, direct strategic interests 
in Mexico that it seeks to secure. These are based around trade, investment, and 
access to raw materials (including oil), and are thus in keeping with wider U.S. 
strategies to open up and secure access to markets and materials around the globe. 
Thirdly, NAFTA has hugely increased the importance of the bilateral relationship to 
the U.S. in terms of overall levels of investment and trade, to the point where it plays 
an important role in U.S. global competitiveness, based on the creation of a regional 
North American economy developed through the economic forces unleashed by 
NAFTA. This economic importance necessitates security, a fact brought brutally 
home to U.S. policymakers5 by the adverse economic impact of 9/11 on the North 
American economy. Finally, but related to all of the above, policy is now being 
formulated to directly tackle the instability associated with the incredible levels of 
drug violence in Mexico. From the perspective of the U.S. state the regional 
‘NAFTA-land security’ framework being pushed through Mérida and wider U.S. 
assistance thus makes sense as a response to Mexican instability directly, and to 
protect the NAFTA economy more generally. 
 
The overall aim of this chapter within the project is to discuss why the U.S. seeks 
security integration with Mexico, and aims to bolster Mexican state security 
                                                
3 Doug Stokes ‘The Heart of Empire: Theorising U.S. Empire in an Era of Transnational Captialism’ 
Third World Quarterly 26, 2 (2005) p.230; Doug Stokes and Sam Raphael Global Energy Security and 
American Hegemony (The John Hopkins University Press, 2010) p.15,  
4 I discuss this a little more below, but I am thinking here of the keenness on the part of some U.S. 
politicians, civil society groups and media outlets to promulgate a kind of border security that makes 
anything other than trade crossing the south-west border a grave national security threat, including 
‘migrants’ whose only crime is the seeking of a better life. 
5 And indeed Mexican and Canadian ones, reacting both to events and the U.S. response to those 
events. 
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capabilities across a number of spectrums. To do this it justifies a macro-theoretical 
position that holds that states are actors with interests, links U.S. aims in Mexico to 
wider U.S. strategy and those interests, and then discusses the specifics of the North 
American context and the relative importance of new or enhanced (or newly focused 
upon) security threats associated with the increased focus on terrorism, drug violence 
and the negative consequences of increased integration. This provides the theoretical 
framework within which to place subsequent chapters that show how the U.S. has 
sought, and is seeking, to protect its interests in Mexico through security projection to 
and around NAFTA’s borders through greatly increased levels of aid and the MI, as 
well as leaving us sufficient analytical and theoretical space to consider whether the 





The (U.S.) State and the Reality of Interests 
 
Some Basics: Defining the State, and State Agency  
When discussing the state, it helps to begin with some basics, and some fundamental 
questions. First, we should make clear we are discussing the modern state here, as it 
exists contemporaneously. In terms of actually ‘defining’ the modern state, Weber’s 
classic designation is still a useful starting point. A state is, “a human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a 
given territory. Note that ‘territory’ is one of the characteristics of the state”.6 We can 
be clear in stating that this involves an institutional apparatus able to exercise that 
monopoly, which of course requires coercive power, and, arguably, some form of 
legitimacy, consent, or recognition with a significant enough portion of the population 
within the territory.7 Also, as Taliaferro et al (drawing on Desch) add, the monopoly 
                                                
6 Weber quoted in Jeffrey W. Talliaferro, Steven E. Lobell & Norrin M. Ripsman ‘Introduction: 
Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy’ in Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman & Jeffrey 
W. Talliaferro Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
p.24-25 
7 Michael Walzer ‘The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics’ Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 9, 3 (Spring, 1980) This of course is a debatable concept. My point here is not that states are 
automatically ‘morally’ legitimate by virtue of their existence. Instead for a state to exist there is at 
least some legitimacy, consent and / or recognition conferred upon it in the vast majority of cases, 
albeit to wildly varying degrees. This legitimacy and / or consent may come, for example, from a 
powerful elite section of the population, be backed up by severe repression based on that power, and be 
actively resented (but still recognised as a state to struggle against, or fear) by large portions of the 
population. Borrowing from Gramsci, a state’s power and legitimacy is never absolute, and a 
successful, fully autonomous state cannot be built on total coercive power over the total population it 
exists within alone. Of course a state may claim to be in control or legitimate whilst actually facing an 
existential crisis (witness the Assad regime in Syria in 2012 and 2013), but internationally that state 
still enjoys de jure sovereignty even whilst that crisis rages. Indeed international legitimacy, especially 
in a legal sense, has traditionally been more sure than domestic legitimacy, with important absolute 
sovereign rights afforded to states and the groups that wield state power, “regardless of how that group 
came to power, of how it exercises power, and of the extent to which it may be supported or opposed 
by the population it rules”. Thomas Pogge ‘Priorities of Global Justice’ Metaphilsophy 32, 1/2 
(January, 2001) p.19-20 However, there have been some exceptions to this (indeed there are some 
interesting cases in the Mexican revolutionary period itself), and the traditional legal recognition for 
states in all circumstances is arguably more in flux than ever previously with the advent of the 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine. 
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of violence may only be claimed rather than fully realised.8 It is also uncontroversial 
to note that on a domestic level states have an important role to play in both 
regulating a state’s economy and mediating between, or acting for, what are now 
commonly termed differentiated interest groups (we may more controversially call 
them economic or social classes). Finally, internationally states have been tasked with 
representing ‘national interests’, and as part of that role, ensuring security vis-à-vis 
external threats. From there though, things get more difficult, especially in terms of a 
state’s foreign policies (and I have even probably inspired some dissenting voices 
already). How much autonomy does the state have from the society it exists within? 
Does it, as a matter of fact, exist within that society, or is it separate from it? How 
much connection is there between a state’s domestic and international role, especially 
in terms of the mediation between or action on behalf of interest groups inside the 
state? Does ‘the state’ act internationally? What are ‘state interests’? Can ‘a state’ 
have them? These are important questions to consider, especially as I argue that U.S. 
policies in Mexico can be greatly explained by the conclusion that the U.S. state is 
acting in its interests.   
 
Much traditional analysis in IR talks of the state unproblematically in terms of its 
agency. That the state is seen as the principal actor in IR is most explicitly proffered 
in IR Realism and Liberalism, but in truth the discipline resorts to discussing the state 
as an actor. As Wendt points out, it even often gives the state personhood - it talks of 
it as if it has not only agency, but also, crucially interests. Indicative of the 
discipline’s approach to discussing the state, it even gives states the ability to engage 
in rational deliberation and posses feelings.9 Examples of this abound. In a classic 
neo-Realist text, Mearsheimer tells us that states (or at least great power ones) “fear” 
one another, that they “aim to guarantee their own survival” and that therefore they 
“pursue” strategies to gain power to ensure that survival.10 IR neo-Liberals have also 
talked of the state in this way. Taking another indicative classic of the genre, Keohane 
argues, “states are crucial actors, not only seeking wealth and power directly but 
striving to construct frameworks of rules and practices that will enable them to secure 
those objectives […] in the future”.11 Finnemore, writing from a constructivist 
position, contends, “States do want power, security, and wealth”.12 In truth, I could 
have pulled any number of similar quotations regarding the state from any number of 
analysts across IR’s theoretical spectrum. 
 
Discussing the state in such terms is often useful shorthand designed to simplify 
analysis and prose, but it does in fact provoke an interesting debate. Is it analytically 
accurate or useful to think of the state in this way? For many, such a conception 
would wrongly give agency to what is in fact a, “fiction” or a, “theoretical 
                                                
8 Talliaferro et al ‘Introduction’ p.25 
9 Alexander Wendt ‘The State as a Person in International Theory’ Review of International Studies 30, 
2 (2004) p.289 
10 John Mearsheimer The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (W.W. Norton & Company, 2001) p.13, 32-
33, 42 My emphasis 
11 Robert O. Keohane After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton University Press, 2005 [1984]) p.25 My emphasis 
12 Martha Finnemore National Interests in International Society (Cornell University, 1996) p.1 ‘Do’ is 
emphasised in the original, I have emphasised ‘want’ to make clear the linguistic assignment of desires 
upon the state.  
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abstraction”.13 Gilpin has suggested that in fact the state, “does not really exist,” and 
that the traditional IR Realist only talks, “as if” it does as, “a matter of convenience 
and economy”.14 Gilpin makes the important point that states can only act on the basis 
of decisions and actions made by the human actors within them. Although he doesn’t 
tackle the question of the state as an actor as directly as Gilpin, and would perhaps 
baulk at the suggestion that the state is only an abstract, Mearsheimer tacitly 
acknowledges the human element of state agency by stating, “the elites who make 
national security policy speak mostly the language of power […] and the United 
States acts in the international system according to the dictates of realist logic”.15 He 
also contends that his brand of offensive Realism is, “prescriptive” in that ‘states’ 
should act according to the logic of an offensive Realist.16 Thus it is accepted that it 
always requires human actors to ‘make the state act’.  
 
This characterisation of the state as an exercise in abstractive brevity is insufficient. 
The ‘state as useful abstraction’ concept simply does not fully justify the near 
ubiquitous use of language that gives the state agency, and, relatedly, does not fully 
explore why this language is, “so useful”.17 As Wendt and Wight argue, in contending 
the state does not really exist Gilpin is guilty of reducing what is real to mere 
physicality, or empirically limiting it to what we can see.18 Both argue, correctly, that 
in fact the state is real in an ontological sense. For both, despite the fact that states 
have undoubtedly come into being and act through social processes and human 
interactions, this does not make them any less ‘real’.19 As Wight contends, it is a false 
distinction to suggest otherwise, as, “Socially constructed entities are real irrespective 
of how they came to be; unless, of course, we accept the empiricist’s narrow 
definition of real”.20 To accept a strict empiricism with regards to the state would 
leave us with a very unsatisfactory account of the material affect states have on 
human lives; why, “real people with guns and batons will enforce decisions attributed 
to this nonphysical reality”.21  
 
Moreover, talking of the state as if it were a ‘real’ actor is also useful because in 
foreign policy ‘state behaviour’ does show significant consistency over time. We 
cannot, even based on collective everyday experience, reduce the state to the actions 
of human agents, as if each set of policymakers and leaders remade the state anew. 
                                                
13 Colin Wight ‘State Agency: Social Action without Human Activity?’ Review of International Studies 
30, 2 (2004) p.269 
14 Robert G. Gilpin ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’ in Robert O. Keohane [ed] 
Neorealism and its Critics (Colombia University Press, 1986) p.318; Wendt ‘State as a Person’ p.289; 
Wight ‘State Agency’ p.270 
15 Mearsheimer Tragedy of Great Power Politics p.25 My emphasis 
16 ibid p.12 i.e. seek power and security through hegemony. 
17 Wendt ‘State as a Person’ p. 290 
18 ibid; Wight ‘State Agency’ p.271-273 
19 Wendt and Wight are both arguing from a scientific or critical realist perspective that the strictly 
empirical or observable does not exhaust ‘the real’, and that social structures should be understood as 
having a real ontological status. 
20 Wight ‘State Agency’ p.272 
21 Robert W. Cox ‘Towards a Posthegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the 
Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun [1992]’ in Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World 
Order (Cambridge University Press, 1996) p.145 Wight contends that the empiricist or positivist “get 
out of jail free card” over this is a move to nominalism, whereby again the state is an abstraction with 
no basis in ‘reality’ Wight ‘State Agency p.271  
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With regard to the object of our study, US policymakers and state leaders have 
consistently sought global primacy through hegemony as a grand strategy since 
WWII, have used international institutions, aid, normative leadership and security 
support to bolster and justify this hegemony, have opened up new markets to spread 
global capital, have intervened in Mexico and elsewhere consistently to support 
political and economic stability or install new regimes to secure U.S. strategic 
interests, and have shown cohesiveness across the state apparatus in pursuit of these 
goals. There is a strong case to be made that contemporary (post ’45) U.S. grand 
strategy has been largely based on, and in sum secured, the interests of the U.S. state 
in securing and maintaining global primacy through hegemony in a liberal, capitalist 
global order.22 The subsequent chapters will show that despite contextual 
contingencies and the real effects of bureaucratic politics and political contestation 
and change, U.S policy towards Mexico has been historically consistent in seeking 
Mexican political economic openness and stability. With regard to this and the 
policies associated with MI, we can empirically observe policy coherence and 
continuity across a number of state institutions. Therefore, despite the inescapable 
fact that it is human beings who make the state act, I contend we should follow Joseph 
and consider the state to act coherently in the emergent sense that we also use to 
speak of, “organisations and other collective bodies” acting coherently, as long as we 
bear in mind that, “their actions are expressions of agency by various groups”.23  
 
Some Deeper Questions: International Structures, Domestic Contexts and ‘Actual’ 
Foreign Policies 
These conclusions, however, prompt deeper questions. Why is there such durability of 
U.S. state behaviour across time, contexts and administrations? The IR structural neo-
Realist (and, though with slightly different conclusions, neo-Liberal)24 explanation 
pivots around the anarchic structure of international relations. With no overarching 
sovereign or Hobbesian authority above the collection of world sovereign states, each 
state fears that another, or alliance of others, will use their inherent military capability 
to attack it in hopes of increasing their own chances of security and survival.25 States, 
which crucially within many structural neo-Realist (and neo-Liberal) accounts are 
strategically minded rational egoists, do and should seek to guarantee their own 
survival through the accrual of military (and concurrently, economic) power.26 This 
                                                
22 Of course the U.S. state may be the par exemplar of consistent state behaviour in this sense. It would 
be hard to assign such consistency to some of the less powerful states in the international system. 
23 Jonathan Joseph The Social in the Global: Social Theory, Governmentality and Global Politics 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012) p.7, 36 
24 To differing degrees, neoliberal institutionalists share the assumptions of neorealism about the 
international structure, but contend states can cooperate even given anarchy. For example see Robert 
Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane ‘Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions’ 
World Politics 38, 1 (October 1985); Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, ‘The Promise of 
Institutionalist Theory’ International Security 20, 1 (Summer, 1995) 
25 This may be, depending on the neorealist you ask, to defensively maintain the balance of power in 
the system (or a miscalculation that will adversely affect that balance), or to offensively fundamentally 
change it and maximize the power and positional advantage of the aggressive state. See John J. 
Mearsheimer ‘Realists as Idealists’ Security Studies 20, 3 (2011a) 
26 For the classic example see Kenneth Waltz Theory of International Politics (Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, 1979) Mearsheimer has recently argued, convincingly, that Waltz was actually 
rather skeptical of the idea of state rationalism, based on their tendency to act recklessly and not how 
his own theory prescribes. See John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Reckless States and Realism’ International 
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structurally determined drive to security is a state’s primary interest, which other, 
related interests emerge from, and foreign policy is based on. This tends to ‘wash 
out’, to use Dueck’s nice phrase, “domestic level differences” between variegated 
state cultures, politics, and histories.27 As Keohane neatly summarises, “pressures 
exerted on all states by the [security] competition among them” is the most important 
determinant of ‘state’ behaviour.28 The structure of the international system 
effectively straightjackets the human actors within state apparatuses into certain 
rationally strategic, interest-driven behaviours. Mearsheimer refers to this as an, “iron 
cage” that state foreign policymakers cannot escape.29 In this conception it is useful to 
conceptualise states as agents, because, “state leaders tend to conform to systemic 
pressures over time” with a high degree of autonomy from other influences from the 
domestic level.30 Human actors make the state act in a consistent, strategic, interest-
based manner in reaction to structural compulsions. 
 
This neo-neo account is a pleasingly parsimonious explanation for consistent state 
behaviour, and the practical applicability of assigning agency to states. However this 
parsimony is achieved through serious shortcomings. As Finnemore notes, these 
explanations of state behaviour, based on rather vague notions of state interests in an 
anarchic structure, tell us little about how states actually pursue goals such as 
security.31 This matters not only in terms of explanatory completeness, but also, and 
relatedly, because it opens up the potential for agency and discontinuity within the 
state’s apparatus once again. If the U.S. can take multiple routes in its grand strategy, 
why has it chosen to seek hegemony rather than becoming an offshore balancer?32 
Neoclassical Realists have recognised that the international structure of anarchy and 
subsequent security competition does not exclusively determine the detail of state 
foreign policy. Instead they posit that it is the interaction between structure and 
domestic or unit-level that determines state behaviour as, “systemic pressures [i.e. 
structure] must be translated through intervening variables” at that unit-level.33 In an 
introduction to the neoclassical approach Taliaferro et al provide a good (but not 
                                                
Relations 23, 2 (June, 2009) Also see Taliaferro et al ‘Introduction’ for a brief discussion of the 
mistaken notion that IR realism should be automatically equated with state rationalism (p.22). 
27 Colin Dueck Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy 
(Princeton University Press, 2006) p.16 
28 Keohane After Hegemony p.25-26 
29 Mearsheimer Tragedy of Great Power Politics p.12 
30 David Skidmore & Valerie M. Hudson ‘Establishing the Limits of State Autonomy: Contending 
Approaches to the Study of State-Society Relations and Foreign Policy-Making’ in David Skidmore & 
Valerie M. Hudson The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation 
(Westview Press, 1993 )p.7 This is not to say that structural neo-neo accounts insist that ‘states’ or 
their policymaking elites are utterly removed from effects springing from the ‘domestic’ level, or that 
this structural straightjacket is all-determinative. This is of course a theory and thus it is accepted it will 
occasionally miss other important elements and anomalous cases. However it doesn’t assign all that 
much importance to what is missed. 
31 Finnemore National Interests p.2 
32 For example see the critiques of contemporary U.S. foreign policy in John J. Mearsheimer ‘Imperial 
by Design’ The National Interest 111 (Jan/Feb, 2011); Christopher Layne The Peace of Illusions: 
American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Cornell University Press, 2006); Christopher 
Layne ‘America’s Middle East Grand Strategy After Iraq: The Moment for Offshore Balancing has 
Arrived’ Review of International Studies 35, 1 (2009) 
33 Gideon Rose ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’ World Politics 51, 1 (Oct, 1998) 
p.146 
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exhaustive) list of the important questions underplayed in neo-neo approaches, and 
reintroduced by considering the unit-level: 
 
How do states, or more specifically the decision-makers and  
institutions that act on their behalf, assess international threats and  
opportunities? What happens when there is disagreement about the  
nature of foreign threats? Who ultimately decides the range of  
acceptable and unacceptable foreign policy alternatives? To what  
extent, and under what conditions, can domestic actors bargain with  
state leaders and influence foreign or security policies? How and  
under what circumstances will domestic factors impede states from 
pursuing the types of strategies predicted by balance of power theory  
and balance of threat theory? Finally, how do states go about  
extracting and mobilizing resources necessary to implement foreign  
and security policies?34  
 
Where, then, does this reemphasis on domestic elements, with the unavoidable 
conclusion that we cannot assume rational agency on the part of states, leave the 
notion of the state as a unified actor? How do we explain continuities in policy? What 
are the ordering principles in neoclassical Realism? Without wishing to homogenise a 
variegated theoretical approach,35 there are some identifiable connecting points. First 
of all, it is important to note that the structural constraints set out in Waltzian theories 
of IR remain important here. States still strive above all for security in the anarchic 
structure, and there are structural relations of power in the inter-state system. 
“Parameters” and inducements36 are thus set for state behaviour. Of course this 
returns us to the problem with neo-neo approaches (perhaps especially neo-Realism) 
in that the anarchic ‘structure’ dictates that a state should seek security, whilst the 
relative power structure defines the state’s relative ability to do that, with pretty much 
everything else in terms of the actual content of foreign policy ‘up for grabs’.37 Thus 
as we go on to explore further below, if we define structure as an enabling or 
constraining force on action - which we most certainly should38 - the structure 
proffered by neo-neo accounts, and indeed in neoclassical Realism, is not all that 
much of a (powerful) structure at all. As Donnelly has argued, the classic neo-Realist 
definition of structure innovated by Waltz tells us that it should include an ordering 
principle, yet the anarchy Waltz offers as the fundamental international structure is 
not even an ordering principle.39 Also, as Finnemore and Joseph have separately 
argued, the ‘structure’ in realist accounts is a strange one, with, “no underlying causal 
mechanism”40 and, “no independent ontological status”.41  Waltz himself admitted as 
                                                
34 Talliaferro et al ‘Introduction’ p.1 My emphasis 
35 ibid p.10 
36 ibid p.3 
37 Waltz of course claimed that his theory of international politics should be complemented by a 
separate theory of foreign policy for this very reason. 
38 For example Margaret S. Archer Structure, Agency, and the Internal Conversation (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) p.4 
39 Jack Donnelly ‘Rethinking Political Structures: From “Ordering Principles” to “Vertical 
Differentation” - and Beyond’ International Theory 1, 1 (March, 2009) p.49-54 
40 Joseph Social in the Global p.54 
41 Finnemeore National Interests p.12 An indicative example helps reinforce this point. Consider the 
ability of a small clique of neoconservative and hawkish administration officials, influential experts, 
and aides to shift official perceptions, and therefore policy, regarding the Soviet Union’s relative 
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much, calling his structure a “permissive cause” with no reality in an ontological 
sense.42  
 
Thus, despite claiming its innovation is the focus on the interaction of structure and 
domestic politics, neoclassical Realist theory has in fact differentiated itself from neo-
Realism by placing more importance on the internal or unit-level workings of the 
state, in the U.S. case at least. Firstly, as introduced above, the theory highlights what 
Rose and Taliaferro et al call an, “imperfect ‘transmission belt’” between the 
parameters and inducements of, ‘international structure’ and the international 
environment, and actual foreign policy responses. Policy responses are filtered 
through the domestic workings of the state,43 and the interpretations (including, 
crucially, potential misinterpretations) of reality that inform the foreign policy 
decisions of “flesh and blood officials”.44 This is true even though neoclassical 
Realists tend to give state policymaking elites a high (but never total) degree of 
autonomy from the domestic society in which they exist in the setting and direction of 
foreign policy.45 Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, many emphasise that the 
current structure is unique in world history, as the U.S. has achieved a genuine first in 
terms of relative power and influence in the modern state-centred anarchic system: 
unipolarity and global hegemony.46 For some, this has increased the importance of 
domestic variables, such as ideology, ideas and elite interests, in the formation of U.S. 
foreign policy and strategies. Structural power preponderance has also afforded U.S. 
                                                
power, capability and danger towards the U.S in the late 1970s. This was achieved through intentional 
threat inflation by the politically motivated ‘Team B’ intelligence inquiry and Committee on the 
Present Danger, in spite of internal administrative opposition and contravening intelligence facts on 
Soviet abilities and declining economic power provided by the CIA. See Adam Curtis ‘The Power of 
Nightmares’ T.V. Mini-Series (2004) Information here: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0430484/ 
Accessed 14.07.14; Gordon R. Mitchell ‘Team B Intelligence Coups’ Quarterly Journal of Speech 92, 
2 (May, 2006) p.148-150 If misperceptions, ideas, normative preferences, strategic cultures, ideologies 
and so on can have such important effects in foreign policy, especially for the U.S., what structural, 
causal role is ‘international structure’ as defined by Realists actually playing?  
42 Milja Kurki Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) p. 111-112 
43 ibid p.4, 7; Rose ‘Neoclassical Realism’ p.147 
44 Rose ‘Neoclassical Realism’ p.158; Zakaria From Wealth to Power p.24 
45 Talliaferro et al ‘Introduction’ p.25; Zakaria From Wealth to Power p.24 Zakaria writes, “‘central 
decision-makers’ have the authority to conduct a nation’s foreign policy. Clearly, many factors enter 
into a state’s foreign policy, but since statesman are ultimately responsible for all such decisions, any 
domestic pressures are reflected in their discussions and actions.” 
46 For example see William C. Wohlforth ‘The Stability of a Unipolar World’ International Security 
24, 1 (Summer, 1999); Layne Peace of Illusions p.4-6; Randall L. Schweller & Xiaoyu Pu ‘After 
Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline’ International Security 
36, 1 (2011) p.46 Thus neoclassical Realist work plugs into other debates concerning hegemonic 
stability theory (e.g. Peter. J.Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane & Stephen D. Krasner ‘International 
Organization and the Study of World Politics’ International Organization 52, 4 (1998) p.660-661; 
Colin Dueck ‘Ideas and Alternatives in American Grand Strategy, 2000-2004’ Review of International 
Studies 30, 4 (Oct, 2004) ) and U.S. decline. Layne now argues that the “‘unipolar moment’ is over” as 
the U.S. declines and China rises. Christopher Layne ‘This Time it’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and 
the Pax Americana’ International Studies Quarterly 56,1 (March 2012) Other neoclassical Realists 
disagree with Layne’s premises e.g. William C. Wohlforth  ‘How not to Evaluate Theories’ 
International Studies Quarterly 56,1 (March 2012) 
Of course for neoclassical Realists the propensity for unipolarity to end is itself a result of the structural 
tendency of other powers to seek to balance or challenge within the system, and poor strategic choices 
or other spoiling elements from the domestic level. 
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policymakers the opportunity and ability to pursue ideas and policies not afforded to 
others in the system.47 In the U.S. case48 many neoclassical Realists conclude the 
structural inducements of anarchy to seek security as an overriding national interest, 
(as simplistically as that is defined and as weak a structure that is) has been tamed by 
its relative material power.49 This means that other ‘unit-level’ forces are the real 
propelling elements in U.S. foreign policy. It is worth exploring some neoclassical 
work to explore this further, focusing on Dueck and Layne, before offering analysis of 
it in terms of my own theoretical claims. 
 
The U.S. State and Neoclassical Realism 
Given that structure is not determinative for foreign policy and does not tell us much 
about what policies will be actually pursued, “understanding the links between power 
[structure] and policy requires close examination of the contexts within which foreign 
policies are formulated and implemented”.50 Several neoclassical Realists have done 
this in our case. Zakaria offers a, “first-cut theory” he calls “state centered realism”, 
which builds on his reading of “classical realism” in explaining how powerful, 
economically expanding states concomitantly expand their, “political interests” not 
only in automatic response to their own growing relative capabilities in the anarchic 
international system (the structural factors),51 but also as a result of increased state 
strength within domestic society afforded by the expanding bureaucratic capacities of 
a central state apparatus (domestic factors). In conjunction this forms state power. 
Thus, despite material and economic power increases from 1865, the U.S. did not 
expand its interests proportionate to these increases until the 1890s and the 
development of a strong, autonomous, executive state that could both define and 
pursue foreign policies based on the extension of foreign interests.52  Importantly, 
policymakers have to, “perceive” the increase in state strength and national capability 
combined in state power.53  
 
                                                
47 Dueck Reluctant Crusaders p.34 
48 This does not mean unit-level variables are only important in U.S. state behaviour across 
neoclassical realist theory. Discussing the response to and impact of purported U.S. relative decline, 
subsequent multipolarity and increased international disorder, Schweller and Pu contend that 
developments will, “largely depend on what roles the emerging powers, especially China, decide to 
play”. Schweller and Pu ‘After Unipolarity’ p. 42 (My emphasis). Talifaferro et al argue that, “Unit-
level variables constrain or facilitate the ability of all types of states – great powers as well as lesser 
states – to respond to systemic imperatives” (Taliaferro et al ‘Introduction’ p.4) 
49 This is of course not absolute, and the U.S. does not control the international system. For example 
see Layne Peace of Illusions p.4.  
50 Rose ‘Neoclassical Realism’ p.147 
51 Just for clarification, I treat Zakaria’s treatment of “classical realism” as ‘structural’ in the IR neo-
realist sense. Rather than seeing capability induced power maximization in a ‘will to power’ or innate 
compulsion in man (a la some of the classical realist work of Morgenthau or Neibuhr), Zakaria sees 
expansion as the product of the anarchic system. “The best solution to the perennial problem of the 
uncertainty of international life is for a state to increase its control over its environment through the 
persistent expansion of its political interests abroad” Zakaria From Wealth to Power p.20 (My 
emphasis). The resultant relative power imbalances are also thus structurally determined to a good 
degree, and are themselves part of the international structure. 
52 ibid p.5-12, 32, 35-43 
53 ibid p. 32, 38 I assume that the word, “perceive” pre-supposes that this perception is the correct one; 
recognition of state power seems the more correct term here, although Zakaria, in line with neoclassical 
Realist theory, does place a good deal of emphasis on the possibility of misperceptions of power by 
policymakers. 
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Despite the useful insights of this work, not least the importance of recognising the 
prerequisite of necessary domestic state power in defining and achieving interests, 
Zakaria’s account is still largely ‘structural’. States expand their interests due to the 
inducement of the international system of anarchy, and this effect snowballs for 
powerful states as the result of the, “classical” realist dictum that, “relative 
capabilities determine […] intentions”.54 Zakaria adds the crucial caveat that the 
pursuit of maximisation requires a state that is both ‘strong’ relative to the society it 
exists within, and recognised by policymakers as such,55 but he doesn’t answer 
Finnemore’s question of how these ‘strong states’ actually go about pursuing those 
expanded interests, and why they do so in particular ways with particular policies and 
strategies. Interests are not defined much beyond the need for security and the 
capability to achieve it through further increases in influence and relative power. 
However, Dueck and Layne do offer neoclassical Realist accounts of U.S. foreign 
policy that purport to retain the importance of structure in limiting and selecting 
foreign policy interests and therefore actions, whilst also both emphasising the 
particularities of those policies and offering extended explanations for the U.S.’ 
broadly consistent hegemony-seeking grand strategy. They do this through including 
a serious engagement with the ideational aspects of U.S. foreign policy within their 
theoretical frameworks and understanding of states and state behaviour.   
 
Thus, in Dueck’s work, there is an explicit use of theoretical features normally 
associated with constructivism in IR: the impact of national cultures, security cultures, 
ideas and norms on state behaviour. Focusing on grand strategy, Dueck contends that 
whilst the international system remains, “the single most important overall cause of 
strategic behavior” (in terms less about anarchy than about the balance of power and 
the emergence of potential threats),56 we should also pay attention to how “country-
specific cultural variables can influence the preferences and perceptions of a state’s 
foreign policymakers” and consider, “that culture can predispose a state toward 
certain strategic choices rather than others; and that culture can delimit the range of 
                                                
54 ibid 
55 Indeed, Zakaria’s argument here is almost tautological. As a state’s capabilities increase, so do its 
interests, though they cannot be acted upon without the emergence of a strong state. However, in 
Zakaria’s account the U.S. state acquires relative strength largely due to the role it undertakes in the 
expanding economy that increases U.S. relative capabilities in the first place. The impression is of U.S. 
statesman having to wait patiently for the capabilities of the state having to catch up with structurally 
given interests. Zakaria does give some weight to the emergent disconnect between state capabilities 
and structural incentives and the complicating division of powers in the U.S. political system (e.g. 
p.94), but how and why specific policies are chosen in the expansion of interests and the creation of 
state power is rather left out. Hence the critique of those who posit the importance of specific domestic 
variables (p.50-55) seems premature. Structure is ill-defined in keeping with the neo-realist realist 
tradition, whilst the role of agency is theoretically underplayed. 
56 Anarchy may still conceivably lie as a deeper structure, but Dueck does not emphasise it here. 
Elsewhere he has stressed the, “extent to which the United States dominates today’s international 
system”. Dueck ‘Ideas and Alternatives in American Grand Strategy ‘ p.519 However whilst the world 
may longer be anarchic, Dueck argues it makes sense for the U.S. to prefer to preserve unipolarity 
rather than a return to something less hierarchical, but considering ‘fear of anarchy’ as an anarchic 
structure would to my mind be stretching the concept (ibid, p.520). Causally speaking, Dueck posits, in 
a mixture of offensive (powerful states further maximize power) and defensive (states facing threats 
maximize power) realism, that, “When a given state becomes more powerful, or when it faces greater 
threats from abroad, it tends to adopt a more costly and expansive grand strategy. Conversely, when a 
state becomes less powerful, or when it faces fewer foreign threats, it tends to adopt a less costly and 
less expansive grand strategy” Dueck Reluctant Crusaders p.19  
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acceptable alternatives in a given situation”.57 Concerning the strategic choices of the 
most recent Bush administration, he argues that, “international structural pressures 
actually explain very little” and, “a more useful explanatory framework points to the 
influence of policy ideas in shaping strategic outcomes”.58 Indeed, in line with 
neoclassical work on the U.S.’ overwhelming structural power, Dueck suggests, 
“Precisely because the United States is so powerful today, structural pressures may 
actually be relatively unimportant in explaining US strategic adjustment”.59 
 
For Dueck, the prevailing strategic culture in the U.S. is significantly reflective of a 
broad-based “liberalism”, and U.S. strategy has been largely comprised of the 
ambitious attempt to construct a liberal international order, which policymakers see as 
not only a ‘good’ for its own sake, but also because they believe it serves, “American 
interests, in that it will make the United States more influential, prosperous, and 
secure”.60 This liberal tradition is not all determinative of course, Dueck sees it as 
more of a, “permissive cause” that makes “some grand strategies more likely than 
others” and can occasion overcome systemic pressures and compulsions.61 For 
example, the W. Bush administration exhibited two sub-set traditions both competing 
with, and existing within the liberal tradition - an ideational Realism, and a turn to 
seeking U.S. primacy imbued with an assertive Wilsonialism that, “had more to do 
with the recurring power of classical liberal ideas in American grand strategy, 
resurrected in a particularly muscular form” than any international structural 
pressure.62 Also, importantly, the large-scale (and often expansive) interests suggested 
by the creation and maintenance of liberal order have been tempered by “limited 
liability”, defined as “a culturally shaped preference for avoiding costs and 
commitments in grand strategy, to an extent that is actually inconsistent with stated 
and established international goals”.63 What is important here is that domestic cultural 
factors mean there are additional interests defined by policymakers as opposed to 
them being solely provided by international structures, which whilst encouraging 
change also helps explain why the U.S. state still acts consistently. 
                                                
57 ibid p.18-19 
58 Dueck ‘Ideas and Alternatives’ p.511 
59 ibid. p.535 At earlier points in history, specifically following the world wars, Deuck makes more of a 
case for the interaction of structural and cultural factors in explaining U.S. strategy. Colin Dueck 
‘Realism, Culture and Grand Strategy: Explaining America’s Peculiar Path to World Power’ Security 
Studies 14, 1 (April-June, 2005) 
60 Dueck Reluctant Crusaders p.21-24 My emphasis 
61 ibid p.26 There is also room within the tradition for significant policy debate and shift about how to 
act within it and best create and secure a liberal world order. ibid p.23 Dueck identifies “crusaders” - 
who aim to spread liberal ideals forcefully (the Bush administration after 9/11 is seen in this light) - 
and “exemplarists” - who think of the U.S. as Winthrop’s shining city on a hill, encouraging others to 
liberalism themselves. H.W. Brands and Michael Hunt use similar distinctions (see Layne Peace of 
Illusions p.202). Dueck also discusses internationalists, progressives, nationalists and realists, who all 
have various levels of commitment to versions of liberalism and limited liability. Of these, Dueck sees 
internationalists committed to open markets, international institutions and the spread and support of 
democratic governance as most prevalent in the U.S. state structure historically. Reluctant Crusaders 
p.23, 31 
62 ibid p.147; Dueck ‘Realism, Culture and Grand Strategy’ p.511 
63 Dueck Reluctant Crusaders p. 26-30 In contrast to Zakaria, Dueck locates the lack of expansionist 
behaviour (all the way up to the bombing of Pearl Harbor) on the part of the U.S. on this tendency, 
rather than the absence of recognised state power. Lots of factors play into this tendency for Dueck, 
including U.S. geographic isolationism, and a division of powers political system, “created to resist 
dramatic policy changes” ibid p.29  
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Layne’s conception is similar to Dueck’s, without the explicit nod to constructivist 
thought. If anything however, the ordering principle for (U.S.) state behaviour in 
Layne’s conception is even more strongly based on domestic ‘cultural’ factors. He 
argues that the U.S.’ prime objective interest, security, has been pursued through the 
choice of U.S. policymakers to seek, “extraregional hegemony” through “Open Door” 
economic and ideological policies based on liberal or Wilsonian ideas.64 Building on 
revisionists like Appleman Williams and La Faber, Layne contends ‘the Open Door’ 
rests on the idea that U.S. interests are best served by securing open access to markets 
by ensuring states have ‘open doors’ to both U.S. and wider economic integration 
(economic element), and democratic ideals (ideological element). These two are 
mutually reinforcing, in theory, through “a virtuous circle” whereby greater economic 
interdependence and openness symbiotically induces greater commitments to 
democracy and to peace, and vice versa.65 The guiding framework for U.S. grand 
strategy is thus similar to the one proposed by Dueck; self-interested liberalism. In 
contrast to Dueck, Layne suggests that the continued grand strategic commitment to 
global hegemony through the Open Door is almost entirely not the product of 
systemic pressures. Whilst the U.S. drive to, “extraregional hegemony” is based on an 
attempt to achieve international dominance, and thereby security, this phenomenon is 
not a structurally determined one. Instead “[T]he Open Door, not objective security 
considerations, explains why the United States has pursued extraregional 
hegemony”.66 Layne seems strangely close to what some constructivists claim about 
the social world, that it is, “ideas all the way down”.67 Layne even claims that 
successive U.S. policymakers have, “defined security ideationally”.68  
 
Even the economic aspects of the Open Door are conceptualised as idealist. “U.S. 
policymakers have believed that prosperity is the key to domestic political stability 
and have perceived that America’s prosperity depends on access to overseas markets, 
investment opportunities, and raw materials”.69 Layne at points appears sceptical of 
any economic imperatives in the Open Door. In a footnote, he cites Appleman 
Williams’ contention that it was a belief that, “America’s economic well-being and its 
domestic political stability” depended on economic expansion on the part of U.S. 
companies into overseas markets and the prerequisite maintenance of the openness of 
those markets this entailed, rather than any “objective condition of U.S. dependency” 
upon international economic activity.70 Layne rather belittles the importance of 
international trade to the U.S. economy as evidence of this ‘non-dependency’, stating 
that, “only 6-10% of U.S. GDP” was made up of imports / exports up to the 1970s, 
and that the more contemporary figure of 16-22% is still, “among the lowest of the 
major advanced industrial countries”.71 These arguments are part of a thesis that seeks 
                                                
64 Layne Peace of Illusions p.6-10 
65 ibid p.34-35 
66 ibid p.37 
67 Alexander Wendt ‘Constructing International Politics’ International Security 20, 1 (1995) p.74 Of 
course Wendt is putting this in a certain context, and its not quite all the way down as we get to 
“biology and natural resources” Nonetheless much constructivist work sees ideas as the most important 
element in IR. 
68 Layne Peace of Illusions p.194 
69 ibid p.32 Second emphasis in original 
70 ibid p.216 Note 83 My emphasis 
71 ibid 
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to establish that the maintenance of U.S. hegemony through the Open Door is 
objectively strategically dangerous and anachronistic in a world of structural change 
and rising powers.72 Layne seeks to establish that a grand strategy based on sustaining 
U.S. hegemony has for some considerable time been based on an ideational rather 
than a structurally informed and strategically sound edifice.73  
 
However the ideational-material aspects sit uneasily. Firstly, Layne suggests that the 
Open Door’s insistence on the importance of overseas markets leads to a situation 
where the U.S. state must ensure the stability of those markets, with military means if 
necessary. Indeed, the Open Door leads to the creation of “new interests abroad that 
had to be defended” and therefore, “pulled U.S. military power along in its wake”.74 
Thus despite the fact that the Open Door is at root ideational for Layne, it would seem 
to inculcate an underlying economic expansionary logic for U.S. foreign policy in its 
power to spawn new interests that have to be defended through parallel military 
expansion. This indicates a nexus, albeit an ill-defined one, between ideational and 
material aspects within the Open Door. Layne deals with this nexus very briefly, 
through his conception of the state. Arguing that the state is the dominant elites who 
control it, Layne suggests that elite foreign policymakers formed a coalition with 
other elite groups such as, “capital-intensive corporations that looked to overseas 
markets and outward-looking investment banks” (as well as the media, think tanks, 
and Wall Street law firms). Statesmen and women have pursued policies that have, 
“served the interests of [these] dominant elites that have formed the core of the U.S. 
foreign policy establishment since at least the late 1930s”.75 The material interests 
within the Open Door accrue to these elites, rather than being in the (security) 
interests of the U.S. In this reading, and despite Layne’s earlier theoretical claims, the 
state appears to be an instrument of elite power and its interests. Thus the Open Door 
is seemingly both ideational and instrumental. 
 
Neo-classical Realism: Where did the Structure Go? 
Neoclassical Realist theory is useful to our understanding of the state and its interests 
in several ways. On one theoretical level it gives us some basic tools in terms of how 
we understand state behaviour. In its attempt to meld structural and domestic elements 
it offers convincing accounts based on theories of state foreign policy that crucially 
seeks to avoid both structural determinism and voluntarism. This makes for rich 
analysis of U.S. foreign policy. There is a strong link between the theoretical basics 
and the empirical arguments of the neoclassical Realists, and the empirical evidence 
of consistent U.S. state behaviour based on its construction of an international liberal 
order that secures its primacy and constituent economic / strategic interests. However 
whilst Layne and Dueck provide analytical detail through engagement with domestic 
                                                
72 ibid p.198-205 
73 ibid p.201 Layne accepts that the move to hegemony in Europe made strategic sense in its 
contemporary context, even though there would have been some inevitable costs to eventually pay for 
even that strategic manoeuvre. ibid p.200 
74 ibid p.36 My emphasis 
75 ibid p.200-201 It should be noted that Layne’s ideas here are sketches dealing with what he admits is 
a complex topic “worthy of a book in its own right” ibid p.200 As Gowan has pointed out these 
‘sketched ideas’ are in fact crucial to the argument, and are sadly missing from the rest of Layne’s 
analysis. Peter Gowan ‘A Radical Realist’ New Left Review 41 (Sept / Oct, 2006) This makes it 
difficult to pin Layne down as he spends much of the analysis seeing the Open Door as ‘ideational’, 
before concluding by adding an instrumentalist logic to it. More on this below. 
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‘variables’, the sense of an orderly state actor acting consistently through time is 
established not through ‘structure’ (as it is understood by neo-Realists), and ‘unit-
level’ interaction, but through a largely autonomous policy making body acting within 
the largely ideationally defined strategic ‘culture/s’ of U.S. foreign policy. In short 
even the weak structures of neo-neo accounts - anarchy and power capabilities - have 
been largely stripped away here in terms of explanations of U.S. foreign policy both 
in terms of analytical focus on dominant ideas within U.S. foreign policy making, and 
due to the particular power of the U.S. in the international system. I contend we need 
a clearer idea of what structures mediate U.S. foreign policy. We need to understand 
structure beyond the neo-Realist informed understandings of it still so prevalent in IR.  
 
Putting Structure Back In: Constructivism 
As we have seen, some neoclassical Realists have engaged directly with more 
ideational approaches in IR more traditionally associated with constructivism. Whilst 
Dueck has done this on a surface level with regard to an engagement with the 
importance of a policy culture of liberalism and limited liability, Sterling-Folker has 
attempted to build a bridge between the two theoretical disciplines of Realism and 
constructivism writ large based on a discussion of their respective ontologies. The 
argument is interesting in terms of our purposes here for its treatment of 
constructivism itself.  It largely deals in the view that constructivism treats the social 
as, ‘ideas all the way down’. In contrast to IR Realist ontology, which sets pre-
existing parameters on social action (in her argument mainly based on biology in a 
zero-sum environment), Sterling-Folker claims constructivism has traditionally 
employed an ontology whereby only human activity causes human activity, and extra-
ideational boundaries are essentially non-existent for that activity.76 With limitless 
opportunities and avenues for social construction, “there is no reason to anticipate any 
stasis or isomorphism to human social practices.”77 In an inversion of a traditional 
critique of IR realism,78 the challenge in constructivism, for Sterling-Folker, is how to 
explain consistency of social behaviour, rather than rapid change.79 
 
However Sterling-Folker’s Realist-constructivist dialogue is indicative of a limited 
and skeptical engagement with the concept of social structure on the part of IR 
Realists.80 As we have noted ‘structure’ in neo-Realist, neo-Liberal and neoclassical 
work is the anarchic international system and / or the power differentials amongst the 
states that make it up.81 What is implicit in much of this work is a definitional 
distinction between the anarchic / power structure outside the state and prior to state 
actors, and the ideas, cultures, norms and institutions within the state made up by state 
actors. Ideas and strategic cultures are in the realm of agency, not structure, in this 
                                                
76 Jennifer Sterling-Folker ‘Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or 
Rereading’ International Studies Review 4, 1 (Spring, 2002) p.92-94 
77 ibid p.94 
78 Of course based on its theoretical failure both foreseeing the end of the Cold War and analysing its 
aftermath. For example see Kratochwil ‘The Embarrassment of Changes’; Gowan ‘A Radical Realist’  
79 Sterling-Folker ‘Realism and the Constructivist Challenge’ p.94 
80 For example, Milja Kurki & Adriana Sinclair ‘Hidden in Plain Sight: Constructivist Treatment of 
Social Context and its Limitations’ International Politics 47,1 (2010) p.6 
81 Sterling-Folker goes a little deeper in positing that group formation is an inherent part of human 
behaviour in response to biological imperatives to survive, and group resource competition (which 
includes emulation of other groups) springs inevitably from this. This means there are some interesting 
parallels with her work and classical realism, although she is more biologically deterministic. 
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understanding. Strangely then, some of the neoclassical conclusions are rather 
voluntarist.82 More importantly for our purposes, it is clear that the U.S. state’s policy 
or security culture, and the ideas that influence it, are not conceptualised structurally. 
This seems rather odd, given how the neoclassical Realists I have looked at in the 
most detail set up the strategic culture of the U.S. or the preeminence of ‘Open Door’ 
ideas as highly influential and delimiting / enabling in U.S. foreign policy choices. 
Dueck gives culture a “permissive” causal power,83 contending that, “it is simply 
historically inaccurate to suggest that classical liberal cultural assumptions [i.e. 
ideational factors] have had no impact on American grand strategy. The more 
interesting question is: what sort of impact have they had?”84 However he does not 
define this impact as a structural one. This implicit IR Realist distinction between 
extra-ideational ‘structure’ and ideational domestic ‘culture’ is a false one. It ignores 
the emphasis in much constructivist work on ideationally constituted but nevertheless 
real social structures.  
 
The ontological distinction between Realism and constructivism is therefore not just 
whether there are any extra-ideational limits to human action, but whether ideas have 
independent, real, structural, and, therefore causal power in IR. The ontological 
debate between Realism and what we may term ‘structural constructivism’85 is in fact 
more about the distinction between what structures make up international politics, 
what those structures are themselves made up of, and what is their relative 
importance. In a shortened answer to those questions, Finnemore and Sikkink explain, 
“From a constructivist perspective, international structure is determined by the 
international distribution of ideas” and those ideas, “give the world structure order 
                                                
82 However it is not just voluntarism informing neoclassical conclusions, and the move away from 
structural determinism in the U.S. case it not limited to self-avowed neoclassical realists. Much of the 
rationalist neoliberal and neorealist work of the 1980s and 1990s hinged on positivist, nomothetic 
covering law models; when would the independent variable - international anarchic structure - cause 
dependent variables - war, balancing, cooperation? As Katzenstein et al have recognised (with regard 
to IPE) the complexity of social reality has meant that although some important insights were gleaned 
through these efforts, “well documented, causal arguments are rare” ‘International Organization and 
the Study of World Politics’ p.682-683 I would argue they are not possible given the thin 
understanding of structure in this work, lacking in detail on causal mechanisms. Perhaps partially in 
response to this, as well as the ideational turn in IR theory and an apparent ideological disaffection with 
contemporary U.S. leadership, much current Realist work on U.S. foreign policy - both neoclassical 
and those traditionally called neo-Realist - is emphasising the misinterpretation of international 
structural forces by policymakers and / or the causal prevalence of domestic, cultural factors in its 
analysis of U.S. state behaviour (e.g. Layne Peace of Illusions; John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen M. 
Walt ‘Keeping Saddam in a Box’ New York Times (February 2nd, 2003) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/02/opinion/02MEAR.html?scp=11&sq=walt%20john%20iraq&st=c
se&pagewanted=2 Accessed 13.05.13 
John. J. Mearsheimer, ‘Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: Realism versus Neo-Conservatism’ 
OpenDemocracy (May 18th, 2005) http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-
americanpower/morgenthau_2522.jsp Accessed 13.05.13; ‘Imperial by Design’ The National Interest 
111 (Jan/Feb, 2011) 
). This would seem to further undermine any claims about a simple or generalisable 
independent/dependent variable covering law causal relationships in IR between structure and state 
action.  
83 Dueck Reluctant Crusaders p.24-26; 36 
84 ibid p.25 
85 As Kurki and Sinclair note, “Constructivism is not a singular or unified approach” ‘Hidden in Plain 
Sight’ p.3 I have focused here on more ‘structurally-minded’ constructivists. 
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and stability”. Thus, on this reading, “the problem for constructivists” is not 
voluntarism, or explaining why the world is not in constant flux, but instead is, “the 
same problem faced by [IR] realists - explaining change”.86 Therefore a number of 
constructivists posit that an historical sedimentary build up of ideas concerning how 
the world works and how (emergent) state actors should behave within it prefigures 
those very state actors, and enables and constrains their behaviour. As Finnemore puts 
it: 
 
Socially constructed rules, principles, norms of behaviour, and  
shared beliefs may provide states, individuals, and other actors  
with understandings of what is important or valuable and what  
are effective and / or legitimate means of obtaining those valued  
goods. These social structures may supply states with both  
preferences and strategies for pursuing those preferences.87  
 
The fundamental importance of the U.S.’ ideational commitment to a liberal 
international order is a collection of ideas and shared understandings (including 
subsets of ideas within the wider structure) that prefigure actors and set, “preferences 
and strategies” - or put another way, interests - for a state. Such a conception would 
better explain or define these ‘cultures’ or ‘ideas’ causal power in their ability to 
define and reproduce actions ostensibly in favour of U.S. interests over time.88 As we 
have seen already Dueck discusses the liberal tradition that has dominated U.S. 
contemporary grand strategy in terms that could easily be recognised as structural, not 
least in the sense that he understands that tradition as a causal filtration system that 
makes some strategies more likely to be employed than others. The liberal strategic 
tradition in Dueck’s work bears some resemblance to Weldes’ “security imaginary”. 
It is essentially, “a [social] structure of well-established meanings and social relations 
out of which representations of the world of international relations are created”.89  
 
We have already seen that for Layne the decision to pursue extra-regional hegemony, 
and the edifice this is built upon (the ‘Open Door’), is almost exclusively ideational. 
The U.S. policymaking elite is afforded huge leeway in how it defines and pursues 
ideationally set interests, which also perniciously accrue material interests to that 
elite. As we saw above Layne’s ideas here are self-confessedly under-developed, but 
he does not countenance this development as in any way structural, and thereby 
reinforces the distinction between ‘structural’ and agential ‘ideas’ within U.S. grand 
strategy. Again though, I argue we would be better served retaining much of Layne’s 
empirical insight, but considering the Open Door and U.S. commitment to primacy 
(through a liberal order) as having its own structural causal power prior and 
independent to actors, including policymakers, in line with structurally-minded 
constructivism. This avoids some of the voluntarism and instrumentalism that is 
present in his analysis. However, considering the grand strategy or overall direction of 
U.S. foreign policy in the contemporary era to be mainly ideational in inspiration, 
                                                
86 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ 
International Organization 52, 4 (1998) p.894 My emphasis 
87 Finnemore National Interests p.15 My emphasis 
88 ibid p.12-13 
89 Jutta Weldes Constructing National Interests: The United Sates and the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(University of Minnesotta Press, 1999) p.10 
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design and propulsion, whether we consider ideational social structures to be at work 
or otherwise, simply cannot be sustained. We also need to consider the material 
elements that make up those structures, and how complex structural interaction, in 
tandem with agency, drives foreign policy. 
 
Putting Structure Back In: Critical Realism and Historical-Materialism 
The U.S.’ ‘strategic culture’ and the Open Door, once understood structurally, do help 
our understanding and explanatory purchase of motivations in U.S. foreign policy. 
Ideational ‘Liberal’ traditions are important in U.S. foreign policymaking, and the 
Open Door is both a good fit in explaining U.S. behaviour in expanding its interests 
and seeking to secure them through hegemony, and, when seen as a social structure, a 
useful way to consider the established policy preferences of the U.S. state and the 
consistency of its behaviour.90 However they must be placed firstly in their structural 
context, as must the actors within them. Layne hints that policymaking elites have a 
positional structural power in arguing that it would take a, “Damascene-like 
intellectual conversion” or wholesale ‘changing of the policy guard’ to force a 
substantive change in U.S. strategy.91 However we need to be clear that they can only 
hold this power due to their position within a social structure - the state itself. The 
elites are not ‘the state’ - it preexists the numerous human actors that enter into it and 
has a causal (not finally determinative) effect upon them. The ideational factors 
identified by Layne and Dueck, themselves structural, are bounded up in the wider 
U.S. state structure. In short, the state is a structure that guides, but does not 
determine, the behaviour of human actors into “patterns of regularity”. Thus, to 
conclude the point, and as Wight argues, the state itself has its own socio-structural 
causal power. We need to insist on this to understand regularities in U.S. foreign 
policy.92  
 
In addition Layne and Dueck are essentially committing novel versions of the error of 
constructivist ontology: over-emphasising the ideational within social structures.93 
Constructivist ontology has been criticised for effectively cauterising the ideational 
from any material or economic elements within it, which detrimentally effects 
subsequent explanations of the social.94 Specifically with regard to interests, which 
should be identified as key drivers of consistent state behaviour, the constructivist 
emphasis is on how, “security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural 
                                                
90 There is no clash to seeing a Liberal tradition in U.S. foreign policy in terms of building a liberal 
order and the Open Door as co-existing. As Dueck argues and we more explicitly state below, U.S. 
interests in primacy are served by building a liberal order. 
91 Layne Peace of Illusions p.201 
92 Wight ‘State Agency’ p.204 
93 This is even more curious in Layne’s case considering that the thesis he draws upon most readily in 
his argument, Appleman Williams’ interpretation of the ‘Open Door’, explicitly went beyond the 
classical IR realist critique of U.S. foreign policy being at risk of demonstrating too much idealism and 
moralism, instead showing the political economic factors that underpinned U.S. strategies. See the 
Foreword by Lloyd C. Gardner in the 50th Anniversary edition of William Appleman Williams The 
Tragedy of American Diplomacy (W.W. Norton and Company, 2009 [1959]) p.ix 
94 For example see Doug Stokes ‘Ideas and Avocados: Ontologising Critical Terrorism Studies’ 
International Relations 23, 85 (2009); Douglas V. Porpora ‘Critical Terrorism Studies: A Political 
Economic Approach Grounded in Critical Realism’ Critical Studies on Terrorism 4, 1 (April, 2011); 
Jonathan Joseph ‘Critical of What? Terrorism and its Study’ International Relations 23, 1 (2009) 
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factors”95 and the claim that, “Interests are not just ‘out there’ waiting to be 
discovered” but are instead, “constructed through social interaction”.96 This work is 
based on an ontology that gives the ideational constitutive primacy in social life, and 
thereby elides or underplays extra-ideational factors. Thus, “ideas, norms, and culture 
generate structures” and, “[State] [b]ehavior flows from structures, but these are given 
content and meaning by the ideational precursors”.97 The ontological error (or perhaps 
omission) of constructivism is not that there are no parameters for social action; it is 
that those parameters are conceptualised as at root ideational, and ideas are detached 
from their material contexts. In refocusing on ideational or ‘unit-level’ factors, the 
neoclassical Realist work of Layne and Dueck is, oddly, making this same error.98 
 
This is of course where it gets very murky. Interests are ‘out there’ for neoclassical 
Realists, given in large part by the structural reality of the international. This is why 
Layne critiques the continued pursuit of extra-regional hegemony;99 he states 
objective U.S. security interests are not achieved due to the ideational / elite interest 
commitment to Open Door inspired hegemony. States have the same problem as other 
human actors; getting to objective interests through a subjective process of 
interpretation. This is compounded by other difficulties arising out of state-society 
relations.100 The real problem for Layne and Dueck in explaining U.S. foreign policy 
(and in Layne’s case its obstinate refusal to recognise the structural ‘facts’) is that 
once we remove the ‘international structure’ as a driving force (whether we do so due 
to the game-changing reality of U.S. structural power or because of the macro-
theoretical problems with IR Realists’ conceptions of international structure, or better 
yet both) we are in the same territory as the constructivists: ideas are given a distinct, 
hermetic and primary role in explaining behaviour. This is simply an untenable 
position. We cannot explain social action through an ideational lens alone (even if it 
makes our critique of foreign policy we don’t like stronger). To do so would be to 
greatly oversimplify it, and would be unsatisfactory in terms of understanding how 
(U.S.) state behaviour is significantly explained by what are in some senses objective 
interests. The key is to explain why there are interests ‘out there’. 
 
                                                
95 Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on International Security’ in Peter J. 
Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (Colombia 
University Press, 1996) p.2 
96 Finnemore National Interests p.2 
97 Alistair Iain Johnston ‘Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China’ in Katzenstein Culture of 
National Security p.265 
98 In an effective demonstration of the elasticity of IR theories (and the quixotic folly in trying to neatly 
taxonomise them) Miller has critiqued Dueck and Layne in arguing that neoclassical Realism should 
advocate that structural factors make the selection of certain ideational strategies more likely, 
reestablishing international structure’s primacy as the independent variable whereby the, “material 
international environment selects the dominant ideational approach to security or great power grand 
strategy” Benjamin Miller ‘Explaining Changes in U.S. Grand Strategy: 9/11, the Rise of Offensive 
Liberalism, and the War in Iraq’ Security Studies 19,1 (2010) p.30 
99 It is also why ‘illiberal’ practices exist within the liberal tradition of U.S. strategy for Dueck. 
100 For the constructivist this is not so much of an issue because Layne’s proposed solutions are 
themselves normative and therefore mostly reflective of other sets of shared ideas and shared meanings 
(mainly within the school of IR Realism), rather than representing a pure discovery interests ‘out 
there’. However that is an unsatisfactory critique.  
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In Layne’s argument, material factors are subordinated to ideas. In constructivist 
ontology, they are only given meaning by ideational social structures,101 or “material 
and economic” structures will be seen as distinct from those ‘social structures’, as if 
economic relations and material exploitation and manipulation are somehow not 
social.102 Thus in both theoretical positions there is a tendency to remove ideas from 
their material contexts, and / or offer a detrimentally limited view of social structure. 
Ideas undoubtedly may acquire an existence that prefigures human actions, but they 
do not, “fall, unbidden, from the sky”.103 Instead they are the result of human actions 
and are enveloped within wider social conditions. As Kurki and Sinclair contend, 
“social structures cannot be reduced to the beliefs of individuals, nor equated with the 
‘ideational’ or normative contexts of social action.” Instead, in line with a critical 
realist philosophy of science, they should be, “seen as materially embodied 
ontological realities that are (simultaneously) both materially and ideationally 
constraining on agents positioned within them”.104  Thus ideas cannot have purely 
independent causal power; their power exists in conjunction with how they relate to 
and co-exist with material realities within deeper social structures. We also need to be 
clear why certain sets of ideas gain prominence, and this means placing ideas in wider 
structural contexts, including thinking about power within structures.105 This is part of 
the historical materialist concern to identify underlying structures which can help 
explain social behaviour, with of course social structures of production being key 
generators of phenomenon at the, “level of appearances”.106 As Kurki and Sinclair 
point out, it is hard to see how social structures that are purely ideational can help us 
explain a social structure like capitalism, which is a complexly constituted inter-
relational mixture of material prerogatives, social relations affected by distinct 
hierarchical and materially based power positions, and ideational factors.107 Material 
and ideational elements are bounded up together within social structures. Ideas do 
not, “float free of the material contexts in which those ideas are embedded and 
emerge”108 but are intimately related to those contexts. 
 
What I am arguing for here is a historical-materialist focus on the social structures of 
production as the missing element that can help us explain the consistency of U.S. 
state behaviour as mediated by its interests. It is accurate to think of the structures of 
production as underlying that state’s structure, and feeding into and partially 
determining its constitution.109 The structure of production on a global level amongst 
                                                
101 For example, see Wendt ‘Constructing International Politics’ and Wight’s discussion of his move to 
idealism. Colin Wight Agents, Structures and International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 
2006) p.155-157 
102 Finnemore National Interests p.15 
103 Kurki and Sinclair ‘Hidden in Plain Sight’ p.18 
104 ibid p.7 
105 Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton ‘The Deficits of Discourse in IPE: Turning Base Metal 
into Gold?’ International Studies Quarterly 52, 1 (March, 2008) p.104-105 
106 Erik Olin Wright Class Crisis and the State (Verso, 1979) p.11-12 
107 Kurki and Sinclair ‘Hidden in Plain Sight’ p.7-8 
108 Wight Agents, Structures and International Relations p.158 
109 I have presented what is a complex interaction quite simply here. The state itself, or more accurately 
the actors within it, also of course affects the underlying structure of production. However I do not 
wish to, or necessarily need to, get drawn into deeper meta-theoretical debates given the purposes of 
this project. See Wright for a helpful discussion of structural relations between the economic structure 
and the state Class, Crisis and the State p. 15-26 
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and within states is, almost uniformly since the end of the Cold War, capitalist. As 
Wood notes, “Capitalist economies are all ‘capitalist’” as they are all,  “subject to 
capitalist imperatives of competition, capital accumulation and profit 
maximization”.110 These imperatives are simultaneously extremely creative and 
destructive in catalysing social change. As recent history has borne out, capitalist 
modes of production and associated social relations have accelerated the creation, 
destruction, or partial solidification of ways of life, economic class formations, and 
subsequent interests. This has inexorably led to social conflict. In addition, and to a 
good extent symbiotically, the capitalist mode of production has proven extremely 
susceptible to cyclical crises and regulatory / coordination problems. The modern 
state has a crucial and complex role to play within this, “broader environment” as 
both a maintainer of the, “cohesion of the social formation” that capitalist relations of 
production exist in, and as a regulatory body and integral fail-safe mechanism for the 
continued opportune conditions for successful capital accumulation and the wider 
mode of production.111 Indeed, historical materialists have tended to see the state as 
entirely necessary to the reproduction of capitalism, and it has even been postulated 
that the nexus between political powers within the state and “top-level” capitalists is 
what defines capitalism.112  
 
Crucially, the phenomena of competition, capital accumulation and profit 
maximisation have driven capitalists outside of the borders of their respective nation-
states, recalling Marx and Engel’s evocative phrasing that the, “need of a constantly 
expanding market chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe”.113 This 
expansionary logic,114 combined with concomitant accelerated social change and 
fractiousness, means there is an extremely important connection between a nation-
state’s economy and its foreign policy, as capitalists seek markets and materials 
outside of the domestic sphere, and therefore events and economic processes both 
inside and outside of its geographical territory can affect its success and development. 
This is increasingly more important and complex as global interconnections 
proliferate in the modern era. Therefore, in fulfilment of its functional role, the state, 
as far as it is able, has sought to bulwark its domestic economic success through its 
dealings with the outside world. This can be attempted in a number of ways of course 
- the literal protection of the domestic economy through tariffs discouraging cheaper 
imports, the construction of empires, encouraging domestic firms into foreign 
markets, the construction of open international or global trade and capital markets, or 
competing to both attract and project financial capital and investment. All of these 
and more, often obviously in combination, have been attempted by states. However 
the most successful exponents have also been the most successful capitalist states - 
                                                
110 Ellen Meiksins Wood ‘Global Capital, National States’ in Mark Rupert Hazel Smith Historical 
Materialism and Globalization (Routledge, 2002) p.17 Wood does not accept the existence of a, 
“global economy abstracted from the particular local, national, and regional economies that constitute 
it, or from the relations among them”  
111 Bob Jessop State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach (Polity Press, 2008) p.28, 79 
112 For example Wright Class, Crisis and the State p.18-19; Braudel quoted in Giovanni Arrighi The 
Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of our Times (Verso, 2010 [1994]) p.12 
113 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels The Communist Manifesto (Penguin Books, 2004 [1848]) p.7 
114 It’s important to avoid reductionism here. State forms significantly pre-date what we could 
legitimately call capitalist social relations, and territorial expansion also prefigures the triumph of 
capital. Myriad reasons for these storied social phenomena exist, but of course what may be termed 
economic or material imperatives are an important part of the picture.  
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Great Britain and the U.S. The initial catalyst for expansion, and the success, ability 
to pursue, and to a degree necessity of these states’ subsequent expansionist strategies 
was underpinned by expansionary logics of capital and their associated domestic 
economic strength. Let’s now begin to look at the U.S. case to reinforce this point. 
 
 
A Theory of U.S. Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy 
 
U.S. Expansionism and the Creation of Interests 
As U.S. economic success snowballed over the latter half of the 19th Century and into 
the 20th, U.S. capitalism and capitalists spread their activities and influence far 
beyond their domestic borders. The dynamo of U.S. economic success provided the 
need for export markets and the ability to reach them profitably. It necessitated access 
to raw materials, and produced the capital necessary for foreign investment. Moreover 
for students of IR, it generated and sustained the material foundations for U.S. power, 
and the material means to project and propagate that power on a regional and then 
global level. As U.S. ‘foreign’ economic markets fused with its ‘domestic’ ones, the 
importance of the former to the latter for continued economic success increased. U.S. 
foreign policy coalesced around the opening up, maintenance and protection of these 
foreign investments and markets, and ensuring their overall stability. This was of 
course bound up with a cultural and political expansionary tendency whereby 
American thinkers, politicians and businessmen (overwhelmingly men of course) 
proclaimed U.S. exceptionalism and leadership, seeking to spread the reach of the 
U.S. political economic model of democratic government detached in many ways 
from economic management, increased free(r) trade, and private enterprise; broadly 
summarised as liberalism.115 Overall this expansive strategy, a compound of material 
and ideological impulses, represents the liberal Open Door foreign policy discussed 
previously.  
 
The connections between political liberalism and the growth of global capital are 
complicated. As Hobsbawn notes it is an open question whether the first is, “cause, 
concomitant, or consequence” of the latter.116 What we can say with certainty 
however is that the liberalism coursing through U.S. foreign policy is not a distinct 
and detached ideational construct, but has its roots fused within processes of the 
capitalist means of production. Despite politicians and statesmen’s oft-stated desires 
for global influence and regional dominance via the superior ‘American way’,117 it 
was, as Rosenberg argues, “private impulses, more than government policies” that 
                                                
115 This is not to say this was what the U.S. practiced in actuality either at home or abroad. As we go 
onto briefly draw out more below, the state played a major role in creating the conditions for private 
enterprise to flourish, democracy promotion can be often trumped by political-economic interests in 
‘stability’ in U.S. foreign policy, and free trade is more relative than pure doctrine, especially earlier in 
the 19th Century as the U.S. vigorously protected its dynamic domestic market. Also whilst there were 
unique features to the U.S. experience this was part of a more global trend in economic expansion. See 
Eric Hobsbawm The Age of Capital: 1848-1875 (Abacus, 1975) p.43-54 
116 ibid 
117 Political dreams of a hemispheric United States of America and frustrated, racist laments about the 
need for U.S. intervention to cure the ‘inherent’ instability within Latin America borne of its ‘inferior’ 
people are well covered in the early chapters of Lars Schoultz’s Beneath the United States: A History 
of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (Harvard University Press, 1998) 
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provided the mechanical impetus for this expansion.118 We should add that these 
“private impulses” were connected to and guided (but not determined) by the 
expansionary structural logic of capital, and created within and part of a wider 
political-economic environment within which even the less interventionist state of this 
period played a key role.119 However individualist dreams of profit and power did 
motivate financiers, investors, and speculators, and all manner of capitalists were 
effectively the vanguard of U.S. expansionism in the latter half of the 19th Century. 
As the level of expansion gathered pace, U.S. statesmen increasingly began to 
perceive both a political economic necessity in finding and maintaining favourable 
access to external markets to cope with the increasing U.S. production (both in 
markets for exports, and increasingly raw materials for import), and a process by 
which relative U.S. power and influence could be augmented on a global level, which 
accrued material benefits to the U.S.  
 
Whilst capital led the way in actually expanding U.S. influence overseas, economic 
expansionism soon fused with U.S. foreign policy in Open Door principles. The 
developing state actively aimed to further economic expansion and increase U.S. 
economic penetration (often to ensure access for exports, financial capital and 
investment), and by extension U.S. wealth, power, and ability to project that power. 
This is what Rosenberg calls “the promotional state”, as the U.S.’ political 
bureaucracy that had been growing at a domestic level120 turned its attention to this 
task in foreign affairs.121 However the commitment to this policy, whilst of course 
symbiotic with an ideological structure based around U.S. exceptionalism (and upon a 
dominant reading of what U.S. foreign policy interests were and how best to attain 
and secure them) was not purely based upon a subjective perception of the Open 
Door’s importance. Economic expansion did help increase relative U.S. affluence, 
material power, and global authority. The importance of U.S. exports (and therefore 
their markets) grew, becoming crucial in certain sectors. The hyper-productive U.S. 
industrial economy required raw materials from foreign sources. Greater material 
power was borne of greater economic success, and the ability of the U.S. to promote, 
protect and project that power was itself increased by that economic success, and vice 
versa. As Mabee puts it, “Much of the development of state power in the early part of 
the twentieth century relied on the interactions with economic power.”122 Economic 
interests here are therefore ‘real’ in two important, inseparable senses. Foreign profit-
seeking was a real interest for U.S. capitalists and industries, and their influence upon 
and within the state increased. However the U.S. state also perceived the real strategic 
interest in opening up foreign markets to the U.S., protecting them, and thereby 
ensuring the continued profit-making for U.S. capitalists, and increasing the material 
benefits to the U.S. in relative economic success and international power.   
                                                
118 Emily S. Rosenberg Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion 
1890-1945 (Hill and Wang, 1982) p.38  
119 The expansionary potential was rooted in the industrial success of previous decades and the stable 
political environment within the U.S., as well as some of the political-economic decisions in and 
outcomes of the U.S. Civil War. See Walter LaFeber The New Empire: An Interpretation of American 
Expansion 1860-1898 (Cornell University Press, 1963) p.6-7 
120 Zakaria From Wealth to Power 
121 Rosenberg Spreading the American Dream p.38-62 
122 Bryan Mabee Understanding American Power: The Changing World of US Foreign Policy 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) p.55; Also as we saw above Zakaria makes this case in From Wealth to 
Power 
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It is in the insistence that the interests created in these processes, involving both 
structural compulsions, constraints and enablers to the (still key) agential power of 
U.S. policymakers and capitalists (as well of course as the less lofty but entirely 
crucial actions of people who actually did the work this economic success was built 
on) that we depart from the analysis we have covered thus far. Indeed we saw that 
Layne has also described a process of interest creation through ‘Open Door’ grand 
strategy, whereby foreign economic interests inspire protection of those economic 
interests by the state.123 However, Layne considers this an ideationally informed 
strategy, which only serves the interests of the U.S. policymaking and commercial 
elite. As Gowan states, this is rather indistinct.124 Moreover, it misses the fact that the 
‘Open Door’ is neither an ideational construct nor a convenient pretext serving elite 
interests. The U.S. commitment to the Open Door through the spread of open 
economies and market democracies125 is a structural edifice within U.S. foreign 
policy, enmeshed within wider structures of the U.S. state, the logics of capital 
accumulation, and the associated drive to primacy through hegemony within a global, 
liberal, capitalist order significantly of U.S. design. This grand strategy, whilst by no 
means infallible, has helped create and serve U.S. interests in augmenting U.S. 
economic power, and thereby increasing U.S. power to influence events in the 
international system relative to other states. The ideational aspects of U.S. policy are 
not completely divorced from these material realities.  
 
Therefore we should not belittle the importance of foreign economic interactions and 
integration to the continued domestic economic success of the U.S. Layne cites trade 
figures to make the point that they make up a relatively small percentage of U.S. 
GDP. However, taking contemporary figures of 16-22%, trade still represents a very 
significant portion of a huge economy.126 We should also consider the importance of 
trade within particular key industries (consider the continuing importance of U.S. 
agricultural subsidies to maintain relative export strength, key - for example - to U.S. 
agricultural export success to Mexico within NAFTA, and driver for the genesis of 
the original Open Door).127 Moreover, however, ‘trade’ in the general sense does not 
exhaust U.S. interests overseas. On one level, the U.S. economy itself continues to 
rely on imports of key raw materials, not least crude oil and petroleum products, but 
                                                
123 Layne Peace of Illusions p.36 Also see above. Layne comes pretty close to discussing both the 
materiality of interests achieved by the Open Door and supported by U.S. hegemony on other 
occasions, especially where he discusses the connections between “liberal ideology” and grand 
strategy, discussing how economic interests abroad act magnetically to pull in, “U.S. military power to 
defend those economic stakes”, and how power underpins the stability and security required for 
successful investment. See ibid p.124-128 However this uneasily bookended by his claims about the 
ideational roots of the Open Door and how these interests are only elite interests. He also considers the 
commitments involved to be ultimately self-defeating, which is a more challenging thesis that we can’t 
involve ourselves with here, but bears resemblance to some Marxian arguments. 
124 Gowan ‘A Radical Realist’ Gowan draws on Kolko to suggest U.S. expansionism was not a product 
of capitalist logics but a “social-power” project to spread U.S. influence within “other capitalist 
centres” through increased political power. In underplaying the structural compulsions of capital in the 
early phases of U.S. economic and then political - military expansion, I consider Gowan to be a little 
too instrumentalist in his thinking about the U.S. state. 
125 Or what Dueck refers to as the liberal strategic culture. 
126 Appleman Williams provides a pretty definitive critique of this kind of thinking himself. Tragedy of 
American Diplomacy p.52-55 
127 Appleman Williams Tragedy of American Diplomacy p.24-27 
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also spanning minerals and metals that remain key to production.128 The role of some 
of these raw materials or natural resources to the functioning of the U.S. economy in 
terms of production and transportation / communication is almost immeasurable in 
importance. On a more profound level though, the U.S. has built a system that is 
based on its primacy within a liberal, capitalist global order, and the U.S. state acts as 
a hegemonic guarantor of that order. This means promoting the Open Door to 
maintain widespread openness for U.S. economic penetration, but it has also involved 
the construction and maintenance of global capitalism. This is built around 
multilateral institutions, and was built and is managed largely through U.S. power.129 
It seeks to benefit both ‘capital’ in a general sense, other core states within that order, 
and the U.S. itself. 
 
Crucially, real, relative, material benefits flow to the U.S. through this arrangement. 
As Ikenberry puts it, the U.S. has, “become the ‘owner and operator’ of the liberal 
capitalist political system - supporting the rules and institutions of liberal 
internationalism but also enjoying special rights and privileges”.130 As Stokes and 
Raphael make clear, by maintaining the current order, the U.S. helps ensure its 
position at its apex through an historically unique set of methods.131 The U.S. found 
itself as the dominant power in 1945 as a result of the war-time degradations 
elsewhere and the cumulative effects of general long-term economic growth,132 which 
was based on relative sanctuary from the war (provided by two major oceans that also 
put the U.S. in a privileged position trade-wise), massive importation of worldwide 
labour (including in the early stages slave labour) and therefore skills, a natural 
resources endowment, managed openness to financial capital alongside protection of 
domestic production markets, and strengthening involvement in, and domination of, 
its ‘backyard’ as a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere.133 At the end of the 
WWII it immediately set about rooting, solidifying and then maintaining this position. 
It did this by pulling in Europe and the defeated powers into an open, capitalist aegis, 
whilst continuing to actively open up the global South to market penetration and the 
installation and insulation of capitalist social relations, often coercively and with quite 
brutal methods, especially in Latin America.134 Military power is key to undergirding 
                                                
128 For information on this, see U.S. Census Bureau Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012 
p.559-580 Available here http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012edition.html Accessed 
16.07.14; U.S. Department of Interior U.S. Geological Survey Mineral Commodities Summaries 2013 
(Virginia, 2013) p.6; U.S. Energy Administration How Dependent are we on Foreign Oil? (May 10th, 
2013) http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/foreign_oil_dependence.cfm Accessed 16.07.14 Also 
see Stokes and Raphael Global Energy Security 
129 Not entirely of course. Consider the impact of Great Britain on the creation of the Bretton Woods 
institutions (although they came to be more U.S. dominated after the systemic crisis of the 1970s), or 
Germany within the European Union, as just two examples of other power poles and key actors in 
liberal global order. We can also see in this extremely brief overview the validity of Mabee’s point that 
whilst many observers of U.S. foreign policy look at its hegemonic strategy from World War II 
onwards, there are deeper historical roots and continuities at work. Mabee Understanding American 
Power p.16 
130 G. John Ikenberry Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American 
World Order (Princeton University Press, 2011) p.2 My emphasis. 
131 Stokes and Raphael Global Energy Security p.20-38 
132 Speaking in terms of general trends, marked of course by often huge cyclical crises. 
133 Stokes and Raphael Global Energy Security p.20; Arrighi Long Twentieth Century p.62-63  
134 For example Eduardo Galeano Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of the 
Continent (Serpents Tail, 1971); Walter LaFeber Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central 
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this system. The U.S. rearranged but deepened this framework (albeit with a good 
deal of contingent innovation rather than prescient planning) following the systemic 
crisis and dissolution of the Soviet Union.135 However, whilst other national poles in 
the liberal capitalist core (and increasingly beyond)136 gain from the current order, its 
most meaningful advantages are enjoyed by the U.S. as the dominant global economic 
power, able to most benefit from and shape an open global market system.137  
 
There is therefore a mutual reinforcement between unipolar military preponderance 
and economic ascendency, and continued U.S. structural power within international 
system, and the sustainment of that system itself. Given the economic imperatives of 
profit making and improved welfare and standards of living, intersecting with the 
logics of anarchy and power-seeking on the international stage and the concomitant 
ideational beliefs in U.S. exceptionalism, U.S. hegemonic strategy ‘makes sense’ 
beyond ideational structures or persistent ideology and domestic economic factors. 
There are interests that confront the U.S. state as external compulsions and 
constraints, arising largely from complex, variegated social structures comprised of 
inter-related material and ideational components. Whilst they are part ideational, they 
are also part material. Whilst they can only be accessed through subjective processes 
and therefore may be missed, there will be costs involved in missing them. Whilst 
structures evolve and interests can shift, they have ‘staying power’ precisely because 
they are structural, and interests to a good degree arise from them and actors places 
within them. Thus interests have an emergent causal power in U.S. foreign policy (as 
they do across the social world) acting mechanistically between structure and agency. 
 
To summarise, U.S.’ power is sustained in large part by the continuance of the order 
it has created, based around Open Door economic principles, and concomitant 
institutional, military and economic involvement around the globe. There is a 
structural compulsion to secure U.S. primacy through and within widespread 
economic openness and competition from instability or change, and one eminently 
strategic solution to achieve this is to manage it within institutions and to spread and 
back it up with far-flung U.S. military power. There are also likely to be severe costs 
                                                
America 2nd edn. (W.W. Norton & Company, 1993); Ruth Blakeley State Terrorism and 
Neoliberalism: The North in the South (Routledge, 2009); Doug Stokes America’s Other War: 
Terrorizing Colombia (Zed Books, 2005); William Blum Killing Hope: US Military & CIA 
Interventions since World War II (Zed Books, 2003); Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman The 
Washington Connection and Third World Fascism: The Political Economy of Human Rights: Volume I 
(South End Press, 1979); Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, 
Counter-Insurgency, and Counter-Terrorism 1940-1990 (Random House, 1992) 
135 Stokes and Raphael Global Energy Security p.20-38 
136 Here I am thinking of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and other rising economies, often 
assumed to be challengers to the U.S. order, but also fundamentally tied to it. 
137 Stokes and Raphael Global Energy Security p.35-38 Carla Norloff America’s Global Advantage: 
US Hegemony and International Cooperation (Cambridge University Press, 2010) In this way the U.S. 
is following other dominant powers who have shaped and managed international economic orders 
historically, such as the Dutch and the U.K. These powers, especially the U.K and U.S., have benefitted 
from ruthlessly protecting their domestic markets, before then seeking to open up others to ‘free trade’ 
(on the powerful state’s terms). The U.S. has been more successful at avoiding capitalist competition 
spilling into national conflict (thus far) than the U.K., and does not rely on direct imperialism in the 
South (in fact it successfully undermined the British Empire at the end of World War II to end British 
privileges within it). Also see Ha-Joon Chang Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in 
Historical Perspective (Anthem Press, 2002); Arrighi Long Twentieth Century  
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in not achieving this end, or drawing back from those commitments and frameworks. 
Thus, utilising Porpora’s helpful definition of structure, interests present themselves 
to the U.S. as externalities: they are in some sense ‘out there’ waiting to be achieved, 
and are given by both domestic and international social structures, associated with 
capitalist social relations and forms of production, and the U.S.’ long-standing 
position within those structures as the most successful and powerful capitalist state. 
Importantly “[T]his does not mean that actors always with necessity act in their 
interests” - the complexity of the social world and the role of interpretation preclude 
that, as the neoclassical Realists recognise - “but if they don’t they are likely to 
suffer”.138  
 
This is not to suggest that this is an infallible arrangement, which it most certainly is 
not.139 I also do not suggest alternative grand strategies or foreign policies are not 
available or, moreover, possible. It does not claim this broad direction in U.S. foreign 
relations and global strategy and its continuance was or is an inevitability, and 
therefore certainly does not suggest that the broad thrusts of U.S. strategy are not 
open to change, not least due to contingencies and human agency. However it does 
assert that we cannot claim the Open Door and U.S. hegemony are only ideational 
constructs. To put it simply, there are good strategic reasons the U.S. has sought to 
create and maintain hegemony beyond the designs of a wrong-headed policy-making 
elite, ideational or cultural social structures, or domestic economic interests. These are 
significantly based in inducements towards hegemony as a strategy given by a 
multiple-determining140 structural conglomeration based in logics of anarchy, U.S. 
power capabilities, liberal and exceptionalist ideological currents and, moreover, their 
inter-relation with stronger structural forces provided by economic, material 
imperatives. These are activated of course by policy-making agents within the state’s 
structure itself who have considerable leeway to strategise and innovate, but who do 
so in pre-existing structural conditions that privilege certain courses of actions tied to 
certain interests. It’s important to quickly flesh out how the U.S. state works in 
practice here. 
 
The U.S. State, Interests and Hegemonic Grand Strategy 
Up to now we have discussed some of the contemporary theories in IR and moved 
through them to show how the U.S. state has interests mediated by complex social 
structures. I now want to examine further how the U.S. foreign policy and grand 
strategy have proceeded in practise with regard to the U.S. state. There are however 
still some important questions and debates within the broad overview of U.S. foreign 
relations and interests above. Firstly we should consider how much the U.S. state 
‘makes’ this grand strategy in terms of the origins of interests. Using Marxian theories 
obliges us to think about Marxian debates on the state, and specifically in this case 
what interests are represented by the state. I have argued that the U.S. state’s foreign 
                                                
138 Douglas V. Porpora ‘The Four Concepts of Social Structure’ in Margaret Archer, Roy Bhaskar, 
Andrew Collier, Tony Lawson and Alan Norrie [eds.] Critical Realism: Essential Readings 
(Routledge, 1998) p.353 
139 We look at some of the tensions within it briefly below. 
140 A concept borrowed from Bhaskar. In reality of course, as I established in the Introduction, the 
intensely complex sources of U.S. foreign policy are given scant justice by the broad-brush used here. 
However I contend we have hit on the key constitutive elements and can make justifiable and strong 
claims based on them.  
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policy interests followed commercial interests driven by capital’s expansionary logic, 
transmuting in the process to become a more general aim of the U.S. state. How 
much, then, do we separate ‘U.S. interests’ from the interests of its capital or 
capitalists? Is the state instrumental for capital? Here we need to assert the state’s 
relative autonomy, its structural nature and the fact it is both a strategic terrain but 
strategically selective to answer that with a qualified ‘only in part’. We can in fact 
look at the state’s dysfunctionality as evidence of its non-instrumentalism and its 
existence as a strategic terrain. One need only witness the contemporary regular farces 
that pass for Washington attempting to raise debt-ceiling limits (or avoid 
sequestration, or pass a budget, or how it is influenced by the Tea Party…) to realise 
even the most powerful state is not uniformly functional for the smooth running of 
capitalist economies, cannot be easily ascribed as a tool for a homogenous ‘capitalist 
class’ or interest group, and is subject to the wider ideological and political 
contestation amongst ‘intra-elite’ political groups as well as (varying levels of) 
influence from wider society.  
 
How then do we explain consistency? Firstly, we should recall that the state is itself a 
social structure (as well as being an “institutional complex”)141 that prefigures actors, 
but is made to act only by them. Interests, again as described above, significantly 
motivate those actors. However this is severely complicated by the fact that the state 
is also a social relation and reflects and is influenced by the wider society of which it 
is part. Taking us further down the rabbit hole, despite being a social relation the state 
still has a functional role within the capitalist economy and in capitalist social 
relations; underwriting, securing, and directing economic activity (to differing 
degrees), and in seeking to maintain the social formation of which it is part, all the 
while being “called upon by diverse social forces” to intervene in societal issues and 
problems.142 Given this, we must simplify somewhat to understand the consistency of 
U.S. grand strategy over time. The work of Jessop can help us cut through the 
complexity here. Whilst the state may be relational, it is also strategic. It is a strategic 
terrain where social forces and groups contest politically, but it is also strategically 
selective in that it preferences specific strategies and specific actors or groups of 
actors.143 In capitalist social relations this means the relative economic power of 
certain groups or actors is crucial of course, but not all determinative. We can, and 
should, avoid crude instrumentalism by keeping in mind that other influences (and 
strategies) still bear out on the state and temper its selectivity (for example the 
influence of a working class, which is still important in the U.S. and other capitalist 
states despite its relative loss of influence in neoliberalism) and, moreover for our 
purposes, the state itself is relatively autonomous. 
 
When we combine these insights with the discussion of structures above we can better 
understand the consistency of the U.S. state’s overarching strategy. The U.S. state 
itself is a social structure that favours - or better yet strategically selects - expansive 
foreign policies, and this is in large part because it is enmeshed in wider social 
structures that provide ideological-material compulsions and constraints to achieve 
                                                
141 Colin Hay and Michael Lister ‘Introduction: Theories of the State’ in Colin Hay, Michael Lister and 
David Marsh [eds.] The State: Theories and Issues (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) p.5 
142 Bob Jessop State Power p.6-9 
143 Hay and Lister ‘Introduction’ p.10-11; Bob Jessop State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in their 
Place (Polity Press, 1990) p.9-10 
Paul Ashby: NAFTA-Land Security: The Mérida Initiative, Transnational Threats, and U.S. Security Projection in 
Mexico  
PhD Thesis 
University of Kent 
 
104 
economic and power primacy. As I have already argued, the related predilection for 
an expansive global grand strategy that seeks to ensure primacy through hegemony is 
itself structurally bounded up in the U.S. state. Within this complex context of course 
there is still significant room for agency, both on the part of the actors within the 
state’s institutions and bureaucracies, and in terms of the state’s relational nature and 
the fact it constitutes a wider social strategic terrain upon which different actors 
participate. However despite this elasticity the pushers and pullers towards a 
continuation of the hegemonic grand strategy based around spreading and maintaining 
an open liberal-capitalist order remain strong. In the following two chapters we will 
see empirically the U.S. state acting relatively autonomously in its actions within 
U.S.-Mexican bilateral relations, and in how it constructs policy towards its 
neighbour. We can also definitively place U.S. policies within its wider strategy both 
in terms of the historical effort to maintain Mexico’s openness to U.S. capital 
alongside the associated desire to ensure Mexican stability, and in the effort to further 
spread and entrench global capitalism on U.S. terms.  
 
 
U.S. Strategic Interests in Mexico 
 
With a working conception of U.S. interests and major trends in foreign policy and 
grand strategy in place, we can better illuminate and understand its interests in 
Mexico itself. U.S. policy documentation gives us a clear insight into a number of the 
key concerns for the U.S.’ foreign policy and interests when it comes to their southern 
neighbour. Just prior to the launch of the MI, the U.S. DoS’ Congressional Budget 
Justification for Foreign Operations outlined that: 
 
The United States has enormous interests in Mexico -- politically,  
economically and with regard to our own national security. Its  
very proximity inexorably intertwines our everyday life, as well  
as our futures. Mexico shares a 2000 mile border with the U.S.,  
is our thirdlargest trading partner, and, within NAFTA, is a trade  
and security partner with the U.S. and Canada and a major  
recipient of direct foreign investment.144 
 
This seemingly simple overview is useful in establishing key U.S. concerns in 
Mexico, but these “enormous interests” have a complex history. Geography ensures 
the U.S. and Mexico have deeply intertwined stories of development, and as the U.S. 
emerged as the more powerful economic and political actor over the course of the 19th 
and 20th Century its influence on Mexico was profound. It included war and the 
conquest of huge swathes of Mexican territory (including Texas and California, both 
of which would further catalyse U.S. economic success) sealed by the Treaty of 
Guadalupe-Hidalgo in 1848.145 As U.S. investors sought new markets, raw materials, 
and economic opportunities further afield in the late 19th Century, their investments 
and influence in Mexico grew, creating economic interests within Mexico and 
between Mexico and the U.S. Where interests grew, foreign policy followed. The 
                                                
144 U.S. Department of State Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 2008 
(Washington D.C. 2007) p.651 
145 Amy S. Greenberg A Wicked War: Polk, Clay, Lincoln, and the 1846 U.S. Invasion of Mexico 
(Alfred A. Knopf, 2012) 
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Open Door led to U.S. support (both ‘private’ and ‘public’) for the regime of Porfirio 
Díaz, who was extremely open to U.S. investment and brought the stability required 
for its continued success for some thirty years. However Díaz’s increasingly 
authoritarian rule, combined with unprecedented levels of growth, the creation of 
differentiated political and economic interests of particular classes, and the heavy 
influence of U.S. economic power in Mexico created a febrile and explosive mix that 
combusted in revolutionary fervour in Mexico in 1910. The U.S. attempted to 
influence events in their favour in terms of restoring political stability throughout the 
Revolutionary period. 
 
As the forces unleashed by the Revolution were tamed by and congealed around the 
one party state created by the PRI,146 U.S. interests in Mexico’s political-economic 
stability and economic openness were largely met, in a qualified sense. After World 
War II, and despite the continued nationalistic development course undertaken by the 
PRI, a fairly benign and mutually beneficial political-economic relationship 
proceeded between the two neighbours. U.S. interests in Mexico significantly 
deepened in 1976 when a fisherman in the Bay of Campeche stumbled upon what 
turned out to be a huge oil field. Shortly after this apparent boon, Mexico’s economy 
was plunged into severe crisis. The U.S seized the opportunity to restructure Mexico’s 
political economy more in line with openness to U.S. investment and trade. These 
processes culminated in NAFTA, which effectively “locked in” Mexico’s macro-
economic changes.147 With the signing of NAFTA U.S. interests in Mexico’s political 
economic stability were hugely increased. Military aid began to increase from 
relatively low levels from this point, partly in response to a short-lived but influential 
insurgency and resistance campaign launched in Chiapas by the EZLN as NAFTA 
came into effect. Thus, we can start to connect the U.S.’ policies in Mexico to its 
long-traceable and generalisable efforts to secure the stable economic openness of key 
nation-states and markets. As I show in the following chapter the jump in security aid 
received by Mexico coincided with NAFTA, and was aimed in part at securing it from 
potentially destabilising political threats.  
 
However, the increase in U.S. assistance that has itself culminated in the MI part of 
something much more holistic. Due to the regionality of economic integration that 
NAFTA has inculcated in trade, production, and investment, it has become pressing to 
protect the North American economic space itself. Almost immediately after 9/11 
exposed U.S. vulnerability, and the U.S. response in hardened border security 
measures had extremely painful costs on the North American economy, initiatives 
were undertaken to try and ‘secure the openness’ of the North American economy. 
The policy response to this became centered on the SPP, whereby the NAFTA zone 
was conceptualised as a shared economic space that should be protected mutually 
amongst its members. The same logic underpins the MI, and both are part of a nascent 
NAFTA-land Security project. The U.S. has put a renewed premium on its own HS in 
the wake of 9/11, and is actively trying to ‘project out’ its borders beyond the 
contiguous ones to meet or neuter threats and illicit activity before they reach the 
                                                
146 See Adam David Morton Revolution and State in Modern Mexico: The Political Economy of 
Uneven Development (Rowman and Littlefield, 2011) for a Gramscian take on this process. 
147 G. John Ikenberry After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after 
Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) p.239-242 I discuss this further in the 
upcoming chapter. 
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Homeland. The trafficking of cartels and associated corruption and violence became 
increasingly seen as a threat to the NAFTA zone and its political economy through its 
destabilising effect within Mexico. The MI has become a vehicle for all of these 
concerns, not just ‘CN’ in simple terms. It is part of wider effort to secure U.S. 
interests at multiple levels. This is the key claim of the project, and is backed up with 
a weight of evidence in its empirical sections to follow. At this point, I want to flesh it 
out a little more theoretically.  
 
North America as an Economic Space, Strategic Interests, and NAFTA-land 
Security  
 
The National Security Strategy for 2010 actually spells out the interests within 
NAFTA, and the need to protect them, succinctly: 
 
The strategic partnerships and unique relationships we maintain with  
Canada and Mexico are critical to U.S. national security and have a  
direct effect on the security of our homeland. With billions of dollars  
in trade, shared critical infrastructure, and millions of our citizens 
moving across our common borders, no two countries are more  
directly connected to our daily lives. We must change the way we  
think about our shared borders, in order to secure and expedite the  
lawful and legitimate flow of people and goods while interdicting  
transnational threats that threaten our open societies.148 
 
It goes on to discuss Mexico specifically:  
 
With Mexico, in addition to trade cooperation, we are working  
together to identify and interdict threats at the earliest opportunity,  
even before they reach North America.149 Stability and security in  
Mexico are indispensable to building a strong economic  
partnership, fighting the illicit drug and arms trade, and promoting  
sound immigration policy.”150 
 
However, what underpins these core concerns for U.S. policymakers? First of all, lets 
deal with stability and security in Mexico itself. What interests would be threatened 
by instability?151 Of course, the relationship between the U.S. and Mexico has always 
been a significant one, and this has included political-economic ties in areas like 
factory production,152 ‘flexible’ labour importation,153 and energy.154 Nonetheless, the 
                                                
148 U.S. White House National Security Strategy 2010 (Washington D.C., May 2010) p.42 
149 This reflects the wider push by the U.S. in Central America that also informed the early Mérida 
Initiative. As discussed in the Introduction and Conclusions, this aspect of U.S. policy requires further 
research. 
150 ibid p.43 
151 The argument in this section draws upon my work elsewhere, see Paul Ashby ‘Solving the Border 
Paradox? Border Security, Economic Integration, and the Mérida Initiative’ Global Society 28, 4 
(2014) 
152 The maquiladora cross-border factory initiative was started in 1965, partially in response to the end 
of the Bracero programme that had allowed Mexican workers temporary work visas in the U.S.  
153 Through various official and unofficial means, including the aforementioned Bracero programme 
that ran from 1943 to 1964, Mexican workers have made up a shortfall of labour in the U.S., especially 
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passage of NAFTA in 1994 has in many ways rendered Mexico crucial to 
contemporary U.S. economic success (and, in a albeit different and more profound 
manner, vice versa).155 Thus, Mexico was the U.S.’ third largest trading partner in 
2012 behind fellow NAFTA member Canada and (far higher imports but lower 
exports) China.156 U.S. interests in Mexico are now deeper than ever before, and thus 
require insulation from internal instability. Drug violence has increasingly come to be 
seen as a direct threat to Mexico’s stability.  
 
U.S. Interests in Mexico, and Destabilising Drug Violence 
The increase in trade between the U.S. and Mexico since NAFTA went into effect has 
been huge. Total trade (imports and exports) increased 522% based on 1993 and 2013 
figures (with imports from Mexico up 603%).157 U.S. investment in Mexico jumped 
over 495% between 1994 and 2012.158 Much of this trade is accounted for by 
maquiladora processing plants, export assembly businesses that receive duty free U.S. 
components for much cheaper assembly by Mexican labour, with final products 
exported back into the U.S. at comparatively lower tariffs.159 Despite experiencing 
significant economic pressures from an increasingly competitive China in the 21st 
Century, and shocks from the downturn associated with financial crisis in 2007-2009, 
several large border complexes integral in the North American supply chain now 
exist, such as El Paso-Ciudad Juárez and San Diego-Tijuana (and their immediately 
surrounding areas). These hubs are not just based around trade, but also cross-border 
production and then transportation elsewhere in several key industries. Looking at the 
El Paso - Ciudad Juárez alone region gives us some more insight here. In 2012 almost 
725,000 trucks and over 33,000 loaded rail containers crossed the border at El Paso 
Points of Entry (POEs).160 Over $65 billion in transborder freight moved through El 
                                                
in the agriculture and service industries. This has also provided a valve for Mexican unemployment 
pressures.  
154 Through the 1980s and 1990s Mexican crude oil exports to the U.S. rose and it is now consistently a 
top-three exporter to the U.S. market. Despite declining production and exploration difficulties that 
have resulted in falling exports since 2004, 972,000 barrels per day arrived from Mexico in 2012, 
around 11.5% of total U.S. crude imports. See U.S. Energy Information Administration ‘Mexico: 
Country Analysis’ http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=MX and ‘Petroleum and Other Liquids: 
Data: Crude Oil: U.S. imports by Country of Origin’ 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbblpd_a.htm Accessed 30.06.13 
155 This is illustrated by the deep economic slump in Mexico in 2009, reflecting the profound but 
shallower recession in the U.S. 
156 United States Census Bureau ‘Trade in Goods with Mexico’ http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/balance/c2010.html#1993 Accessed 20.05.13 
157 Figures from Unites States Census Bureau ‘Trade in Goods with Mexico 
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c2010.html Accessed 29.08.14; Office of the United 
States Trade Representative ‘Mexico’ http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/mexico 
Accessed 29.08.14 
158 Using figures from M. Angeles Villarreal U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and 
Implications (Congressional Research Service, July 2014) p.6 
159 Although the maquila program was started in the 1960s, it received a huge boost through NAFTA, 
and between 1970 and 2006 the number of plants operating in Mexico increased from 120 to 2, 810. 
César M. Fuentes and Sergio Peña ‘Globalization, Transborder Networks, and U.S.-Mexico Border 
Cities’ in Kathleen Staudt, César M. Fuentes & Julia E. Monárrez Fragoso [eds.] Cities and Citizenship 
at the U.S.-Mexico Border: The Paso del Norte Metropolitan Region (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010) p.10 
160 United States Department of Transportation: Research and Innovative Technology Administration 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics ‘Border Crossing Entry Data: El Paso 2012’ 
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Paso-Ciudad Juárez in 2012, including $43 billion in trade groups that include parts 
and components for assembly in the maquilas and factories that straddle the two 
major cities and surrounding areas.161 Further, cross-border economic impacts are not 
just limited to trade figures. Almost 10 million cars crossed the border alongside over 
6 million pedestrians,162 generating and sustaining a cross-border retail economy and 
reflecting a cross-border lifestyle in terms of work, family life, and leisure.163  
 
In addition, Mexico has become increasingly important for North American 
competiveness within more globalised economic processes and trends, and that has 
large implications for the U.S.’ comparative global economic success and wider grand 
strategy. Across the NAFTA-zone, ‘just-in-time’ processes (whereby the smaller 
components of a larger product are delivered ‘just-in-time’ for final assembly, giving 
greater flexibility for customers, saving on inventory costs and problems),164 
advantageous use of labour ‘flexibility’ (wage inequalities) and innovative tariff 
arrangements have revolutionised areas of North American production and are 
responsible for a significant chunk of the increase in North American trade, both in 
the parts traded for assembly in cross-border maquila plants and factories, and in final 
products.165 Looking at figures for trade gives us an insight into this phenomenon, as 
some of the top items (outside oil and associated products) are similar for both 
imports and exports, including electronic equipment (parts and products) and auto 
(parts and products).166 For example, ‘American’ automotive manufacture can now be 
increasingly said to be ‘North American’, given the integral role Mexico and Canada 
play in the truly trilateral production process.167 O’Neil states that it is estimated that 
for every item imported from Mexico, 40% of its value is actually ‘American’ (as in 
U.S. labour inputted that amount into the production of the imported product).168 
                                                
http://transborder.bts.gov/programs/international/transborder/TBDR_BC/TBDR_BCQ.html Accessed 
30.07.13 
161 United States Department of Transportation: Research and Innovative Technology Administration 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics ‘North American Transborder Freight Data: Port and Commodity 
Data El Paso 2012’ 
http://transborder.bts.gov/programs/international/transborder/TBDR_QAPC07.html Accessed 30.07.13 
July, 2013)   
162 U.S. Department of Transportation ‘Border Crossing Entry Data’  
163 See, for example, Tony Payan The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, Immigration, and 
Homeland Security (Praeger Security International, 2006) p.2-3, 5  
164 For a discussion of the ‘just in time’ process in the auto industry see Thomas Klier and James 
Rubenstein Who Really Made Your Car? Restructuring and Geographic Change in the Auto Industry 
(Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 2008) p.135-141 
165 Shannon K. O’Neil Two Nations Indivisible: Mexico, the United States, and the Road Ahead 
(Oxford University Press, 2013) p.113-116; Robert A. Pastor The North American Idea: A Vision of a 
Continental Future (Oxford University Press, 2011) p.100-101 
166 See International Trade Centre ‘Trade Map: Mexico & United States’ 
http://www.trademap.org/countrymap/Bilateral_TS.aspx Accessed 22.07.13 
167 Krista Hughes ‘Mexican Manufacturing: From Sweatshops to High-Tech Motors’ Reuters (April 
9th, 2013) http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/09/us-mexico-economy-manufacturing-
idUSBRE9380TN20130409 Accessed 09.05.13 Thomas H. Klier & James M. Rubenstein ‘The 
Growing Importance of Mexico in North America’s Auto Production’ The Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago Chicago Fed Letter No. 310 (May 2013)  
168 Shannon K. O’Neil ‘Good Neighbors’ Foreign Policy (February 17th, 2014) 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/02/17/good_neighbors Accessed 31.07.14  
Paul Ashby: NAFTA-Land Security: The Mérida Initiative, Transnational Threats, and U.S. Security Projection in 
Mexico  
PhD Thesis 
University of Kent 
 
109 
These overall North American productive trends are summarised in further detail by 
Wilson.169 
 
Beyond North American cross-production, several important key economic areas for 
U.S. interests exist. Mexico remains a key agricultural trading partner.170 Mexico has 
steadily increased its agricultural exports to the U.S. at a rate of almost 10% year-on-
year since NAFTA, albeit through the decline of small-scale farming and the 
increased dominance of agribusiness.171 Mexico also remains an important supplier of 
raw materials to the U.S. and global markets, but whilst Mexico’s trade portfolio in 
goods remains heavily made up by oil and associated products (14% exports and 9% 
imports in 2012), and Mexico is an important source of other key resources (notably 
silver and gold), in terms of percentages products tied to bi-national and North 
American assembly processes (and the subsequent final products) dominate U.S.-
Mexican trade. Thus, the argument that Delgado Ramos and María Romano make 
suggesting that Mexico is important to the U.S. as chiefly a raw materials exporter is 
rather outdated. Its political economic importance now goes far beyond that.172 As I 
will show in the following chapters, the U.S. has attempted to recognise this reality 
through policy undertakings, and the MI is very much connected to these wider 
developments. 
 
We can also see this ‘North American logic’ in energy production and security, itself 
also increasingly ‘North American’ in scope. Whilst Mexico’s crude oil exports to the 
U.S. currently retain their importance, the U.S. supplied Mexico with over 82% of 
non-crude refined petroleum products in 2012, and is set to take advantage of its shale 
gas boom by partnering with Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) in creating pipelines that 
will stretch across the border and deep into Mexico’s territory.173 Mexico itself has 
very large prospective deposits of technically recoverable shale gas in deposits in the 
East and especially North-East of its territory, a potentially very tempting resource for 
large foreign investment and important contributor to North American energy 
security.174 The depletion of Mexico’s oil reserves, especially at the huge Cantarell oil 
field,175 and PEMEX’s lack of experience in deepwater drilling has potentially 
significant implications for the U.S. and wider North American energy security, given 
that 11.5% of the U.S. crude imports came from Mexico in 2012 (an already 
decreasing figure from previous years). The impact on Mexico’s overall political 
economic stability also concerned the U.S. according to diplomatic cables, given the 
                                                
169 Christopher Wilson Working Together: Economic Ties Between the United States and Mexico 
(Woodrow Wilson Center Mexico Institute, 2011) 
170 Although given the huge subsidies that allow overproducing U.S. farms to use Mexico as an 
uncompetitive market the concept of ‘partnership’ may be stretched here 
171 Trade figures U.S. Department of Agriculture Strengthening NAFTA Through U.S.–Mexican 
Cooperation in Agriculture (Washington D.C., March 2007) p.2 
172 Gian Carlo Delgado-Ramos and Silvina María Romano ‘Political-Economic Factors in U.S. Foreign 
Policy: The Colombia Plan, the Mérida Initiative, and the Obama Administration’ Latin American 
Perspectives 38, 4 (2011) p.101-103. Trade figures from International Trade Centre ‘Trade Map’  
173 Reuters ‘Mexico's Pemex opens contract bids for Ramones gas pipeline project’ Reuters (May 13th, 
2013) http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/13/mexico-gas-idUSL2N0DU2KR20130513 Accessed 
14.05.13 
174 See Chapter Five for a discussion of this. 
175 See Michael T. Klare The Race for What’s Left: The Global Scramble for the World’s Last 
Resources (New York: Picador, 2012) p.19-22 
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huge input PEMEX provides to Mexico’s federal and therefore national budgets.176 
Peña Nieto’s administration has finally pushed through reforms along these lines. 
Should they meet the hopes of several commentators, and Mexico’s oil production 
open up successfully to private investment, energy integration is likely to go 
further.177 The importance of Mexico to U.S. strategic interests is underlined in these 
energy issues and beyond.  
 
As we have seen, U.S. drug policy is often viewed in critical examinations through its 
efficacy in securing foreign policy goals not directly related to CN, or how drug 
policy stems from domestic drivers and U.S. political pressures, as well as 
bureaucratic inertia.178 This remains a valid point more generally. However, in this 
case I contest we would be better placed to understand a significant portion of the 
drug-related violence in Mexico as directly and increasingly contradictory to U.S. 
strategic interests in Mexico itself. This allows me to understand drug violence from a 
historical-materialist perspective that still considers U.S. political economic interests 
as key to the MI. Crucially, this threat is seen holistically in terms of the challenge it 
poses to economic integration and the NAFTA space. Although not as intense, 
widespread, or ideological as ‘traditional’ political violence, in areas of Michoacán, 
Tamaulipas, Nuevo León and Guerrero the violence in Mexico is akin to low-level 
insurgency, with attacks on the state, and business interests commonplace.179 Whilst 
perhaps alarmist in its overall claims,180 much of the military-based extant literature 
builds on real evidence to suggest the existence of a ‘criminal insurgency’. Whilst the 
designation maybe clumsy, it does capture the level of the security challenge. Critical 
accounts also present alarming accounts of the level of violence and state complicity 
inside Mexico.181 The evidence points to drug violence being a direct challenge to 
U.S. interests in Mexico. Mexico witnesses sustained firefights in urban areas, the use 
of roadblocks, and the deployment of (improvised and genuine) military weapons. 
There are significant police and military casualties. Whilst it is hard to confirm 
whether police officers especially are killed for being police officers or for being 
aligned with the wrong cartel, the corruption of police forces themselves represents an 
                                                
176 U.S. Embassy Mexico Economic Conditions in Mexico Cable Reference 000033 (7th January, 2009) 
Link: http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09MEXICO33&q=china%20mexico Accessed 
13.10.12) 
177 Again, discussed a little more in Chapter Five. 
178 For an example in my case, see Emily Gilbert ‘Borders and Security in North America’ in Jeffrey 
Ayres and Laura Macdonald [eds.] North America in Question: Regional Integration in an Era of 
Economic Turbulence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012) p.204-205 
179 For academic / journalistic cases that outline the existence of this phenomenon, see Ioan Grillo El 
Narco: Inside Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2012); Robert Killebrew 
‘Criminal Insurgency in the Americas and Beyond’ NDU Prism 2, 3 (June, 2011); John P. Sullivan & 
Robert J. Bunker (ed.) Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency (iUniverse Books / Small Wars Foundation, 
2012) More below 
180 Bunker and Sullivan’s futurist speculations of a failed state seem wide of the mark, and I contend 
Mexico’s violence is much more localised than they treat it. Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan 
‘Cartel Evolution Revisited: Third Phase Cartel Potentials and Alternative Futures in Mexico’ in 
Robert J. Bunker [ed.] Narcos Over the Border: Gangs, Cartels and Mercenaries (Routledge, 2011) 
p.30-54 Nonetheless there is no doubting the capability and brazenness of the cartels in some areas of 
Mexico. Also see Lisa J. Campbell,‘Los Zetas: Operational Assessment’ in ibid p.55-80  
181 See Chapter Two, but Gibler offers a particularly gripping and shocking account of the depths of 
corruption and violence in the Mexican state and the country’s drug war. John Gibler To Die in 
Mexico: Dispatches from Inside the Drug War (City Lights Books, 2011) 
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alarming reality in terms of the Mexican state’s capabilities to maintain the monopoly 
of violence and rule of law. Several diplomatic cables have discussed at least the 
potential for instability related to drug trafficking violence to impact upon economic 
investment and wider business and trade inside Mexico itself.182 Some academic 
studies have also made this case (although the effects are very complex).183 To 
summarise, whilst we may quibble over a precise definition of Mexico’s current 
crisis, the instability generated by the violence is a genuine strategic concern. This 
further links the MI to established traits in U.S. foreign policy in shoring up political 
economies to help ensure their stability in the service of its interests, without having 
to underplay the CN elements.  
 
The Mérida Initiative, Border Security, and NAFTA-land Security 
The bid to help tackle Mexico’s drug-related instability within the MI is enveloped by 
its primary rationale - the integration of security relations between the U.S. and 
Mexico as part of the regionalisation of security and across and around the NAFTA 
sphere. Whilst the strategic importance of North America and Mexico grew over the 
NAFTA period, presenting a strategic compulsion to secure its political economy, it 
took the events of 9/11 to catalyse the NAFTA-land Security response. The impacts 
of those terrorist attacks went far beyond the tragic loss of life. Subsequent border 
closures and heightened security imposed high costs North American business, 
individuals, and, more broadly, U.S. interests that are rooted in regional trilateral 
economic openness.184 The disruptive potential for a further attack within or 
emanating from North America has become a key animator for policy. As the 
Department for Homeland Security (DHS) put it, “the systems that provide the 
functions essential for a thriving society are increasingly intricate and interconnected. 
This means that potential disruptions to a system are not fully understood and can 
have large and unanticipated cascading effects throughout American security.”185 
Another successful terrorist attack from within or without of North America is likely 
to have similar or even more detrimental results on trilateral integration.186 The 
                                                
182 For evidence of both U.S. concern in this area, and descriptions about how former President 
Calderón explained his own security crackdown in these terms, see U.S. Embassy Mexico Scene Setter 
for President’s Trip to Mexico, March 12-14th, 2007 Cable Reference: 001102 (March 5th, 2007) 
available <http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07MEXICO1102&q=merida%20mexico> 
(accessed October 3rd, 2012); U.S. Embassy Mexico Effect of Violence on Mexican Investment Cable 
Reference: 001536 (March 22nd, 2006) available 
<http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06MEXICO1536&q=investment%20mexico%20securi
ty> (accessed 4th October, 2012) 
183 Miguel A. Ramos and Nathan J. Ashby ‘Heterogeneous Firm Response to Organized Crime: 
Evidence from FDI in Mexico’ Journal of International Management 19 (2013); Nathan J. Ashby and 
Miguel A. Ramos ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Industry Response to Organized Crime: The 
Mexican Case’ European Journal of Political Economy 30 (2013); Steven Samford and Priscila Ortega 
Gómez ‘Subnational Politics and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico’ Review of International 
Political Economy 21, 2 (2014) Interestingly and confoundingly, these authors find that investment is 
highest in some of the areas where investment is highest. This may not be so surprising in terms of the 
fact that the northern states of Mexico receive a lot of FDI, and also are where drugs cross the border. 
However it is an area that deserves further research.  
184 I discuss this in Chapter Five 
185 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Risk Management Fundamentals: Homeland Security Risk 
Management Doctrine (Washington D.C., April, 2011) p.7 
186 Considering the political and economic ramifications had the ‘Millennium bomber’ Ahmed Ressam 
had not been stopped by a vigilant Customs inspector at the U.S. Canadian border en route to bomb 
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conundrum for U.S. policymakers is therefore not just how to maintain the advantages 
of economic integration and openness within the NAFTA-zone but to secure that very 
economic openness. 9/11 highlighted that security risks to North American economic 
integration that were in some part inherent in North American economic integration. 
The U.S. aim therefore has been to secure openness. 
 
This argument sets me apart from some of the other theories on North American 
security integration. There is, within that literature, a recognised trend towards 
‘harder’ border security regimes and border space securitisation (even militarisation) 
as a response to immigration, illicit trafficking, and (especially after 9/11) terrorism in 
North America and much of the global North, even as these states seek maintain the 
open political and economic systems they have invested in.187 However, I have shown 
previously that  ‘economic’ and ‘security’ issues have been dissected into distinct 
policy subsets in much of the extant literature.188 As an indicative example, 
d’Appolonia and Reich see the challenge to Western states in border secure as citizen 
security issue, discussing how in both the U.S. and Europe, there exists, “a new 
challenge in reconciling the requisites of public safety with the foundations of the 
‘open society’ upon which political and social relations have been constructed”.189 
There is no focus on the importance of open political economies to states in the 
Global North and their protection here. In the North American context, there are 
instances of analysts suggesting (or decrying) that in the wake of 9/11, ‘security 
trumps trade’ and that therefore economic liberalisation has taken a back seat to 
security concerns.190 One is often left with the impression of a back and forth between 
two policy poles. 
 
I contend differently. Whilst there is no doubt that a security agenda has emerged in 
North America, the reasons for this are absolutely and fundamentally connected to the 
region’s economic integration. It is crucial to note from a theoretical standpoint that 
there is not a shifting, competing tussle between distinct policy aims, but instead an 
inherently difficult challenge presented by deeply intertwined coeval economic-
security interests, marked by the need to achieve the security of an open economic 
system. The debate is internal to achievement of this complex interest, not between 
‘economics’ and ‘security’. Indeed, this is a good example of the fact that whilst 
interests may be fairly clear, discerning how to achieve them is not.191 The economic 
effect of NAFTA (as a singular regional example of a far wider reality) underlines the 
importance of a certain kind of openness - to trade, talent, labour and ideas - to the 
U.S. economy. The U.S. has pursued the construction of deeper economic integration 
                                                
Los Angeles International Airport should give us pause regarding the threat to continued integration 
from potential cross-border incidents.  
187 Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia and Simon Reich’s  [eds.] Immigration, Integration, and Security: 
America and Europe in Comparative Perspective (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008) explores this 
development in Europe and the U.S.  
188 See the Literature Review. 
189 Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia and Simon Reich ‘ The Securitization of Immigration: Multiple 
Countries, Multiple Dimensions’ in d’Appollonia and Reich Immigration, Integration, and Security: 
p.1 
190 See Literature Review 
191 Matthew Coleman makes an argument on complexity of interests at the border in Mathew Coleman 
‘U.S. Statecraft and the U.S.–Mexico Border as Security/Economy Nexus’ Political Geography 24 
(2005)  
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on a global scale, and needs to be able to accept the benefits that flow to it as result of 
being the prime actor in that system. However, it is also a recognised trend more 
widely within economic globalisation that illicit actors have been able to take 
advantage of the same globalised ‘space-time compression’192 that has been promoted 
by the U.S. and so invigorated licit transnational flows. As par examplar of an 
integrated region NAFTA provides a microcosm of these wider phenomena, albeit of 
course a highly specific one. President Bush summarised the overall and regional 
challenge to the U.S. succinctly when in the aftermath of 9/11 he told his then head of 
Customs Robert Bonner, “You’ve got to secure our borders against the terrorist threat. 
But you have to do it without shutting down the U.S. economy”.193 Part of the damage 
of 9/11 was to globalised and regionalised economic flows, and this (in part) was why 
border security was ramped up, and security solutions were sought to protect those 
flows from further disruptive events.194 
 
Thus, those analysts that or posit that security interests have trumped or clash with 
economic ones underplay that the U.S. policy response is in large part about ensuring 
that such attacks do not threaten strategic U.S. interests in securing the openness of 
the North American economic space.195 Nonetheless, ‘hardening’ U.S. borders has 
proved ineffective and counterproductive, perhaps not surprising given the impact on 
highly integrated systems. Whilst it is perhaps to be expected that borders have 
received renewed security focus,196 increasing security arrangements at the border has 
had pernicious effects in harming trade (and relatedly, so the argument goes, 
investment, competitiveness and prosperity).197 There is also a strong case that it has 
increased the capabilities of various illicit actors through the honing of skills in 
avoiding interdiction. It is therefore essentially a paradoxical undertaking.198 Some 
policy analysts have noted that in response the U.S. has tried to ‘have it both ways’ - 
securing the border against illicit actors, loosening it up for licit trade.199 Others have 
encouraged trilateral thinking in the NAFTA context to solve mutual security issues 
around drugs, terrorism and migration, and / or bemoaned the lack of movement in 
this direction.200 Especially important here is the idea of projecting borders outwards 
                                                
192 David Harvey The Condition of Postmodernity (Wiley Blackwell, 1991) 
193 Edward Alden The Closing of the American Border: Terrorism, Immigration, and Security Since 
9/11 (New York: Harper Perennial, 2008) p.52 
194 Of course border security within U.S. politics is a wider and more storied affair. ‘Domestic’ issues 
thus complicate matters a little here. I deal with this below. 
195 As noted in the Literature Review, Pastor’s North American Idea is a good example here, as is the 
work of O’Neil. They have also underplayed the debate within U.S. administrations. In the Bush era 
this revolves around the very question of securing economic openness, rather than being based on 
diametrically opposed positions on ‘economics’ or ‘security’. See Alden Closing of the American 
Border for a fascinating account.  
196 As transnational flows have increased within globalisation it is no surprise, that borders have 
become increasingly Janus-faced ‘securitised’ and ‘liberalised’ spaces, serving as they do as territorial 
boundaries to the political and social space the state is meant to protect as well as interchange zones, 
197 Ashby ‘Solving the Border Paradox’  
198 Ashby ‘Solving the Border Paradox?’; Stephen E. Flynn‘The False Conundrum: Continental 
Integration versus Homeland Security’ in Peter Andreas & Thomas J. Biersteker The Rebordering of 
North America: Integration and Exclusion in a New Security Context (Routledge, 2003) p.110 - 127 
199 Peter Andreas ‘Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the 21st Century’ International Security 
28, 2 (Fall, 2003) 
200 Many of the analysts I focused upon in the Literature Review have discussed the potential for and 
nascent moves towards a wider conception of North American security that integrates security policy 
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to achieve better, layered, HS and establishing a “security perimeter” around the 
NAFTA zone in order to better protect the U.S. and North America, especially from 
terrorism.201 
 
Both of these solutions have appeared in actual U.S. policy efforts. The ‘Smart 
Border’ and 21st Century Border Management programmes undertaken amongst the 
NAFTA countries, as discussed in the chapters to follow, justify themselves as 
focused on interdicting illicit threats whilst expediting licit trade.202 In 2005 the U.S., 
Mexico and Canada announced the SPP, a trilateral undertaking that sought to 
regionalise and coordinate North American security arrangements whilst deepening 
economic integration amongst the NAFTA partners. Announcing the SPP, the three 
NAFTA leaders stated it would aim to, “establish a common approach to security to 
protect North America from external threats, prevent and respond to threats within 
North America, and further streamline the secure and efficient movement of 
legitimate, low-risk traffic across our shared borders.”203 As I mentioned in the 
Literature Review, the SPP was described by Shannon as an agreement that 
understood, “North America as a shared economic space and that as a shared 
economic space we need to protect it”. He went on to say it would effectively “armor 
                                                
across the three NAFTA countries to catch up with economic integration, and indeed some have 
actively encouraged such a development. See that chapter for further detail. Others have discussed 
concepts such as ‘border projection’, whereby the U.S. achieves border security through aiding its 
international partners. However, many have remained skeptical that these processes are either currently 
happening in North America or indeed will happen in the near future. As indicative reminders, Pastor 
charges, “Today’s problems” in the NAFTA area, including continuing security problems, “are the 
result of the three governments failure to govern the North American space”. He encourages the 
creation of trilateral institutions to tackle security issues, including CN concerns. O’Neil suggests a 
partnership-based partnership approach to mutual security issues that would move beyond the 
militaristic focus of the Mérida Initiative to something akin to a ‘whole of society’ programme that 
seeks to tackle Mexico’s security crisis from the perspective of inculcating Mexican ‘rule of law’. 
Andreas discussed the potential for the creation of a North American security perimeter in line with 
policy initiatives that have suggested, “pushing borders outwards” as a solution to the border paradox, 
whereby border security tasks could be completed by trusted international partners, in this case Canada 
and Mexico. However he has concluded that such an approach, “would require such a high level of 
institutionalization and regional policy harmonization that it does not seem realistic at the present time” 
and instead through piecemeal policy programs the potential creation, “of an informal, quasi- 
continental security perimeter” could eventually take place. Robert Pastor The North American Idea: A 
Vision of a Continental Future (Oxford University Press, 2011); p.167; Shannon K. O’Neil Two 
Nations Indivisible: Mexico, the United States, and the Road Ahead (Oxford University Press, 2013); 
Andreas ‘Redrawing the Line’ p.98-99  
201 Gary Claude Hufbauer and Gustavo Vega-Cánovas ‘Whither NAFTA: A Common Frontier?’ in 
Peter Andreas & Thomas J. Biersteker The Rebordering of North America: Integration and Exclusion 
in a New Security Context (Routledge, 2003)  p.128-153 Flynn ‘The False Conundrum’ 
202 U.S. White House President George W. Bush Archive ‘Border Security: U.S.-Mexico Border 
Partnership Agreement’ (Washington D.C.) http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/usmxborder/ Accessed 20.07.14; U.S. White House Office of the 
Press Secretary Declaration by The Government Of The United States Of America and The 
Government Of The United Mexican States Concerning Twenty-First Century Border Management 
(Washington D.C., May 19th, 2010) http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/declaration-
government-united-states-america-and-government-united-mexican-states-c Accessed 22.07.14  
203 U.S. Department of State Archive Joint Statement by President Bush, President Fox, and Prime 
Minister Martin: Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (Crawford, Texas, March 23rd, 
2005) http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/wha/rls/prsrl/2005/69850.htm Accessed 22.07.14 
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NAFTA”.204 Clearly the Partnership was understood as tackling the interconnected 
nature of security and economic issues in North America through integrative 
measures. The initial report developed by Working Groups who were tasked with 
suggesting where progress could be made on the SPP stated, “While the Security and 
Prosperity agendas were developed by separate teams, we recognise that our 
economic well-being and our security are not two separate and distinct issues.”205  
 
Crucially the SPP was envisioned as being operative on multiple issues and a multiple 
scales. Again the initial report on the SPP’s progress from its Working Groups set out 
the goals: 
 
In North America, we have established plans for equivalent  
approaches to strengthen aviation security, to enhance maritime  
transportation and port security, to combat transnational threats to  
the United States, Canada, and Mexico, including terrorism,  
organized crime, illegal drugs, migrant and contraband smuggling  
and trafficking, to enhance partnerships on intelligence and  
information sharing, and to develop and implement a common  
approach to critical infrastructure protection, and response to  
cross-border terrorist incidents and, as applicable, natural disasters.206 
 
Thus the SPP was an ambitious trilateral agenda, which at heart sought to secure the 
North American economic space from internal and external threats and threat 
potentials. This is in line with core U.S. foreign policy goals in securing key markets, 
but is also a specific regional expression of this aim, greatly influenced by the high-
level of integration within the NAFTA zone. Showing further compatibility between 
policy scales, the intended protection of the North American economic space was also 
intended to improve U.S. HS through coordination and regularisation. In this sense it 
represented security projection. However amidst political pressure and a lack of 
substantive, trilateral, high-profile policy progress the SPP lost steam. Thus there is 
skepticism about achievements on a trilateral level concerning the SPP.  
 
We are better served in seeing the SPP as part of a process towards U.S.-Mexican 
security integration, which in turn adds towards the overall regionalisation of 
NAFTA’s security. The SPP, alongside tentative security interconnectivity between 
the U.S. and Mexico prior to that agreement, helped continue to lay the foundations 
for greater bilateral cooperative efforts on security questions that have culminated in 
the MI. Recalling Cadena-Roa’s analysis, which is perhaps closest overall to my own 
argument in this project: 
 
 … we should interpret [the] SPP not as a single (failed) project 
 but rather as one of a series of agreements and commitments 
 assumed by the [NAFTA] member states. Thus the SPP,  
 Calderón’s war on drugs, and the Mérida Initiative are not  
                                                
204 Shannon quoted in Laura Carlsen ‘Armoring NAFTA: The Battleground for Mexico’s Future’, 
NACLA Report on the Americas 41,5 (September, October, 2008) p. 17 
205 Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America: Report to Leaders 2005 (June 2005) 
Accessed via the Government of Canada’s SPP Archive here http://www.spp-psp.gc.ca/eic/site/spp-
psp.nsf/vwapj/Report-Rappport-Ju2005.pdf/$file/Report-Rappport-Ju2005.pdf  
206 SPP Report to Leaders p.32 
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 unrelated, nor are they responses to short-term problems […]; 
 rather, they are stages in a long-term project to draw Mexico 
 into the U.S. security perimeter as a reliable partner.207 
 
Those analysts who have drawn connections between the SPP, the MI and U.S. 
security interests are much closer to the import of the policy. However, no study has 
been able to reveal in detail just how deep the connections between the aims of the 
SPP and actual policy detail of the MI are. We also must keep in focus the causal role 
of U.S. strategic interests in securing both Mexican stability and continued economic 
openness in North America. In the next section, I finalise my explication of what is 
driving this policy, and connect up and unpack the different levels of the policy 
clearly. 
 
Transnational Threats: Within and Without 
As noted within the SPP documentation cited above, the official discourse 
surrounding U.S. policy in Mexico has reflected the growing official focus on 
transnational threats and TOC as a significant focus within U.S. strategy.208 The 
increasing emphasis on TOC in the Mexican context, running through policy 
academia, military statements, and administrative policy programs like The Strategy 
to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,112 is in some sense reflective of the 
security challenge facing the U.S. U.S. strategic interests in Mexico are facilitated by 
the open North American economic space, but cartels, and potentially others, straddle 
and take advantage of those open borders. In this scenario focusing on transnational 
threats makes prima facie sense. Effectively, the very ‘transnationalism’ of this 
challenge necessitates a response that goes beyond the immediate border with 
Mexico. The use of TOC here then is part of the wider concrete move to solutions that 
transcend border security by looking at the security issues more regionally and 
holistically. As a Pacific Council report noted, drug trafficking is not “a ‘border 
problem’, but rather a bi-national and international problem that governments try to 
address in part through enforcement and interdiction at the border”.113 
 
This links back to the threat posed by drug traffickers, which the U.S. is now 
conceptualizing as TCOs.209 Andreas and Friman have highlighted how increasingly 
powerful transnational criminal actors, through their increased use of violence, can 
undermine the authority of the state both by directly challenging it, and by 
undermining the populations wider trust in the state and its institutions.102 A Mexican 
state unable to effectively hold the monopoly of violence or guarantee the rule of law 
is inimical to the interests of the U.S. in sustaining an open economically integrated 
investment environment in the NAFTA zone. In the context of Mexico’s security 
crisis, U.S. concerns are not primarily about the ill-defined phenomenon of ‘spillover 
violence’, or the effects of drugs themselves (although these factor into 
policymaking). Instead, the manner in which profits massively swell in the act of 
                                                
207 Jorge Cadena-Roa ‘The Mexican Political Security Crisis: Implications for the North American 
Community’ in Ayres and Macdonald North America p.132 
208 U.S. White House: National Security Council The Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized 
Crime (Washington D.C., 2011) 
209 In the sense that their activities move beyond drug trafficking there is some logic behind this 
designation. However how hierarchical or even networked these ‘organiations’ are, and how far their 
reach extends, is hard to discern from the lay perspective due to the very nature of their activities. 
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successfully crossing illicit material over the border acts as a force multiplier for the 
operational abilities of violent groups inside Mexico. These profits connect U.S. 
interests at the border to these wider interests in Mexico itself, and they span the 
NAFTA zone and beyond. This concern coexists with the U.S. interest in preventing 
potential transnational terror threats from emanating from Mexico and crossing the 
border, or threatening the North American economic space more holistically. These 
also threaten the same things - integration, trade, investment and (to a certain extent) 
the societies that sustain them - as natural disasters or pandemics.  
 
Therefore, much of the contemporary bilateral U.S. policy with regard to Mexico is 
more reflective of North American security concerns, ensuring that the Mexican state 
is far more competent in meeting a wide variety of current and potential transnational 
security threats inside its territory. This is very much inclusive of, but not limited to, 
CN concerns and the strategic threat of Mexican instability. It also aids in the 
attempted establishment of a North American security perimeter. Official 
explanations of policy have emphasised that the U.S. is partnering with Mexico as 
part of a wider concern in ensuring that it can, “leverage opportunities working with 
our foreign partners to intercept and neutralize threats before they reach the U.S. 
border.”210 The policy reaction to Mexico’s current security crisis is very much a part 
of this, and to a degree drug-related violence has acted as a catalyst for policy action, 
especially in terms of providing a connecting point with Mexican security institutions 
and concerns. The regionalised, intergrative logic of the SPP reflects what underpins 
current security aid to Mexico - the improvement of Mexico’s ability to maintain 
internal stability, its ability to be involved in the protection of North America’s shared 
economic zone, and the improvement of U.S. HS through projection. These aims are 
intended to complement one another as part of NAFTA-land Security. Through this 
the U.S. seeks to protect its strategic interests in Mexico and North America. In the 





This chapter has set the macro-theoretical and theoretical context of U.S. foreign 
policy in a general sense, and with specific regard to contemporary U.S.-Mexican 
relations and security aid revolving around the MI. In keeping with the ontological 
commitments and key explanatory claims of the project’s argument, I made a case for 
the centrality of interests in the make up of U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy, 
looking at interests from a macro-theoretical perspective, before showing how they 
are formed and operate with regard to the U.S. I then drew connections between the 
U.S. political-economic interests in securing foreign political-economies with 
connections to the U.S. and global economy, and the drug violence in Mexico. 
Finally, I introduced the concept of NAFTA-land Security and how it relates to 
multiple U.S. key interests in both U.S.-Mexican relations, the North American 
                                                
210 Testimony of Mariko Silver, then Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of International Affairs, DHS, 
in Merida Part Two: Insurgency and Terrorism in Mexico Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the 
Western Hemisphere of House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on Oversight, 
Investigations and Management of House Committee on Homeland Security (Serial 112-108 / 112-48) 
112th Congress (October 4th, 2011) p.30 
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economic space, HS, and beyond. This provides the platform to examine U.S. 
interests in Mexico historically, and the MI and NAFTA-land Security, from a sound 
theoretical basis.  
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‘…So Close to the United States…’ The U.S.-Mexican Relationship in 
History 
 
‘¡Pobre México¡Tan lejos de Dios y tan cerca de los Estados Unidos!’ 
‘Poor Mexico! So far away from God, and so close to the United States!’1 




When reading analyses on the history and nature of U.S.-Mexican relations, one is 
often left with the overall impression of neighbours that do not particularly get along, 
but, due to the brute facts of geography, are forced to deal with each other. There is 
popularly considered to be a deep suspicion of U.S. interference within all levels of 
Mexican society, engendered by the appropriation of half the latter’s territory by its 
powerful neighbour in 1848, interventions in its Revolution, and forthright U.S. 
reactions to Mexican economic nationalism or narcotic and security problems. For its 
part the U.S. has been cast as a frustrated observer weary of Mexican recalcitrance on 
important issues, not least those revolving around narcotics, and its general 
unwarranted suspicion of U.S. motives. On both sides much of this mutual distrust 
and subsequent fractious relations are rooted in a fundamentally asymmetrical power 
relationship that of course the United States is on the happier side of.2 In this reading, 
the run up to and passage of NAFTA is seen as a watershed moment marking a shift 
towards more cooperative approaches. This sense has deepened with the adoption of 
the MI. Emphasis is given to both the unprecedented scale of cooperation between 
Mexico and the United States under this framework, and the likelihood for continued 
and deepening cooperation despite the continued relevance of historically entrenched 
misunderstandings, potential flashpoints, and antagonisms. 
 
This chapter seeks to offer a necessarily brief sweep of the history of U.S.-Mexican 
relations in the 20th and 21st Century, through Mexico’s Revolution to the signing of 
NAFTA. Its initial aim is to qualify, but not entirely refute, the historical truism that 
this particular relationship has been marked by inequality, distrust and suspicion that 
has only recently begun to thaw. Unsurprisingly given its pervasiveness, the idea that 
historical relations have been at best strained between these two nations is of course 
based on a good deal of evidence. Nevertheless, in positing a narrative of mutual 
wariness, and occasional conflict within U.S.-Mexican interaction that has only 
recently begun to shift towards cooperation, a number of studies tend to elide or 
                                                
1 Remark attributed to Mexican President Porfirio Díaz 
2 Amongst numerous examples, see Enrique Krauze ‘Looking at Them: A Mexican Perspective on the 
Gap with the United States’ in Fukuyama, Francis  (ed.) Falling Behind: Explaining the Development 
Gap Between Latin America and the United States (Oxford University Press, 2008) p.49; Jorge I. 
Domínguez and Rafael Fernandez de Castro The United States and Mexico: Between Partnership and 
Conflict (Routledge, 2009) p.9; Sidney Weintraub Unequal Partners: The United States and Mexico 
(University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010) p.27, 92-93; Tony Payan The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars: 
Drugs, Immigration, and Homeland Security (Praeger Security International, 2006) p.97, 120;  
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underplay some important issues. Firstly, we need to be clear that the asymmetry 
underpinning this relationship was of course one born of specific and complex 
historical contingencies, but has been to a good degree maintained and even deepened 
through U.S. policy, rather than being a pre-given and natural set of affairs. Secondly 
we must be careful not to over-emphasise the conflictual or mistrustful elements of 
the U.S.-Mexico relationship. As we will see in this chapter there are significant 
episodes of cooperation on important issues prior to NAFTA, and whilst we will see 
that cooperation has indeed deepened in the run up to the trade agreement and 
beyond, it is simplistic (if conceptually helpful) to demarcate periods of cooperation 
and non-cooperation. More importantly, we cannot understand broad changes in the 
nature of bilateral relations without a clear conception of the U.S. interests motivating 
policy in the context of its regional and (developing through the period under 
inspection) global hegemony. 
 
Thus, in keeping with the project’s historical materialist framework, I seek to 
highlight that the core interest that has guided U.S. policy makers has been the 
keenness to ensure Mexico remains an economically open and politically stable 
neighbour. This is in service of the strategic interests that propel (but do not entirely 
determine) U.S. foreign policy as discussed in Chapter Three, rising from socio-
economic structures and conditioned strongly by the logics of capitalism and capitalist 
social relations. I show that in the period under review here the U.S.’ central aim in 
encouraging, fostering and maintaining Mexico’s openness to U.S./ foreign capital 
and its political stability has not dramatically changed. Neither has it been severely 
threatened, other than during and in the immediate aftermath of the Mexican 
Revolution. However, since Mexico’s economic crisis in 1982 the U.S. has reasserted 
itself and both its core interests and more contextual ones more strongly. In tandem 
with Mexican political elites, the U.S. has been able to ferment a relationship with 
Mexico whereby the latter is much more ‘open’ to the U.S.’ influence both 
economically and politically, a political-economic arrangement “locked in” by 
NAFTA.3 In turn, the deepening of the U.S. economic interests within NAFTA 
provoked a deeper U.S. security involvement in Mexico. This was instantaneously 
clear as political violence reemerged as NAFTA went into effect. 
 
Throughout this historical analysis, I will show the utility of my established 
theoretical framework as a tool for understanding the U.S. bilateral relations with 
Mexico. I am able to focus on and pinpoint evidence for the centrality of strategic 
interests as drivers of the U.S. policies and behaviors, but the framework remains 
flexible enough to do this whilst including and accounting for the richness of 
historical developments. Thus it takes in and takes seriously contingencies, 
intermittent conflicts, various administrations, shifting ideological currents, and the 
complications of a shared border, whilst showing that core and durable interests have 
continually shaped relations at a macro-level. Indeed the historical narrative offered 
bolsters the theoretical framework and its key claims with supporting evidence. I also 
am able to demonstrate the aptness of my understanding of U.S. hegemony, and how 
it works in conjunction with the four types of power outlined in the Introduction. The 
U.S. has regularly applied purer forms of coercion to achieve its interests in Mexico, 
                                                
3  G. John Ikenberry After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After 
Major Wars (Princeton University Press, 2000) p.239-242 
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especially in the early periods of the chronology covered here. However, whilst it has 
at times displayed imperialistic tendencies (which some actors in the U.S. state have 
reached for more than others, and often taking placein particular contexts), for the 
most part Mexico has been able to nominally exercise its own political control. 
Nonetheless, it does this within regional power realities and under U.S. hegemony, 
whereby its choices are limited to strategically trying to plot its own path within a 
delimiting context. Thus we see a complex history unfold here, where Mexico has 
periodically asserted its independence, a mutually acceptable status quo has persisted, 
but where the U.S. has directly employed aspects of its power to change realities in 
Mexico in line with its interests and preferences. The chapter closes at a point where 
the U.S. has successfully created a situation whereby the Mexican state largely ‘wants 
what the U.S. wants’. U.S. regional hegemony is currently at a high-point in bilateral 
relations, not least due to the strictures and realities of NAFTA. However this has its 
complications and contradictions with regard to regional security. 
 
Chapter Outline & Key Aims 
This chapter is essentially structured around a chronological exploration of key points 
in the history of U.S.-Mexican relations, from the Mexican Revolution up to the 
passage of NAFTA and its immediate aftermath. The chapter aims to begin to 
integrate the theoretical framework offered in the previous chapter with the empirical 
case for the motivating power of U.S. strategic interests in its historical dealings with 
Mexico. In the first instance, we see how strategic interests undergirded U.S. policy 
towards Mexico in broadly defined historical junctures; the immediate run-up to the 
Mexican Revolution, the Revolution itself and its aftermath, Mexico’s expropriation 
of its oil reserves, World War II, Cold War relations, Mexico’s economic crash, and 
finally the passage of NAFTA. The broad swath of history I look at is bookended with 
two periods where Mexico is extremely open to U.S. trade, investment, and influence 
conducive to U.S. interests - the Porfiariato (1884 - 1911), and the period around the 
NAFTA agreement (1982 onwards). I will show that U.S. policy has been aimed, with 
a great deal of continuity, at ensuring Mexico is a politically secure and stable 
economic neighbour open to U.S. investment and trade (and latterly to more global 
economic interaction). However within this I also look at the complex interplay of 
some core issue areas. If strategic interests stemming from its political economy are a 
guiding thread for U.S. policy, they also interact with and are connected to a 
cornucopia of other concerns, not least of course over narcotics. Therefore I aim here 
to give a nuanced account that leaves the broad argument for policy guided by 
strategic interests intact, whilst maintaining historical specificity and complexity.  
 
Through this discussion a good deal of important points relating to this chapter’s 
argument, and the themes and arguments of the wider project, will be further brought 
out. Perhaps most importantly, I set the empirical bedrock for the argument that there 
is a good deal of continuity in the U.S.’ effort to create a secure and stable Mexican 
political economy. This chapter helps to show that Mérida fits in with longer-term 
trends in this regard. However, in the final stages of this historical narrative we will 
also begin to see the practical fallout of the deepening of strategic interests in 
Mexico’s political economy inculcated by economic integration. The increased 
awareness of (potential and real) security threats to those interests through terrorism, 
political violence, and drug-related violence, have been catalysts for much deeper 
involvement on the part of the U.S. in Mexican security. This chapter ends at the 
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point where the U.S.’ achievement in helping to pull Mexico into an unprecedented 
trading relationship, tying Mexico’s development and political future fundamentally 
to the U.S.’ preferences, begins to produce its own dynamics. In this way we will 
begin to see that there is both deep continuity with regard to the interests of the U.S. 
in Mexico, and change in their import and how they are secured. 
 
 
U.S.-Mexican Relations in Overview: From Conflict to Cooperation? 
 
Before entering into detailed historical discussion, it is useful to offer both an 
overview of the bilateral relationship, and some of the established understandings of 
it. This both sets the scene for what follows, and helps identify further what I am 
trying to illustrate here in contrast to those established understandings. Perhaps the 
overriding fact of U.S.-Mexican relations is the inequality of power between the two 
neighbours. This imbalance lies in the starkly differing development of Mexico (and 
indeed Latin America generally), and the United States. As the former became subject 
to colonial latifundia and hacienda agricultural systems, and imperial metropoles, 
national elites and international capitalism plundered its resource wealth, the latter 
embarked upon a developmentalist programme of national capitalism, built squarely 
on an industrial base, competitive exports, and strong domestic markets.4  The 
resultant economic disparity was matched in the nations’ relative political stability; in 
an indicative period between April 1824 and January 1846, Mexico had 30 
presidential reigns (amidst continued Spanish and French intervention, and domestic 
coups and counter-coups) to the U.S.’ orderly seven.5 The important state of Texas 
won its independence from Mexico in 1836, and Mexico was comprehensively 
defeated militarily by the United States in the 1846-1848 war, culminating in the 
Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo through which Mexico ceded half of its pre-war 
territory.6 By the eve of the Mexican Revolution, Porfirio Díaz’s 30-year7 repressive 
order, marked by economic growth, state violence, stark inequality and huge foreign 
capital investment and ownership, had fundamentally tied Mexico to U.S. influence, 
to the point one contemporary observer characterised it as a virtual U.S. “slave-
colony”.8 
 
Thus the U.S.-Mexico relationship mirrors that of much of Latin America, as the U.S. 
assumed a position of economic dominance. In addition, Mexico endured the most 
far-reaching military intervention in the continent. This history of intervention is 
argued to have created a disdainful diffidence on the part of Mexico towards the U.S, 
and a fierce insistence on the sanctity of Mexican sovereignty in the national psyche, 
even at an official level.9 Further, the unfolding of the Mexican Revolution, as Dillon 
                                                
4 Eduardo Galeano Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent 
(Serpents Tail, 1971) p.115-116, 200-203  
5 Monroe was at the tail end of his Presidency by 1824, Polk at the beginning of his in 1846, and Henry 
Harrison died 32 days into his tenure in 1841. 
6 Jan Bazant From Independence to the Liberal Republic in Leslie Bethell (ed.) Mexico Since 
Independence (Cambridge University Press) p.15-22 
7 Díaz effectively ruled Mexico from November 1876 until May 1911. The tenures of Méndez (two 
months in 1876-1877) and González (1880-84) were essentially puppet presidencies. Friedrich Katz 
The Liberal Republic and the Porfiriato in ibid, p.71-74   
8 John Kenneth Turner quoted in Galeano Open Veins p.121 
9 Enrique Krauze Looking at Them p. 49 
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and Preston put it, would set Mexico, “on a different course […] from that of its Latin 
neighbours.”10 Characterising the relationship that emerged as one of “conflict” 
Domínguez and de Castro point to the tensions over Mexico’s 1917 nationalist 
constitution that claimed Mexican ownership for all resources in its territory.11 
Weintraub highlights the build-up and fall-out of Lazaro Cárdenas’ 1938 
expropriation of foreign oil companies.12 However it was during the Cold War that 
Mexico’s unique approach amongst Latin American countries to U.S. foreign policy 
is argued to have most obviously manifested itself. Preston and Dillon summarise 
that, “Mexico had […] guarded its independence from Washington’s polarizing 
policies during the Cold War more zealously than most Latin nations.”13 Mexico did 
not receive the kind of security aid provided to almost every other Latin American 
nation, and often spurned U.S. policies, especially in Central America and Cuba.14 It 
also pursued a relatively independent developmental path based on nationalised 
companies, import-substitution-industrialisation (ISI), and large officially sanctioned 
workers unions, all fundamentally tied to its rather idiosyncratic one party system 
under the PRI. 
 
However, following the Mexican economic crash of the early 1980s, it would seem a 
new era of bilateral cooperation has been ushered in, most visibly through increased 
economic integration and trade openness culminating in NAFTA. Following 
ostensibly the expectations of neo-Liberal or functionalist / neo-functionalist 
regionalisation theory, improved bi-national security ties, based officially in CN, have 
also improved, themselves culminating in the MI. It is this general narrative that 
informs much of the broad study on U.S. Mexican relations. Weintraub characterises 
the correlation that emerged through the knitted history of the two nations as one of 
diffident yet resentful dependency on the part of Mexico, and blasé dominance on the 
part of the United States.15 This is based largely of course on the realities of relative 
U.S. power, which is both resultant of its direct dealings with Mexico, and broader 
historical processes as it assumed the role of economic powerhouse, and then global 
superpower. Domínguez and de Castro also outline that same historical backdrop and 
the dominant nature of the United States, asserting that, “No political order in Mexico 
was able to survive without U.S. self restraint.”16 However, in spite of this power 
imbalance, they characterise the relationship as one subject to dynamic shifts. Whilst 
conflict marked the Mexican Revolution and its early institutionalisation, mutual 
“bargained negligence” prevailed for most of the Cold War era. We are now in an 
unprecedented era of cooperation indicated by the NAFTA and Mérida agreements, 
albeit one in which historical tensions remain.17  
 
The idea that a fundamental shift in bilateral relations has occurred rests on the 
pervasive trope that Mexico was so deeply suspicious of U.S. intervention that 
                                                
10 Julia Preston and Samuel Dillon Opening Mexico: The Making of a Democracy (Farrar, Straus & 
Giroux, 2004) p.ix 
11 Domínguez and de Castro The United States and Mexico p.9 
12 Weintraub Unequal Partners p.27, p.92-3 
13 Preston and Dillon Opening Mexico p.ix 
14 Domínguez and de Castro The United States and Mexico p.39-41; 58-60 
15 Weintraub Unequal Partners p.6  
16 Domínguez and de Castro The United States and Mexico p.10 
17 ibid. p.8-14  
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bilateral cooperation on any significant scale faltered. It is in this context that scholars 
are able to highlight the import of an unprecedented “turning point”18 or “major 
shift”19 in bi-national relations, whether we see this as happening through NAFTA 
and its preceding trade negotiations or, like Weintraub, with the abandonment by 
Mexico of ISI policies in the ferment of the economic crisis of 1982.20 There is no 
doubt that major shifts have occurred in the relationship since the early 1980s. 
However, examining the historical record clearly shows that these phases cannot be as 
neatly compartmentalised as this perspective implies. Following the narrative that 
relations moved from ‘conflict to cooperation’, as Dominguez and de Castro put it, 
can obscure important and illustrative instances of cooperation prior to the broader 
shift represented by NAFTA. Moreover, as I go onto demonstrate, the conflictual or 
neglected nature of the relationship is often overplayed. Quite simply, the U.S. 
interest in Mexico’s political economy being stable and open to U.S. investment 
drove its behaviour towards Mexico. As Pastor contends, “The heart of U.S. concerns 
in Mexico is its political stability”.21 This project insists that this remains as true after 
NAFTA as it did prior to it, and asserts that we make the vital connection between 
political stability and the stable environment necessary for investment and capital 
accumulation. The relationship has not been particularly strained on this key level 
since the Revolution. 
 
Thus, whilst these aims certainly caused friction in the years prior to, during and 
following the Revolution (of which more below), during the Cold War they were 
simply not threatened in anything like the same way they were elsewhere in Latin 
America. As Mason Hart has shown, following the revolutionary ferment the U.S.-
Mexican relationship was reasonably benign; U.S. firms invested in Mexico 
respectful of the boundaries set in the Revolution years and it’s aftermath concerning 
national control of resources.22 Moreover, the PRI’s one-party state was just as 
concerned with political stability within its borders as the U.S. was during the Cold 
War, and actively sought to confront challenges to its rule from social dissidents 
(whether they were Communist sympathisers or merely promoting social change). 
Whilst at times it could be brutal,23 and it undoubtedly had a pronounced authoritarian 
strength, the PRI was effective at maintaining stability and to some extent social 
cohesion because it also brought a lot of interest groups along with its nationalist 
project, co-opted many others, and achieved high levels of growth. Deep U.S. 
intervention in defence or promotion of strategic interests in this context was simply 
not necessary. What, then, has driven the historical changes in the relationship, most 
especially the undoubtedly huge change in the 1980s and 1990s? What provided the 
catalyst for this switch to interlocking economies, and the opening up of Mexico to 
                                                
18 Domínguez and de Castro United States and Mexico p.14  
19 David R. Mares & Gustavo Vegas Cánovas The U.S.-Mexico Relationship: Towards a New Era 
(Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 2010) p.3 
20 Weintraub Unequal Partners p.6 
21 Robert A. Pastor & George C. Casteñeda Limits to Friendship: The United States and Mexico 
(Vintage, 1989) p.8 
22 John Mason Hart Empire and Revolution: The Americans in Mexico Since the Civil War (University 
of California Press, 2002) p.403-431 
23 Especial mention here for the victims of Tlateloco massacre in 1968 linked to President Díaz Ordaz, 
and some of the actions sanctioned or tolerated in restive states like Chiapas and Guerrero, including 
the massacre at Acteal and Aguas Blancas in 1997 and 1995 respectively. These were (at least) linked 
to the local state authorities and not properly investigated by central authorities. 
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the free market, despite the fact that the realities of power between the two nations 
remained static? Why did Mexico begin to accept more security aid and influence 
from the U.S.? Many studies have suggested changes in the global economy and 
international system has driven the shift towards a more cooperative U.S.-Mexico 
relationship.24 They also, as we saw in the Literature Review, take the issue of 
narcotics as the main driver on security integration. 
 
In these accounts Mexican policymakers are argued to have ‘woken up’ to the 
economic realities of the era following the debt-induced crash of 1982, and explicitly 
moved to reform the economy towards a more free-market, less state-led model of 
growth, which, in conjunction with the end of the Cold War and the space it allowed 
for focus on new priorities, led inexorably to the NAFTA negotiations. There is a 
sense of an unproblematised, natural historical progression in these accounts, with 
little room for investigations of the actors and structural mechanisms propelling the 
shifts. Firstly we need to recognise that the strategic importance of Mexico to the U.S. 
jumped as Mexico made huge oil discoveries in the 1970s. We also need to 
understand that during the 1970s and 80s, as the U.S. itself helped unleash and 
construct globalised capital within a global crisis of capital accumulation. The U.S. 
acted more purposively towards Mexico, as part of a wider strategy of reestablishing 
U.S. structural economic power and control. That U.S. interests within Mexico were 
not severely threatened during the Cold War does not negate its grander strategic 
goals in sustaining its regional and global hegemonic position. It used the opportunity 
presented by Mexico’s profound economic crisis to open it up to more U.S. influence, 
investment, and trade in line with its globalised political economic strategy.  
 
However, this integrative process did have specific bilateral effects. Whilst the U.S. 
has had particular strategic security concerns in Mexico for much of its history, the 
deepening of integration has led to a heightening of those concerns. Moreover, the 
EZLN political insurgency in Chiapas, although short-lived, alarmed U.S. 
policymakers, as did the political violence of the Ejército Popular Revolucionario 
(EPR), who stemmed from Guerrero but operated more widely and with some 
sophistication. The deepening of economic interests in Mexico was always likely to 
push increased security involvement, though a challenge remained in getting Mexico 
to accept it. However cooperation was given undoubted impetus by political 
instability in Mexico’s south. U.S. military aid to Mexico began to step in line with 
NAFTA and these events, and although a longer concern for CN intersected with this, 
it was not the primary rationale behind this security interaction in this period. 
However as drug-related violence began to snowball over the 20-year period 
following NAFTA, it too began to concern U.S. policymakers still overwhelmingly 






                                                
24 Domínguez and de Castro United States and Mexico p. 17-34, Weintraub Unequal Partners, Nora 
Lustig Mexico: The Remaking of an Economy (Brookings Institution Press, 1998)  
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U.S. - Mexican Relations: From Intervention and Expropriation, to 
NAFTA and Integration 
 
Capital and Revolution: Bilateral Relations 1870-1945 
 
Mexico and U.S. Expansionism 
As we saw in Chapter Three, U.S. strategic interests have proliferated and deepened 
in Latin America and across the globe, and in effect this followed the expansionary 
logic of capital, and the profit-seeking of individual capitalists. We can see the role 
this private initiative and investment played in U.S. foreign relations in the influx of 
capital and capitalists into Mexico prior to the Mexican Revolution in 1910; railroad 
tycoons, investors, bankers, landowners, ranchers and so on (although the interests of 
some of them were often not limited to singular pursuits). Indeed Mason Hart has 
argued that what U.S. investors would do in Mexico would be repeated on a more 
global level, and that this is where U.S. economic expansion, led by this capitalist 
phalanx, cut its teeth.25 As U.S. investors looked to Mexico and financed and armed 
the Mexican Liberal struggle against the short-lived French colonial regime of 
Maximilian (1864-1867), their actions dovetailed with the wishes of U.S. statesmen 
who were concerned about continued European involvement in the Western 
Hemisphere and expectant that Mexico would inevitably fall under growing U.S. 
sway, but whom were of course in the throes of their own civil war.26 U.S. economic 
penetration increased throughout this period, and rail interests especially looked for 
opportunities to expand their networks into Mexico. However, U.S. investors and 
financiers were increasingly frustrated by the ‘nationalistic’ policies followed by the 
Liberal administrations of Benito Juárez (1867-1872) and even more so by Sebastián 
Lerdo (1872-1876).27 By 1876 prominent U.S. capitalists were throwing their 
financial muscle behind the popular General, insurrectionist, and seasoned warrior 
Porfirio Díaz, and helped sustain and propel his rebellion to victory.28 Díaz wooed a 
variety of influential members of the U.S. economic elite with promises of investment 
opportunity, stability (including stopping violent attacks on U.S. property in the 
border regions), loan repayments, and economic development based on a close 
relationship with U.S. capital. The U.S. state was both more cautious about Díaz and 
more bullish towards him, initially displaying its autonomy from investors excited 
                                                
25 Mason Hart Empire and Revolution p.3 
26 Mason Hart Empire and Revolution p.9-17; Walter LaFeber The Cambridge History of American 
Foreign Relations Volume II: The American Search for Opportunity 1865-1913 (Cambridge University 
Press, 1993) p.7-9 LaFeber contends that Unionists such as William Henry Seward were reluctant prior 
to the U.S. Civil War to expand U.S. territory and thereby potentially boost slave states. They were also 
concerned with the ‘stock’ and ‘character’ of the Mexican people. Combined with the realisation that 
economic penetration promoted U.S. interests and influence without the need for political 
administration, this effectively ended significant U.S. territorial acquisitions. 
27 Mason Hart Empire and Revolution p. 59-60 These Liberal regimes also cancelled railroad 
concessions and loans, struggled with significant fiscal problems, and were eventually starved of credit, 
angering U.S. investors en masse and making it harder for them to secure political stability, including 
violence in the U.S.-Mexico border region and Díaz’s insurrection.  
28 Díaz was a hero of the struggle against the French, playing a decisive role in the Battle of Puebla 
(origin of the Cinco de Mayo celebrations) and in later engagements. However he was a long time 
political headache for Benito Juárez and led a rebellion against him 1871-72, prior to his more 
successful rebellion against Sebastián Lerdo in 1876.See ibid p.60-68; John Mason Hart Revolutionary 
Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution (University of California Press, 1987) 
p.105-128; Katz ‘The Liberal Republic’ p. 65-69 
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about Díaz and eager to recognise him, but as the General began to make good on his 
wider promises to the U.S. and its investors he was officially recognised as de jure 
sovereign in 1878.29 
 
Díaz’s rule ushered in an unprecedented increase in American involvement in 
Mexico. The figures are quite remarkable. The driving force behind this change was 
the laying down of railroad track that inserted Mexico into the industrialised economy 
of the U.S. and, through its technological compression of space and time, opened up 
the Mexican economy to profitable investment. In 1867 there was only 50 kilometres 
(km) of track in Mexico. As Díaz welcomed U.S. railroad men this number grew 
exponentially. By 1884 there was 5,898km,30 and by 1910 there was 24,560km. The 
vast majority of these various lines were owned by U.S. investors (including William 
Rockefeller, James Stillman, E.H. Harriman and son William, and the Gould 
family).31 As Hart states, the railway, “transformed economic relations” between the 
U.S. and Mexico, encouraging trade levels to hugely increase alongside profit 
margins, as Mexican raw materials and goods could be brought onto U.S. and global 
markets more efficiently. Bilateral trade thereby increased from $15 million in 1880 
to $166,386,917 in 1910.32 By the dawn of the Mexican Revolution U.S. investors 
owned 130 million acres of Mexico’s 485 million surface area - over 25% of its total 
(with 100 million acres owned by 154 companies or individual landholders) - whilst 
Mexico’s indigenous rural smallholders of land saw their share drop from 25% to 
2%.33 As Mexico’s economy was integrated increasingly into the U.S.’ in the period 
between 1876 and 1910 there were profound implications for both countries, namely 
an unprecedented economic boom alongside a developing semi-dependency on the 
part of Mexico, and the creation and compounding of U.S. strategic interests in 
Mexico’s political-economic stability and continuing integration with the U.S. 
market. It would also set the political and social context for the Mexican Revolution 
of 1910 as a combination of forces and classes sought to end Díaz’s rule, and to very 
different extents and intents to change Mexico’s political economic system. 
 
Inevitable Revolution? The Porfiriato and U.S. Interests 
LaFaber has discussed how U.S. systemic dominance in Central America helped 
create socioeconomic conditions of, “inevitable revolution”.34 Given the political 
economy and political system created by Porfirio Díaz, with hindsight we can see 
something similar at work regarding U.S. economic expansion into Mexico. Díaz 
dominated Mexican politics from 1876 until 1910, a period that became known as the 
Porfiriato in a literal representation of the absolute nature of his leadership. This era 
would witness unheralded economic growth and (on the surface, and relative to the 
                                                
29 At the Congressional level there was some disquiet at the open support of Texan businessmen and 
military men for Díaz’s rebellion. At the Executive level the state delayed recognition in an effective 
act of political pressure, waiting to be assured that he would fulfill Mexico’s international obligations 
and pressuring him at the border. See Mason Hart Empire and Revolution p.66-67; Schoultz Beneath 
the United States p.236-237; Peter V.N. Henderson ‘Woodrow Wilson, Victoriano Huerta, and the 
Recognition Issue in Mexico’ The Americas 44, 2 (1984) p.156; Katz ‘The Liberal Republic’ p. 68-69 
30 Of course the two puppet presidencies mentioned in footnote 7 occurred in this period. 
31 Mason Hart Revolutionary Mexico p.131-135 
32 ibid p.133 
33 ibid p.xi 
34 Walter LaFeber Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America 2nd edn. (W.W. Norton 
& Company, 1993) p.13-18 
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period prior to his reign) political stability in Mexico. However the system began to 
break down in the latter half of the first decade of the 20th Century. Katz shows this 
was significantly due to the contradictions of Díaz’s policies - namely, “concessions 
to foreign and especially US interests, rapprochement with Europe, and maintenance 
of internal stability at any price” - becoming too much to contain.35 He summarises a 
period of genuine and unprecedented openness to foreign capital, and the foreign 
control of crucial sectors of the Mexican economy, including, “banking, mining, 
industry and transportation.”36 Rich in resources such as gold, silver and oil, Mexico 
began to rely on exports and became a, “classic example of an underdeveloped 
country producing raw materials that depended on markets in the industrialized North 
Atlantic.”37 Whilst this was by no means exclusively in U.S. interests, or controlled 
by U.S. capital,38 U.S. firms had the majority of key holdings in Mexico, including 
“three quarters of the mines and more than half the oil fields”.39 Mexican railways 
were plugged into the U.S., rather than serving Mexico itself, and by 1911 those 
railway lines were aiding in the delivery of 75% of Mexico’s exports to its northern 
neighbour.40  
 
We should resist the temptation of seeing Díaz as the nominal head of a U.S. colony, 
despite the undoubted influence of the more powerful nation. Firstly, the policies 
followed by the dictator were not just a meek submission to U.S. power, but an 
economic policy arrived upon by an educated section of the ruling class within 
Mexico, collectively known as the científicos. This group was aiming to advance 
Mexico through stages of historical development, in line with vogue theories of Social 
Darwinism, via free trade inspired economic growth.41 Secondly, both Díaz and this 
clique became uneasy about the undoubted dependency/dominance dynamic with the 
United States their open foreign investment policies had engendered, and actively 
attempted to diversify Mexican trading partners, especially in the latter years of the 
Porfiriato.42 However the científicos did encourage U.S. firms to extract profit from 
Mexican resources. This extraction served both the specific profit interests of the 
firms in question, and the need for key resources in the rapidly growing and 
industrialising U.S. economy as a whole. In turn, these U.S. interests dovetailed with 
both the high-minded interests of the ruling class and its significant científico element 
in Mexico (their technocratic right to rule, their mission to modernise the country 
                                                
35 Katz The Liberal Republic in Bethell Mexico Since Independence p.72, 109-110 & 117 
36 ibid p.81 
37 ibid 
38 The role of Great Britain and its companies, unsurprisingly, was significant in Mexico in this period 
especially, and France and Spain had continuing influence. 
39 Bill Weinberg Homage to Chiapas: The New Indigenous Struggles in Mexico (Verso, 2000) p.45 
40 ibid; Mason Hart Empire and Revolution p. 106-130 
41 Variously, ibid, Katz Liberal Republic p.84 and John Womack Jr. Zapata and the Mexican 
Revolution (Thames & Hudson, 1969) p.10 
42 Katz Liberal Republic p.121-122, Krauze Looking at Them p.54 Indeed Katz argues (p.103-104) that 
the científicos intellectual bias was towards economic integration with Europe, though in reality the 
U.S. emerged as the key player. Perhaps the temptations of self-enrichment were stronger than 
intellectual and policy consistency, and the brute facts of geography should not be discounted. 
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through growth)43 and their baser class interests and the interests of other powerful 
class strata (quite simply self-enrichment and the consolidation of state power).44  
 
The broad economic policies followed by Díaz and his científico ministers had intense 
impacts on Mexican society. Between 1884 and 1900 the Mexican Gross National 
Product (GNP) grew at 8% annually, and the much sought after modernisation did 
occur in Mexico to a significant degree. However, it occurred very unevenly, both in 
terms of regions (where the North prospered over the South) and classes (where 
wealth was concentrated at the top of societal strata).45 It also unleashed or affected 
powerful social forces, as important class formations were created or affected- a 
genuine middle class locked out of the political leadership, a small but growing 
industrial working class, and a more traditional agrarian ‘peasantry’ who lost out 
severely as land was transferred to private ownership on a massive scale.46 After 
1900, the economic ramifications of openness to foreign investment, the científico 
desire to place Mexico within a global economic regime, and the (perhaps 
unintended) semi-dependence on the U.S. coalesced in dramatic fashion. Foreign 
capital poured into the country between 1900 and 1910, tripling the amount invested 
between 1884 and 1900. The process and events that ensued are summarised by Katz: 
 
This new wave of investments led to a sharp rise in prices, which  
was further accentuated by the decision of the Mexican  
government to give up silver and adopt the gold standard. The  
result of these developments was a sharp fall in real wages in  
many parts of Mexico. This tendency was accentuated when the  
boom gave way to one of the greatest economic crises that  
Porfirian Mexico had ever faced. In 1907-8, a cyclical downturn  
in the United States extended into Mexico, leading to massive  
lay-offs and reductions in wages.47 
 
Thus, the domestic social and economic context for revolution was set, as the 
contradictions of the policies of the Porfiriato proved too much to hold social stability 
in Mexico together. However, whilst there was a populist social and redistributive 
element within the Mexican Revolution, most purely personified by Emiliano Zapata 
and his Zapatista army (and to a lesser extent Francisco “Pancho” Villa and the 
Northern Division) it was also at its heart a political and power struggle amongst 
elites. Wealthy middle class landowners like Francisco Madero and Venustiano 
Carranza were key actors in the drama. They succeeded in decapitating the very top 
level of Díaz’s regime that had denied them a political voice (the leader himself and 
the cientificos) with the crucial aid of Zapata and Villa’s more populist forces. 
However the more radical social and political-economic designs of the latter did not 
                                                
43 Womack Zapata p.10 
44 Gibler Mexico Unconquered p.34-37 describes how the Porfiriato period witnessed the acceleration 
of transportation projects, through foreign investment and capital, which opened up new markets and 
areas to further penetration of foreign and domestic capital. This led to a race for “land, water, and 
labor” (Womack Zapata p.15), which in turn led to a huge increase in communal land expropriation, to 
the benefit of large landowners (domestic and foreign, though agricultural policy was still profoundly 
nationalist) in terms of real estate, and dispossessed labor to work on it. 
45 Katz Liberal Republic p.74-75 
46 Stuart Easterling The Mexican Revolution: A Short History (Haymarket Books, 2012) p.4-40 
47 Katz Liberal Republic p. 109-110 
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come to pass. The Revolution ended as a violent and protracted power succession 
between the elites of the North.48 Morton (following Gramsci) terms it a “passive 
revolution”, whereby crucial political economic arrangements shifted but largely 
remained intact.49 After the initial Revolutionary moment and removal of Díaz, in 
essence Mexico descended into a civil conflict, although there is no doubt important 
elements of the socio-economic revolutionary politics swirling within this did survive 
intact through the brutal process and impacted upon policies and politics later on.  
 
For its part the U.S. involved itself through its support for certain factions in the 
conflict. It acted as kingmaker by granting or denying international legitimacy and 
access to vital financial support through official recognition of any grouping that 
ascended to state power.50 This afforded it some measure of influence in events that 
were to follow, though this was of course by no means total or always or completely 
successful. The presence of elite interests in the Revolution’s ferment, and the 
disparate, complex and often confusing progress of the fighting, allowed the U.S. 
space to intervene and attempt to shape its outcome in a manner broadly beneficial to 
U.S. interests. The overarching logic driving U.S. policy towards the Revolution was 
the securing of a stable political order in Mexico friendly towards the United States, 
and to the presence of U.S. capital in the country. It is important to note that the 
nature of U.S. intervention shows that the first element in this dual interest most 
animated successive U.S. administrations thinking, as a prerequisite for the second.51 
Whilst there were myriad complexities to the interests, events, actors and actions 
involved, (as with any period in history) this dominant logic does come through in the 
U.S. administration’s actions. 
 
The Mexican Revolution and U.S. Policy 
The Mexican Revolution exploded into life after Francisco Madero and his allies had 
fermented a crisis and insurrection in northern Mexico in response to Díaz’s 
repression of more open elections, and his arrest of Madero and his supporters as they 
attempted to politically campaign in June 1910 (Madero escaped to San Antonio, 
Texas).52 Eventually through the revolutionary crisis and several military defeats Díaz 
would flee to Spain and Madero would be elected to the Presidency in October 1911. 
However Madero’s regime was embattled by instability generated by an insurgency 
centered in Morelos led by former revolutionary ally Emiliano Zapata,53 the 
                                                
48 For an authoritative account, see Womack Zapata and also his chapter The Mexican Revolution 
1910-1920 in Bethell Mexico Since Independence p.125-201 
49 Adam David Morton Revolution and State in Modern Mexico: The Political Economy of Uneven 
Development (Rowman and Littlefield, 2011) 
50 See Henderson ‘Recognition Issue in Mexico’ on the importance of recognition generally, and 
especially to revolutionary figure General Victoriano Huerta (of which more below)  
51 The U.S. Presidency switched from Taft to Wilson during the Mexican Revolution. Though 
following different methods to achieve it, they were both concerned with Mexican stability as an 
important site for U.S. capital and provider of cheap exports, notably petroleum. Wilson also had to 
consider a more global context however as war in Europe also began in 1914, and European powers, 
not least Germany, schemed within Mexico.  
52 Historical detail here draws on various sources from already cited works. 
53 Zapata had supported Madero’s conflict with Díaz, but had grown disillusioned with what he saw as 
the new leaders overly modest proposals for agrarian reform. More radical changes on land ownership 
were the bedrock for Zapata’s ‘Plan of Ayala’ issued in late 1911. 
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continuing rebellion in the North by another erstwhile backer Pascual Orozco,54 
armed challenges from supporters of Díaz, and fiscal problems. Perhaps more 
importantly for Madero’s eventual fate, there were also continuing attacks on U.S. 
economic interests in Mexico that alarmed the U.S. political leadership,55 and the U.S. 
began to have serious doubts about the new regime’s ability to assure the required 
stability. As the relative solidity of the Porfiriato crumbled and the Mexican elite 
turned against Madero,56 Díaz’s pithy quip that through removing him Madero had, 
“unleashed a tiger; let’s see if he can tame it” was definitely answered in February 
1913 during La Decena Trágica, as Madero was overthrown in a coup led by his 
former ally General Victoriano Huerta, and then killed alongside his Vice-President in 
captivity.57  
 
In one of many examples of the complexity of events in this period, the U.S. 
ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, appears to have sanctioned and even 
helped coordinate Huerta’s coup, and was in definite support of the general.58 
However, much of his actions appear to be effectively independent of, rather than 
directed by, the U.S. government in Washington. U.S. President Taft had given Lane 
Wilson a lot of leeway in his posting, most concerned that U.S. economic interests 
were secured. Taft backed much of the pressure Lane Wilson was putting on Madero 
to improve stability and especially security for U.S. citizens and economic interests 
affected by revolutionary violence.59 Katz suggests, based on German foreign cables, 
that there may have been official sanction to threaten intervention and other measures 
designed to “upset” - as in encourage the removal - of Madero.60As the President 
struggled to keep a lid on continuing violence from the more ‘radical’ factions within 
the revolutionary mix, and attacks on U.S. interests continued, Taft told Secretary of 
State Philander C. Knox that the Mexican leader was a, “dreamer”, who was “unfitted 
to meet the crisis in the country of which he is President” and whom may require 
some “dynamite” to wake him up.61  However, in supporting a murderous coup there 
is no direct evidence Lane Wilson was doing anything but acting independently of 
official directives, albeit he was still trying to secure U.S. political-economic interests 
as he saw fit.62 Knox himself became increasingly distrustful of his Ambassador’s 
                                                
54 Orozco was defeated by troops led by Victoriano Huerta in 1912. When Huerta claimed power in a 
coup in 1913 Orozco eventually agreed to support him and led missions against Huerta’s 
Constitutionalist foes. 
55 For example Mason Hart Empire and Revolution p.276-278 
56 Friedrich Katz The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States and the Mexican Revolution 
(The University of Chicago Press, 1981) p. 92-93 
57 LaFaber American Search for Opportunity p.223 The coup began as rebellion of those tied to the 
former regime, including Felix Díaz, Porfirio’s nephew. Katz Secret War in Mexico p.95-96 Huerta’s 
involvement as a traitor to Madero was decisive,a nd an accident of history, as he replaced loyal 
wounded General Lauro Villar as head of the armed forces. 
58 See Schoultz Beneath the United States p.240  
59 LaFaber American Search for Opportunity p.225 
60 Katz Secret War in Mexico p.92 According to the German minister to Mexico Taft was willing to 
intervene militarily at this point, but Secretary of State Knox was opposed. However he was willing to 
sanction the plan to ‘upset’ Madero. Cables from Know himself suggest that Taft was more wary of 
intervention than Hintz suggests (ibid p.99) 
61 Taft quoted in Easterling Mexican Revolution p.63 
62 For example see Alan Knight The Mexican Revolution: Volume 1 Porfirians, Liberals and Peasants 
(Cambridge University Press, 1986) p.486; Katz Secret War in Mexico p.94, 99, 110 
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reporting.63 Katz points out that Taft may have agreed with Lane Wilson’s view that 
U.S. interests were served best by Madero’s removal given his tacit support for the 
affairs outcome - Huerta as President. However, high-level involvement in or support 
of Lane Wilson’s actions therefore remains a matter of historical uncertainty.64 
 
Indeed, the Republican President was wary of recognising coup-leader Huerta 
officially in the very final days of his tenure. Henderson suggests this was due to the 
bargaining power that would be retained with Huerta if he were made to anxiously 
wait on the U.S.’ official recognition, important given the security for U.S. interests 
both Taft and his successor were aiming to achieve.65 In addition the Zapata 
insurgency continued, and the landowner and governor of Coahuila Venustiano 
Carranza launched his own Constitutionalist insurrection against the new leader 
almost immediately.66 When Woodrow Wilson moved into the White House in March 
1913 he inherited a fluid, unstable situation. He was also suspicious of the actions and 
intentions of his ambassador, and the reports of the DoS. Sending his own reporters 
and emissaries to Mexico, Wilson sought to uncover the nature of Huerta’s ascent, 
and Lane Wilson’s part in it. His informants reported the Ambassador had played a 
decisive role in the coup. Wilson, shocked by the diplomat’s actions, summoned him 
to Washington where the latter resigned after realising his case that Mexico’s new 
leader should be officially recognised without delay was not winning through with his 
President.67 In August 1913 President Wilson officially advocated neutrality in the 
ongoing Mexican ‘Revolution’ (a civil conflict by this point), which cut off arms 
supplies to Huerta. By April 1914 the U.S. was directly intervening in Veracruz to 
stop arms shipments to the Mexican regime in its fight against its rebels, and to 
destabilise Huerta’s leadership credentials.  
 
Why did Wilson follow this course? Henderson argues that the U.S. had fashioned 
and followed a policy of official recognition that should have kicked in fairly quickly 
in this instance, whereby Huerta would meet the conditions of a) control of the 
“machinery of the state”, b) no significant opposition to his rule, and c) a guarantee to 
meet “international obligations” (debt repayments and a number of issues important to 
the U.S.). He further suggests that Huerta easily met the first, arguably the second 
(see below), and was moving towards the third, and therefore he should have been 
afforded de facto recognition under traditional U.S. approaches to such matters.68 In 
addition, Lane Wilson had singled out Huerta as most conducive to guaranteeing U.S. 
economic interests in Mexico. Domìnguez asserts Huerta was the revolutionary 
figure, “most favorably disposed towards U.S. investors”. He therefore concludes 
that, “economic considerations” cannot explain Wilson’s actions as much as Wilson’s 
ideological commitments to self-determination and democracy and his revulsion at 
                                                
63 Katz Secret War in Mexico p.94-95 
64 Katz Secret War in Mexico p.112-113 
65 Henderson ‘The Recognition Issue’ p.161 
66 These forces called themselves Constitutionalist in reference to the Mexican constitution of 1857, 
which they felt could be restored. 
67 Mark E. Benbow ‘All the Brains I can Borrow: Woodrow Wilson and Intelligence Gathering in 
Mexico, 1913-15’ Central Intelligence Agency Library: Studies in Intelligence 51, 4 (2007) 
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/vol51no4/intelligence-in-another-era.html Accessed 08.05.14  
68 Henderson ‘The Recognition Issue’ p.163-175 
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the coup itself can.69 However, the U.S. did arm Huerta for six months in 1913 in the 
hope he could impose order on the situation,70 even as Wilson deliberated about 
recognising his regime and investigated the coup. As Henderson shows, during his 
vacillations Wilson came close to granting official recognition.71 In May 1913 the 
President drafted instructions to Lane Wilson that Huerta would be recognised if 
hostilities ceased and he called early elections. He repeated this in June and August 
making clear that Huerta should not be a candidate.72 Huerta refused despite the fact 
his fellow coup conspirator Felix Díaz could have participated.73 This rebuff hardened 
Wilson’s stance and he employed an arms embargo. However what sealed U.S. 
disapproval was in fact a mixture of elements, not just Wilson’s distaste at Huerta’s 
methods of claiming power. The General was indeed repugnant to Wilson’s 
democratic ideals,74 but just as importantly, he did not bring the stability to Mexico 
the United States required.  
 
The Zapatista Rebellion centered around Morelos rumbled on, and those who were 
winning back land they had lost were never going to accept Huerta’s power, which 
effectively represented “a científico counterrevolution”75 and a return to the Porfiriato 
status quo. In addition the Constitutionalist forces of Venustiano Carranza and the 
populist forces of Villa had allied against the General and won several significant 
engagements in the North, denying a swift end to the conflict. Evidence shows that 
Wilson was aware of this and it factored heavily into his deliberations. On different 
occasions during press conferences he discussed the fact that Huerta did not control 
the territory he was meant to or claimed to, exaggerated his military victories, and 
even said that his government “can’t last.”76 Meanwhile Wilson was receiving 
intelligence that instability was significant and Huerta could not bring it to an end.77 
His Secretary of State Jennings Bryan summed up the concerns in August 1913 when 
he wrote to his President that U.S. action was delayed by a lack of information, and, 
“by the desire to allow a reasonable time for those supporting Huerta to prove their 
ability - or inability to restore order and establish peace - they have now had nearly 6 
months”. Encouraging action, Bryan, stated the recognition option was, “indefensible 
on both material and moral grounds.”78   
 
There is thus a very strong case that Henderson’s recognition test of ‘no significant 
opposition’ was not met even prior to Wilson’s personal moral misgivings, and 
stability remained elusive. As Raat and Brescia argue it is better to consider Wilson’s 
                                                
69 Domínguez Cold War p.40  
70 Mason Hart Empire and Revolution p.502 
71 Henderson ‘The Recognition Issue’ p.163-175 
72 Arthur S. Link [ed.] The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Volume 27, 1913 (Princeton University Press, 
1978) p.435-436; 518 
73 Katz Secret War in Mexico p.107-108 Felix was Porfirio’s nephew. Katz relates that immediately 
after the coup these two rowed bitterly over who would become President, perhaps showing the 
unrealistic element of Wilson’s plan. 
74 Schoultz Beneath the United States p.241-243 
75 W. Dirk Raat & Michael M. Brescia Mexico and the United States: Ambivalent Vistas Fourth Edn. 
(University of Georgia Press, 2010) p.120 
76 Arthur S. Link [ed.] The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Volume 28, 1913 (Princeton University Press, 
1978) p.57-58; 141-142 
77 For example ibid p.27-34; 77-78 
78 ibid p.136 My emphasis. 
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“morality” as fused with his wider ideology.79 As Knight points out, Wilson saw 
liberal government as “the best guarantor of political order”, and this would in turn be 
conducive to U.S. trade and investment.80 Effectively Wilson was an early 
practitioner of the liberal grand strategy the U.S. would come to wholeheartedly adopt 
and employ during and after the Second World War. Rather than Wilson being led by 
his moral compass, his morality formed part of his decision-making process in trying 
to best secure the clear U.S. interests at stake in Mexico. Wilson and many in his 
administration did not trust that Huerta could guarantee long-term stability, and in fact 
there was a lot of evidence in Huerta’s military losses that this was indeed the case.81 
As the beleaguered General made favourable overtures to Great Britain (and its oil 
companies) and Germany, Wilson moved from a stance of waiting and watching, 
diplomatic opprobrium, and failed cajoling to direct intervention through arms 
supplies to the Constitutionalist forces in February 1914, and then in April 1914 the 
launching of the Veracruz action, a planned occupation of the Mexican coastal port on 
a flimsy public pretence82 that sought to deny Huerta further arms supplies from 
Europe or elsewhere.83  
 
The allied Constitutionalist and Villaista / Zapatista forces were able to force Huerta’s 
abdication of power in July 1914, aided by the strength of U.S. armaments, at which 
point the Revolution more comprehensively splintered into a number of factions, 
based mostly around the big split between the Constitutionalists and the Villaistas / 
Zapatistas. Thus Wilson’s policy did not yield the desired result as the instability 
deepened. From hereon Wilson’s actions became based around supporting the faction 
most able to bring a close to the armed stage of the Revolution, stability to the nation, 
and thereby be conducive to U.S. economic interests. These latter interests were based 
around a political agreement through a, “conservative but reputably popular 
constitutional restoration, an American loan to reform the foreign debt and fund a 
claims commission, and American financial supervision of Mexico’s economic 
development.”84 As Womack points out these aims, “tallied well enough with the 
interests of the twenty or so large foreign and domestic companies” in Mexico.85 
Again though stability was the prerequisite for all else. Some in the U.S. therefore 
tentatively supported Villa in early 1915, before the military victories of Carranza’s 
Constitutionalist forces through 1915 convinced U.S. observers that he was the man 
                                                
79 Raat and Brescia Ambivalent Vistas p.120-121 
80 Knight Mexican Revolution Vol. II p.67-68 
81 Henderson suggests that not recognising Huerta generated instability as the U.S. could not back him 
financially and militarily to counter Carranza and his allies. There may be some validity to this. Again 
though, arms had been provided for six months to no positive result for the U.S., and to say Huerta 
could’ve quelled the ongoing insurrection both benefits from not being definitively provable, and 
underestimates the opposition to him and the revolutionary social forces already unleashed by this 
point.  
82 The intervention was justified as a response to a bizarre incident where U.S. sailors were very briefly 
jailed in Tampico and the local authorities failed to apologise in the formal manner the U.S. requested. 
However in reality it was in the immediate sense launched to stop a German rearmament ship for 
Huerta’s administration from docking at Veracruz itself. See Knight Mexican Revolution Vol. II p.150-
153 
83 Womack The Mexican Revolution p.147-149 
84 ibid p.157 
85 ibid 
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to back to reestablish stability.86 Mason Hart’s meticulous research shows the U.S. 
helped arm Carranza and his Generals through Veracruz (whilst denying weaponry to 
Villa and Zapata), and that the force of these arms helped Carranza to defeat the 
Villaistas and Zapatistas.87 Through official de facto recognition of the Carranza 
regime in October 1915, the U.S. was then able to openly back the Constitutionalists 
with arms and even through allowing Carranza’s troops to move through the U.S.88  
 
It is important to note the relative autonomy of the U.S. state is highlighted through 
Wilson’s policies in this period. Whilst we should consider the important role of 
foreign capital in Mexico, as Knight points out we should also not make the mistake 
of subsuming U.S. interests as a state to the interests of those foreign companies.89 In 
a telling quote, Wilson bemoaned that, “I sometimes have to pause and remind myself 
that I am the President of the whole United States and not merely a few property 
owners in the Republic of Mexico.”90 The U.S. President resisted the more robust 
military intervention that some oil interests and other lobbying groups, especially the 
media, were lobbying for.91 No doubt partially influenced by his commitment to self-
determination (within important limits, most especially concerning the right to decide 
domestic economic policies), and having duly noted the Veracruz intervention had 
initially united all revolutionary parties in proclaiming they would defend Mexico 
from the U.S., Wilson followed a more subtle path that attempted to gain a beneficial 
result for wider U.S. interests, rather than simply those of specific interests. Hence as 
war with Germany approached in 1916, both the U.S. and its European enemy were 
deliberately destabilising the nascent Carranza regime in Mexico to deny the other an 
ally; the interests of stability temporarily took a subordinate role to geostrategic 
concerns.92 There is also evidence to suggest the U.S. aimed to maintain some 
opposition to Carranza, and delayed his de jure recognition to maintain a stronger 
bargaining position with him on the wider matters of U.S. interest.93 
 
Mexico’s Constitution and Revolution’s ‘End’ 
Following the passage of the Mexican Constitution on February 5th, 1917, U.S. policy 
again became more hardened. Article 27 of that Constitution, no doubt in large part 
inspired by the economic woes Mexico found itself in through years of war (despite a 
boom in oil exports), and by the Villaista / Zapatista element of the Revolution, 
                                                
86 New Secretary of State Robert Lansing’s (in office June 24, 1915 – February 13, 1920) role is 
especially important in convincing his President and others of the wisdom of recognising Carranza, 
despite some misgivings about his willingness to cooperate with the U.S. See Louis G. Kahle ‘Robert 
Lansing and the Recognition of Venustiano Carranza’ The Hispanic American Historical Review 38, 3 
(August, 1958) p. 353-372  
87 Mason Hart Revolutionary Mexico p. 14-15, 280-301 
88 See Knight Mexican Revolution Vol. II p.334, 343-345 This was what provoked Villa to attack 
Columbus, New Mexico in 1916, which itself led to the second direct U.S. intervention in the 
Revolution as General John J. Pershing led an unsuccessful nine month ‘Punitive Expedition’ into 
Mexico to capture or kill the infamous revolutionary. 
89 ibid p.69 
90 Quoted in Weinberg Homage to Chiapas p.52 
91 ibid 
92 Womack The Mexican Revolution p.173-175 In late 1916 Germany offered a pact to Mexico to try 
and establish a diversionary front in the Americas, details of which were contained in the infamous 
‘Zimmerman telegram’. For example see James Thompson Making North America: Trade, Security 
and Integration (University of Toronto Press, 2014) p. 77 
93 Kahle ‘The Recognition of Venustiano Carranza’ p. 366-369 
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“vested in the Mexican nation the ownership of the country’s natural resources, 
specified as Mexican all titles to land and water, and mandated the expropriation of 
large estates and their subdivision into small farms and communal landholdings.”94 
The U.S. response given this grave threat to the interests to its oil and mining 
companies and the possibility for a greatly less favourable Mexican political economy 
was relentless pressure on the Carranza government through diplomatic and economic 
channels.95 This ramped up following Germany’s defeat in Europe, and Carranza had 
to ‘negotiate’ with the U.S. and concede that Article 27 would not be retroactive upon 
U.S. company property.96 The pressure was heightened still further as Carranza was 
assassinated in May 1920 during the last stage of counter-revolution in Mexico - the 
victory of the Sonoran industrial-agricultural section of the Mexican elite. Carranza 
was undone by resisting the leadership campaign of this group, expertly led by 
Revolutionary General Álvaro Obregón.97 The United States once again had the ace 
card of non-recognition of whatever leading group emerged. The Sonorans were 
therefore keen to emphasise their openness to foreign capital investment, and their 
obligations to the international community to repay foreign debts.98  
 
Hence, ten years of Revolutionary struggle ended with the baton of power passed 
from one section of the Mexican elite to another. Through an extremely complex 
period U.S. interests were largely secured by its end, albeit elements of the Mexican 
Constitution were troublesome, and it had taken some time and policy flexibility. 
Though U.S. ‘intervention’ was often quite limited, and events in Mexico itself were 
of course the main driver of outcomes, U.S. co-option and influence at points was 
indeed important in the eventual conclusion. This left much intact in terms of the 
commanding heights of Mexican politics and economy, which of course suited the 
U.S., whilst undoubtedly sweeping away the Porfirian order and increasing the 
influence of particular social classes.99 Womack suggests, “There was nothing 
historically definitive in [the Revolution’s] principal economic and social results: the 
same big companies existed as before, plus a few new ones, relying more heavily than 
ever on American markets and banks.”100 However, there was a dialectical element to 
the Revolution also, as although it was sparked by an intra-elite political spat and 
ended in continued elite rule, it was also militarily reliant at crucial stages on populist 
social forces, led by Villa and Zapata, that were made certain promises. In 
conjunction with broader development processes in Mexico following the 
revolutionary period, these forces would come to complicate matters for Mexican 
elites, and U.S. interests in Mexico. As Gibler contends, “The elite were able to gain 
national control over the masses […] but they could not hold power without making 
                                                
94 Womack The Mexican Revolution p. 176 
95 The U.S. oil companies in Mexico also actively plotted with Mexican co-conspirators about directly 
removing Carranza. ibid p.183  
96 ibid p.187  
97 Knight Mexican Revolution Vol. II p.490-493 
98 However, the specific dispute around Article 27 rumbled on until 1923, of which more below. 
99 Whilst the agrarian class as represented by Zapata were defeated militarily they remained important. 
Also something we have not mentioned is the importance of a small industrial working class who threw 
their support behind the Constitutionalists and who would become a key part of the post-revolutionary 
Mexico. Of course the Revolution and its results were also the outcome of the already increasing 
influence of these classes brought about in large part by Porfirian policies, and related growth and 
industrialisation.  
100 Womack The Mexican Revolution p.199 
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concessions.”101 This would come to be important in bilateral relations in the years 
leading up to WWII. 
 
Post-Revolution Relations 
The Sonoran elite who assumed control of the Mexican state following the 
Revolutionary period were interested in reconstruction and stability for Mexico. 
However from Obregón’s election in November 1920 to the beginning of the rule of 
Lazaro Cardenas in 1934 Mexico still moved through five Presidents.102 Obregón 
himself faced revolt from former ally Adolfo de la Huerta in 1923-24.103 He was 
assassinated after winning a second election in 1928 in an event linked to the 
extremely brutal Cristero Revolt that had broken out in 1926, in which tens of 
thousands died.104 There was also an attempt on the life of President Ortiz Rubio in 
1930. Nonetheless, whilst politically the Mexico ruled by the Sonorans and their 
allies105 remained fractious and violent (perhaps understandably after such an 
upheaval), its economic strategy remained relatively stable, and whilst Obregón was 
especially keen to include Mexico’s newly influential class formations in the political 
project (on the terms of the elite), the economic arrangement that followed the 
Revolution was not radically different to that which preceded it. As Knight states, 
“Under the Sonorans, the country [Mexico] remained an exporter of primary goods 
and a major recipient of foreign investment”. He contends that the, “nationalist 
provisions of the Constitution lay fallow” as Mexico remained under the leadership of 
the conservative Elias Calles (President 1924-1928) in the maximato period (1924-
1935) of post-revolutionary reconstruction.106 
 
The sheer level and proximity of U.S. economic power and influence can be seen in 
generating this result to a degree, although the Sonorans themselves were dedicated to 
a conservative and cautious path based around capitalist development and their 
continued rule. The retroactivity of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution remained a 
sticking point for bilateral relations. The Wilson and Harding administrations delayed 
recognition of the Obregón Presidency until he acceded to certain preconditions in the 
Bucareli Accords, agreed to in 1923. This agreement included a provision that U.S. 
oil companies would not be subjected to retroactive action in terms of their existing 
holdings in Mexico as long as they pre-dated 1917, and the company had completed 
a, “‘positive act’ (such as erecting drilling equipment)”.107 Once Obregón had been 
recognised, the U.S. actively militarily supported him with aid and equipment to meet 
the challenge of de la Huerta.108 President and jefe maximo Elias Calles seemed to 
reverse course on Bucareli initially, making more stringent demands on U.S. oil 
companies (and those from elsewhere). However the status quo of the Accords 
                                                
101 Gibler Mexico Unconquered p.42 
102 However, the specific dispute around Article 27 rumbled on until 1923, of which more below. 
103 Obregón feared that Villa was planning to enter this revolt on de la Huerta’s side, and had him 
assassinated in 1923. Raat and Brescia Ambivalent Vistas p.129-129   
104 Jean A. Meyer The Cristero Rebellion: The Mexican People Between Church and State 1926-1929 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008)  
105 I use the term Sonarans collectively for ease; the group was not all geographically tied to the state. 
106 Knight Mexican Revolution p.517 
107 Raat and Brescia Ambivalent Vistas p.129 
108 ibid p.145 
Paul Ashby: NAFTA-Land Security: The Mérida Initiative, Transnational Threats, and U.S. Security Projection in 
Mexico  
PhD Thesis 
University of Kent 
 
138 
returned by 1927, and in 1929 the U.S. again provided material support to Calles as 
he faced his own rebellion.109  
 
Thus much of the Revolution’s nationalist fervour and radicalism was dulled in these 
years. However the revolutionary Constitution remained intact as a potential 
framework for a different agenda in Mexico. In conjunction with the conditions set as 
Mexico entered into an economic crisis that preceded the more global crisis of 1929, 
this would allow a Mexican leader with a distinctly more nationalist and progressive 
development strategy the political options and space to challenge the status quo on his 
ascent to power in 1934. Lázaro Cárdenas would put in place some of the stalled 
revolutionary hopes and dreams through a series of far-reaching policies. One of 
these, the expropriation of foreign oil companies and nationalistation of Mexico’s oil 
industry, would appear to have directly challenged U.S. interests. How did the U.S. 
react? 
 
Lázaro Cárdenas, Oil Expropriation and its Impact for U.S. Interests in Mexico 
The state expropriation of the holdings of foreign oil companies under the leadership 
of Lázaro Cárdenas in 1938 is seen as a high point of Mexican nationalism and its 
ability to exercise independence from foreign influence, most especially the United 
States. Sparked by an industrial dispute between foreign companies and the recently 
formed Sindicato de Trabajadores Petreleros de República Mexicana (STPRM) oil 
workers union, a failed attempt to arbitrate between the sides by the Mexican 
government ended in expropriation on March 18th, 1938110 (still a national holiday in 
Mexico). Lustig, referring to the legal and institutional basis of the expropriation 
provided by Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution, cites Cárdenas’ actions as an 
example of, “the extent to which the Mexican government can exercise its 
constitutional powers.”111 Weintraub contends it provides an illustrative instance of 
the U.S. pushing its domineering approach to Mexico too far, forcing Cárdenas into 
an act of resistance.112 The nationalised petroleum sector remained largely intact even 
through the opening of the Mexican economy in almost every other area since 1982 
(including a unprecedented number of privatisations).113 Recent legislation to open 
the industry to foreign investment sparked fierce debate amongst Mexico’s political 
class),114 and amongst the population for whom it was a source of pride.115 
                                                
109 ibid p.155, 145 
110 Alan Knight ‘The Politics of the Expropriation’ in Jonathan C. Brown and Alan Knight (eds.) The 
Mexican Petroleum Industry in the Twentieth Century (University of Texas Press, 1992) p.91-92 
111 Lustig Remaking of an Economy p.103  
112 Weintraub Unequal Partners p.27 Weintraub refers to a longer period of conflict over the issue of 
oil between the Mexican and U.S. governments. As we shall see I slightly disagree with his analysis. 
113 See Dag Macleod Downsizing the State: Privatization and the Limits of Neoliberal Reform in 
Mexico (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004)  
114 The Calderón and Peña Nieto administrations, seeking to encourage private involvement in the state 
oil company Pemex, introduced a series of reforms in recent years. Adam Thomson ‘Pemex Approves 
Incentive-based Oil Contracts’ Financial Times (November 25th, 2010) 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fa632a2c-f8b2-11df-b550- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1Cov9ByTM Accessed 
02.11.01 U.S. Energy Information Administration ‘Mexico’s Energy Reform Seeks to Reverse Decline 
in Oil Production’ http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=16431 Accessed 02.07.14 
Accessed 02.07.14 However these debates were sufficiently overcome near submission for reform to 
pass, see Chapter Five for more detail. 
115 Weintraub Unequal Partners p.83, 149 Polls showing large opposition to foreign influence in the oil 
sector are cited. This goes some way to explain the large protests against the recent reforms that 
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However, notwithstanding the importance of this event, both symbolic and ‘actual’, 
the “politics of the expropriation” were a good deal more complex than allowed in 
short summaries or popular nationalist mythologizing.116 A detailed look at the oil 
expropriation helps reveal the continuing importance of foreign capital and resource 
extraction to U.S.-Mexican relations and that whatever this importance, U.S. interests 
writ large do not equate to the interests of its companies or various capitals. It also 
provides an example of the agency of the Mexico state, and the import of internal 
social, class and political relations within Mexico determining events. It is important 
from the outset to recognise that the expropriation has to be seen as very much a 
product of class relations and a shifting political climate in Mexico under Cárdenas. 
The President has variously been seen as an enactor of the social causes of the 
Revolution, a radical aberration who went far beyond those revolutionary goals, and a 
clever politician of the elite, setting in place the inflexible institutions and nationalism 
that would sustain the emergent one party state in Mexico for the next sixty years 
whilst guaranteeing popular support.117 The truth probably lies in a composite of the 
first and last readings; Cárdenas put in place significant land reform programmes as 
well as proving to be more sympathetic to labor in industrial disputes, but this shored 
up his personal support in the country (which was essential in the early days of his 
Presidency as he fought off the challenge of the previously dominant and right-wing 
Elías Calles), and coincided with the creation of many of the state instruments that 
would corral social forces and movements to support of the state and the various 
guises of the emergent PRI.118  
 
Regardless of his intentions, Cárdenas and his supporters and ministers within the 
emergent party deliberately unleashed, co-opted or represented new or previously 
subsumed social forces and classes within Mexico, including the growing industrial 
proletariat, one contingent of which were the freshly organised oil workers.119 
Preceding and consequent Presidents and their ruling allies within the party system 
deliberately dampened or even crushed the aspirations and power of these same social 
forces and class formations, in favour of others. Through his nationalist and inclusive 
policies, again whatever they were designed to do,120 Cárdenas was able to largely 
end the hangover violence of the Revolution and begin to institutionalise one-party 
rule. Within the PRI, the balance of social forces and class factions within Mexico 
was mirrored, and actualised in policies, in intra-elite struggles amongst Mexico’s 
                                                
Mexico has witnessed. See Shannon Young ‘American Media Misses the Story on Mexican Oil 
Reform’ Texas Observer (February 10th, 2014) http://www.texasobserver.org/american-media-misses-
story-mexican-oil-reform/ Accessed 02.07.14; Al Jazeera ‘Mexico Energy Reform Sparks Mass 
Protest’ Al Jazeera (February 1st, 2014) http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2014/02/mexico-
energy-reform-sparks-mass-protest-2014218747733878.html Accessed 02.07.14 
116 Knight Politics of the Expropriation  
117 Knight Cardenismo p.245, and, for examples of the latter reading, Weinberg Homage to Chiapas 
p.57-58 and Gibler Mexico Unconquered p.43-44 
118 The PRI started life as the PNR (Partido Nacional Revolucionario), then became the PRM (Partido 
de la Revolución Mexicana) before the PRI itself was formed in 1946. 
119 For an overview, see Knight Cardenismo p.255-277 
120 Once more, seeing self / elite / party interest in them does not mean there was also not a coeval 
progressive element. 
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ruling class.121 The oil expropriation occurred when the balance and aims of Mexico’s 
ruling elite were shifted to the left politically and consequently the interests of labor 
and the large agrarian population were more robustly represented. This ability to 
reflect, co-opt and utilise social currents within Mexico would prove vital to the 
longevity of the developing PRI state. As Preston and Dillon have stated, the party 
was, “largely unencumbered by doctrinal commitments, making it exceptionally 
adaptable.”122 This in fact gave it a stabilising ability not matched elsewhere in much 
of Latin America. 
 
However at this juncture one of the undesirable results of the Revolution for those 
interests, Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, combined with the shifting political 
and social balance in Mexico and led to the removal of its oil companies and the 
closure of the petroleum sector to outside investment. If the interests of its capitals 
and the extraction of key resources such as oil are so integral to U.S. thinking with 
regard to its Mexican neighbour, why was this situation allowed to develop, and why 
was the nationalisation allowed to occur successfully? The answer lies in the 
historical contingencies faced by U.S. planners, but also tell us much about the nature 
of U.S. interests in Mexico, and the U.S. state. Thus, the U.S. response to the 
expropriation was far from muted,123 but is also fell short of the far-reaching, 
definitive reaction desired by both U.S. and British oil companies,124 and indeed the 
reaction expected by the British government.125 The oil companies were obviously 
concerned with pure bottom-line profits, but were also extremely worried about what 
kind of precedent an uncontested and successful nationalisation in a producer country 
could set, and the reactions it could elicit elsewhere. This also stimulated British 
government concerns, and the continued cheap supply of petroleum on the eve of 
potential conflict in Europe sharpened this alarm and triggered an angry response.126  
 
These elements were by no means unconsidered by the U.S. government. The DoS, 
under Secretary Cordell Hull, was particularly hawkish on this issue, whilst the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) were circulating reports of Cárdenas’ latent 
pro-German outlook.127 However they were specific elements amongst many others. 
Myriad factors were involved in the setting of U.S. policy, including President 
Roosevelt’s personal antipathy towards oil companies, his emphasis on promoting a 
‘Good Neighbour’ policy with Mexico, a wider and older effort to encourage a ‘Pan 
Americanism’ between the United States and Latin America, and the clique within the 
administration and policy circles who favoured such a conciliatory approach, not least 
                                                
121 ibid p.251 Knight however states that intra-elite struggles “coincided” with country-wide struggles, 
whereas I place the emphasis on them representing those struggles, and those struggles becoming a tool 
for the elite, rather than overwhelming them.  
122 Preston & Dillon Opening Mexico p.53 
123 Initially a boycott of Mexican petroleum, and suspension of silver purchases from Mexico (which 
were absolutely vital to the Mexican economy) was put in place. 
124 Knight Cardenismo p.285, Weinberg Homage to Chiapas p.58 
125 Lorenzo Meyer The Expropriation and Great Britain in Brown & Knight Mexican Petroleum 
Industry p.155-157 
126 George Philip The Expropriation in Comparative Perspective in ibid p. 176 
127 Schoultz Beneath the United States p.306-307 Interestingly the British were compiling reports on 
Cárdenas’ “revolutionary socialism” (Meyer Expropriation and Great Britain p.155) leading one to the 
conclusion it was not so much his political or ideological stance that was concerning U.S. and British 
officials, just simply his more populist approach and moves against the dominance of foreign capital. 
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U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Josephus Daniels.128 The response to the expropriation 
began to shift from its initial stress on confrontation, to one that was more 
accommodating of Mexico’s fundamental right to expropriate, as long as sufficient 
compensation was provided for those companies affected. However what really set 
the die in favour of an eventual acceptance of the expropriation was the impact of the 
impending Second World War. 
 
Macleod succinctly summarises the import of the brewing global conflict on U.S. 
policies towards the Mexican expropriation, “The Roosevelt administration was not in 
a position to push Mexico too hard on behalf of U.S. petroleum companies. The need 
to secure the southern border as well as the need for raw materials [oil, but also others 
such as silver that would be affected by a protracted dispute] would force the United 
States to adopt a more conciliatory approach.”129 There was no doubt that the fear of 
an Axis bridgehead in Mexico was at the forefront of U.S. planners minds, and that 
this possibility, however unlikely, was not impossible, as Mexico began supplying 
Italy and Germany with petroleum in the context of a boycott elsewhere.130 However, 
to state that the U.S. government was ‘forced’ to accept Mexican expropriation by 
international events is too simplistic. Notwithstanding the other elements at play (Pan 
Americanism, the Good Neighbour policy) we have already seen above, the U.S. 
administration was also actively following principles of non-intervention that would 
come to underpin the liberal order they would construct following WWII.131 The 
dispute was not fully settled between the U.S. and Mexico until November 1941. Two 
months previously Roosevelt had publicly expounded the norms that would govern 
the international order the U.S. would come to guarantee in the British-American 
Atlantic Charter, a skeletal precursor framework to the United Nations (UN). Hence 
the historical global context no doubt played a crucial determining part in the eventual 
U.S. response that rejected the specific interests of the oil companies in favour of 
wider geostrategic expediencies.132 However there was also significant agency within 
the higher echelons the U.S. administration to follow certain broad policies and an 
emergent wider strategy within this context. 
 
U.S. military cooperation grew through World War II. As Raat and Brescia show the 
U.S. clearly saw Mexico as important to its strategic interests prior to this. Alongside 
military support, albeit limited, plans were in place to militarily secure ports and oil 
and coal fields if necessary, and these were only removed in 1946. Politically radical 
groups from left and right inside Mexico were infiltrated, and intelligence assets 
reported on labour relations, troop movements, the Mexican Communist Party, and 
                                                
128 Variously Philip Expropriation in Comparative Perspective p.174-177, Knight Cardenismo p.285-
286, Schoultz Beneath the United States p.283, 306-307 
129 Macleod Downsizing the State p.56 
130 Meyer Expropriation and Great Britain p.158 Indeed, there were fascist sympathies within 
Mexico’s elite in the 1920s and 30s, represented by the former President and jefe máximo Elias Calles 
and his clique, who dominated this era prior to Cárdenas rule. Purportedly, when Cárdenas had Calles 
arrested in 1936 prior to deportation, he was found in bed flicking through Mein Kampf (Knight, 
Cardenismo p.256) 
131 A similar argument is followed in Meyer Expropriation and Great Britain p.155-156  
132 Even the previously intransigent Cordell Hull would grow tired of the lobbying of oil companies 
that continued even as war approached, and signed the eventual inter-governmental agreement without 
their approval (Knight Cardenismo p.286, Schoultz Beneath the United States p.307) 
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others.133 However the global conflict created the conditions for U.S.-Mexican 
security cooperation on quite a large scale. Mexico entered into an alliance with the 
U.S. and Allied forces and declared war on the Axis powers following the sinking of 
Mexican tankers by German submarines. The U.S. and Mexico also made mutually 
favourable agreements for vital raw materials from Mexico (including opium as a 
derivative for morphine, necessary of course in combat). The U.S. helped create a 
Mexican airforce who saw service in the Philippines. The Bracero Program was 
undertaken, whereby causal labourers from Mexico would be granted temporary 
admission to the U.S., helping the U.S. to overcome the U.S.’ labour shortage during 
the war, and beyond (it only ended in 1964). In effect we can see this wartime 
induced cooperative relationship as the end of the Revolutionary period and its 
immediate fall-out. It ended with a sufficiently friendly regime in place in Mexico, 
and U.S. interests largely secured. 
 
Economic Entente: Bilateral Relations 1945-1978 
 
Mexico Under the PRI  
Mexico’s social balance shifted again at the end of Cárdenas’ tenure. Disproving 
some of the more disparaging analysis that characterise him one-dimensionally as a 
party man,134 the economic and social policies he followed elicited a real backlash 
within Mexico’s inflation-hit middle class, and business and capital interests in the 
country also agitated for change. By building a power base on the left, the President 
had stirred opposition on the right.135 This recalibration of social forces was mirrored 
by a power struggle within the ruling party. Cárdenas’ successor, Avila Camacho, 
would shift Mexico back to a more business-friendly, conservative environment, 
overseeing a, “decline of agrarian reform, the curtailment of workers control, renewed 
stress on private enterprise and commercial agriculture, the dynamic growth of private 
and foreign investment (and of profits at the expense of wages), accommodation with 
the Church and the elimination of Socialist education.”136 Thus the balance between 
the interests of capital and labour tilted back towards capital, and this coincided with 
an increasingly close military and economic relationship with the U.S. in the ferment 
of WWII. Alemán Valdés continued in this vein, though he added personal 
enrichment and corruption to PRI politics, a tradition taken up with gusto by his party 
in subsequent years.137  
 
From this point to the early 1970s Mexico’s economy underwent the ‘Mexican 
Miracle’; sustained, steady economic growth. This was certainly based substantially 
on an ISI development model and investment in infrastructure projects. However the 
conception of Mexico as simply a closed, corporatist space suspicious of foreign 
ownership does not stand up to scrutiny.138 Instead we should see the Mexican 
economy in this period as a compromise between U.S. and Mexican capitalist 
interests. As Mason Hart summarises: 
                                                
133 Raat and Brescia Ambivalent Vistas p.144-148 
134 Gibler Mexico Unconquered p.42-45 
135 Knight Cardenismo p.289-293 
136 ibid. p.302 
137 Preston & Dillon Opening Mexico p.54 
138 Weintraub Unequal Partners p.45-46 Also see Stokes and Raphael Global Energy Security p.205 
for a critical presentation of this argument. 
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During the 1940s the role of Americans in Mexico moved from  
the lost ownership of productive properties to an overwhelming  
domination of bi-lateral trade and high technology. […] The  
Americans also adapted to greater control of their private  
enterprises by the Mexican government. The nationalism of the  
Cárdenas era had demonstrated that the Mexicans wanted control  
of their resources, and the U.S. elites preferred cooperation to  
confrontation.139 
 
As a result of this cooperative relationship, U.S. interests in having a secure space for 
capital accumulation in Mexico were realised, within important parameters. By 1970 
half of Mexican industry was foreign owned, with U.S. firms heavily represented.140 
Although Mexico trod its own development path, based on the macro-scale on ISI-led 
development, the U.S. was satisfied enough on economic questions to deal with 
Mexico. Moreover this qualified economic entente was backed up by the political 
stability that Mexico largely ‘enjoyed’. For much of the Cold War period Mexico’s 
political stability appeared more robust than many of the Latin American countries to 
its South. Thus, Mexico has been seen as somewhat of an outlier within ‘Latin 
America’ with regard to Cold War relations. The empirical case for this ‘uniqueness’ 
is a strong one. Mexico had no defence treaty with the U.S. during the Cold War, was 
the only country outside Cuba in Latin America not to host a U.S. Military Assistance 
Advisory Group, and did not accept large amounts of U.S. military assistance.141 
Mexico did not vote to expel Cuba from the OAS in 1962.142 During the late 
1970s/early 1980s President Portillo, boosted by the discovery of large Mexican oil 
reserves143 and the fact that the U.S. was actively diversifying its supply of crude oil 
from a Middle East dependence to other sources, including of course Mexico,144 
openly challenged U.S. wishes and hegemony in Central America by providing 
political and military support to the Sandanistas in Nicaragua, and political support to 
the insurgents in El Salvador.145 Why did the U.S. tolerate this in the Cold War 
context?  
 
Conflict, Cooperation and the Cold War 
U.S. strategy in the Cold War (and indeed before and beyond the ‘superpower 
conflict’) helps us better understand the Cold War relationship between the U.S. and 
Mexico. The U.S. was concerned with the suppression of alternative development 
models in Latin America, whether they were communist or not. U.S. actions in Latin 
America were less about countering Soviet advances or the spread of ideological 
communism, and more about the containment, often the violent containment, of social 
movements or forces who sought to encourage nationalistic economies, threatened 
                                                
139 Hart Empire and Revolution p.403 
140 Weinberg Homage to Chiapas p.61 
141 Domínguez and de Castro The United States and Mexico p.39 There was however a limited 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) partnership, with a 1000 trainees between 1950-
1980. More details below. 
142 ibid. p.55 
143 Peter H. Smith Mexico Since 1946: Dynamics of an Authoritarian Regime in Bethell Mexico Since 
Independence p.376 
144 Weinberg Homage to Chiapas p. 61  
145 Domínguez and de Castro The United States and Mexico p.41 
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direct U.S. economic interests, and, most importantly, provided “the threat of a good 
example” i.e. a nationalistic economy that succeeded without U.S. influence, and was 
not primed for U.S. economic needs. Through widespread military training - 
especially in COIN - and support for U.S. friendly regimes, the U.S. sought to achieve 
these goals across Latin America.146 How does Mexico, which developed a nationalist 
economy, rejected U.S. influence over its military, and aided social movements in 
Nicaragua and El Salvador, fit into this strategy? Whilst it is of course a complex 
case, we should consider the overriding fact that the Mexican economy categorically 
allowed U.S. capital and business interests to operate in the country during the Cold 
War, and that stability was largely secured through the power of the PRI and its 
ability to oversee economic growth. 
 
However, there are some interesting cases within the larger backdrop that can 
illuminate the relationship in this period a little beyond generalisations. In terms of its 
aid to Central American insurgent movements, we should contextualise this 
phenomenon with Mexican support for U.S. backed COIN operations in Guatemala 
and its agreement with the U.S. to secure its southern border from Guatemalan 
insurgent penetration, revealed in released documents now presented by the National 
Security Archive.147 Relatedly, during the Dirty War of the late 1960s/1970s, Mexico 
turned its military against the exact social / political forces U.S. military aid was 
helping states repress across Latin America.148 The U.S. did not need to provide 
extensive military aid or engage in COIN in Mexico to protect a capitalist model 
attuned to U.S. economic/strategic interests. The Mexican state did it of its own 
volition. There are even some diffuse links to wider U.S. Latin American strategy in 
the Cold War. During the formative years of the Dirty War, the Mexican military and 
PRI leadership recognised the need for a revamp of the military’s preparedness for 
internal insurgency. As rebel movements began to bubble up in the countryside and 
Mexico’s cities, inspired by a number of issues,149 - the political and military powers 
in Mexico actively planned to meet these challenges in a forthright manner.150  
 
Part of this planning involved the deliberate but Mexican-led adoption of the U.S. 
devised ‘Low Intensity War’ strategy, one that had been taught at the School of the 
                                                
146 This is, of course, the revisionist account of the Cold War, based on conceptualizing the U.S. as an 
imperial force in Latin America. For an excellent and useful summary, see Doug Stokes America’s 
Other War: Terrorising Colombia (Zed, 2002) p.21-25 Also see Ruth Blakeley State Terrorism and 
Neoliberalism: The North in the South (Routledge, 2009); Michael McClintock Instruments of 
Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counter-Insurgency, and Counter-Terrorism 1940-1990 (Random 
House, 1992) As these sources make clear this went beyond Latin America. 
147 Kate Doyle Mexico’s Southern Front: Guatemala and the Search for Security (National Security 
Archive, November 2nd, 2003) http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB100/index.htm  
148 For a useful introduction and summary see Doyle The Dawn of Mexico's Dirty War: Lucio Cabañas 
and the Party of the Poor  (National Security Archive, December 5th, 2003) 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB105/index.htm & Human Rights and the Dirty War 
in Mexico (National Security Archive, May 3rd, 2003) 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB89/  
149 To include the Cuban Revolution, similar movements across Latin America, political isolation and 
alienation from the PRI regime amongst Mexico’s youth, and the grinding inequality and poverty of the 
countryside in states like Guerrero.  
150 Jorge Luis Sierra Gúzman ‘Armed Forces and Counterinsurgency: Origins of the Dirty War (1965-
1982)’ in Fernando Herrera Calderón and Adela Cedillo [eds.] Challenging Authoritarianism in 
Mexico: Revolutionary Struggles and the Dirty War 1964-1982 (Routledge, 2012) p.182-197 
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Americas since 1961.151 As Guzmán relates, the Pentagon described this strategy as 
comprising the political, paramilitary, psychological and economic measures that 
would be required to aid in the defeat of ‘subversion.’152 In contemporary military 
terms, this is a COIN strategy.153 The adoption of this strategy was followed by the 
regime of Díaz Ordaz’s (1964-70) decision to send 306 officers to military training 
academies in the U.S., to prepare for rural COIN especially.154 Whilst by no means 
was this responsible for some of the brutal tactics in La Guerra Sucía, it was not an 
insignificant development given the established wisdom that Mexico’s leadership and 
military was wary of U.S. involvement in its internal affairs.155 As would be repeated 
throughout Central America in the coming years on a far wider and more violent scale 
(with much more direct U.S. involvement), paramilitary forces were formed and 
utilised as part of Mexico’s COIN effort. One paramilitary group, Los Halcones, were 
trained by, “lieutenants and captains in the armed forces” whom, “used what they 
learned from taking courses on counterinsurgency techniques in the United States, 
Japan, and France.”156 However to reiterate the key point, Mexico undertook this 
effort on its own terms for its own ends. Crucially, though, the U.S.’ key interests 
were not threatened through this period.157 
 
However the bilateral issue of narcotics did become pertinent. Whilst the Mexican 
military had been engaged in domestic crop (marijuana and opium) eradication efforts 
since the 1930s,158 it was through an increased focus on CN during Nixon’s 
presidency that the U.S. was able to pressure the Mexican government into 
undertaking significant domestic CN efforts through its military. This was largely 
achieved through “economic blackmail” via the closing of the US-Mexico border to 
trade for 20 days in 1969.159 One Nixon advisor referred to this action as, “ an 
exercise in international extortion, pure, simple, and effective, designed to bend 
Mexico to our will."160 Over the coming two decades, Mexico would dedicate 
increasing numbers of troops to CN missions in drug producing states, including the 
launch of Operation Condor in the 1970s. According to one study, by 1985 20% of 
the Mexican military was engaged in CN efforts.161 Thus an absolutely crucial 
aperture for the U.S. in being able to influence Mexican security forces began to be 
prized open. This of course would have large ramifications. 
 
                                                
151 ibid p.156; The School of the Americas became infamously associated with torture and human 
rights repression across Central and South America during the Cold War. See Ruth Blakeley ‘Still 
Training to Torture? U.S. Training of Latin American Military Forces’ Third World Quarterly 27, 8 
(2006) It has since become the Western Hemisphere Institute for Hemispheric Security, and it trains 
Mexican recruits, as we will see in Chapter Six. 
152 Guzman ‘Armed Forces and Counterinsurgency’ p.156 
153 United States Headquarters Department of the Army Counterinsurgency FM 3-24 (Washington 
D.C., Dec 2006) p.1 
154 Guzman ‘Armed Forces and Counterinsurgency’ p.186 
155 Domínguez & de Castro The United States and Mexico p.39-40 
156 ibid p.188 
157 Mason Hart Empire and Revolution p.402-431 
158 Camp Armed Forces and Drugs p.8 
159 Richard Craig cited in Domínguez and de Castro United States & Mexico p.42 The border closing 
was named Operation Intercept. 
160 G. Gordon Liddy quoted in Kate Doyle Operation Intercept: The Perils of Unilateralism (The 
National Security Archive, 2003) http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB86/  
161 Camp Armed Forces and Drugs p.9 
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The Prelude to and Aftermath of the 1982 Economic Crisis: From the Volcker 
Shock to NAFTA 
 
Whilst the post-war era can appear rather stilted in terms of U.S.-Mexico relations, 
the period between 1970 and 1982 would prove to be dynamic and formative. It sets 
crucial context for Mexico’s opening up to the U.S. and the signing of NAFTA, and 
therefore the deepening of U.S. interests in Mexico which underpins the 
contemporary security agenda. The systemic crisis in the global capitalist economy 
that rumbled through the 1970s and early 1980s affected Mexico and the U.S. in 
distinct ways. In the U.S., a balance-of-payments issue mounted as a result of 
increased global competition, especially from Japan, and the costs of the Vietnam 
war. The oil shock of 1973 further added to U.S. economic woes. In Mexico, the 
slowdown in the U.S. economy affected the Mexican economy adversely as private 
enterprises began to struggle and fail. However, a series of huge oil discoveries 
through the 70s would allow the Mexican state the economic flexibility to prop up 
these private businesses and extend state ownership.162 It also increased U.S. interests 
in Mexico, as Mexico primarily exported its new-found oil to the U.S. Exports 
jumped from 94,200 barrels per day to 562,500 between 1975 and 1980.163 Mexico 
underwent a boom as a result of its enhanced production of petroleum and gas, with 
GDP growth spiking at around 9% by the end of the 1970s. However, inflation spiked 
along with growth,164 and much of the state investment and spending that drove the 
economy and made up for the private downturn was based on international borrowing, 
as banks scrambled to lend to the ‘newly’ petroleum rich country.165 The Mexican 
national debt rose from $6.8 billion to $58 billion between 1972 and 1982.166 When 
the bust came, it came spectacularly, as the Mexican economy crashed precipitously 
in 1982 and struggled throughout the rest of the 1980s. 
 
There is a sense in much of the traditional analyses that the 1982 economic crisis 
persuaded Mexican policy-makers of the obsolescence of the internal 
developmentalist approach. Weintraub contends that the ruling party had an epiphany: 
“it realised that whatever benefits earlier economic policies had, and these were in 
fact substantial, they were no longer suitable.”167 Coerver and Hall suggest that this 
was part of region wide “disillusionment” with state-led ISI models on the part of 
Latin American policy-makers,168 whilst Domínguez and de Castro summarise that as 
a result of the regional economic collapse in the 1980s (of which Mexico was the first 
major victim), “nearly all Latin American governments readjusted their economic 
strategies.”169 The Mexican crash that inspired this realisation, according to 
Weintraub, was brought about, “by a mixture of just about all Mexico’s development 
policies.” These included an over-reliance on newly discovered oil exports which of 
                                                
162 David Harvey A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford, 2005) p.99 
163 The number kept rising up to 1985 Gabriel Székely ‘The Oil Industry and Mexico’s Relations with 
the Industrial Powers’ in Brown and Knight The Mexican Petreloeum Industry p.257-261 
164 Inflation and growth overviews based on real GDP growth and consumer price inflation. See 
Weintraub Unequal Partners p.12, 49 
165 Macleod Downsizing the State p.50, 58-59 
166 Harvey Neoliberalism p.99 
167 Weintraub Unequal Partners p.6 
168 Don M. Coerver & Linda B.Hall Tangled Destinies: Latin America and the United States 
(University of New Mexico, 1999) p.188 
169 Domínguez & de Castro United States and Mexico p.xii 
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course fluctuated in price, and an under-reliance on other exports as, “a consequence 
of the Mexican policy of keeping its distance from the U.S. market,” the use of 
foreign debt financing (i.e. borrowing) to stimulate the economy rather than opening 
up to FDI, and the Volcker shock in the U.S. which left Mexico paying more interest 
on its borrowings.170 Preston and Dillon also lay the blame at the Mexican 
government’s door, specifically that of Lopez Portillo, who presided over a splurge in 
public spending based on the façade of oil wealth, and who made a series of bizarre 
decisions as the economy began to crumble with tumbling oil prices, not least 
nationalising the banks.171 
 
Whilst these analyses offer important insights into undoubted mistakes made at the 
‘commanding heights’ of the Mexican economy, they offer a rather reductive view of 
events that only considers internal factors. As Lustig has pointed out, Mexico at this 
time faced a very unfavourable external environment with regards to borrowing, oil 
prices, the slowdown in global demand in the 1970s and a host of other factors not 
entirely in Mexico’s control. In addition, she argues that those who point to Mexico’s 
ISI development policy as a having a role in the crash are conflating 30 years of 
development policy with a period of, “macroeconomic mismanagement.”172 Gowan 
shares a similar analysis, but crucially adds the agency of U.S. policymakers to effect 
change within the structure of the global economy. The Mexican crisis occurred 
within the context of explicit U.S. state moves to reassert economic dominance 
through a “Dollar Wall Street Regime” (DWSR). The Gold Standard was abandoned, 
currency exchanges pegged to the dollar, and petrodollars resulting from U.S. induced 
higher oil prices were recycled through Wall Street’s private banks and onto the 
economies of the South in the form of hugely increased lending.173 Mexican leaders, 
unwisely, took the opportunity to borrow heavily to prop up the private sector and 
extend social spending. The new “DWSR” caused increased volatility for the global 
economy, especially in the developing world, which suddenly had to contend with 
fluctuating exchange rates not pegged to an internationally agreed standard. It also 
gave the U.S. state and private capital a far greater stake in a number of domestic 
economies. The Volcker shock that followed the high levels of U.S. lending, which 
again was explicitly about the U.S. attempting to restructure its economy by killing 
inflation and disciplining labour internally, served to also help push Mexico into a 
debt crisis.174   
 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) loans followed the crash, 
which were dependent on huge economic restructuring more in line with the 
‘economic realities’ of the era. This ’economic reality’ can be broadly described as 
the applicability of neoliberalism; suppression of inflation through monetarist policy, 
opening the economy to foreign direct investment (FDI), more openness to mobile 
finance capital, the rollback of the public sector and state enterprises (and therefore 
                                                
170 Weintraub Unequal Partners p.28-29 How this is an entirely Mexican development policy is not 
explained. 
171 Preston & Dillon Opening Mexico p.95-96 
172 Lusting Remaking of an Economy p.1-12 
173 Peter Gowan The Global Gamble: Washington’s Faustian Bid for World Dominance (Verso, 1999) 
p.19-22 
174 Harvey Neoliberalism p.99 U.S. recession and high oil prices formed the other elements of a trifecta 
that pushed Mexico into recession. 
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national debt), and so on. These policies would serve to greatly benefit capital 
interests, those of financial and political elites internationally and domestically, and 
U.S. interests over the coming decades.175 This was a process undertaken across Latin 
America (with echoes today in continuing ‘structural adjustment programs’ (SAPs). 
In sum, for Gowan this entire development could be summarised as one where:   
 
[…] a successful development strategy [ISI] faced sudden, large  
challenges to macroeconomic tactics produced by the orchestrated  
chaos of the new international monetary-financial regime. The  
macroeconomic tactical failure led to terrible currency and  
financial crises and these enabled Washington to impose a new  
strategic model on these countries. This model was then claimed  
to be a superior strategy to an earlier failed strategy.176  
 
Whilst Gowan is instrumentalist in his thinking here, skirting over the fact that the 
U.S. state itself was in crisis management mode during much of this period,177 there is 
no doubt we need to consider this wider context when we come across arguments that 
suggest this was an internal Damscene conversion on the part of Mexican economists. 
Although more ad-hoc than Gowan states, the U.S. efforts in this period cleaved to the 
continued need to secure its interests, based on its primacy and through hegemony, 
within financial markets and beyond. Where we can see stronger instrumentalism on 
the part of the U.S. state is its role in overseeing the innovative SAP that conditioned 
loans and ‘help’ on extensive economic restructuring.178 For the first time the WB 
provided loans based on conditionality, and this conditionality helped open Mexico 
up to U.S. and globalising capital through Mexican membership in the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).179 However this SAP was not a complete 
imposition upon the Mexican state, as a resurgence of U.S.-Mexican capital class 
collusion unseen since the Porfiriato played out. The U.S. trained tecnocratas that 
served as Presidents from ’82 (de la Madrid, Salinas and Zedillo) were the modern 
day equivalent of the científicos, orchestrating the reinvigorated welcome of greater 
U.S. investment and private ownership through huge deregulation and privitisation in 
a bid to stimulate growth and pay off Mexico’s debts.180 That this process also 
happened to personally enrich them and a number of political cronies also highlights 
the links between the científicos and the tecnocratas. This group would also be key to 
the passage of NAFTA, not least President Salinas de Gortari.181  
 
Narcotics Again? 
Regarding the relationship on narcotics between the U.S. and Mexico in this period, 
U.S. pressure and the focus on CN in source and transit countries such as Mexico was 
increased in 1986 through Reagan’s designation of drugs as an issue of National 
                                                
175 See ibid.  
176 Gowan Global Gamble p.49 
177 Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American 
Empire (Verso, 2012) p.214-216  
178 ibid, Harvey Neoliberalism p.98-104 
179 ibid 
180 Harvey Neoliberalism p.100 Macleaod Downsizing the State 
181 It is an interesting counterfactual to consider what would’ve happened in U.S.-Mexican relations 
had Cuatehomoc Cardenas (Lazaro’s son) won a Mexican election he appeared to be leading before a 
mysterious massive computer glitch in 1988.  
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Security through National Security Decision Directive 221. The Certification progress 
enacted through Congress (whereby aid would be withheld from countries deigned 
not to be cooperating with the ‘War on Drugs’) also ramped up. The Mexican 
administration of Miguel de la Madrid responded largely as US pressure had 
intended; in 1987 Madrid followed Reagan in classifying drugs as an issue of 
Mexican national security.182 The Mexican government began to allow DEA agents to 
operate in Mexican territory.  The 1985 abduction, torture and murder of one such 
agent, Enrique Camarena, which had a level of state complicity regarding Mexico’s 
highly corrupted internal intelligence agency (and possibly beyond)183 provoked a 
second round of border closing.184 The DEA was apoplectic with Mexican 
recalcitrance to extradite or apprehend individuals it suspected of involvement who 
enjoyed political, and even effectively rendered two such individuals to the U.S. The 
steady application of pressure - the threat of unilateral U.S. border actions and the 
certification power vested in Congress -thereby loomed over all Mexican CN 
action.185  
 
NAFTA, the Zapatista Uprising, Narcotics and U.S.-Mexican Security Relations  
Whilst NAFTA is of course crucial in contemporary U.S.-Mexican relations, this is 
more so because it was the high-point of a longer term shift that culminated in 
NAFTA, ‘locking in’ Mexico’s structural changes. I have covered how NAFTA has 
created and deepened U.S. interests in Mexico’s political economy in Chapter Three. 
Thus here I highlight the relationship between NAFTA and improving U.S. Mexican 
security relations, especially with regard to the renewal of political violence in 
Mexico in the 1990s most (in)famously associated with the EZLN. Following the 
structural adjustments solidified through NAFTA, U.S. interests in Mexico’s 
openness were now being met on a level not seen since the Porfiriato. This meant that 
U.S. interest in how Mexico secured it political economy from potential threats, 
especially threats to the political economic structure and the investment climate, grew 
considerably. In conjunction with NAFTA, the U.S. upped its security aid to Mexico 
to unprecedented levels. Under the administration of Presidents Zedillo and Fox US-
Mexican cooperation ostensibly based on CN increased186, even as the US continued 
to engage in unilateral actions,187 and the violence and corruption associated with the 
                                                
182 Freeman and Sierra Militarization Trap p.277 
183 Camarena had been involved in the discovery of Rancho Bufalo, a huge marijuana plantation (it is 
estimated up to 7000 people worked on the site) that appeared to be operating with the knowledge or 
cooperation of authorities in the region, including, allegedly, the CIA itself. There are also posited 
connections to the (latterly uncovered) conspiracy to arm the Contras in Nicaragua. Charles Bowden 
Down by the River: Drugs, Money, Murder and Family (Simon & Schuster, 2003); Paul Kenny and 
Mónica Serrano ‘The Mexican State and Organized Crime’ in Paul Kenny; Mónica Serrano and Arturo 
Sotomayor, (eds.) Mexico’s Security Failure: Collapse into Criminal Violence (Routledge, 2011)  p.36-
37  
184 Domínguez and de Castro United States and Mexico p.42 Weintraub Unequal Partners p.78 
185 See Freeman and Sierra ‘The Militarization Trap’; Camp Armed Forces for useful summaries 
186 For an overview, see ibid. p.270-287, Domínguez and de Castro The United States and Mexico p.43-
49 
187 Including state based border interdiction Operations Gatekeeper, Hold the Line and Safeguard 
(which were primarily anti ‘illegal’ immigration operations) and Operation Casablanca, a covert DEA 
detail that chased the money generated by the drug trade in Mexico itself, without official Mexican 
knowledge. Mexican banks were unsurprisingly implicated, but the full import of the investigation may 
have been lost as it was shut down prematurely to avoid further Mexican government ire. Domínguez 
and de Castro The United States and Mexico p.45, 48  
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drug trade also steadily rose. Aid and training for military and federal forces from the 
U.S. to Mexico also increased in this period, undergoing a dramatic spike from 1995. 
Again, this was officially justified within a CN rubric. Equipment, mostly in the form 
of helicopters or helicopter equipment, was provided. Mexico sent a total of 1,488 
personnel to U.S. military academies between 1981 and 1995. Then, in 1997 and in 
1998, more than 1,000 GAFEs [Grupo Aeromóviles de Fuerzas Espaciales], an elite 
‘CN’ 188 special forces unit, went through training in the United States in each year,189 
surpassing in number the trainees for the entire previous fifteen years. Whilst drugs 
were of a concern to U.S. administrations and populations,190 I contend this 
increasingly close relationship between Mexico and the U.S. in military affairs is 
related to Mexican political and social conflicts that followed NAFTA, especially the 
Zapatista insurgency.  
 
Domínguez and de Castro acknowledge this  “closer” military relationship between 
the US and Mexico in the wake of the Zapatista uprising and the Mexican military’s 
subsequent COIN campaign.191 They state, however, that despite these increases, “the 
United States did not wish to be drawn into counterinsurgency operations.”192 Where 
connections do seem exist between U.S. aid and Mexican COIN, analysts have 
contended that Mexico has used the aid in a manner unintended by U.S. planners. For 
example, Domínguez and de Castro assert that the U.S. has “found it difficult to 
control the Mexican military’s absorption of equipment and training that was 
delivered for counter-narcotics efforts.”193 In other words, US CN training and aid 
was inadvertently (from the U.S perspective) being diverted into Mexico’s internal 
security battles with political dissidents and insurgents. This notion is reinforced 
through their explicit distinction between training provided under the CN budget, and 
that provided through ‘military’ budgets at locations such as the (then) School of 
Americas. Foley expresses a similar sentiment. Whilst pointing out that US CN 
training could be applied in COIN contexts and situations, and that the lack of 
Congressional oversight of such training programs leads to concerns over how they 
are being applied, he is concerned that training provided to Mexico maybe being used 
in ways not consistent with, “U.S. foreign policy aims”, and further that, “foreign 
militaries are able to use military assistance and training in ways not foreseen under 
the terms of U.S. military assistance law.”194 Therefore, any link between U.S. 
training and Mexican COIN operations is seen as unplanned and even undesirable. 
There is prima facie evidence that such a conception is plausible, as the U.S. gave 
instructions that Mexico could not use a donation of 73 UH-1H helicopters in 
operations outside of a CN capacity.195 
                                                
188 See below for a discussion of this dual role. 
189 Freeman and Sierra Militarization Trap p.280 
190 It seems both Nixon and Reagan had a personal antipathy towards drug use. We should also 
consider the role of domestic societal pressure to ‘do something’ about drugs, and the institutional 
growth and influence of important agencies such as the DEA. 
191 Domínguez & de Castro United States and Mexico p.49 
192 ibid 
193 ibid p.51 
194 Michael W. Foley Southern Mexico: Counterinsurgency and Electoral Politics (United States 
Institute of Peace, January, 1999) p.5 
195 Domínguez and de Castro The United States and Mexico p.47, Freeman and Sierra Militarization 
Trap p.279 Mexico later returned the helicopters, claiming they were ineffective, in a further example 
that not all matters in the burgeoning bi-national security relationship ran smoothly. 
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However, there is also strong evidence that the uptick in training and aid provided by 
the US to Mexico was significantly inspired by the Chiapas rebellion and similar 
nascent movements across the Mexico, and indeed was designed to aid Mexican 
forces in their response to it. Declassified defence intelligence documents show that 
the U.S. DoD had been monitoring increasing levels of political violence and military 
deployment in Chiapas for some time prior to the official start of the uprising in 
1994.196 These documents also show that as the conflict continued and fitfully flared 
from this point, US officials were concerned about the Mexican military’s ability to 
successfully fight the rebels on a number of fronts. As Doyle summarises, “U.S. 
defense experts observed that the military had no real counterinsurgency capabilities, 
did a poor job gathering intelligence and failed to comprehend the crucial role of 
public relations in ‘selling’ their operations to the Mexican people.”197 The distinction 
between US CN and COIN aid and training should also be questioned in light of the 
fact that GAFE troops, explicitly publicly trained in the US under a CN rubric in 
1997-1998 as Freeman and Sierra point out,198 were deployed to Chiapas in the wake 
of the Acteal massacre199 of civilian indigenous villagers by state-backed 
paramilitaries in 1997.200 That a force envisioned as, “combat ready shock-troops to 
attack drug cartels”201 should be deployed to a region in the midst of low-intensity but 
bloody insurgency and COIN should not come as a surprise when considering what 
GAFE were trained in at U.S. military locations such as Fort Bragg;202 “helicopter 
assault tactics, explosives, rural and urban warfare, drug interdiction and operational 
intelligence and planning”.203 This, as Foley pointed to above, is easily applicable to 
COIN situations. Further, Weinberg cites a telling report from a Fort Bragg magazine 
concerning the GAFE forces trained at that location and their operations in Chiapas 
and Guerrero (the latter being the birthplace and operational base of the EPR 
insurgent group) which makes “no mention of counterdrug training.”204  
 
We can therefore begin to offer a conception of the relationship between CN aid and 
training, COIN aid and training, and the Chiapas rebellion. In the DoD concern about 
Mexico’s COIN capabilities as the Chiapas rebellion brewed and erupted, and the 
dual use of ostensibly CN trained GAFE troops in both CN and COIN operations, can 
we trace deliberate US COIN policy at work in Mexico? We can certainly 
fundamentally refute a neat distinction between CN and COIN training. Literature 
emanating from influential academic institutions from within the defence community 
                                                
196 Kate Doyle Rebellion in Chiapas and the Mexican Military (The National Security Archive, 2004) 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB109/  
197 ibid 
198 Freeman and Sierra Militarization Trap p.279 
199 Again, despite denials on the part of successive Mexican governments and the conclusions of 
Mexican investigations, US defense intelligence documents show significant evidence of Mexican 
military support of paramilitary groups in Chiapas in this period. See Kate Doyle Breaking the Silence: 
The Mexican Army and the 1997 Acteal Massacre (The National Security Archive, 2009) 
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in this period blurs the lines between drugs and COIN. Weinberg points to several 
examples of this phenomenon in his discussion of U.S. involvement in the COIN 
campaign in Chiapas.205 One U.S. Army report concluded that, “the distinction among 
drug traffickers, arms traffickers, other heavily armed criminal groups and bandits, or 
insurgents is often not a clear one” and that therefore, “military support to law 
enforcement will certainly be directed against a variety of targets.”206 We should also 
consider the activities of the EPR here too, who announced there arrival in 1996 with 
attacks on security forces in Guerrero, and then a sophisticated bombing campaign 
across Oaxaca, Guerrero, Puebla and Mexico City. 
 
What we can say is that the U.S.’ interests in Mexico’s political stability increased as 
its economic integration with Mexico grew, from the discovery of huge Mexican oil 
reserves, through Mexico’s structural readjustment, and into the NAFTA era. We can 
also note that political instability increased in the wake of NAFTA through two 
genuine insurgency campaigns which had concerned the U.S. Finally, U.S. security 
aid to Mexico jumped significantly from its previously relatively low levels, and that 
aid was undoubtedly multi-purpose in its potential use. The threat that politically 
violent groups posed to the foreign investment, free-trade, export led political 
economic model in Mexico was real. An adviser to Chase Bank reported that the 
Mexican government would, “need to eliminate the Zapatistas to demonstrate their 
effective control of the national territory and security policy”.207 By no means a 
formal announcement of U.S. state policy, the instability provoked by the EZLN and 
EPR spooked investors and thus activated core U.S. interests. Increasingly into the 
2000s, drug violence would begin to do the same. In addition, 9/11 would expose the 
vulnerability of the North American economic space. Security integration was set to 





There is a clearly traceable focus on U.S. interests in Mexico based around the 
twinned concerns that the U.S.’ neighbour be as open as possible to U.S. investment 
and economic interchange, and be as politically stable as possible, even with the 
complex tumult of bilateral history. These interests were largely met during the 
Porfiriato on the surface, but their contradictions splintered the stability in Mexico 
and resulted in twenty years of violence and fractiousness, despite strong U.S. 
interventionism. A Mexico emerged that to a certain extent kept the U.S. at arms 
length, whilst never really threatening those key interests of economic interaction and 
political stability, even when Mexico nationalised its oil reserves (perhaps partly as a 
result of favourable geopolitical timing). Gradually a political-economic entente 
prevailed in an era of mutual post-war economic growth. With the onset of Mexico’s 
economic crisis however, a particular political configuration within the U.S. state, and 
wider global economic trends, led to the U.S. seeking to open up Mexico once more 
to deep U.S. involvement. This process that culminated in the “locked in” openness of 
                                                
205 ibid p.355-358 There are other examples through the text. 
206 Graham H. Turbiville Jr. quoted in ibid. p.356 
207 Mason Hart Empire and Revolution p.452-453 
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NAFTA arrangement, fixing Mexico to a development course that was open to U.S. 
investment and trade and relied heavily on exports to the U.S. market.  
 
The results of this were Janus-faced. The events leading up to the passage of NAFTA, 
and the agreement itself, have solidified a genuine hegemony in both North America 
and with regard to U.S.-Mexican relations. Whilst core interests in Mexico have been 
largely secure post World War II -as Mexico achieved its own political economic 
stability and was open to U.S. capital whilst following its own developmentalist path - 
the economic and political ructions associated with the rise of ‘neoliberalism’ resulted 
in an even more favourable arrangement for the U.S. Mexico has bought into a 
agenda that interlocks with U.S. preferences and interests. However, this has in turn 
inspired greater U.S. concern for the stability of Mexico’s political economy in the 
fashion I discussed in Chapter 3, as the coeval link between economics and security 
began to inspire greater U.S. intervention to ensure Mexico’s stability through 
military aid. Much of this is in line with continuous trends within wider U.S. grand 
strategy based on the spread and maintenance of stable open markets. Nonetheless, 
the regional dynamo of NAFTA and contingent events have also pushed U.S. policy 
in quite unique regional directions. Perversely, but not unsurprisingly from a 
historical-materialist perspective, destabilising forces have appeared or grown up with 
the passage of NAFTA, and economic interdependence has also revealed 
interdependent vulnerabilities. More happily for the U.S., the Mexican state is keen to 
protect the hegemonic status quo, and has begun to more deeply tie itself to U.S.-led 
security arrangements within the NAFTA-zone, girding U.S. regional hegemony 
further still. I turn now to the policy results of these developments, as I explore the 
concept of NAFTA-land Security. 
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I discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 how NAFTA has deepened U.S. interests in Mexico’s 
political economy and North America’s continued openness.  In this chapter I reveal 
how 9/11 and drug violence highlighted the vulnerabilities of this economic 
integration. Both the security problems themselves, and the initial U.S. reaction to 
them, began to challenge that openness and have adverse effects on the North 
American economy, and, thereby, U.S. interests within it. Thus more innovative 
solutions were required. These began to coalesce around the ideas of layered security, 
risk assessment, smart borders, security or border projection and, specifically within 
North America, a regional security perimeter. The disparate ideas came together 
under the SPP whereby a security layer would be added to the economics of NAFTA. 
In addition, and less publicly, the U.S. began building on increases in military-to-
military interaction post-NAFTA in trying to find ways to open up Mexican security 
forces to further U.S. influence, with the aim being to export the same security 
concepts to Mexico’s security forces. Whilst the basis for increased security 
involvement had already been set by the integrative processes leading up to and 
springing from NAFTA, the impact of 9/11 made it a matter of urgency. As Mexico’s 
drug-related security crisis worsened over the contemporary period, it too began to 
animate policymakers in the direction of regionalised security in North America, due 
to its increasing threat to Mexican stability and therefore North America’s political 
economy. This chapter briefly explores these processes, filling out some of the work 
already undertaken in the theory chapter with empirical detail.  
 
Again, the evidence presented here is both facilitated by the historical materialist 
framework employed and the understandings of U.S. interests and hegemony that 
have been fleshed out previously, and builds further evidential support for their 
pertinence in this case. This chapter begins to affirm that the U.S. is above all 
motivated by a concern for the political economic stability of Mexico both singularly 
and as a crucial component of the North American economy. It also speaks to how 
political economic developments within economic integration display a dark side, 
through interdependencies that are vulnerable to transnational threats piggybacking on 
economic regionalisation. I develop the case that the U.S. solution to this centres 
around building a stronger security relationship with Mexico where Mexican security 
institutions are encouraged to take robust actions to ensure Mexican stability, the 
protection of U.S HS, and regional security for ‘NAFTA-land’. It is crucial to 
emphasise these points within the historical materialist framework, because such a 
conception shows how the MI and NAFTA-land Security are in an important sense 
‘working’, something that is not captured in much of the extant literature. Meanwhile, 
this chapter begins to provide more direct evidence that drug-related violence is a 
strategic concern, something I build on in Chapter Six. Finally, the complexities of 
regional relations under U.S. hegemony are once more emphasised. The U.S. has 
actively sought to cajole Mexico to participate in NAFTA-land Security, but the lines 
between power and partnership here are distinctly blurry. The U.S. has allowed space 
for Mexico itself to push forward the liberalising economic agenda, but of course 
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Mexican policymakers do this within regional economic realities that are underpinned 
by U.S. hegemony. Mexico has to effectively respond to U.S. security priorities. 
Indeed there is insight here into how the U.S. actively strategises about pulling 
Mexico further into integrative processes in economics and security. Again a complex 
‘back and forth’ develops between the NAFTA countries, but U.S. interests are the 
most powerful driving force behind developments. 
 
Chapter Structure & Aims 
Having already established the depth of U.S. interests in Mexico, and set out the 
theoretical underpinning of why the U.S. has sought to regionalise security within and 
around NAFTA in response to threats to economic openness, this chapter’s initial aim 
is to provide the detail as to how the U.S. has actually gone about this. I thus approach 
this chapter through a broad historiography of processes and events around the 
creation of some key policy responses that have sough to ‘secure openness’ through 
regional security thinking within and around North America in the wake of 9/11, 
namely the ‘Smart Border’ effort, the SPP, and 21st Century Border Management. 
Most important here is the SPP; in many ways it encompasses the other two. I also 
look at the role of NORTHCOM in regional security and involvement in and with 
Mexico. This leads us into a discussion of how Mexico’s security crisis has both 
stimulated action in direct response to it, and allowed access on the part of the U.S. to 
Mexican security institutions with those wider regional goals in mind. All of these 
policies are part of the creation of a nascent NAFTA-land Security framework for 
North America’s political economy. 
 
I then look at some of the wider context of NAFTA-land Security, linking in some 
more associated policy programmes to the overall logic, and discussing recent reform 
in Mexico and U.S.-Mexican conversation of further economic integration, 
reinforcing the case that economic integration deepens interests and necessitates some 
kind of security backdrop. Thus in a sense the chapter is introductory in terms of 
setting out the crucial context for the MI. It is the necessary starting point to 
understanding Mérida, which I tackle directly in the following chapter, because 
Mérida is fundamentally connected up to the policies I look at here, and the overall 
logic of NAFTA-land Security. In traceable ways Mérida grows out of the SPP, 
taking forward some of the posited policies within the SPP framework that it failed to 
deliver in terms of tangible, policy results. Because of these deep conjunctions 
between what are in fact elements of NAFTA-land Security rather than disparate 
policies, at times I will have to ‘jump forward’ in this chapter to give a little detail MI 
for clarity, although as far as possible I aim to stick to Mérida’s backdrop rather than 
the Initiative itself.  
 
 
9/11 & The Border Paradox 
 
Following 9/11 the U.S. unilaterally imposed the highest-level security checks at its 
borders with Canada and Mexico. The impact was immediate. Trucks and trade were 
backed up on NAFTA’s borders for miles. Produce rotted on the roads. U.S. auto 
companies, reliant on just-in-time processes within North American production lines, 
told the Bush administration that if relief wasn’t forthcoming to get cross-border 
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traffic normalised they would soon go out of business.1 In many ways, the impact on 
the NAFTA economy thus became another of the costs imposed on the U.S. (and even 
more so upon Canada and Mexico) by the terrorist attacks, and this, paradoxically, 
was reinforced by the security response at the border. This revealed a conundrum. The 
U.S. became concerned about its vulnerability to direct attack and the costs that would 
have on its open economy. That economy was rooted in large an open North America. 
Yet, an open North America appeared in itself more threatening in the potential for a 
‘cross-border’ terrorist incident. Whilst the U.S. Ambassador to Canada may have 
bullishly told his hosts that they would have to get used to a new reality where, 
“security trumps trade”,2 the ‘real reality’ was that U.S. policymakers were 
scrambling to find ways to maintain the economic openness the U.S. relied upon 
whilst better protecting it, and the Homeland, from transnational threats. The problem 
was (and to a good degree still is) that securing the U.S. at its contiguous borders is 
inherently paradoxical; the inspection regimes that would be required to ‘fully’ 
protect the U.S. from illicit actors impose prohibitively high costs, and those that 
already exist already slow down licit trade, as well as incur unintended effects in 
honing the skills of illicit border crossers and traffickers.3  
 
We saw in the Literature Review and Chapter 3 that a number of analysts and 
policymakers, often working in tandem or straddling the line between policy and 
academia, were animated by this problem of ‘secure openness’. The U.S. state, again 
incorporating ideas from this wider milieu (the state, after all, is a social relation) was 
working along the same lines. The proposed solutions began to formulate around 
some core general concepts: 
 
1) Risk-based assessment of cross-border traffic that used intelligence and 
leveraged partnerships to screen risk traffic and expedite licit traffic.4 
 
2) Border projection, whereby inspections would be undertaken by partners and 
U.S. officials prior to reaching the U.S. border. 
 
3) Through the above, a layered defence of the U.S. homeland. 
 
These priorities can be seen in core policy documentation following 9/11. The 2002 
National Security Strategy of the United States stated that a new threat came from, 
“shadowy networks of individuals” who, “can bring great chaos and suffering to our 
shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank.” The risk to open economies and 
                                                
1 Edward Alden The Closing of the American Border: Terrorism, Immigration and Security Since 9/11 
(Harper Perennial, 2008) p.43-48 
2 Gloria Galloway ‘U.S. Envoy Chides Canada’ The Globe and Mail (March 25th, 2003) 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/us-envoy-chides-canada/article20448312/ Accessed 
22.07.14 Celluci’s oft-quoted comments should be put in context; he was making clear U.S. 
dissatisfaction that Canada was unwilling to support the War in Iraq, and offering a timely reminder of 
the power realities in North America. It also served as a way to ensure continued cooperation by 
Canada with the U.S. reformulation of its security practices on the continent.  
3 See previous chapters and Paul Ashby, ‘Solving the Border Paradox? Border Security, Economic 
Integration, and the MI’ Global Society 28, 4 (2014) I again draw on the arguments herein in the earlier 
parts of this chapter. 
4 On the DHS’ risk management approach see U.S. Department of Homeland Security Risk 
Management Fundamentals: Homeland Security Risk Management Doctrine (Washington D.C., April, 
2011)  
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societies was clear,  “Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn 
the power of modern technologies against us.”5 Further, the Strategy expressed 
succinctly the dilemma for U.S. hegemony that was also at the heart of the ‘border 
paradox’: 
 
Our society must be open to people, ideas, and goods from across  
the globe. The characteristics we most cherish—our freedom, our  
cities, our systems of movement, and modern life—are vulnerable  
to terrorism. This vulnerability will persist long after we bring to  
justice those responsible for the September 11 attacks.6   
 
Broadly speaking the Strategy sets out the response to this threat. Alongside headline 
grabbing claims to the right to pre-emptive defence (soon exercised in Iraq), it also 
states that the U.S. would go about, “defending the United States, the American 
people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat 
before it reaches our borders”.7 Of course on one level this meant the kind of 
expeditionary military action witnessed in Afghanistan (and to a lesser extent Iraq)8 
and support for military campaigns in Pakistan, Somalia, the Philippines and so on. 
However there is another, less high-profile logic to this too. The Strategy reflected 
more granular approaches undertaken at lower levels of the U.S. state that sought to 
strengthen the U.S.’ defences by building partner capacities and projecting the U.S. 
border outwards. For example, cargo and passenger screening would begin away from 
the contiguous border. The aim was to minimise risk whilst maintaining the U.S. 
openness’ to global flows of people, goods and finance. The Strategy also set out the 
attendant benefits to this approach, stating the U.S.’, “emergency management 
systems will be better able to cope not just with terrorism but with all hazards. […] 
Our border controls will not just stop terrorists, but improve the efficient movement of 
legitimate traffic.”9 As Alden reports, this was the logic the Bush administration was 
largely following under, “border of the future” principles, whereby the “big idea was 
to use intelligence and information systems in a sophisticated manner to push the U.S. 
border outward. The goal was to build a layered defense” of the Homeland.10 
 
This aim is clearly reflected in lower level policy documentation, and actual policy, 
too. By 2007 the Homeland Security Strategy of the Homeland Security Council  
                                                
5 U.S. White House The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002 (Washington 
D.C., September, 2002)  
6 ibid p.31 
7 ibid p.6 My emphasis 
8 I am one of those of the opinion that the Iraq War was classically geostrategic and meant to shape the 
international environment to U.S. interests, rather than being part of a response to a direct ‘terrorist 
threat’. In some ways the whole GWOT fits into this definition, but the terrorist threat in Afghanistan 
was patently more real than it that emanating from Iraq. See David Harvey The New Imperialism 
(Oxford University Press, 2003) p.213-221; Greg Muttitt Fuel on the Fire: Oil and Politics in 
Occupied Iraq (The Bodley Head, 2011); Doug Stokes ‘The War Gamble: Understanding US Interests 
in Iraq’ Globalizations 6,1 (March, 2009); Slavoj Zizek Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle (Verso, 2004) 
9 ibid p.6-7 My emphasis  
10 Alden Closing of the American Border p.138 My emphasis As Alden reports, this was not a 
uniformly supported strategy within the administration, and it came in for criticism. However I 
consider the main thrust of U.S. policy through this period and into the contemporary era to rely on 
these methods to secure openness.  
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(HSC)11 was reflective of these border projection concepts in action. It also showed 
how the U.S. was conceptualising various threats to its security and the security of 
open markets, not just terrorism. In his introduction to the Strategy President Bush 
asserted: 
 
Many of the threats we face – pandemic diseases, the proliferation  
of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and natural disasters –  
also demand multinational effort and cooperation. To this end, we  
have strengthened our homeland security through foreign  
partnerships, and we are committed to expanding and increasing  
our layers of defense, which extend well beyond our borders, by  
seeking further cooperation with our international partners.12 
 
This Strategy was reflected in several ways in actual policy, with a number of 
initiatives were undertaken within this broader framework. The Container Security 
Initiative (CSI) placed Customs and Border Protection (CPB) officials in foreign ports 
to screen cargo,13 whilst the Megaports Initiative (run out of the Department of 
Energy -DoE) sought to collaborate with foreign nations to ensure the security of 
ports to the trafficking of nuclear and radiological material.14 Older programs, such as 
the Export Control and Related Border Security Program (EXBS) that provides 
assistance on export control mechanisms to other states through the DoS, were 
expanded and connected up with these newer efforts.15 In addition new foreign 
assistance and “partner capacity building” programs specifically tailored to combating 
terrorism and improving HS capabilities in other countries (and thereby projecting 
U.S. defences) were introduced. The Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program 
(CTFP - under Section 2249c, Title 10 of the U.S. Code) was legislated in 2002 and 
allows the DoD to provide “tailored operational and strategic-level education and 
training to our international partners in support of U.S. efforts to combat terrorism”,16 
whilst Section 1206 Train and Equip Authority, legislated in 2006, allows the DoD to 
build partner capacity in military preparedness for CT and stability operations, 
including maritime CT.17 Whilst we should be very mindful that these programmes 
can also support more established U.S. goals in foreign assistance to stabilise and 
secure ‘friendly’ countries and regimes in order to protect political economies 
favourable to investment and extraction and regional and international order, and 
therefore are connected to more established tropes in U.S. foreign policy in using 
                                                
11 An executive office created as part of the largest bureaucratic shakeup in recent U.S. history in the 
wake of 9/11. The Bush administration also of course created the DHS and NORTHCOM (see below) 
in its bureaucratic overhaul after 9/11. 
12 U.S. Homeland Security Council National Strategy for Homeland Security 2007 (October, 2007) My 
emphasis 
13 ibid p.18; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection Container 
Security Initiative in Summary (May, 2011) 
14 HSC National Strategy for Homeland Security p.18; U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear 
Security Administration, Office of the Second Line of Defense Megaports Initiative (Washington D.C, 
2010)  
15 U.S. Department of State: The EXBS Program http://www.state.gov/t/isn/ecc/c27911.htm Accessed 
29.05.13 We will see this in action in Chapter Six. 
16 U.S. Department of Defense Section 1209 and Section 1203(b) Report to Congress on Foreign 
Assistance Related Programs for Fiscal Year 2012 (Washington D.C. 2013) p.5 
17 ibid p.4 
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foreign assistance in the interests of continued U.S. hegemony,18 there is nonetheless 
a new ‘layered defense’ logic within them too. 
 
Security Projection in North America 
In North America policy analysts were calling for an exceptional and specific 
framework, still fundamentally based on the layered defence principles, but one that 
would also recognise the North American economy as unique in its levels of 
integration, trade, and cross-border production, as well as its concomitant importance 
to the U.S. (and Mexico and Canada). Given this integration and importance, many 
suggested seeing North America holistically, and therefore defending it as such, by 
effectively projecting U.S. security outwards to NAFTA’s border, creating a security 
perimeter that would envelop and protect the North American marketplace and 
peoples from external threats, and allow the NAFTA countries to better cooperate and 
coordinate on security issues arising within NAFTA.19 This project shows empirically 
that this is exactly the approach the U.S. has undertaken, albeit with less focus on 
trilateralism and more on U.S. control of regional security than some of these 
observers have advocated. This has been done through a series of interlocking 
policies, directives and initiatives, all designed with the overarching logic of securing 
the NAFTA economy (and its openness) from external and internal threats under 
what I have termed NAFTA-land Security. These policies start with the Smart Border 
accords with Canada and Mexico in 2002 and 2004, are most definitively 
conceptualised under the SPP, and, crucially, are taken up in policy terms by the MI 
and associated programmes. Thus, and this is key, the CN element of the MI is 
contained within that same wider regional security logic. It conjoins with the aim to 
better defend the U.S. homeland through ‘layered defense’ and security projection. 
 
Early Responses: Smart Borders 
The first expressions of this effort in North America came through the respective 
bilateral ‘Smart Border’ agreements - between Canada and the U.S. originally, and 
then Mexico and the U.S. The agreements were essentially the same in tone and 
content, but of course the challenges on the U.S.-Mexico border were stronger and 
more resistant to change, incorporating issues of drug trafficking on a much higher 
scale than Canada, economic migration (seen by a vocal section of the U.S. 
population as illegal migration and increasingly pulled into a ‘terrorist threat’ 
narrative) and the fact Mexico was seen as a less reliable security partner. U.S. 
Ambassador Celluci stated that Canadian business groups considered that, “Canada 
and the United States already share a security perimeter to some degree; it is just a 
                                                
18 In this sense, terrorism is a usefully elastic word. For example, what was previously considered as 
COIN can become CT, making funding much more palatable and justifiable for U.S. Congress and 
civilian populations. As we will see, it can also be conflated with CN. 
19 For example, Stephen E. Flynn ‘The False Conundrum: Continental Integration versus Homeland 
Security’ in Peter Andreas and Thomas J. Biersteker The Rebordering of North America: Integration 
and Exclusion in a New Security Context (Routledge, 2003); Council on Foreign Relations Independent 
Task Force on the Future of North America ‘Creating a North American Community: Chairmen’s 
Statement’ Council on Foreign Relations (March, 2005); Council on Foreign Relations Independent 
Task Force on the Future of North America ‘Building a North American Community’ Council on 
Foreign Relations (May, 2005); Gary Claude Hufbauer, and Gustavo Vega-Cánovas, ‘Whither 
NAFTA: A Common Frontier?’ in Andreas and Biersteker Rebordering of North America p.128-153 
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question of how strong we want to make it”.20 However, focusing on that tone and 
content of the Mexican side of the agreement shows clearly that the U.S. was aiming 
to create a secure U.S.-Mexican border - open to licit trade, closed to illicit activity. 
Thus, the officially titled ‘U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership Agreement’ would be a 
22-point plan designed “to build a smart border for the 21st century - one that better 
secures our borders while also speeding the free flow of people and commerce.”21 The 
announcement of the Agreement went on to state that cooperative approaches to 
border management were key to the, “continued integration of the North American 
economic region”.22 The overall ideas were similar to the more global strategy, 
utilising technology to develop trusted programs for cargo, shipping, travelers and so 
on, based on risk assessment and border depth. 
 
Nonetheless, there continued to be some more searching questions from the 
perspective of the U.S. towards Mexican security within NAFTA and in the ‘new’ 
security environment. Cables show concern about aviation security, improvised 
explosive device detection,23 maritime security,24 the impact Mexico’s increasing 
levels of drug violence was having upon investment,25 and even Mexico’s plans to 
buy Russian fighter jets, an unfavourable scenario for the U.S. that would, 
“complicate North American security cooperation” (not to mention establish deep ties 
between Russia and Mexico).26 Negotiations on increased U.S.-Mexican military 
cooperation, including in maritime and aviation security cooperation were clearly 
ongoing from 2003.27 The U.S. became increasingly interested in more holistic, 
continental views of security in North America and an especial security focus on 
Mexico. This interest spurred the search for more profound answers to North 
America’s security questions. The Smart Border approach became a component of 
something much wider - the SPP. 
 
                                                
20 U.S. Embassy Canada Placing a New North American Initiative in its Economic Policy Context 
Cable Reference 000268 (28th January, 2005) Link: 
https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=05OTTAWA268&q=canada%20perimeter%20secu
rity Accessed 13.03.14   
21 U.S. White House President George W. Bush Archive ‘Border Security: U.S.-Mexico Border 
Partnership Agreement’ (Washington D.C.) http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/usmxborder/ Accessed 20.07.14 
22 ibid 
23 U.S. Embassy Mexico Aviation Cooperation Continues, ICAO Demarche Delivered Cable Reference 
000787 (13th February, 2006) 
https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=06MEXICO787&q=mexico%20security Accessed 
21.07.14 
24 U.S. Embassy Canada Canada: Mission Perspective on SPP Security Goals Cable Reference 001384 
(6th May, 2005) Link: 
https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=05OTTAWA1384&q=maritime%20mexico%20sec
urity Accessed 22.07.14 
25 U.S. Embassy Mexico Effect of Violence on Mexican Investment Cable Reference: 001536 (22nd 
March, 2006) Link: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06MEXICO1536&q=investment%20mexico%20security 
Accessed 04.10.12 
26 U.S. Embassy Mexico GOM Backing Off Purchase of Russian Fighter Aircraft Cable Reference 
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The Security and Prosperity Partnership 
 
Even as the above discussion was taking place, a new trilateral initiative was 
emerging behind the scenes that sought to maintain NAFTA’s integrated economic 
openness and secure it from real, potential and perceived threats. The SPP aimed to 
formulate concrete, trilateral initiatives and policy solutions to deepen NAFTA’s 
economic connections still further, whilst also (and more importantly for the U.S.’ 
immediate interests) protect those economic connections from threats. Terrorism, 
broadly defined, was at the forefront of U.S. policymaker’s minds in this endeavour, 
but the SPP took in other transnational issues to include drug smuggling, wider illicit 
trafficking, pandemics, natural disasters, and so on. Recalling the points made in 
Chapter Three and above, the SPP ambitiously aimed to answer Bush’s call to ‘secure 
U.S. borders without shutting down the U.S. economy’ in the North American 
context. It did so through the exploration of trilateral security solutions and 
arrangements that conceptualised NAFTA as a shared security and economic space. 
Its basic premise was that trilateral ‘cooperation’ on mutual security issues (which 
would have to involve serious Canadian and Mexican flexibility to U.S. demands) 
would better secure the NAFTA economy from all security threats and their 
deleterious economic impacts. However it essentially contained two complementary 
logics - the NAFTA economic space would be both better protected and better able to 
withstand security problems with less economic fallout, and the U.S. homeland itself 
would also be better secured.   
 
Interestingly the progenitor for the SPP appears to have come from Canada. The 
Canadian Council of Chief Executives outlined a ‘North American Security and 
Prosperity’ (NASP) plan as early as February, 2003. U.S. Ambassador to Canada Paul 
Celluci noted the plan envisioned, “making the U.S.-Canada border a ‘zone of 
cooperation’, not a line of defense; moving enforcement activities away from the 
border itself; and making the border ‘an effective, shared checkpoint within an 
integrated economic space.’” It also sought regulatory reform, mutual resource 
security, “twenty-first century institutions” that could better tackle NAFTA’s 
“continental issues”, and, crucially, Canada addressing the U.S. post-9/11 focus on 
HS through internal defence programs, cooperation in the GWOT, and “moving to a 
new phase of cooperation with the United States on continental security”.28 Within 
this cable, we can see that this represents a response from the influential Canadian 
business community to ‘new realities’ and U.S. preferences. Celluci reported that the 
NASP’s, “inclusion of a major security/defense component” is the strength of the 
NASP plan as it “acknowledges the importance of this element” to the U.S. 
government.29 The cable in question is positive about the Canadian proposals, no 
doubt as it fitted the Bush administration’s agenda in continued economic openness 
between the U.S. and Canada, U.S. border security, and security for that openness.  
 
Clarkson reports that these priorities formed the basis of a meeting in March 2003 at 
the White House. Truly trilateral in that it involved officials from the Fox and 
                                                
28 U.S. Embassy Ottawa Canadian CEOs Push ‘North American Security and Prosperity Initiative’ in 
WashDC on April 7 Cable Reference 000443(14th February, 2003) Link: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/search.php?q=mexico+prosperity+security&qto=20030228 Accessed 
22.06.14 My emphasis. 
29 U.S. Embassy Ottawa Canadian CEO’s 
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Chrétien administrations, Clarkson contends the meeting effectively saw Bush accept 
that hardened U.S. borders could no longer, “jeapordize the transboundary flow of 
goods and people that were crucial to the three economies and therefore crucial to 
their hopes for future global competitiveness.”30 Increasingly the ideas within the 
NASP plan began to be taken up as viable options to help protect North America, and 
overcome the border paradox. In January 2005 Celluci reported the benefits of a 
North American security undertaking could potentially be profound:  
 
Security and law enforcement within North America have  
evolved rapidly since 9/11, leading to many less-than-perfect  
processes for handling legitimate international traffic.  
Collaboration to improve these processes could yield efficiency  
improvements which would automatically be spread widely  
across the economy, leading to general gains in trade, productivity,  
and incomes.31   
 
The SPP was formally announced in March 2005.  Upon announcement, the leaders 
echoed some of the language within wider U.S. efforts to expedite licit commerce and 
travel whilst screening for illicit elements, whilst adding a regional logic: 
 
We are launching the next generation of our common security  
strategy to further secure North America and ensure the  
streamlined movement of legitimate travelers and cargo across our  
shared borders. To this end, Canada, the United States, and Mexico  
will work together to ensure the highest continent-wide security 
standards and streamlined risk-based border processes are achieved”32 
 
Immediately ‘Working Groups’ were tasked with the task of setting policies and 
achieving trilateral goals in two broad and interlinked areas, prosperity and security. 
On the prosperity arm groups worked on further streamlining practises and 
homogenising regulatory standards to increase trade and interconnectedness. On the 
security arm there were three points of focus within a guiding aim of developing “a 
common security strategy.” These were a) “Securing North America from external 
threats”, b) “Preventing and responding to threats within North America” and c) 
“Streamlining the secure and efficient movement of legitimate and low-risk traffic 
across our shared borders.”33 The latter element had of course already begun under 
Smart Border agreements, and the SPP was intended to complement rather than 
replace those.34 However the other two aims were deceptively expansive and quite 
distinct from wider ‘new border’ ideas. These official releases on the part of the U.S. 
government did not quite capture the full import of the SPP on this score. 
 
                                                
30 Stephen Clarkson Does North America Exist? Governing the Continent after 9/11 and NAFTA  
(University of Toronto Press, 2008) p.436 
31 U.S. Embassy Mexico Economic Policy Context   
32 U.S. Department of State Archive ‘Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America Security 
Agenda’ (Crawford, Texas, March 23rd, 2005) http://2001-
2009.state.gov/p/wha/rls/prsrl/2005/69849.htm Accessed 16.04.12 
33 U.S. Department of State Archive ‘Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America: Fact 
Sheet’ (Washington D.C., March 2005) http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2005/69843.htm 
Accessed 16.04.12 
34 ibid 
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Instead, a lecture provided by former Assistant Secretary for WHA Shannon sums up 
the logic of the SPP better than any general overview could. Discussing the North 
American Forum (an offspring of the SPP) he stated it was a dialogue between 
government and civil society that explored how the NAFTA countries could, “begin 
to create a vision for North America and an understanding of what North America is 
as an entity and then how governments could be working better together to fashion 
more productive cooperation and address the kinds of problems we saw in the 
immediate aftermath of September 11.”35 The aim was to bring together the NAFTA 
countries in a specific manner, “integrating them economically but then providing a 
security overlay”.36 The rationale provided by Shannon is worth quoting at length, as 
it highlights exactly the variegated threats the SPP saw itself meeting: 
 
What the leaders again instructed their foreign ministers to do  
was to take another look at the security agenda and to adjust it to a  
reality in which the real threats to states were not other states in a  
hemisphere that had committed itself to democracy but instead the  
threats were terrorism, drug trafficking, natural disasters,  
environmental disasters and pandemics and in so doing created an  
opening for state dialogue about security which was new and unique  
and fresh. It actually took a lot of that dialogue out of defence  
ministries and put it in law enforcement agencies and intelligence  
agencies, in crisis and emergency response agencies, and also in  
health agencies, especially those that dealt with pandemics. This  
was, I think, an important step forward in again building kind of  
the connective tissue within the hemisphere that allows a  
conversation and a level of cooperation that really had never  
existed before.”37 
 
Thus, to quote (and repeat) the revelatory Shannon again, the goal was “armoring 
NAFTA” against variegated security threats,38 and by armoring it the U.S. and its 
partners sought to ensure its secured openness. As Shannon also stated at another 
event, those constructing the SPP agenda were mindful, “that as we look for ways to 
improve security we don't want it necessarily to unduly constrain or inhibit what has 
always been a commercial relationship and a relationship among peoples that has 
been very fluid.”39 In addition to the more global efforts to project borders outwards 
and screen for risks through a layered defense, in North America U.S. policymakers 
envisioned a unique regional configuration of these global principles that would 
create a holistic spatial security arrangement around the NAFTA zone. This would, in 
theory, protect the North American political economy from threats and potential 
threats emanating both from within and from without.40 Although direct references to 
                                                
35 U.S. Department of State Archive Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas A. 
Shannon Why the Americas Matter Speech at 4th Annual Killam Public Lecture (Ottawa, Canada 
September 14th, 2006) http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2006/72860.htm Accessed 08.07.14 
36 ibid My emphasis 
37 ibid My emphasis 
38 Shannon quoted in Laura Carlsen ‘Armoring NAFTA: Battleground for Mexico’s Future’, NACLA 
Report on the Americas 41,5 (September, October, 2008) p. 17 
39 U.S. Department of State Archive Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas 
Shannon Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington D.C. January 23rd, 
2007) 
40 Isidro Morales Post-NAFTA North America: Reshaping the Economic and Political Governance of a 
Changing Region (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) p.153 
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a ‘NAFTA security perimeter’ were not made officially in terms of planned releases,41 
this rationale was thus implicitly clear in wider official explanations of the SPP. What 
the SPP effectively represented, then, was a framework for a NAFTA-land Security 
model.  
 
This rationale is clearer still when we consider what the SPP was aimed to do. 
Although no great detail ever emerged on concrete trilateral policy initiatives, some 
generalised snapshots of plans are available. In the 2005 Report to Leaders a number 
of security elements were focused upon as being important to the successful 
implementation of the SPP. It is worth picking out a few to quote at length, because 
this will help make clear how the MI directly picked up some of these priorities in its 
more concrete policies. Thus within the three broad areas on the Security track ten 
smaller Working Groups were set up on traveller security; cargo security; border 
facilitation; aviation security; maritime security; law enforcement; intelligence 
cooperation; bio-protection; protection, preparedness, and response; and science and 
technology.42 The three countries sought to, “ensure real-time information sharing on 
high-risk individuals and cargo, and thereby better enable our Governments to prevent 
them from entering North America”, and to, “implement import/export control 
programs, consistent with newly established international standards, to minimize the 
risk of illicit movements of radioactive materials that could be used for malicious 
purposes such as ‘dirty bombs’.” They also sought to protect shared critical 
infrastructure and, “develop and implement a comprehensive North American 
approach to strengthening maritime and aviation security”.43 In short, they sought to 
begin to establish NAFTA-land Security.  
 
As the 2006 Report makes clear, progress on these issues was not uniformly 
successful, and was often in areas perhaps considered (in contrast to this project’s 
focus at least) as ‘policy minutiae’.44 However, when it comes to the overall rationale 
of regionalised security within and around North America I consider this level of 
detail to again miss something of the ‘bigger picture’. Many of those aims expressed 
in SPP reports required at once a more ambitious and more basic holistic effort to 
improve, guide and coordinate Mexico’s security institutions towards what were U.S. 
security priorities. We should see the SPP’s aims for the holistic approach that they 
are. For example, on aviation security, whilst passenger information is important, it 
does not say much about how effectively Mexico’s reconnaissance and tracking 
systems meet U.S. concerns, or match up with those of the North American 
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). It does not consider whether Mexico has 
the necessary capabilities to protect critical oil infrastructure, or the skills to track and 
board suspect ships. How Mexico would screen for radioactive and other illicit 
                                                
41 Searches in WikiLeaks also did not send back results on ‘security perimeter’ and ‘NAFTA’ or 
‘Mexico’ in this sense, aside from a few references to Canada. 
42 M. Angeles Villarreal and Jennifer E. Lake Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America: 
An Overview and Selected Issues (Congressional Research Service, May 2009)  
43 Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America: Report to Leaders 2005 (June 2005) 
Accessed via the Government of Canada’s SPP Archive here http://www.spp-psp.gc.ca/eic/site/spp-
psp.nsf/vwapj/Report-Rappport-Ju2005.pdf/$file/Report-Rappport-Ju2005.pdf p.29-36 
44 Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America: Report to Leaders 2006: Security Priorities 
(August, 2006) Accessed via the Government of Canada’s SPP Archive here http://www.spp-
psp.gc.ca/eic/site/spp-psp.nsf/vwapj/security-2006-Aug-10.pdf/$file/security-2006-Aug-10.pdf  
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material is not considered. These wider issues speak directly to the SPP’s priorities 
when we look at them from a more ‘macro’ perspective. 
 
It is here where I begin to see connections to the MI emerge. Indeed it is my core 
argument that Mérida provided the concrete policy undergirding to these priorities, 
by helping Mexico to build its capacities in these very areas, and (alongside the SPP 
discussions) providing the space for this to occur. Additionally, as the SPP quietly 
collapsed, Mérida took up its tasks. The SPP’s existence at an executive level meant it 
faced a good deal of (often conspiratorial) criticism from the political right in the U.S  
that its real aim was to create a ‘North American Union’ along the lines of the 
European Union above the heads of the American people, .45 Mérida, as I go onto 
argue in Chapter Six, took up the baton of the SPP’s goals, even as it was sold as a 
policy effort to fight drugs trafficking. However, in an overall sense, the SPP is in fact 
better understood as an expression of the wider goal to create NAFTA-land Security 
in response to pressing U.S. interests to protect the highly-integrated North American 
political economy. It is these pressing interests that better allow us to understand the 
connection between the SPP and Mérida. They are both aimed at the same goal; 
NAFTA-land Security. They are both in fact components of the moves in that 
direction. The Smart Border agreements should also be included in this expansive 
rubric. 
 
The SPP & Mérida  
Of course for a short time the SPP and the MI co-existed. Bush administration 
officials continued to refer to the SPP after the announcement of the MI, not least at 
the trilateral Leader’s Summit that still took place under this moniker. However their 
pronouncements in this period were in fact amongst the clearest on the priorities of 
the SPP, underscoring its focus on treating the NAFTA zone as a homogenous 
economic entity in need of a coherent security framework, ideally through a mutual 
trilateral approach, and certainly by treating NAFTA as a common economic and 
security area. In a 2008 Chamber of Commerce event Shannon again summarised the 
continuing rationale for the SPP and the connection between economic integration, 
success and security: 
 
… in order to have prosperity we have to have good  
security. This means recognizing that we cannot protect  
our borders at the frontier. What we can do at a frontier  
is regulate the movement of people, regulate the  
movement of goods and services, or facilitate them. But  
ultimately good security requires cooperative relationships  
among the countries of North America to identify external  
threats and to intercept them well before they get to our  
borders and in many instances well before they get to  
                                                
45 Jerome R. Corsi Late Great USA: NAFTA, the North American Union, and the Threat of a Coming 
Merger with Mexico and Canada (Simon and Schuster, 2009); CBC News ‘Security and Prosperity 
Partnership: SPP FAQ’s’ CBC News In Depth http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/spp/ Accessed 
02.09.12 Robert A. Pastor The North American Idea: A Vision of a Continental Future (Oxford 
University Press, 2011) p.11, 136-137 Interestingly the conspiracists, although somewhat wide of the 
mark, were not completely without merit. Cellucci reported that the nascent SPP could “facilitate future 
steps toward trilateral economic integration, such as a common external tariff or a customs union, if 
and when our three countries chose to pursue them.” U.S. Embassy Canada Economic Policy Context  
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North America.46  
 
As we will see in Chapter Six, much of this rationale informs the real policy in the MI 
and wider assistance provided to Mexico. At the same event the Assistant Secretary 
for the Private Sector Office at the DHS, Alfonso Martinez-Fonts, discussed the 
security / free trade economy dilemma and the need to screen undesirable cross-
border traffic - guns, drugs, hazardous materials, human trafficking - and expedite 
legitimate trade further.47 We will see that Mérida provides real policy that plugs into 
this logic, alongside associated programmes within the NAFTA-land Security 
framework. Also pushing the move in this direction were the DoD. 
 
 
The Role of NORTHCOM 
 
Alongside a ‘civilian’ bureaucratic overhaul, Bush’s post 9/11 reforms also created a 
new military entity and combatant command - USNORTHCOM. Stood up on October 
1st, 2002, NORTHCOM describes its mission, “to provide command and control of 
Department of Defense […] homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense 
support of civil authorities. USNORTHCOM defends America's homeland — 
protecting our people, national power, and freedom of action.”48 With an ‘Area of 
Responsibility’ (AOR) that covers the U.S., Canada, Mexico, and parts of the 
Caribbean and surrounding waters, this includes overseeing “Theater Security 
Cooperation” between the U.S, Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas to ensure HS and 
protect U.S. regional interests.49 Thus, self evidently, NORTHCOM defines U.S. HS 
within a regional context. Its subsequently has played a key role within the creation of 
NAFTA-land Security. NORTHCOM has actively set about to pull Mexico into a 
continental security framework.  
 
NORTHCOM and NAFTA-land Security 
In 2006 John A. Cope, an experienced veteran of official U.S. military interaction in 
the Western Hemisphere with U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM / 
SOUTHCOM) and the WHA, wrote a piece for the National Defense University’s 
(NDU) publication Joint Forces Quarterly that very succinctly encapsulates some of 
the driving logics that underpin the emerging NAFTA-land Security arrangement. 
Recalling that the DoD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support 
underlined those principles for a layered defence of the U.S. homeland that I have 
already discussed,50 Cope states that a strong, integrated partnership with those 
layered principles at its core already existed with Canada, bolstering U.S. defences. 
However, he warned that the U.S.’ ‘southern approaches’ were more vulnerable, and 
this was due in large part to weaker relationship with a reluctant Mexico. Cope stated 
                                                
46 U.S. Department of State Archive ‘Discussion on the Security and Prosperity Partnership at the 
Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America and Council of the Americas’ 
(Washington D.C., April 18th, 2008) Link: http://2001-
2009.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2008/q2/103879.htm Accessed 22.06.14 My emphasis 
47 ibid 
48 U.S. Northern Command: About USNORTHCOM http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html 
Accessed 15.09.12  
49 ibid 
50 U.S. Department of Defense Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (Washington D.C., 
2005) 
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that Mexico, “must somehow play a role” in regional defence, and he suggested that 
to encourage it do so the U.S. should work on how to generate and integrate, “threat 
perceptions”.51 His suggestions are especially pertinent and somewhat prescient for 
what was already the evolving U.S. approach, and therefore worth quoting at length. 
Cope states, “Since 9/11, Washington has tried to achieve a common threat picture in 
the region based on international terrorism.” However Mexico (and Central American 
countries) were more concerned about criminality and the cartels operating in their 
territories. Cope therefore offers: 
 
This impasse can be overcome by accepting and acting on the  
correlation between the two threat perceptions. Proceeds from  
transnational crime are known to support terrorist organizations,  
and their members exploit the lines of flow used by traffickers.  
If countries in the zone improve public safety and the capacity to  
control, diminish, and, ideally, end the scourge of trafficking and  
smuggling networks, U.S. vulnerability to terrorists eager to take  
advantage of ungoverned space and local instability decreases.  
This avenue to the United States becomes unreliable and hard to  
use. Protecting the southern approach against terrorists is  
predicated on greater attention to the fight against drug  
trafficking and other forms of transnational crime.52 
 
Cope essentially suggested using the security issues Mexico and the Central American 
nations were most worried about as leverage in getting them to perform better on the 
issues the U.S. was most concerned about. He also suggested a manner by which 
Mexico would be encouraged to lead in a regional Caribbean Basin Security 
Partnership that would monitor and defend regional maritime and aviation security, 
and thereby contribute to the U.S. layered defence.53 
 
However this was not quite how the U.S. and NORTHCOM would engage Mexico. 
Cope’s argument does capture some of the essence of the goals underpinning 
NORTHCOM’s role in NAFTA-land Security in terms of layering U.S. homeland 
defence through the incorporation of Mexico into a regional security configuration, 
and allowing Mexico sovereign space to do so in part on its own terms. In addition 
drugs would become the main aperture through which the U.S. was able to achieve far 
greater Mexican security cooperation on a variety of security issues. What Cope 
missed was the uniquely North American element to the emerging U.S. strategy, 
which is based in the deep, integrative ties of NAFTA. Policy pieces by 
NORTHCOM staff themselves better capture this NAFTA based security logic. In 
2007, Biff Baker (a strategist who has advised NORTHCOM) summarised U.S. 
regional security thinking clearly and succinctly, and is again worth quoting at length. 
I will avoid emphasis because the whole paragraph is crucial: 
 
Our unique economic relationship has evolved over the past decade,  
                                                
51 John A. Cope ‘A Prescription for Protecting the Southern Approach’ Joint Forces Quarterly 42, 3 
(2006) p.17-19 
52 ibid p.19 
53 ibid p.20 Interestingly, and as I discuss briefly in the next chapter, the early MI was more regional in 
scope, and the U.S. has also sought to bolster Central American regional security in tandem with its 
efforts in Mexico (and Cope was not all that far off some of the terminology used in some of these 
policies - the MI was originally the Mexico and Central America Security Initiative). 
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in part due to an inextricably linked infrastructure, which has shaped  
our current interests in security and defense. […] From a bilateral  
perspective the North American economy and related critical  
infrastructure is a shared center of gravity that must be defended to  
preserve our ways of life. This continental view of defense and  
security issues became increasingly important after Mexico, the  
United States, and Canada implemented NAFTA.54 
 
Baker goes onto relate how the recession that followed 9/11 hurt the Mexican, U.S. 
and North American economy. Border closures also had negative effects, and 
therefore the U.S. must, “plan to ensure this does not happen again.” That meant 
security cooperation across North America.55 Baker and NORTHCOM commander 
James Renuart made similar claims in a piece for another NDU publication. To 
preserve the advantages of free movement of capital, people,56 and goods the 
NORTHCOM personnel stated, “our homeland defense and security initiatives must 
be planned and coordinated continentally.”57 
 
NORTHCOM’s resultant strategy, revealed in official documents, makes NAFTA-
land Security logics clear. In the first instance we see this in the sense of the layered 
defence approach. NORTHCOM operates on its, “Theater Campaign Plan's 
Cooperative Defense Line of Operation (LOO)” that seeks to promote, “a 
strengthened homeland defense through a mutually beneficial North American and 
Caribbean partnership that fosters effective continental defense to counter terrorism, 
WMD, illicit trafficking of funds, drugs and persons, other transnational threats, and 
their consequences.”58 The desired end state is one in which the U.S.’ “allies” are 
involved in mutual defence of their region. However a document released to the 
National Security Archive makes clear that within that, “USNORTHCOM's Top 
Theater Security Cooperation Priority is Mexico”.59 The document repeats the wider 
designation of threats and reveals the broad security logics to its efforts, this time 
applying to Mexico specifically, stating it, “conducts security cooperation with 
Mexico to strengthen the cooperative defense of the continent through mutually 
beneficial partnerships that counter terrorism, WMD, other transnational and 
asymmetric threats and their consequences, while contributing to national security 
objectives.” This is described as “Line of Operation 2”, whilst “Line of Operation 3” 
is dedicated to defeating cartels (termed ‘TCOs’) in order to enhance the “Security 
and Prosperity of North America”. Whether we should read anything into this in 
terms of an ordering of priorities and importance is unclear. What is clear though is 
that a variety of threats are within the U.S. purview, and the U.S. seeks to create a 
                                                
54 Biff Baker ‘The United States and Mexico: Enhanced Military Cooperation’ The DISAM Journal of 
International Security Assistance Management 29, 3 (2007) p.28 
55 ibid 
56 Unless, it should be assumed, you are poor and Mexican. 
57 Victor E. Renuart Jr. & Biff Baker ‘U.S.-Mexico Homeland Defense: A Compatible Interface’ 
Strategic Forum 254 (February, 2010) p.3 My emphasis 
58 DoD Section 1209 / 1203(c) p.22 
59 This document is provided as part of a project of the National Security Archive called Migration 
Declassified. It can be found here Michael Evans ‘NSA Staffed U.S.-Only Intelligence “Fusion Center” 
in Mexico City’ Migration Declassified (November 14th, 2013) 
http://migrationdeclassified.wordpress.com/2013/11/14/nsa-staffed-u-s-only-intelligence-fusion-center-
in-mexico-city/ 02.12.13 
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NAFTA-land Security framework in order to better protect the North American 
political economy from them. 
 
NORTHCOM’ security engagement with Mexico as part of building the latter’s 
capacities to achieve better security across a spectrum of areas is therefore its top 
priority. This is in service of a nascent NAFTA-land Security project. As the next 
chapter goes onto make clear in detail, NORTHCOM’s involvement in Mexico adds a 
vital direct training component to the U.S.’ regional security aims. Moreover, it 
complements the MI, and in turn the MI joins up with NORTHCOM activities. A 
crucial prerequisite to this, however, has been to open up Mexico’s security forces to 
deeper U.S. involvement. WikiLeaks cables reveal that the U.S. government and its 
military were keen to build on security relations, and especially to engage a seemingly 
keen Calderón on these ‘mutual’ North American security issues. U.S. Ambassador to 
Mexico Tony Garza suggested for his government to take the opportunity afforded by 
Calderón’s election on several occasions, suggesting some key actions that could be 
undertaken to help open up Mexico’s military still further to U.S. security priorities.60 
Again, according to the cable doing this would help the U.S. “realign [its] own 
posture vis-a-vis Mexico to give it the stature it merits in our own security strategies, 
but also to build Mexico's acceptance of its strategic role in North America.” 
Subsequently cables discussed with enthusiasm the growing engagement, trust, and 
shared priorities between U.S. and Mexican militaries. Cables from 2006 praise, “the 
years of patient work by DoD and USNORTHCOM” that “have opened the way to 
more meaningful interaction”.61 These cables are interesting from the point of view of 
the development of the SPP and the MI, and their aims and priorities.  
Another cable emphasises that, “We cannot achieve our security goals with regard to 
Mexico without a strong mil-mil relationship with a capable Mexican military.” It 
goes on to lament that progress on improving both the interaction and their 
capabilities, “have reached the point where the scant resources we allocate to 
assistance have become the major limiting factor”.62 In this context, the MI has been 
crucial as a delivery vehicle and integrative dynamo between the militaries. The next 
chapter will show this definitively. The goals of NORTHCOM in this regard though 
clearly go beyond CN. Admiral Timothy J. Keating63 bemoaned the freeze on aid to 
Mexico due to the latter’s signing of the Rome Statute,64 stating that it hindered his 
Command’s efforts to aid Mexico in meeting, “transnational terrorism and narcotics 
threats”.65 This would have a knock-on effect in NORTHCOM’s mission, defined by 
Keating as homeland defense as part of winning the GWOT.66 For NORTHCOM, this 
                                                
60 U.S. Embassy Mexico Scenesetter for Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’ April 17-18 Visit to Mexico 
Cable Reference 001889 (April 10th, 2006) Link: 
https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=06MEXICO1889&q=northcom Accessed 05.04.14 
This included providing a waiver to sanctions against military aid following Mexico’s signing of the 
Treaty of Rome, a crucial prerequisite to Mérida aid 
61 U.S. Embassy Mexico Engaging the New Mexican Administration on Security   
62 ibid 
63 NORTHCOM Commander Nov’ 2004-Mar 2007  
64 Whereby the International Criminal Court was established. The U.S. seeks through sticks and carrots 
to convince nations to sign bilateral agreements to mutually ensure personnel won’t be sent to the ICC. 
65 ‘Statement of Admiral Timothy J. Keating USN Commander United States Northern Command and 
North American Aerospace Defense Command’ Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 109th 
Congress (March 22nd, 2007) 
66 ibid p.1 
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entailed, “Theater Security Cooperation activities [that] contribute to the Secretary of 
Defense’s Security Cooperation Guidance’s top priority to build the capacities of 
allies and partners to help win the GWOT by enhancing coordination with our 
continental neighbors, Canada and Mexico.”67 Again, although CN would 
increasingly gain its own standing as a top NAFTA-land Security issue, first NAFTA-
land Security needed to be constructed. As I show in the next Chapter, CN concerns 
have helped NORTHCOM and the U.S. get over the line in persuading Mexico that 
an integrated security relationship is the path forward. 
 
The Other Threat: Mexico’s Security Crisis  
I discussed in Chapter Three how and why Mexico’s drug violence threatened U.S. 
interests in Mexico’s political economic stability. Of course it is worth recalling that 
this kind of instability in such a strategically crucial partner for the U.S. (and direct 
neighbour) may well have provoked a U.S. response in and of itself, in line with those 
well established tropes in U.S. foreign policy previously discussed. However, whilst 
this logic remains a key animator for policy, the cartel threat has been subsumed 
within the wider goals of NAFTA-land Security. On one level we can see this in the 
threat conflation that is often engaged in by the U.S., where there is a stated fear of, 
“potential collaboration among gangs, criminal networks, and terrorist organizations 
with global reach”.68 Such discourse (which has little evidence to show it is a current 
real concern)69 reflects both a keenness to justify NAFTA-land Security arrangements 
to Congress and the public, but also fear of threat potentials that underlie U.S. 
security policy. On another level, though, the reason to designate cartels as a threat to 
NAFTA-land Security is clear; they destabilise the North American political 
economy. NORTHCOM itself very much defines the cartels as a singular threat to 
Mexican stability, something alluded to above in its documentation, and I will 
demonstrate this further when in investigating the training role it has undertaken with 
Mexican security forces below. This though is still within the wider logics of 
                                                
67 ibid p.18-19 
68 Cole ‘Protecting the Southern Approach’ p.18 I will refer to more of this kind of threat conflation in 
an official sense as we proceed. A critical discourse analysis of the definitional debate around the 
cartels and threat conflations by the U.S. would be an interesting topic for further research. 
69 The posited narco - terrorist nexus is one of those cases where the strange inconsistencies within the 
U.S. state can be seen. Whilst many official reports continue to suggest it as a possibility that should 
animate policy, administration law enforcement officials are always keen to point out that there is little 
current evidence of transnational terrorist activity in Mexico, or a threat that would jump the U.S. 
borders. See Becky Bowers ‘Mitt Romney says Hezbollah in Latin America poses an imminent threat 
to the United States’ Politifact (Tampa Bay Times) http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/statements/2011/nov/23/mitt-romney/mitt-romney-says-hezbollah-latin-america-poses-imm/ 
Accessed 02.09.14; Mark P. Sullivan & June S. Beittel Latin America: Terrorism Issues 
(Congressional Research Service, August 2014) p.11-12 In 2011 the U.S. prosecuted two Iranians for 
an assassination plot on the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., a case the U.S. alleged had links to the 
regime in Tehran. The case is often cited by the political right (including in Congress) in the U.S. as 
evidence of a terrorist-narco relationship that goes as far as joint action. The problem is the agency in 
this plot seems to have all been from the side of the Iranians involved, who tried to contact los Zetas, 
but ended up negotiating with an undercover DEA agent. That los Zetas would’ve carried this out is 
therefore just speculation. See A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the 
Southwest Border Majority Report by the United States House Committee on Homeland Security: 
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations and Management 112th Congress (2012) p.14; Peter Finn 
Notorious Iranian Militant has a Connection to Alleged Assassination Plot Against Saudi Envoy’ The 
Washington Post (October 14th, 2011) http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/notorious-iranian-militant-has-a-connection-to-alleged-assassination-plot-against-saudi-
envoy/2011/10/14/gIQAJ3E6kL_story.html?hpid=z2 Accessed 02.09.14  
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NAFTA-land Security project, because what threatens Mexico’s political economy 
threatens the integrated political economy of NAFTA.  
 
 
The Wider Context of NAFTA-land Security 
 
In this section I provide more context for the NAFTA-land Security project. Firstly, I 
show how the 21st Century Border Management initiative begun under Obama again 
displays the same NAFTA-land Security logic that I have already discussed. Then I 
consider the recent moves to revivify the economic relationship between Mexico and 
the U.S. I show how U.S. interests in Mexico are set to intensify still more as a result 
of the latters liberalising reform agenda. This once again prioritises the need for 
security within Mexico and the North American political economy still further, and 
provides further context for why the NAFTA-land Security project is so important, 
and how the MI pushes it forward. 
 
21st Century Border Management 
The 21st Century Border Management plan, launched officially in May 2010, is 
perhaps most striking in its repetition of much of the long-term goals of the ‘Smart 
Border’ agreement between the U.S. and Mexico in 2002. The plan uses even more 
brevity in expressing the same aims in overcoming the border paradox, citing the, 
“shared interest in creating a border that promotes their economic competitiveness 
and enhances their security through the secure, efficient, rapid, and lawful movement 
of goods and people”.70 It seeks to expand the risk management approaches begun 
under the Bush administration, coordinate and cooperate on identifying threats and 
risks before they meet the border, harmonise work at Points of Entry, and so on.71 21st 
Century Border Management is thus best understood as part of the same wider 
NAFTA-land Security process that has sought to secure the NAFTA political 
economy from potential threats, whilst protecting and expanding integrative openness 
between its members. Indeed the undertakings within this framework are familiar; 
there are elements based around the reduction of violence and coordination of 
enforcement activities, renewed focus on construction of border infrastructure, and 
expansion of risk-based pre-clearance systems.72 Whilst the effort is multi-agency, the 
heavy involvement of the DHS affirms that it comprises ‘securing openness’, and that 
HS increasingly stretches beyond the U.S.’ border. At the U.S.’ borders this means the 
DHS recognises the, “importance of continuing efforts to promote and expedite 
lawful travel and trade that will continue to strengthen our economy” even as it tries 
                                                
70 U.S. White House Office of the Press Secretary Declaration by The Government Of The United 
States Of America and The Government Of The United Mexican States Concerning Twenty-First 
Century Border Management (Washington D.C., May 19th, 2010) http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/declaration-government-united-states-america-and-government-united-mexican-states-c 
Accessed 22.07.14  
71 See ibid; U.S. White House George W. Bush ‘U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership’ For more on policy 
detail, see U.S. Department of Homeland Security ‘21st Century Border: A Comprehensive Response 
and Commitment’ http://www.dhs.gov/21st-century-border-comprehensive-response-commitment 
Accessed 08.08.14; U.S. Department of Homeland Security ‘21st Century Border: The Executive 
Steering Committee’ http://www.dhs.gov/executive-steering-committee Accessed 08.08.14; U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security U.S.-Mexico 21st Century Border Management: Progress Report 
2013 (Washington D.C., 2013)  
72 DHS 21st Century Border Management: Progress Report 2013 
Paul Ashby: NAFTA-Land Security: The MI, Transnational Threats, and U.S. Security Projection in Mexico  
PhD Thesis 
University of Kent 
 
172 
to interdict threats.73 The DHS co-chairs the Executive Steering Committee’s group 
on infrastructure development, which, “coordinates plans for new ports of entry, the 
modernization of existing ports of entry, and upgrades to the infrastructure feeding 
into them at and between ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexico border.”74 Beyond the 
border, and within the 21st Century Border Management Strategy, the DHS chairs and 
co-chairs the ‘Secure Flows’ and ‘Corridor Security’ groups, with the former 
involving DHS, “engagement in relevant capacity building measures with the 
Government of Mexico.”75 
Despite this clear continuity there has been an increase in the stated complementary 
of U.S. goals. One of the four key pillars of the contemporary MI is ‘Building a 21st 
Century Border’. The 2011 INL Budget Guide stated that support for this pillar would 
include: 
Information technology and technical equipment, including  
biometric equipment, and training will allow for rapid data  
collection and monitoring of all travelers entering and leaving  
Mexico. Non-intrusive inspection equipment will allow for  
efficient movement of legitimate trade while stopping illicit  
trafficking of drugs, bulk cash, and guns. Trained canine teams  
will target illegal activity, especially along the border with the  
U.S.76 
 
The 2012 document expresses similar aims,77 whilst in 2013 the Budget Guide 
discusses policy based around this pillar focuses on helping Mexico secure it southern 
border, to permit, “the free flow of licit goods and people while deterring illicit 
flows.”78 When we consider much of this policy in its totality - the SPP, the MI, the 
increasing involvement of the DoD, and the 21st Century Border Management Plan - 
we see the U.S. state’s institutions acting in tandem to achieve the wider goals of 
regionalised security that animate NAFTA-land Security. There is a real 
interconnectedness between programmes, strategies and policies, highlighting that the 
MI is part of something much larger than a mere CN plan. 
Economic Integration Continues: The High-Level Economic Dialogue 
In May 2013 President Obama conducted a visit to Mexico, where it was announced 
that the two countries would conduct a cabinet-level ‘High-Level Economic 
Dialogue’ (HLED) aimed to improve bilateral efforts in, “promoting competitiveness, 
productivity and connectivity, fostering economic growth and innovation, and 
                                                
73 U.S. Department of Homeland Security The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (June, 
2014) p.6-7 
74 DHS ‘Executive Steering Committee’ 
75 ibid The DHS has also operated within Mexico. ‘Operation Armas Cruzadas’ was run out 
ofImmigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and sought to interdict weapons smugglers. Gunmen 
in San Luis Potosi attacked ICE agents Jaime Zapata and Victor Avila, and the former was tragically 
murdered.  
76 U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Fiscal 
Year 2011 Program and Budget Guide (Washington D.C., 2010) p.172 
77 U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Fiscal 
Year 2012 Program and Budget Guide (Washington D.C., 2011) p.164 
78 U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Fiscal 
Year 2013 Program and Budget Guide (Washington D.C., 2013)     
p.221 
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partnering for global leadership.”79 Also announced was a, ‘Bilateral Forum on 
Higher Education, Innovation, and Research’, which is touted as aiming to, 
“encourage broader access to quality post-secondary education for traditionally 
underserved demographic groups, especially in the science, technology, engineering, 
and mathematics (STEM) fields” to help build a “21st Century workforce” for “mutual 
economic prosperity”.80 The two leaders also discussed progress on the 
‘Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement’ concerning deepwater drilling in Gulf of 
Mexico boundary areas previously subject to a moratorium, and mutual projects in 
these areas between U.S. energy companies and PEMEX.81 All of this reflected a 
keenness within the administration of Enrique Peña Nieto, who came into power in 
Mexico in 2012, to shift the national conversation and bilateral relationship away 
from the continuing drug war, and towards developmental issues. 
 
A recent House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing on U.S.-Mexican relations 
reinforced how the U.S. has to an extent supported Peña Nieto’s efforts. Whilst it 
certainly retained content on security issues, there was also a good a deal of 
discussion on these new bilateral economic actions, and interest in Mexican reforms, 
especially in the opening up of the energy market dominated by PEMEX.82 Also 
important in this context are the ongoing negotiations for Trans Pacific Partnership 
(TPP), the expansive trade talks between Asia Pacific and Western Hemisphere 
countries that Mexico entered in June 2012. Indeed, watching U.S.-Mexico relations 
in recent years, one could be forgiven for surmising that ‘economics’ is back at the 
top of the agenda. A background briefing from the DoS prior to Secretary of State 
Kerry’s trip to Mexico in May 2014 underlines this sense: 
 
…the Pena Nieto government, which has been in power for about  
a year and a half, has really wanted to balance the relationship  
moving away from what was an almost entirely security-focused  
relationship under the previous government of President Calderon  
to make sure that we emphasized both the security and the  
economic relationship. And so what you’ve seen over the last 18  
                                                
79 U.S. Embassy Mexico ‘Joint Statement Between the United States and Mexico’ (May 2nd, 2013) 
http://mexico.usembassy.gov/press-releases/joint-statement-between-the-united-states-and-
mexico.html Accessed 15.06.13 
80 U.S. Department of State ‘United States-Mexico Bilateral Forum on Higher Education, Innovation, 
and Research: Fact Sheet’ (May 2nd, 2013) http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/208579.htm 
Accessed 15.06.13 
81 Mexico has sought some kind of progress on this issue since 2008, and the Agreement been laid out 
in principle in 2012 U.S. Embassy Mexico Transboundary Reservoirs - What is Motivating Mexico? 
Cable Reference 00000635 (March 3rd, 2009) Link: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09MEXICO635 Accessed 06.08.13; U.S. Department of 
State ‘U.S. Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement’ (February 20th, 2012) 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/184235.htm Accessed 21.02.12 At this point it was moving 
through the U.S. Congress, before being signed into law in December 2013 See U.S. Embassy Mexico 
‘Joint Statement’ (2013); U.S. Department of the Interior ‘Secretary Jewell Applauds Passage of U.S.-
Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement’ (December 23rd, 2013) 
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/secretary-jewell-applauds-passage-of-us-mexico-
transboundary-hydrocarbons-agreement.cfm Accessed 10.07.14 
 
82 For example, The Future of U.S.-Mexico Relations Hearing Before the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs (Serial 113-167) 113th Congress (May 20th, 2014)  
p.38-39 
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months is a real focus on some of the economic components to  
the relationship: the High-Level Economic Dialogue, which  
kicked off; the focus over the last 18 months extensively on  
education, which you’ll see a lot of today and I’ll talk about that  
in a second; as well as, obviously, the whole slew of economic  
reforms that the Pena Nieto administration has put in place, 
including energy reform.83  
 
However, these economic efforts should not be decoupled from NAFTA-land 
Security, instead they reinforce the logic behind it. Indeed, I contend we would be 
better served seeing the ‘shift’ as a renewed focus on the ‘Prosperity’ arm of the SPP. 
Some quick points can illustrate this. Firstly, many of the specific aims of the HLED 
between the U.S. and Mexico are recognisable longer-term priorities from the SPP 
and further U.S.-Mexico integration, within the context of the North American 
economy. Vice President Joe Biden, whose office is leading the negotiations, released 
a Fact Sheet explainer in September 2013 that made the intentions of the HLED clear. 
It states, “The global competitiveness of both of our countries requires continued and 
deepened economic integration, commercial exchange, and policy alignment.”84 Peña 
Nieto himself has also made similar statements, telling Foreign Affairs that he wanted 
to “create conditions to help North America be more competitive vis-à-vis the world. 
I think that if we are able to attract the attention of the United States, all of North 
America might be a more competitive and productive region.”85 It appears that the 
Obama administration not only responded to Mexico’s request to ‘rebalance’ the 
relationship towards the stimulation economic growth and further integration, but also 
is attempting to seize an opportunity to deepen economic ties, Assistant Secretary of 
State at WHA Roberta S. Jacobson connected the HLED to her administration 
“capitalizing on Peña Nieto’s strong push for economic development”.86 The reform 
effort in Mexico has thus far been very successful in terms of the movement of 
legislation through the Mexican political process,87 with energy sector reform and the 
                                                
83 U.S. Department of State ‘Background Briefing on Secretary Kerry’s Visit to Mexico’ (May 21st, 
2014) http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/05/226400.htm Accessed 11.06.14 
84 U.S. White House Office of the Vice President ‘Fact Sheet: U.S.-Mexico High Level Economic 
Dialogue’ (September 20th, 2013) http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/20/fact-sheet-
us-mexico-high-level-economic-dialogue Accessed 22.12.13 My emphasis 
85 Enrique Peña Nieto ‘Pact for Progress: A Converstation with Enrique Peña Nieto’ Foreign Affairs 
93,1 (Jan / Feb, 2014)  
86 The Future of U.S. Mexican Relations p. 12 My emphasis 
87 Shannon K. O’Neil ‘Viva Las Reformas’ Foreign Affairs 93,1 (Jan / Feb, 2014) p. 11-16; Roderic Ai 
Camp ‘Mexican Political Reforms, Something New, Something Old? The Expert Take’ Woodrow 
Wilson Center Mexico Institute (October 16th, 2013) http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/mexican-
political-reforms-something-new-something-old-the-expert-take 13.08.14 Duncan Wood ‘Peña Nieto’s 
Fiscal Reform and the Consolidation of the Grand Bargain - The Expert Take’Woodrow Wilson Center 
Mexico Institute (September 9th, 2013) http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/peñ-nieto’s-fiscal-reform-
and-the-consolidation-the-grand-bargain-the-expert-take Accessed 14.08.14 Gene Bolton ‘Evaluating 
Political Compromise: A “Pact for Mexico”’ Council on Hemispheric Foreign Affairs (December 19th, 
2012) http://www.coha.org/pact-for-mexico/ Accessed 08.7.13; Montes, Juan ‘ How Mexico Ended 
Political Gridlock’ The Wall Street Journal (August 15th, 2013) 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323664204578607713224531972 Accessed 
12.07.14; Pacto por México Website http://pactopormexico.org/ Accessed 12.08.14  However, as 
O’Neil mentions, Mexican economic growth has lagged behind expectations and government forecasts, 
coming in at only 1.1% in 2013, and being revised down in 2014. Also see Anthony Harrup ‘Bank of 
Mexico Lowers Growth Estimate for 2014’ The Wall Street Journal (August 13th, 2014) 
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opening up of the state oil company PEMEX’s monopoly - secured in December 2013 
with secondary legislation becoming law in August 2014 - the “jewel” in the reform 
crown.88 Other investment friendly and liberalising reforms have been undertaken, 
aiming to open up Mexico’s telecommunications industry89 to more competition, 
achieve the same in Mexico’s banking sector, and reforming Mexico’s tax system to 
increase federal intake and lessen the burden on PEMEX.90 The government has 
pledged to increase infrastructure spending.91 Although this has mostly occurred 
under the Pacto por México agenda, it was kicked off under Calderón’s tenure with 
labour reform that sought to ‘liberalise’ the employment market to favour business 
more strongly.92 The U.S. has responded positively, because effectively Mexico is 
taking a path the U.S. has wanted and encouraged it to take.   
 
NAFTA-land Economy 
As stated above, the HLED and much that surrounds it is justified in terms of 
improving North American competitiveness. Within that, the efforts are still largely 
bilateral, but that does not preclude the fact that U.S. policymakers are not thinking in 
terms of the NAFTA economy as a whole. President Obama captured the logic well 
enough prior to his trip to Mexico in May 2013:  
 
Increasingly, our economic partnership is defined, not just by the  
goods we sell to each other, but by the products we make together.   
Already, some 40 percent of the products that Mexico exports to  
the U.S. are made with parts from the U.S.  And given Mexico’s  
rise as a manufacturing hub of the global economy, the  
possibilities for even greater “co-production” are tremendous.93  
                                                
http://online.wsj.com/articles/bank-of-mexico-lowers-growth-estimate-for-2014-1407954283 Accessed 
14.08.14  
88 David Enriquez ‘Mexico’s Energy Reform: A Game-Changer in the Nation’s History (An Upstream 
Perspective)’ Woodrow Wilson Center Mexico Institute (2014); Diana Villiers Negroponte ‘Mexico’s 
Energy Reforms Become Law’ Brookings Institute (August 14th, 2014) 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2014/08/14-mexico-energy-law-negroponte Accessed 
15.05.14 
89 Infamously monopolised by the world’s richest man, Carlos Slim, in the wake of de-privitisation in 
the 1980s 
90 For a brief overview see Andres Sada ‘Explainer: Mexico’s 2013 Reforms’ Americas Society / 
Council of the Americas (AS/COA) (December, 17th, 2013) http://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-
mexicos-2013-reforms Accessed 19.07.14 On banking reform see Anthony Harrup and Amy Guthrie ‘ 
Mexican President Signs Financial Overhaul Into Law’ The Wall Street Journal  (January 9th, 2014) 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303754404579310852089741302 Accessed 
08.08.14 Tax reform is also part of the PEMEX effort. Secondary legislation and PEMEX is explained 
in Villiers Negroponte ‘Energy Reforms Become Law’ 
91 Anthony Harrup ‘Mexican Government Boosts Infrastructure Investment Plan’ The Wall Street 
Journal (April 28th, 2014) 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304163604579530131171053254 Accessed 
13.08.14 
92 For example see Ron Buchanan ‘Mexico Labour Reform: Watered Down, but Still a Positive’ 
Financial Times (September 29th, 2012) http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/09/29/mexico-labour-
reform-watered-down-but-still-a-positive/ Accessed 17.08.14; Elisabeth Malkin ‘Mexican Lawmakers 
Allow Changes in Labor Law’ The New York Times (November 14th, 2012) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/world/americas/mexican-lawmakers-approve-overhaul-of-labor-
law.html?_r=0 Accessed 17.08.14  
93 Christopher Sabatini ‘AQ Interviews U.S. President Barak Obama About Trip to Mexico and Costa 
Rica’ Americas Quarterly (April 29th, 2013) http://www.americasquarterly.org/aq-interviews-barack-
obama-about-trip-to-mexico-and-costa-rica Accessed 10.08.14 
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The HLED is intended to provide momentum to making this possible scenario more 
likely. It looks at three issue areas - Promoting Competitiveness and Connectivity, 
Fostering Economic Growth, Productivity and Innovation, and Partnering for 
Regional and Global Leadership. At the time of writing the Dialogue is ongoing, but 
the U.S. Department of Commerce has fleshed out some detail.94 Once again the 
significant complementarily of goals is notable. The HLED focuses on more efficient 
borders and their importance to trade and integration, in line with the aims of Smart 
Borders Agreement, the SPP, and 21st Century border management concepts. As I will 
show, Mérida has provided border inspection equipment, justified as helping border 
efficiency, in line with the HLED’s priorities that, “Understanding that a globally 
competitive economy needs infrastructure that facilitates the flow of goods, services, 
and movement of people in a low-cost, efficient manner”.95 This only goes to 
highlight the integrative direction U.S. bilateral policy with Mexico is taking under a 
number of avenues. 
 
This reinvigorated drive to bolster the North American economy is further 
complemented by wider contemporary foreign policy that continues to push for 
liberalised, integrated global markets. The continuing negotiations for the TPP, for 
example, are also pulled into the North American rationale. Praising levels of 
established integration, President Obama stated during his most recent bilateral visit 
to Mexico that further integration on specific issues could help North American 
products and trade tap into, “the fastest growing part of the world is the Asia Pacific 
region -- huge markets.” Through the U.S. and Mexico, “working closely together to 
upgrade and revamp our trade relationship we’re also in a position to project outward 
and start selling more goods and services around the world.”96 The outcomes of the 
recent North American Leaders Summit, held in February 2014, even show some 
trilateral action in terms of “enhancing our [North America’s] competitiveness in the 
global economy.” Again, although little specific was set in stone, targets were 
announced to increase the NAFTA zone’s competitiveness and productivity, through 
further integration and harmonisation of practises. Again, expediting licit movements 
across borders within North America is a key goal, and a North American trusted 
traveler programme and plan to look at North American transportation were 
announced.97 None of this is particularly far away from SPP priorities. 
                                                
94 U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration ‘Work Plan Specifics’ 
http://trade.gov/hled/hled-workplan-specifics-06262014.asp Accessed 10.08.14 
95 ibid Further, a HLED progress report noted that the fact five “Border Master Plans […] designed to 
better coordinate infrastructure and development in border communities” had been completed within 
the, “HLED work stream”. The Master Plans were in fact begun under the 21st Century Border 
Management framework as part of the Infrastructure element of that undertaking U.S Department of 
Commerce International Trade Administration ‘Progress Report on the U.S.-Mexico High Level 
Economic Dialogue’ http://trade.gov/hled/hled-progress-report-06262014.asp Accessed 10.08.14; U.S. 
DHS Progress Report 2013 p.2 See the Border Master plan website at 
http://www.borderplanning.fhwa.dot.gov/masterplans.asp  
96 U.S. White House Office of the Press Secretary ‘Remarks by President Obama and President Pena 
Nieto of Mexico in a Joint Press Conference’ (May 2nd, 2013) http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/05/02/remarks-president-obama-and-president-pena-nieto-mexico-joint-press-conf 
Accessed 17.08.14 
97 U.S. White House Office of the Press Secretary ‘Fact Sheet: Key Deliverables for the 2014 North 
American Leaders Summit’ (February 19th, 2014) http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/02/19/fact-sheet-key-deliverables-2014-north-american-leaders-summit Accessed 17.08.14 
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Thus the HLED represents the rekindling, or in some cases the borne fruit, of longer-
term U.S. goals in integrating further with a more liberalised Mexican political 
economy. As Stokes and Raphael show, the opening up of Mexico’s energy sector 
especially has been a long sought prize for U.S. policymakers, policy commentators 
and investors alike for some time, albeit one they have pursued with care given how 
controversial it is within Mexican politics.98 Highlighting this, WikiLeaks cables 
reveal that the aforementioned Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement may have 
been less about developing mutual deep-sea oil resources than they were about the 
energy debate in Mexico during Calderón’s attempts at reform. According to the 
cable, International Oil Companies didn’t think any transboundary reserves would be 
of great significance in size, and U.S. officials speculated that Mexican government 
pushed the issue as part of its attempts to reform the energy sector and open it up.99 
U.S. officials concluded that if negotiations for a Transboundary agreement, “promote 
a future opening of the Mexican oil sector to foreign participation, it would be a 
positive development for all involved”, and sanctioned continued negotiation on this 
basis.100 Prior to the reforms, U.S. investors were already expressing interest in the 
opportunities potentially afforded by them and the expectation that “sooner or later” 




In line with my argument throughout, all of this will require security within North 
America, and an improved security outlook within Mexico. Security will be key to 
investment in Mexico’s energy sector. PEMEX pipelines and operations continue to 
be targeted by the cartels as sources of revenue, with taps on pipelines used to siphon 
oil increasing in number by 1548% from 2000 to 2013.102 In addition, (but of course 
relatedly) the Burgos Basin103 - the area most coveted as of huge potential for oil and 
gas exploitation through fracking - is located within Nuevo León and Tamaulipas, two 
states that have struggled with an exceptional degree of violence (perpetrated in no 
small part by the highly organised and extremely ruthless Zetas). A U.S. report stated 
that accessing the large amounts of technically recoverable oil and gas there could be, 
“constrained by several factors”, to include, “public security concerns in many shale 
                                                
98 Doug Stokes and Sam Raphael Global Energy Security and American Hegemony (The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2010)p. 204, 206-207 
99 They did this by tapping into nationalistic concerns about the U.S. siphoning oil from Mexican 
territory, which added to worries about Mexico’s declining easily accessible oil reserves (the second 
concern is more genuine than the first).  
100 U.S. Embassy Mexico Transboundary Reservoirs  
101 ibid; Julian Aguílar ‘Mexico’s Energy Reform Drawing Interest in Texas’ The Texas Tribune 
(March 6th, 2013) http://www.texastribune.org/2013/03/06/mexicos-energy-reform-drawing-interest-
texas/ Accessed 10.08.14; Adam Williams ‘PEMEX CEO Begins Chevron-to-BP Talks as Production 
Slumps’ Bloomberg (August 15th, 2014) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-15/pemex-fine-
tuning-data-ahead-of-potential-production-revisions.html Accessed 15.08.14 
102 Noé Cruz Serrano ‘Crimen “Ordeña” Siete Ductos de Pemex al Día’ El Universal (3rd February, 
2014) http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/finanzas-cartera/2014/crimen--39ordenia-39-siete-ductos-de-
pemex-al-dia-984493.html Accessed 17.08.14 
103 This is part of the Eagle Ford Shale that extends into Texas, where it is already being commercially 
fracked. 
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areas”.104 Violence in the Burgos Basin has already affected PEMEX and oil and gas 
workers in the area for quite some time,105 and some of the smaller companies that 
have been leaders in the U.S. ‘shale boom’ have apparently been discouraged from 
operating in the Basin due to security costs. The Peña Nieto government’s 
deployment of soldiers to the region has included those soldiers escorting oil and gas 
workers to and from work sites.106 There are also concerns about corruption of both 
PEMEX, and U.S. companies who have purchased stolen oil.107 
 
These reforms then, and U.S.-Mexican reengagement on economic integration (or the 
‘Prosperity’ arm of the SPP), continue to necessitate a security underpinning. The 
NAFTA-land Security drive exists in tandem with the priorities of the HLED, and 
both have connections to the policy reformulation within NAFTA after 9/11, and 
deeper roots in the integrative impulses spurred by neighborliness and U.S. economic 
expansion, and locked in by NAFTA. NAFTA-land Security sets out to secure U.S. 
interests in Mexican stability and the protection of the NAFTA space from internal 
and external threats and potential threats. Deepened economic integration and further 
capital friendly reform is likely to encourage further investment in Mexico, with the 
opening up of the energy market especially tempting to market involvement on the 
part of U.S. and transnational corporations.108 Based on current trends production 
would increasingly be ‘North American’, and the U.S.  administration is at least 
seriously talking about North American competiveness, and even ‘North American 
energy security’.109 Although still very much a potential rather than a foregone 
conclusion, this scenario only increases the need to stabilise Mexico and gird the 
North American economy. Discussing Secretary Kerry’s trip to Mexico in May 2014, 
a State Department official said it would reaffirm U.S. bilateral policy drives. 
Recalling the SPP, they stated that in the trip, “[W]hat you’ve got is basically a 
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The economically integrative dynamo sent spinning in North America by NAFTA has 
deepened U.S. interests within Mexico and North America as an increasingly holistic 
regional political economy. In turn ‘NAFTA-land’ becomes crucial to U.S. economic 
success and global competitiveness. The events of 9/11 highlighted to U.S. 
policymakers the risks to North America’s open political economy as posed by 
transnational cross-border incidents. The eagerness for policy responses that dealt 
with the threat whilst maintaining open economies thus set strategists, policy wonks, 
academics and officials on a path to implementing layered and projected HS concepts, 
and a nascent trilateral arrangement that would try to officialise these ideas to better 
protect the U.S. and its shared interests in North America under the SPP. Mexico 
came under increased scrutiny as the ‘weak link in the chain’ and the security 
spotlight that had emerged as Mexico entered NAFTA increased through this period. 
Additionally and relatedly, concern with brutal drug related violence also both 
inspired policy action, and provided a conduit for further cooperation on wider 
regional security issues. Crucially, the U.S. has both dictated the pace, direction and 
depth of this security drive, and this has meant that U.S. interests are key to the 
integrative effort. Thus, as the SPP reached political limits and was quietly shelved, 
the MI became a significant vehicle for NAFTA-land Security, and the SPP’s 
priorities lived on, in no small part due to their strategic importance to the U.S., and 
the logics of capitalist economic integration between the U.S. and Mexico. Just as 
Cole encouraged above, Mexico’s CN issues provided an aperture for more 
substantive security interaction to protect this ongoing arrangement.  
 
Thus, we have seen over the last two chapters the historical backdrop and 
development of growing U.S. strategic interests in Mexico driving the NAFTA-land 
Security effort. In line with the historical materialist framework, I have shown how 
deep core continuities and impulses have driven U.S. policy towards Mexico, in line 
with logics within capitalist social relations and the state’s prioritisation of its 
interests therein. In this chapter I have further revealed how interdependencies and 
integration have coalesced with these continuities, the contingency of 9/11, and novel 
security threats in North America to produce a NAFTA-land Security policy response 
that seeks first and foremost to secure North America’s political economic status quo 
- open markets and increased economic interaction. I have shown the historical 
development of this substantive policy effort and highlighted its core underlying 
drivers. The SPP has been discussed in its proper context, which clearly indicates that 
it is part of a process towards regionalised security in North America based around 
NAFTA’s borders. The next chapter shows empirically how Mérida takes up this 
NAFTA-land Security logic, and how it has deepened U.S.-Mexico security 
cooperation and U.S. security projection into Mexico further than ever before.  
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Mérida Initative: Policy Analysis  
 
“…by 2011, there was little sign of change in the consumption of drugs in the United 
States or the trafficking of weapons or movement of illicit money across the border. If 
there were any operational results, they were in such areas as customs, ports, 





This chapter aims to provide a deep, detailed and thorough breakdown of the MI and 
the bilateral U.S.-Mexican security engagement it is a part of. At its heart, it is an 
empirical presentation of the policy justification and detail that underpins the growing 
security relations between the U.S. and Mexico. As established in the Literature 
Review, analysts of the MI and U.S.-Mexican security relations have not overly 
concerned themselves with deep examinations of policy detail. I seek to fill that gap 
in the literature. However, I do so with the assertion that an informed familiarity with 
the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the MI will yield a more informed understanding of U.S. policy 
goals. The overriding goal is to show how the MI connects both in a general and deep 
sense to the wider context established in the previous chapters. It picks up from the 
preceding chapter in making clear that on one level the MI is part of a continuing, 
wider effort by the U.S. to improve bilateral security relations with Mexico, with the 
aim of dovetailing Mexico’s security policy and aims with those of the United States, 
improving the security production and maintenance capabilities of Mexican state 
institutions for a wide-spectrum of security contingencies, and thereby bolstering 
Mexican political economic stability. This includes, but is by no means limited to, 
security concerns over Mexico’s drug-related violence. In terms of motivating factors 
for the latter, there is evidence of concern on the part of U.S. officials about the threat 
of Mexico’s cartels to the monopoly of violence supposed to be held by the Mexican 
state, and their potential impact on Mexico’s economic and investment environment. 
As I have shown this is an effort motivated by core U.S. interests, which themselves 
emerge from historical developments within U.S. foreign relations, its capitalist 
development, and its associated regional hegemony. 
 
However, this is increasingly subsumed by a sustained and wider U.S. policy goal to 
construct a regionally integrated security framework that conceptualises the NAFTA 
zone as a shared economic space that must be defended from potential threats. Thus, 
deeper justifications and connections revealed in this chapter show unequivocally 
that, to use the neat phrasing of Stokes and Raphael, Mérida and increased U.S. 
security aid in Mexico is about inculcating Mexico’s state institutions and security 
forces with, “a greater capacity to guarantee internal stability across the board”.2 
With regard to the drug related security crisis, this has been skewed heavily towards 
military solutions in arming military and federal police units with the equipment and 
                                                
1 Richard J. Kilroy Jr., Abelardo Rodríguez Sumano and Todd S. Hataley North American Regional 
Security: A Trilateral Framework (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013) p. 156    
2 Doug Stokes and Sam Raphael Global Energy Security and American Hegemony (The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2010) p.212 My emphasis.  
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training to confront armed drug traffickers. However, the U.S. has also sought to 
improve state capacities in other, complementary areas such as criminal justice, 
policing faculties, and urban governance. Moreover, as Chapter Five made clear, the 
security aims of the U.S. are far more expansive. As part of the multi-purpose and 
regional focus of the growing bilateral security relationship, the U.S. is concerned 
with the wider abilities of the Mexican state to maintain security and govern 
effectively. I will show the detail of this in this chapter. Whilst U.S. officials often 
call this “partner capacity building”, which increasingly represents a global security 
policy,3 what it represents regionally is the construction of NAFTA-land Security. 
This is a deeper and regionally unique expression based around NAFTA’s perimeter, 
flowing from uniquely deep economic regionalisation processes that create strategic 
pressures to secure resultant political economic interests.  
 
Of course, such an argument fundamentally begs a central question - if the U.S. is 
improving Mexico’s state security apparatus to improve its abilities to produce and 
maintain security, why is Mexico’s security situation continuing to unravel by a 
number of indices?  Is U.S. policy therefore failing? Why has it continued in a largely 
similar vein even as Mexico’s ability to maintain security has apparently spectacularly 
deteriorated? This chapter provides the empirical bedrock by which to consider this 
question. Put simply, it is crucial to understand what the policy is and what it is aimed 
at doing to answer whether it is actually ‘working’. By analysing U.S. policy at 
granular detail in the historical and theoretical context already established, we see that 
in terms of the U.S.’ wider strategic goals significant elements of the new security 
relationship have been successful enough to warrant its continuation, even as drug-
related violence has vertiginously soared. On a macro-scale, U.S. interests within its 
regional hegemony mean deeper U.S.-Mexican interaction on regional security 
becomes a goal in and of itself, especially given historically low levels of cooperation. 
Bringing Mexico into a regional security configuration further cements U.S. regional 
hegemony, and means Mexico is increasingly able and willing to works towards 
ensuring regional security interests outlined throughout. This chapter pinpoints 
multiple pieces of evidence from the U.S. state that praises growing levels of security 
interaction, and shows in detail particular policies that connect to the regional security 
goals outlined in the previous chapter. In turn I will be able to link these back to 
political economic interests in Mexican and North American political economic 
security and stability, which remain the core motivator for U.S. policy. Thus, through 
the historical materialist framework I gain a better explanatory purchase on how the 
MI and NAFTA-land Security are working. However as explored in the Conclusion, 
the successes here do not completely erase concerns about high levels of violence and 
instability in Mexico continuing despite Mexico’s growing role in NAFTA-land 
Security.  
  
Chapter Structure & Aims 
This chapter is mostly built around a chronological overview and discussion of the 
official policy documents and explanations that have complemented Mérida and the 
U.S-Mexican security engagement. Through the analysis I aim to convince the reader 
that Mérida is part of a bigger strategy, and a wider context. Therefore also included 
is material released by the DoD that is either related to Mérida, CN in Mexico, and/or 
                                                
3 Derek S. Reveron Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the 
Changing Face of the U.S. Military (Georgetown University Press, 2010) 
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the wider security engagement the Initiative is part of. The continuing activities and 
official discourse of USNORTHCOM are especially important in this regard. We will 
see in this wealth of policy justification a number of important consistencies 
regarding the aims of the U.S. as outlined by this project; the incipient construction of 
a NAFTA-land security space a là the SPP, a sense of the importance of 
border/security projection, and the role of U.S. strategic interests in galvanising this 
policy. I then drill down a little more into policy detail ‘on the ground’, i.e. how 
Mérida has been implemented. I will show how various policy strands link up here, 
focusing especially on how training provided outside of the Mérida framework 
connects up explicitly with Mérida itself. Through all of this it will be clear how 
Mérida policy is directly related to the policy aims of the SPP and NAFTA-land 
Security. Finally through this section I consider briefly some of the effects of the 
policy, especially regarding continuing militarisation of the Mexican drug war. I 
conclude by making clear how the project up to this point has answered what Mérida 




The MI: A New Security Paradigm? 
 
This first section of the chapter analyses the policy justifications that have 
accompanied the announcement, development, and delivery of the MI and improved 
U.S.-Mexican security relations. I initially aim to trace out an historical account of the 
policy history of Mérida, operationalised mostly through its legislative history. This 
allows me to bring in a variety of official documentation that was produced as part of 
the legislative process. Whilst the ‘most public’ official accompanying material may 
have focused on drugs, one does not have to dig particularly deeply to find a wealth of 
official policy material that gives a clear picture of a policy that is actually about 
dealing with a far wider set of security concerns as part of what Bush administration 
officials called, “a new security paradigm”.4 However, whilst ‘new’ in scope, the MI 
is firmly in line with the goals of the SPP and NAFTA-land Security. I will show that 
this policy intention survived the potentially transfiguring domestic political process 
intact, despite some important changes. Working through this history also gives us the 
opportunity to intelligibly pinpoint where we place CN concerns in the wider context 
of the U.S.’ drive to improve Mexico’s wide-spectrum security capabilities. I focus 
here on Mérida’s inception under the Bush administration, through to the launch and 
consolidation of the Obama administration’s ‘Beyond Mérida’ strategy. I argue the 
overall focus has not significantly changed at all under Obama, however I do look at 
the justification for the change in tack, and show how low-level state building has 
become more of an overt goal behind the MI.  
 
Mérida: Policy Justifications & Legislative History: 2007-2009 
 
The SPP and the Conception of the MI: 2007-2008 
In terms of its original intention to create a legislative and binding tri-lateral 
agreement, the SPP is currently a defunct arrangement, with the Obama 
administration choosing not to pursue it upon their entrance to power. However, in 
                                                
4 Thomas Shannon in The Anti-Drug Package for Mexico and Central America: An Evaluation Hearing 
before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Serial 110-311) 110th Congress (November 15th, 2007) 
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several ways the SPP continues to enjoy a kind of half-life. Its influence remains in 
the loose geographical understanding it helped to inculcate between the NAFTA 
countries to cooperate on security matters affecting their shared economic space.5 
More concretely, the supposedly annual (but in actuality more inconsistent) North 
American Leaders Summit stemmed from SPP negotiations. More importantly for us, 
the issues it was concerned with, perhaps unsurprisingly, remain integral to relations 
of the NAFTA countries and the policy priorities of the U.S. Indeed, we will see that 
the overall focus of the ‘Security’ element of the SPP - treating North America as a 
shared economic space in need of trilateral protection, in line with Shannon’s 
comments around “armoring NAFTA” - is given practical, policy life in the U.S.-
Mexico context by the MI. Mérida, and policies or programs that intersect with it in 
often complex ways, supports Mexican institutions in a huge number of specific but 
intertwining security areas, including (broadly) CT, maritime security, border 
security, port security, airspace control, criminal investigation and prosecution, and, 
of course, CN. In sum, and given the multi-applicability of some of these programmes 
Mérida seeks to increase the security capabilities of Mexico ‘across the board’, firmly 
in line with the goal of beginning to create a hemispheric security framework, and 
reflecting U.S. goals in projecting their borders outward to aid in the HS mission.  
 
Thus, the MI has a clear familial relationship with the SPP. Indeed, in a diplomatic 
primer to the meeting between Presidents Bush and Calderón in the city of Mérida in 
March, 2007 that saw the two agree on the launch of the MI, the U.S. President was 
explicitly advised by his Ambassador Anthony Garza that the visit should, “reaffirm 
our [the U.S.’] security-related priorities and our continued commitment to the SPP 
framework”.6 Prior to this, and reinforcing points made in the previous chapter, 
another set of cables from Garza specifically concerned how to handle the transition 
of government in Mexico in 2006, and contained clear insights into U.S. priorities. 
One stated that one of the challenges for the U.S. in dealing with any incoming 
Mexican administration,  “will be to get the new administration focused on a number 
of areas for improvement [of security abilities], including training efforts to increase 
Mexican capabilities”.7 Another made clear that it was important to focus the new 
administration on law enforcement cooperation, that the U.S. wanted Mexico to “take 
the gloves off in battling the cartels”, and that the, “goal should be a law enforcement 
relationship that is worthy of the North American partnership.”8 Placing Mérida in 
this context should give us pause when considering the oft-repeated claim that it was 
Calderón who convinced Bush of the need for an extensive aid package and stronger 
                                                
5 Villarreal, M. Angeles and Lake, Jennifer E. Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America: 
An Overview and Selected Issues (Congressional Research Service, May 2009)  
6 U.S. Embassy Mexico Scene Setter for President’s Trip to Mexico, March 12-14th, 2007 Cable 
Reference: 001102 (5th March, 2007) Link: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07MEXICO1102&q=merida%20mexico Accessed 
03.10.12 
7 U.S. Embassy Mexico Engaging the New Mexican Administration on Security and Counter-Terrorism 
Cable Reference: 003296 (15th June, 2006) Link: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06MEXICO3296&q=mexico%20spp Accessed 10.10.12  
8 U.S. Embassy Mexico Engaging the New Mexican Administration on Law Enforcement Cable 
Reference 003297 (15th June, 2006) Link: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06MEXICO3297&q=michoacan Accessed 22.06.14 
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partnership on security and CN.9 . 
 
Just as importantly, the SPP negotiations both provided a context and partial (but 
important) direction for Mérida, and a wider political space in which the Calderón and 
Bush administrations could work on what was quite an ambitious bilateral agreement. 
Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte gives us an insight into this with his 
comment that, “the Security and Prosperity Partnership has provided a framework for 
concrete initiatives that likely would not have taken shape otherwise.”10 The 
channeling of SPP priorities through the MI was also politically expedient. Whilst 
SPP negotiations had indeed happened in private (fuelling conspiracies about a ‘North 
American Union’), they were imbued with a good degree of diplomatic fanfare by the 
very fact that the SPP came into being at a trilateral summit of Presidents and Prime 
Ministers. Perhaps chastened by the kind of criticism the SPP had subsequently 
received from both the political left and right in the U.S. and Canada who opposed 
greater economic union between the NAFTA signatories, U.S. and Mexican 
governments held Mérida negotiations both in private and with no diplomatic fanfare. 
There was also no outside consultation, a move that itself disconcerted and angered 
(mostly Democrat) sections of Congress.11  
 
Additionally, as we shall see below, the legislation for Mérida funding was nestled 
amongst the more headline grabbing latest appropriation for the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. Finally, in its most direct announcements the focus of the MI was very much 
officially explained as ‘counterdrugs’, just as Mexico’s drug violence was in the early 
stages of a sickening spiral, and headlines were being made in the U.S. about the 
brutality of ‘drug cartels’. This is not to suggest a conspiratorial mindset amongst 
officials. Most of the information I present in this chapter, showing a far broader 
security goal behind the MI, is publicly available.12 However it is contained within the 
kind of large Departmental reports and Congressional testimony that would limit the 
already unlikely possibility that the link between the SPP and Mérida would become a 
political controversy, and of course it was not as ambitious as the SPP in that it did 
not seek to create official and long-lasting trilateral connections in any institutional 
sense, and finally was focused on Mexico and issues of security rather than further 
trilateral economic integration. 
                                                
9 Sidney Weintraub Unequal Partners: The United States and Mexico (University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2010) p.74; Clare Ribando Seelke MI for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues 
(Congressional Research Service, January, 2010) p.2;  
10 U.S. Department of State Archive ‘Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte: Remarks at the 
Fourth North American Forum’ (Washington D.C., June 17th, 2008) http://2001-
2009.state.gov/s/d/2008/105999.htm Accessed 26.09.13 
11 Coleen W. Cook and Clare Ribando Seelke Merida Initiative: Proposed U.S. Anticrime and 
Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and Central America (Congressional Research Service, March 
2008 [a]) p.1; Bryce Pardo ‘Congress Has Mixed Feelings About the MI’ Inter-American Dialogue 
(January 14th, 2008) http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=1185 Accessed 
03.09.12; The Merida Initiative: Assessing Plans to Step Up our Security Cooperation with Mexico and 
Central America Hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Serial 110-135) 110th 
Congress (November 14th, 2007) In his testimony at the Committee hearing cited(p.37), Congressman 
David Scott told the two administration officials present that, “Congress is not a bank just for the 
President to come to and get money. We are appropriators. By the Constitution, we are it [sic] that 
determines where the money goes, how it goes. We are here to ask questions, to be deliberative, to 
have the oversight.” 
12 Though diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks, never of course meant to be public knowledge, do 
play an important role in strengthening this case. 
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Launching the Initiative 
Following an initial bilateral meeting between the Bush and Calderón in March 2007 
where it was, “agreed to expand bilateral and regional CN and security cooperation,” 
officials negotiated and crafted the MI - officially known in its early stages as the 
Mexico and Central America Security Initiative13 - before its official bi-lateral 
announcement on October 22nd, 2007.14 To reiterate, we should place these 
negotiations in the context of the SPP and the diplomatic cables we cited above, but 
nonetheless the Initiative was presented and developed as a distinct bilateral policy. 
As mentioned, the official statement that announced it justifies the aid programme in 
quite specific and limited terms. It asserts that the agreement is a bilateral 
undertaking, rather than a traditional assistance program, and that the focus of this 
undertaking is fundamentally focused upon the fight against drug cartels or 
‘organizations’ and the illegitimate businesses they control. It is clear that these 
criminal organisations are conceptualised or understood as “transnational”, and that 
they are increasingly operating a diversified portfolio of criminal activities. The 
statement explains that, “Our shared goal is to maximize the effectiveness of our 
efforts to fight criminal organizations so as to disrupt drug-trafficking (including 
precursor chemicals); weapons trafficking, illicit financial activities and currency 
smuggling, and human trafficking” and to, “allow our countries to better confront the 
common threat of drug trafficking and other transnational organized crime.”15 To 
achieve this, the Initiative aimed to, “1) bolster Mexican domestic enforcement 
efforts; 2) bolster U.S. domestic enforcement efforts; and 3) expand bilateral and 
regional cooperation that addresses transnational crime”.16   
 
The statement goes onto praise the domestic efforts of Caldéron’s government prior 
to Mérida and his focus on CN and security, and promises that U.S. domestic efforts 
will also continue its own efforts. Furthermore it makes a point of stressing the new 
era of “bilateral cooperation” on these issues that Mérida ushers in. Part of this 
cooperation is in increased foreign assistance, and the statement briefly sets out how 
the U.S. intends to aid Calderón and augment his state’s capacities to meet the shared 
goal of the respective governments: 
 
To increase the operational capabilities of Mexican agencies and 
institutions, our strategies include enhanced transfer of  
equipment and technical resources, consistent with all  
appropriate standards in both countries of transparency and  
accountability of use. The strategies also include training  
programs and two-way exchanges of experts, but do not  
                                                
13 Initially the MI included aid to Mexico and Central America, underscoring the regional focus in the 
package. However they would eventually split as Mérida for Mexico, and the Central American 
Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). This did not mean the regional thinking behind the policies went 
away though. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) this was a response to 
Congressional keenness to acknowledge the uniqueness of challenges across the region See Clare 
Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Merida Initiative and 
Beyond (Congressional Research Service, April 2014) p.6, footnote 26; U.S. Government 
Accountability Office Mérida Initiative: The United States has Provided Counternarcotics and 
Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures (Washington D.C., July 2010) p.5 
14 Cook & Seelke Merida Initiative p.1 
15 U.S. Department of State Joint Statement on the Mérida Initiative (Washington D.C. 22nd October, 
2007)  
16 ibid 
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contemplate the deployment of U.S. military personnel in  
Mexico.17 
 
The justification for this approach is a stated concern for, “the health and public 
safety” of citizens of both countries (with a particular concern for youth populations) 
and, “the stability and security of the region.” Criminal organisations are deemed to 
threaten both areas.18 However, the original budgetary request for Mérida funding was 
clear that in fact the Initiative was originally envisioned to go beyond CN concerns 
and tackling criminal organisations. The DoS’ and U.S. Agency for International 
Development’s (USAID) Supplemental Appropriations Budgetary Justification 
document outlined that the proposed $500 million in assistance would, “enhance 
Mexico’s ability to address trans-national threats, including criminal gangs and drug 
traffickers that have an impact on U.S. national security, as well as support 
strengthened justice systems and rule of law programs in Mexico”.19 It went on to 
outline that, “The Mexico and Central America Security Cooperation Initiative has 
important implications for the Global War on Terror.” These implications were 
described as stemming from, “Weak border security, weak rule of law and strong 
transnational crime networks” which coalesced to increase the risk of terrorism. In 
response, the proposed Initiative would, “facilitate the secure flow of goods, services, 
and people across one of the world’s most active borders” and “remove one of the 
major barriers to the region’s economic and political development”.20  
 
This sense that the MI was geared towards wider security concerns than CN in its 
original incarnation is confirmed by the contemporary testimonies of government 
officials, and reports on the make-up of the aid package. We can see this on two 
levels. Firstly, on a broad level, we gain some insight into the strategic logic 
underpinning the Bush administration’s budgetary request for aid to Mexico, a logic 
that goes beyond a contingent concern for rising drug violence and improved CN 
bilateral interoperability. Shannon explained that a key advantage of Mérida (and 
CARSI) was the chance it afforded the U.S. to:   
 
[…] build new and enduring relationships with law  
enforcement institutions in the region, especially in Mexico  
and Central America. We have been approached by the  
Mexicans and by the Governments of Central America in an  
unprecedented fashion. We believe this is an opportunity to  
break down longstanding taboos in our national relationships  
and build new levels of cooperation that will not only 
enhance security cooperation, but will enhance broader 
political and diplomatic cooperation throughout the  
region”.21  
 
Whilst Shannon clearly pointed out the threat of drug trafficking to U.S. interests in 
protecting populations and the stability of the region, he also conceptualised this 
                                                
17 ibid 
18 ibid 
19 U.S. Department of State and Agency for International Development Supplemental Appropriations 
Justification Fiscal Year 2008 (Washington D.C., 2008) p.26 My emphasis. 
20 ibid p.27 My emphasis. 
21 Shannon in Anti-Drug Package for Mexico My emphasis. 
Paul Ashby: NAFTA-Land Security: The MI, Transnational Threats, and U.S. Security Projection in Mexico  
PhD Thesis 
University of Kent 
 
187 
threat as a political opportunity to achieve those wider strategic goals alluded to 
above, and improved relations between the U.S. and Mexico on security and military 
issues, which as we have seen saw had (for the large part) relatively frosty in 
comparison to other Latin American states.22 Thus, discussing the “shared threat” of 
drug trafficking, Shannon argues that it has also opened up a space for progress on 
those wider fronts, and that, “it was the commitment from President Calderon and 
concomitant commitment from President Bush to recognize our responsibility in 
addressing this shared threat that really opens this unique and important space”.23 This 
is something we will see repeated, especially by military officials. 
 
On another level, we can see that this strategic opportunity is about more than just CN 
concerns even with regard to specific Mérida policy. As the proposed Initiative was 
being researched and contemplated by Congress, David T. Johnson, then Assistant 
Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), told the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that, “Through the Merida Initiative [sic], the 
United States seeks to strengthen our partners' capacities in three broad areas: 1) 
Counter-Narcotics, Counterterrorism, and Border Security; 2) Public Security and 
Law Enforcement; and 3) Institution Building and Rule of Law”.24 In a report for the 
Foreign Relations Committee member Richard Lugar25 (R-Ind), a Congressional 
staffer relied on DoS information to provide a budget breakdown of the then proposed 
aid. Nine broad items were listed as being aimed towards, “Counternarcotics, 
Counterterrorism and Border Security”.26 This included the provision of, “eight BH 
412 EP medium-lift utility helicopters to support a variety of counternarcotics and 
counterterrorism missions.” The report states that “most importantly” this provision 
would mean Mexico had a full complement of Bell 412s that would, “provide 
mobility to rapid-reaction forces”.27  
 
This multi-applicability is important given the low but quite consistent level of 
political violence in Mexico from a number of groups, especially in restive, 
impoverished states in the south like Guerrero and Michoacán (often mentioned 
explicitly in diplomatic cables for their instability), and the increasingly militarised 
risk posed by certain drug trafficking groups (often in those same states but much 
more widespread). For example, whilst U.S. diplomatic cables deemed the activities 
of Mexico’s left-wing political insurgents the EPR as limited in threat and scope, they 
also designated the group and its actions as ‘terrorist’ in nature.28 The bombings of oil 
                                                
22 Of course the point on Central American / U.S. security relations may well have been directed 
towards the more controversial recent histories of U.S. security aid to many Central American states 
during civil wars and insurgencies. Shannon may well have been referring to an opportunity to reset 
security relations and move on from associations between U.S. military aid and Central American 
political oppression.  
23 ibid 
24 Johnson in Anti-Drug Package for Mexico 
25 Lugar was then senior Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but has since left the 
Senate.  
26 The Merida Initiative: “Guns, Drugs and Friends” A Report to the Members of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate, 110th Congress (S. Prt 110-35) (Dec, 2007) .16-26 
27 ibid p.17 My emphasis. More detail on this provided below. 
28 U.S. Embassy Mexico Scene Setter for the Visit to Mexico of FBI Director John S. Pistole, May 21-
23, 2008 Cable Reference 001487 (16th May, 2008) 
Link:http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08MEXICO1487&q=epr%20mexico Accessed 
16.10.12 
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and gas pipelines in July and September 2007 claimed by the EPR were troubling for 
Mexican and U.S. officials as the fear was that a sustained campaign could seriously 
affect investor confidence alongside the more immediate economic impact of the well 
coordinated attacks.29 Calderón sent military forces to the difficult environment of 
Michoacán in December 2006 as the first offensive of his crackdown on drug 
trafficking groups, and effectively these troops were intended to militarily engage La 
Familia Michoacána, the cult-like cartel that many have argued exercised de facto 
control over large areas of the state.30 The threat of these trafficking groups is 
emphasised most strongly in the fact that by the end of 2007 there were 34 military 
fatalities, and by the end of 2008 a further 52.31 The ability of the Mexican state to 
successfully disrupt groups that challenge the state and / or are engaged in violence 
that affects stability (be they politically or ‘financially’ motivated) already appears to 
be a key rationale for U.S. policy. Thus we begin to see that the potential applicability 
of MI aid is by no means exhausted by pure CN concerns in terms of interdicting 
drugs, and instead covers a broader array of security contingencies.  
 
This locks into the wider contention that U.S. interests as expressed in the policy 
priorities of the SPP are being met through the MI. Another cable from Anthony 
Garza in October 2007 to then Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte in advance 
of the latter’s trip to Mexico sums up the variegated but interlinked concerns of the 
U.S. In this cable Garza specifically draws connections between the U.S. anxieties 
over domestic terrorism, drug related violence, and Mexico’s “porous” southern 
border. This is also of course NAFTA’s southern border, and crossing it forms part of 
the journey that many of the illicit goods (and the people deemed to be illicit) take on 
their way to the U.S. It also speaks to why the U.S. is concerned about some of these 
activities in terms of Mexico’s “investment climate”, something we draw out further 
below. The cable is worth quoting at length: 
 
EPR attacks on Pemex pipelines in July and early  
September have added another dimension to Mexico's security  
concerns, raising the specter of home-grown terrorism.  
Despite GOM protests to the contrary, it seems inevitable that  
the military and civilian security forces will divert resources to  
protect the pipelines and other major assets from future attacks,  
which might also contaminate the investment climate.  
                                                
29 U.S. Embassy Mexico PEMEX Pipeline Attack Causes Economic Damage Cable Reference 004980 
(14th September, 2007) Link: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07MEXICO4980&q=epr%20mexico Accessed 22.06.14; 
Hector Tobar ‘A Small Guerrilla Band is Waging War in Mexico’ Los Angeles Times (September 20th, 
2007) http://articles.latimes.com/2007/sep/20/world/fg-guerrilla20 Accessed 22.06.14 There was also a 
triple bombing of PRI buildings and the ScotiaBank in Mexico City in 2006 under Fox’s tenure that 
was apparently politically motivated. See U.S. Embassy Mexico Three Bombs Explode in Mexico City 
Cable Reference 006313 (7th November, 2006) Link: 
https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=06MEXICO6313&q=bombing%20car%20mexico 
Accessed 08.07.14 
30 For example, Vanda Felbab-Brown Calderón’s Caldron: Lessons from Mexico’s Battle Against  
Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez, and Michoacán (Brookings 
Institute, September, 2011) p. 24-30 Michoacán and Guerrero are mentioned directly an frequently in a 
number of diplomatic cables from Mexico 
31 Paul Kenny & Monica Serrano ‘Conclusion: Authoritarian Evolution’ in Paul Kenny, Mónica 
Serrano, and Arturo Sotomayor (eds.) Mexico’s Security Failure: Collapse into Criminal Violence 
(Routledge, 2011) p.201, 203 
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Continued criminality and violence countrywide (directed with  
virtual impunity) and now a new spate of guerilla activity will  
pressure the government to show it retains the upper hand and  
can overcome these threats. Calderon also recognizes that  
Mexico's own southern border remains extremely vulnerable to  
immigration, trafficking in persons, and the smuggling of  
contraband, and that securing this border is of vital importance  
to U.S. security.32 
 
Finally an interview highlighted by Kilroy et al helps to reinforce the 
interconnectedness of U.S. strategic thinking here. Just before the launch of the MI, 
then Commander of USNORTHCOM General Victor Renuart stated that the EPR’s 
pipeline attacks provided a, “bellweather” as an example of the potential strategic 
threats both transnational criminal groups (or drug cartels) and terrorists could 
achieve in Mexico. As well as discussing transnational crime and drug traffickers 
more generally, he stated this meant that NORTHCOM would, “try to build 
exchanges, training opportunities, cooperation opportunities, discussion forums, to 
allow us to share ideas with the Mexican military and reach a common ground, a 
common understanding and a common view of how we can work together.”33 Renuart 
also discussed other avenues of bilateral cooperation and the strategic thinking behind 
them, in line with “theater security cooperation”, and indeed with the treatment of the 
NAFTA zone as a shared security space. It is worth quoting this at greater length than 
Kilroy et al. Renuart asserts that at this point Mexico was:  
 
… looking at ways to take advantage of new technologies to  
support the key centers of gravity that they see in their country.  
Energy security is a perfect example. [The Mexicans] have  
offshore drilling areas. When [they], like many other nations, hear  
al Qaeda say, ‘We will attack the energy resources of countries  
which are sympathetic to the West,’ it makes people nervous,  
because they've demonstrated at least an ability to have an impact  
there … [The Mexicans] are looking at ways to modernize their  
naval components, their air and surface defense of key infrastructure  
elements--the way they do force protection around critical  
infrastructure within the country.  So there is potentially a traditional  
foreign military sales, foreign military funding, education, training,  
theater security cooperation relationship here.34 
 
A final complementary logic should also be made clear here. The equipment transfer 
not only provided large one off contracts to several large arms / aircraft 
manufacturers, but Mérida as a whole strengthened the interconnected institutional 
ties between Mexico, the U.S., and the U.S. arms trade, something we will see a little 
more of below. Thus, as the Initiative launched it was explicitly aimed to go beyond 
just CN, and we can clearly place in it a wider strategic context, whereby the U.S. was 
                                                
32 U.S. Embassy Mexico Scenesetter for Deputy Secretary’s Trip to Mexico October 28 - November 1 
(20th October, 2007) Cable Reference 005535 Link: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07MEXICO5535&q=epr%20mexico Accessed 25.06.14 
33 Renuart quoted in Kilroy et al North American Regional Security p.151 
34 Martin Edwin Andersen ‘Top Gun: Gene Renuart Moves out Smartly as Senior U.S. Domestic 
General; Extends Hand to Mexico’ Originally hosted at U.S. Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 
found here http://www.offnews.info/verArticulo.php?contenidoID=9327 Accessed 23.07.14 
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seeking to bolster Mexican security capabilities (with all attendant benefits to the U.S. 
arms industry) across a wide spectrum of threats and threat potentials. 
 
‘Civilian’ Aid 
In addition to the large-scale transfer of military equipment there was significant 
funding proposed for institutional reform and wider questions of Mexican ‘law and 
order’. An indicative and important example is the U.S. support for Mexico’s 
proposed move from inquisitorial to adversarial criminal trials. As further testimony 
from David T. Johnson makes clear this is a complex undertaking35 on the part of the 
Mexico and the U.S, and involves reforms, expert input and aid at many more levels 
than just the courtroom proceedings themselves: 
 
The reforms go far beyond trial methodology—these require a  
fundamental shift in how crimes are investigated, how evidence  
is collected and analyzed, and how defendants are brought to trial,  
including amended standards of proof that previously rested on  
confessions. For example, key to supporting human rights  
concerns, the reforms adopted to date also require that defendants  
be represented by legal counsel.36  
 
Thus, “U.S. Government assistance to Mexico ($79.1 million) would support a 
stronger prosecutorial system and a more efficient judicial system, including 
programs to improve transparency and support respect for human rights”.37 Using 
blunter language not afforded to U.S. diplomats, supporting these reforms showed 
U.S. resolve to help tackle some of the myriad problems affecting Mexico’s judicial 
system. These problems straddle the criminal and judicial process from police 
investigation through to trial, and include the prevalence of torture to extract 
confessions, hearsay as permissible evidence, systemic corruption and bribery, and of 
course the (related) staggeringly high number of unsolved and unprosecuted crimes.38 
There is a very clear sense here that this proposed portion of the MI encourages long-
term steps to ameliorate some of these issues - issues that many have argued 
perniciously feed security challenges in Mexico through their connection to impunity 
and corruption.39 The weakness of Mexican institutions - not least security forces and 
the police - and their continued hollowing out through the corrupting power of drug 
profits contributes to Mexican instability. 
 
A Regional Focus 
What also came through strongly in the testimony and reporting on the incipient MI 
was the regional focus of the package. Again drawing upon Shannon’s indicative 
Committee testimony, there seems to be at least a rhetorical emphasis on the 
                                                
35 The complexity is highlighted by progress in Mexico on this issue, which has been patchy at best. 
For example, see David A. Shirk ‘Justice Reform in Mexico: Change & Challenges in the Judicial 
Sector’ Trans-Border Institute (May, 2010); Matthew C. Ingram; Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira & David 
Shirk ‘Assessing Mexico’s Judicial Reform: Views of Judges, Prosecutors, and Public Defenders’ 
Special Report Trans-Border Institute (June, 2011) 
36 Johnson in The Merida Initiative p.35 
37 DoS / USAID Supplemental Appropriations 2008 p.28 
38 For useful overviews of these issues and the reform process see Shirk ‘Justice Reform in Mexico’; 
Ana Laura Magaloni‘Arbitrariness and Inefficiency in the Mexican Criminal Justice System’ in Kenny 
et al Mexico’s Security Failure p.89-106  
39 ibid, and see the Literature Review 
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integrative nature of the policy, which is argued to plug into existing CN programs in 
the U.S., throughout South and Central America, and into the Caribbean. Shannon 
described the Initiative as a point, “where each nation’s domestic efforts are combined 
with regional cooperation and collaboration to multiply the effects of our actions, and 
that this was a necessity given that, “drug trafficking and criminal organizations do 
not respect political boundaries and that we must synchronize our tactics and confront 
the problem together”.40 We see mention again of the “transnational” nature of the 
threat of criminal drug-trafficking organizations, and the need therefore to respond in 
kind with regional policies. Thus the language and detail shown here prefigures three 
important issues with regard to this chapter’s overall argument. Firstly, when we take 
the stated rationale for the original Mérida request as a whole, we can see that it was 
at least conceived as a strategic multi-purpose security package rather than a purely 
CN orientated plan. Secondly, despite the fact that the Bush administration’s request 
for Mexico was indeed heavily weighted towards expensive military procurements, it 
was not exclusively a military package. Thirdly, there is a strong regional justification 
running through official documentation that is at pains to highlight the transnational 
nature of the security issues currently affecting Mexico. 
 
Mérida’s Appropriation: 2008 
Of course, the funding the Bush administration sought still had to be confirmed 
through the Congressional Appropriation process, and unsurprisingly what was finally 
signed into law was by no means identical to what was requested. Mérida went 
through a complicated legislative history in which the litigation that it was packaged 
in started life as the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 
before that proposed legislation became, “the vehicle” for the Bush Administration’s 
Emergency Supplemental Request for the GWOT.41 Despite the obvious original 
intention to provide a multi-purpose security package, the Supplemental 
Appropriations Act that President Bush signed on the 30th June 2008 was clear that 
Mérida funding should only be applied to CN, law enforcement and institutional 
reform. Both the House and Senate earliest versions of the bill did not include any 
references to terrorism with regards to Mexico in their text.42 Whilst the House bill 
referred to ‘border security’, this was in the stated sense of drug interdiction and 
violence, as opposed to the more abstract version presented in the DoS/USAID budget 
request and by government officials.43 The final version read as follows: 
 
…Of the funds appropriated under the headings ‘‘International  
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement’’ [INCLE], ‘‘Foreign  
Military Financing Program’’ [FMF], and ‘‘Economic Support 
 Fund’’ [ESF] in this chapter, not more than $352,000,000 of  
the funds appropriated in subchapter A and $48,000,000 of the  
funds appropriated in subchapter B44 may be made available for  
                                                
40 Shannon in Anti-Drug Package for Mexico 
41 Coleen W. Cook and Clare Ribando Seelke Merida Initiative: Proposed U.S. Anticrime and 
Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and Central America (Congressional Research Service, July 2008 
[b]) p.5 
42 ibid p.5-6; ‘Merida Initiative to Combat Illicit Narcotics and Reduce Organized Crime Authorization 
Act of 2008’ H.R. 6028 Proposed Bill, 110th Congress (2008); ‘Supplemental Appropriations Act 
2008: Engrossed Amendment Senate 2’ 110th Congress (2008) 
43 ‘Merida Initiative to Combat Illicit Narcotics’  
44 The $48 million referred to here would become available to spend on October 1st, 2008 as a ‘bridge 
fund’ assistance for FY2009. See below for reference. 
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assistance for Mexico, only to combat drug trafficking and  
related violence and organized crime, and for judicial reform,  
institution building, anti-corruption, and rule of law activities.45  
 
Other more substantive changes to what the administration had originally requested 
took place. As indicated in the quote above, Congress divided aid between a number 
of mechanisms, whereas the executive had sought to channel all official Mérida aid 
(including aid to the Mexican military) through INCLE accounts.46 $263.5 million 
was provided through INCLE, whilst $116.5 and $20 million went through the 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Economic Support Fund (ESF) mechanisms 
respectively.47 In addition, sections of Congress (notably Sen. Patrick Leahy [D-Vt], 
an important figure in human rights and foreign aid legislation)48 attempted to 
introduce a number of checks and human rights limits to the funding, to the apoplexy 
of White House officials and the Mexican government. The Bush administration’s 
request had contained no human rights conditionality, beside that which is provided 
automatically by U.S. foreign assistance law.49 Congress’ attempts to go beyond these 
basics with fairly significant human rights stipulations fused to any aid stimulated 
Mexican officials to cite affronts to their country’s sovereignty,50 and administration 
members to engage in surprisingly caustic public pressure in an attempt to cow 
                                                
45 Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub L. No. 110-252, 122 Stat. 2323 (2008) My emphasis. 
46 Seelke Funding and Policy Issues p.3 The Bush administration may have sought to direct funds 
through INCLE because, as of 2006, there was an explicitly CT justification within the INCLE fund. 
The 2006 Bureau of International Narcotics And Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) Budgetary 
Justification explained that, “To deal with the increasing linkage and overlap among drug, crime, and 
terrorist groups, INL has begun shifting from separate programs for counternarcotics and anticrime to a 
broader and more integrated law enforcement effort to combat the full range of criminal, drug, and 
terrorist threats” (U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Congressional Justification (Washington D.C., 2006) p. 5; Just the 
Facts: International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Assistance 
http://justf.org/Program?program=International_Narcotics_Control_and_Law_Enforcement Accessed 
29.09.12 Please note the Center for International Policy’s Just the Facts website U.S. security 
assistance to Latin America is now part of the Security Assitance Monitor project 
http://securityassistance.org)   
47 I provide more detail on this and the various mechanisms below. For a useful table of Mérida 
appropriations up to date to April 2014, see Seelke, Clare Ribando and Finklea, Kristin M, U.S.-
Mexican Security Cooperation: The MI and Beyond (Congressional Research Service, April 2014) p.7 
48 Leahy is the longest serving member of the U.S. Senate (and therefore President pro tempore), and a 
veteran advocate for human rights legislation and consideration in U.S. foreign policy. He is the author 
of the important ‘Leahy Amendment’ that has applied to U.S. foreign military aid since 1997. See 
footnote below. 
49 Since 1998 the so-called Leahy laws, named after their sponser Patrick Leahy, have been in place. 
They prohibit the furnishing of assistance to, “any foreign security force that is credibly believed to 
have committed a gross violation of human rights” under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as 
amended (FAA) and the Arms Export Control Act as amended (AECA). A separate rolling provision 
preventing any training being provided to a security unit by the DoD has also been in place, and in 
FY2014 this has been expanded to include equipment. This has built on country-specific human rights 
legislation (as in Mexico’s case) and some earlier human rights provision upon foreign assistance, but 
is the most expansive ‘permanent’ human rights legislation. See Nina M. Serafino, June S. Beittel, 
Lauren ploch Blanchard and Liana Rosen “Leahy Law” Human Rights Provisions and Security 
Assistance: Issue Overview (Congressional Research Service, January, 2014) p.1 
50 Cook and Seelke Merida Initiative [b] p.6; Dunn, Emily ‘Mexico and the Merida Initiative - A 
Difficult Call’ Council on Hemispheric Affairs (June 5th, 2008) http://www.coha.org/mexico-and-the-
merida-initiative-a-difficult-call/ Accessed 07.09.12  
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recalcitrant lawmakers.51 Despite this pressure, Congress was able to secure a 15% 
conditionality waiver on the INCLE and FMF funds, dependent on Mexico’s ability 
and effort to improve police force transparency, improve liaisons between human 
rights groups and government on Mérida, ensure judicial/civilian authorities 
investigations of military and federal police human rights abuses, and prohibit torture 
in line with international law.52   
 
However, we should exercise caution in determining how much weight we assign 
these Congressional changes to the overall direction of Mérida. Firstly, the human 
rights stipulations Congress attached to aid fell far short of their original aims, and the 
advice of human rights analysts and NGOs. Earlier iterations of the Act had made 
25% of aid reliant upon Mexico’s government and institutions meeting more stringent 
requirements than were set out in the final version of Mérida. Congress rolled back 
language seeking to ensure that Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission was 
strengthened, and that military personnel accused of human rights abuses would be 
tried in civilian courts.53 These are key measures for improving Mexico’s human 
rights records according to a number of expert sources.54 Of more import in terms of 
the aims of this current discussion is the fact that whilst Congress may have 
understood or presented the Supplemental Appropriations Act as, “only” combating 
drug trafficking and, “related” crime and violence, it did very little to change how the 
money was actually spent. Those items that had been described by the DoS as 
fulfilling, “Counternarcotics, Counterterrorism and Border Security” roles, as the 
policy detail sets out below attests, were all part of the eventual Mérida package.  
 
This is also borne out in a DoS spending report provided to Congress following the 
passage of the Supplemental Appropriations Act. The report at times matches up with 
the focus of Mérida as described in the Act, claiming the policy is, “designed to build 
on activities already underway in the region and to complement U.S. efforts here at 
home to reduce drug demand, to stop the flow of narcotics as well as arms and 
                                                
51 John Walters, then head of the Office of National Drugs Control Policy (ONDCP), suggested 
members of Congress attempting to condition the MI were guilty of trading on an insulting, “cartoon 
view” of Calderón and his government, "fighting and dying in order to get U.S. money so they can 
violate human rights". Lara Lakes Jordan‘White House: Congress “Sabotaging” Mexico Aid Deal’ 
Associated Press (June 3rd, 2008) 
http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2008Jun03/0,4675,MexicoDrugAid,00.html Accessed 
08.09.12  
52 Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 
53 Cook and Seelke Merida Initiative [b] p.6; ‘Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008: Engrossed 
Amendment Senate 2’  
54 Stephanie Erin Brewer ‘Rethinking the Mérida Initiative: Why the U.S. Must Change Course in its 
Approach to Mexico’s Drug War’ Human Rights Brief 16, 3 (2009) p.12; Human Rights Watch 
‘Uniform Impunity: Mexico’s Misuse of Military Justice to Prosecute Abuses in Counternarcotics and 
Public Security Operations’ Human Rights Watch (2009) Recently, under pressure from the Inter-
American Court on Human Rights (IACHR), the Mexican Supreme Court has made a number of 
independent rulings increasing the likelihood of civilian trials for military members in human rights 
cases as standard practice (see Amnesty ‘Mexico: Supreme Court Limit on Military Jurisdiction Must 
Become Binding Precedent’ Amnesty International (August 22nd, 2012) 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/mexico-supreme-court-limit-military-jurisdiction-must-become-
binding-precedent-all-courts-2012- Accessed 12.09.12). I look more deliberately at human rights issues 
below. 
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weapons, and to confront gangs and criminal organizations”.55 However, soon the 
language of CT, border security and wider security concerns reappears. Once again, 
the planned provision of Bell helicopters is seen in both a CT and CN light. The 
provision of CASA 235 maritime patrol aircraft will help SEMAR, “deny the use of 
Mexican waters to transnational criminals and terrorists.”  The U.S. would, “support 
the development of the Government of Mexico's institutional capacity to detect and 
interdict illicit drugs, explosives and weapons, trafficked/smuggled persons and 
individuals seeking to enter the United States to conduct terrorist activities.” Ion 
scanners would help, “detect illicit drug and arms trafficking through remote areas of 
Mexico” (whoever these illicit arms belong to or are destined for).56 There is also a 
clear indication that Mérida as a whole (including aid to Central America) is a wide 
ranging package that extends the concept of HS across the hemisphere, much in line 
with the goals of the SPP: 
 
Much as the United States has recognized the need to secure its  
borders, so have Mexico and the nations of Central America. It is  
not enough for us to focus solely on the Southwest border of the  
United States. By supporting our southern neighbors' efforts to  
secure their territory, we are able to create a much more secure  
area that extends to Panama and denies the use of this territory  
by drug traffickers, terrorists, or smugglers for illicit purposes.57  
 
Further Requests, and a Continuing Regional Focus 
The sense that the U.S. is seeking to construct a regional security integration running 
through Mexico via the MI was reinforced by the Bush administration’s request for 
further Mérida aid for FY2009. In asking for $450 million for Mexico (again through 
INCLE accounts only), the DoS again emphasised the threat of drug trafficking and 
transnational crime to joint U.S.-Mexican and regional security, but also highlighted 
improved military-to-military cooperation on CT.58 General ‘border security’ across 
the region is focused upon frequently in the document, often in relation to CT, but 
also in terms of other threats and goals. For example, there is mention of the “shared 
interest” between Mexico, the U.S. and other Central American nations in improving 
border security, with a direct reference for the opportunities to, “develop closer 
cooperation in counter-terrorism”.59 In discussing Belize, the document outlines that 
the U.S. will support its, “border security capabilities by providing equipment to the 
border police to tighten security on unmonitored borders with Guatemala, Honduras, 
and Mexico that facilitate the movement of drugs, trafficked persons, and illegal 
immigrants”.60  
 
As policy detail attests, there is a concomitant but deeper focus on Mexico’s side of 
its southern border. Here we see another clear traceable line between the details and 
policy of the MI, and the broader security concerns expressed by U.S. officials in 
                                                
55 U.S. Department of State FY2008 Supplemental Appropriation Spending Plan: Mexico, Central 
America Haiti and the Dominican Republic (Washington D.C. 2008) p.3 
56 ibid p.5-6 
57 ibid p.17 My emphasis 
58 U.S. Department of State Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 2009 
(Washington D.C, 2008) p.xxi, 707 
59 ibid p.743 
60 ibid p.658 
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relation to the importance of pushing forward with the SPP. As we saw previously, 
diplomatic cables reveal Mexico’s southern frontiers as an area of some weight in 
U.S. thinking. Former Ambassador Antonio Garza repeated in a cable prior to the 
visit to Mexico of then U.S. Attorney General Michael Mukasey, “Calderon also 
recognizes that Mexico's own southern border remains extremely vulnerable to 
immigration, trafficking in persons, and the smuggling of contraband, and that 
securing this border is of vital importance to U.S. security”.61 This is one of a series 
of diplomatic references to the perceived vulnerability of the southern border to a 
number of real and potential illicit activities. Here the MI is attuned explicitly to the 
U.S. goal of projecting its approach to border security onto Mexico, and creating a 
secure, shared economic space in line with the concepts of HS, or, more holistically, 
‘NAFTA-land Security.’ 
 
To highlight this point, and to show how Mérida policies are directly aimed to help 
Mexico to achieve greater border security, the Initiative builds on previous U.S. 
programs by financially assisting Mexican institutions such as the National Migration 
Institute (INM, previously INAMI) and Secretariat of Communications (SCT) to help 
improve their security, IT, inspection, verification and database systems. Mérida 
funds were also to be directed to Mexico’s intelligence service, Centro de 
Investigación y Seguridad Nacional (CISEN) for, “enhanced data management and 
analysis capabilities”.62 Mérida policy detail confirms that these programs went 
ahead, and once again we can see the focus on regional border security in that detail. 
Another report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirmed that Mérida 
funds were pending for Biometric equipment and Biometric sites for INM, including 
for 10 locations along the Southern border.63 This equipment was used to log persons 
crossing the border and has been touted for its part in allowing INM to track these 
individuals more efficiently, and potentially, “identify individuals in immigration 
detention centers who might pose a threat to national security”.64 In terms of Mérida’s 
intersection with wider programs and border security interests, the Export Control and 
Related Border Security (EXBS) Program and its, “strategic vision for the Western 
Hemisphere [...] to strengthen border security, including the legal and regulatory 
frameworks that affect trade” gets a specific mention.65 The EXBS grew out of 
nuclear nonproliferation efforts in former Soviet satellites, and has since expanded to 
a number of geographical areas, and added more general export controls and 
                                                
61 U.S. Embassy Mexico Scene Setter for the Visit of Attorney General Michael Mukasay to Mexico, 
January 15th-16th, 2008 Cable Reference: 000081 (11th January, 2008) Link: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08MEXICO81&q=epr%20mexico Accessed 13.10.12 
62 DoS FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan p.6 
63 Common Enemy, Common Struggle: Progress in U.S.-Mexican Efforts to Defeat Organized Crime 
and Drug Trafficking A Report to the Members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. 
Senate, 111th Congress (S. Prt 111-??) (2010) p.20 
64 U.S. Embassy Mexico ‘U.S. Delivers New Biometric Technology to INM To Help Strengthen 
Mexico’s Southern Border’ Press Release (November 3rd, 2011) http://mexico.usembassy.gov/press-
releases/ep111004-inami.html Accessed 03.10.12 Mexico has become somewhat of a world leader in 
the use of biometric technology. Despite concerns about privacy and its prototypical use on youth and, 
“casual labourers” (presumably at Southern border sites) it is rolling out a biometric I.D. card system, 
which is the first to use iris scans as part of its information package (Manuli, Gabriela ‘Despite Privacy 
Concerns, Mexico Continues Scanning Youth Irises for ID Cards’ Electronic Frontier Foundation 
(August 31st, 2012) https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/08/despite-privacy-concerns-mexico-
continues-scanning-youth-irises-id-cards Accessed 03.10.12). 
65 U.S. Embassy Mexico ‘Biometric Technology’ 
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conventional weaponry to its remit.66  
 
DoD Involvement 
Whilst I will go on to look at the role of the DoD in greater specific detail below, at 
this point it is worth highlighting that alongside further Mérida budgetary requests, 
non-Mérida funding was also increasing in tandem with Mérida. Under DoD aid 
programs such as Section 1004 Counter Drug Assistance and Section 1206 Train and 
Equip Authority,67 the Pentagon increased its involvement in aid provision to Mexico. 
For example in FY2008, the DoD provided just under $12.5 million for Mexico in a 
“CT package” designed to provide, “Equipment and training to reduce ungoverned 
territories that could be exploited by terrorists as safe havens and transit points”.68 
This DoD aid has been administered through USNORTHCOM. NORTHCOM’s 
Commander General. Renuart did not draw a particularly sharp distinction between 
his comments on Mexico’s CN concerns related to, “organized violent criminal 
networks” and the rationale for the 1206 ‘CT’ package, explaining that its equipment 
provision, “includes personal protective equipment, digital media forensics 
equipment, night vision devices, and equipment needed to board suspect vessels at 
sea”.69   
 
Thus military aid programs reinforce the sense of a multi-purpose security package 
being provided to Mexico, with a focus on a number of potential threats, including, 
but not exhausted by, CN. Again, the wider strategic advantages offered by Mérida 
are clear to see in official thinking, and a layering effect of influence is seen from the 
increased cooperation leading up to the SPP, through the SPP itself, and now through 
the MI. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) reported that, “According to 
DOD officials in Mexico City, Mérida has, “opened doors” for U.S.-Mexican military 
cooperation, and may result in increased DOD and State Department-funded training 
and equipment for the Mexican military.70 Another later CRS study discussed the 
view of Admiral James Winnefeld71 in seeing a, “‘tremendous opportunity’ to 
strengthen ties between the U.S. and Mexican militaries” in the Mérida context.72 
These two policy strands - official Mérida aid and increased U.S. military assistance 
from the DoD - are happening concomitantly, and indeed they are meant to 
complement each other. 
 
Further Appropriations, and What Place CN Concerns?  
On its final passage through Congress as the Omnibus Appropriations Act March 11th, 
2009, the Bush administration’s final Mérida request had been divided up amongst 
FMF, ESF and INCLE accounts. Whilst Congress also added the same human rights 
                                                
66 U.S. Department of State: The EXBS Program http://www.state.gov/t/isn/ecc/c27911.htm Accessed 
29.05.13; U.S. Department of State: A Resource on Strategic Trade Management and Export Controls 
http://www.state.gov/strategictrade/ Accessed 29.05.13  
67 More detail is provided on these particular programs below. 
68 U.S. Department of Defense Section 1209 and Section 1203(b) Report to Congress on Foreign 
Assistance Related Programs for Fiscal Years, 2008, 2009 and 2010 (Washington D.C. 2012) p.100 
69 ‘Statement of General Victor E. Renuart Jr. USAF Commander United States Northern Command 
and North American Aerospace Defense Command’ Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
111th Congress (March 17th, 2009)  
70 Seelke Funding and Policy Issues p.15 
71 NORTHCOM Commander May 2010 - August 2011 
72 Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Merida 
Initiative and Beyond (Congressional Research Service, August 2011) p.37 
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conditionality as had been placed on the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, it 
excluded “judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption and rule of law 
activities”.73 It also reduced total aid to $300 million from the requested $450 
million.74 The table below sets out all the appropriations up to this point: 
 
Table 1: Mérida Appropriations under Bush (in millions of $) 
Account FY2008 FY2009 Bridge FY2009 
INCLE 215.5 48 246 
FMF 116.5 0 39 
ESF 20 0 15 
Total 352 48 300 
  Overall Total 700 
 
Sources: Clare Ribando Seelke MI for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues 
(Congressional Research Service, August 2009) p.6 
 
However, once more there was little Congressional involvement in the final detail of 
Mérida aid, and little change on the overall multi-purpose security direction of the 
policy. As just one example, the INL’s 2009 Program and Budget Guide75 stated that 
it would be helping, “support the development of the GOM's [Government of 
Mexico’s] institutional capacity to detect and interdict inter alia illicit drugs, 
explosives and weapons, trafficked/smuggled persons and individuals seeking to enter 
the United States to conduct terrorist activities”.76  
 
In the Budgetary Justification for FY2009, the DoS groups Mexico together with a 
number of other challenging areas for U.S. foreign policy, often of crucial strategic 
importance, in outlining that with regard to INCLE that, “Resources are also focused 
in countries that have specific challenges to overcome to establish a secure, stable 
environment, such as Mexico, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, 
and Indonesia”.77 This specific challenge is namely the activities and increasing 
violence of “criminal elements” (cartels) and indeed their challenge to the state and, 
“virtual dominion” of certain areas within Mexico.78 At first blush, it appears 
credulity stretching to include Mexico amongst states with such serious issues of 
                                                
73 Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Merida 
Initiative and Beyond (Congressional Research Service, July 2010) p.27 
74 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524 (2009); 
Seelke Funding and Policy Issues p.4-5 Despite the author’s best efforts, he was unable to locate an 
exact breakdown for the original Mérida request of $450million for this piece of legislation, and so it is 
hard to say definitively what was ‘cut’ between request and appropriation by Congress.  
75 It should be noted that the legislative history becomes a little complex here, as the requests for 2008 
and 2009 were actually submitted fairly close together, and at the time of the publication of this 
particular document both what would become the Supplemental Appropriations Act and the Omnibus 
Appropriations Act were still at their request stage. It therefore becomes hard to disentangle a clear 
chronology, and assign which particular policy point belongs to which budget request. However, as the 
chapter argues, we should see the separate appropriations as parts of an integrated policy in any case. 
76 U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Fiscal 
Year 2009 Program and Budget Guide (Washington D.C., 2008) p.320-321 
77 U.S. Department of State Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 2009 
(Washington D.C, 2008) p.53 
78 DoS INL Fiscal Year 2009 Program and Budget Guide p.319 
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violence, effective governance and poverty as Afghanistan79 and Haiti.80 However it 
does also hint at the level of official U.S. concern about rising drug-related bloodshed 
and its impact on stability in the country. This flags another of the central arguments 
of this chapter, namely that drug activity and violence in Mexico is a genuine 
motivating factor for policy, and therefore CN programs that attempt to mitigate it are 
an essential element of Mérida and bilateral U.S.-Mexico security relations. 
 
This assertion demarcates me from that section of the Critical literature that has 
underplayed the ‘drug threat’ as a Trojan horse for securing ‘genuine’ strategic and 
economic interests.81 However it does raise an immediate question - what is the move 
to a security relationship and Mérida aid more motivated by: CN and stemming drug 
violence, or the U.S. interest in establishing efficacious security relations with the 
Mexican state and its concurrent drive to improve the wide spectrum security 
competencies of Mexico’s state institutions? The simple answer is the two are not 
mutually exclusive, and indeed share a symbiotic relationship. They are both driven 
by the broad U.S. concern (one, as we’ve seen, with significant historical roots) in 
helping to foster and encourage a secure and stable Mexico, whose overall political-
economic environment dovetails as closely as possible with U.S. strategic preferences 
and interests, most especially economic ones. U.S. planners increasingly see Mexico’s 
continuing drug violence as one of a number of current or potential threats to 
Mexico’s stability, and by extension the economically important free trade NAFTA-
zone it is part of. The U.S.’ Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from 
Central America and Mexico document summarised the threat of violent gangs that 
operate in Mexico and across the Central American region, asserting that they 
endangered, “the U.S. regional interest in fostering stable democracies with free and 
vibrant economies”.82  
 
It is in the context we should understand this excerpt from the Embassy cable that 
prepared Bush for his meeting with Calderón that spawned the MI in March 2007. 
Discussing the security drive the new Mexican President had engaged on since the 
start of his tenure, the cable related that: 
 
 His security efforts are designed to reassure foreign investors  
 and Mexicans worried about drug-related crime and lawlessness  
 that organized criminals will no longer act with impunity. He  
 knows that attracting investment, particularly from the U.S., is  
 pivotal to curbing migration and narrowing the social and economic  
 inequalities that undercut Mexican society and result in bitter  
                                                
79 This is not the last time we will see connections in official parlance and policy concerning 
similarities between Afghanistan and Mexico. See below. 
80 To a certain extent, this chimes with the 2008 Joint Operating Environment report’s controversial 
assessment that Mexico was to be understood as a weak and/or failing state, as we mentioned in the 
Introduction. U.S. Joint Forces Command The Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges and 
Implications for the Future Joint Force (Virginia, 2008) Whilst this assertion has largely disappeared 
from official public discourse, interestingly, Presidential candidate Mitt Romney used the term to 
describe Mexico, grouping the country with Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan in a campaign 
white paper. Joshua Hersh ‘Mitt Romney’s Mexico Problem’ The Huffington Post (January 14th, 2012) 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/14/mitt-romney-mexico_n_1206096.html Accessed 30.09.12  
81 See Literature Review  
82 U.S. Department of State U.S. Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs  
from Central America and Mexico (Washington D.C. 2007) p.1 My emphasis. 
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 political divisions. Calderon also recognizes that his vision of  
 Mexico becoming a more prosperous country and a regional leader  
 depends on security and the rule of law.83  
 
There is some debate as to whether drug violence has in actuality had a tangible effect 
on investment and growth in Mexico. Both have continued to rise (other than in the 
U.S. credit-crunch affected year of 2009) despite the concomitant rise in drug 
violence. Investment levels remain markedly high in several of those states most 
affected by drug violence.84 U.S. diplomatic cables from the 2006-2008 period reflect 
the somewhat confused picture on this issue. In 2006, the U.S. Embassy in Mexico 
discussed a meeting with important Mexico investors, and cited both the study of the 
private NGO Insituto Mexicano para la Competividad (IMC) that asserted crime 
issues cost Mexico 1.5% of GDP annually (around $1.8 billion), and the opinions of 
several of those investors that security concerns affected operating costs and, 
potentially, their continued investment. However it also noted that no company was 
willing or able to offer an example where violence had actually affected an 
investment, which the U.S. interpreted in itself as possibly the result of those present 
not wanting to add to a perception of insecurity that could dissuade investors from 
considering Mexico.85  
 
Despite the complexity of the investment environment’s relations with violence, other 
cables attest to U.S. concern about the relationship between Mexico’s state security 
capabilities, drug violence, and continuing growth and FDI. A cable referring to 
Mexico’s investment climate in 2008 included drug violence in the section on, 
“Political Violence”. Whilst concluding that political violence should, “not be a major 
concern” (despite the previously mentioned limited activities of the EPR and violent 
scenes at protests in Oaxaca in 2006) in discussing drug violence the cable states, 
“Though not political in nature, the Embassy has noticed that general security 
concerns remain an issue for companies looking to invest in the country”.86 Another 
cable specifically discussing the state of San Luis Potosi suggested that if security 
officials were willing to meet, “narco-violence” head on this could increase 
attractiveness for investors, as could a relative increase in such violence in the 
neighboring Nuevo Leon, through making Potosi the comparatively better option.87 
                                                
83 U.S. Embassy Mexico Scene Setter for President’s Trip to Mexico, March 12-14th, 2007 Cable 
Reference: 001102 (5th March, 2007) Link: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07MEXICO1102&q=merida%20mexico Accessed 
03.10.12 
84 June S. Beittel Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence 
(Congressional Research Service, August 2012) p.27 
85 U.S. Embassy Mexico Effect of Violence on Mexican Investment Cable Reference: 001536 (22nd 
March, 2006) Link: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06MEXICO1536&q=investment%20mexico%20security 
Accessed 04.10.12 The cable also directly referenced the “paradox” of areas with the highest growth 
rates also experiencing relatively more security issues. This, as we have seen, is a theme taken up 
academic studies. However it warrants further research given the supposed anathema that violence 
represents for investment and business. As we also saw previously, there have since been more direct 
attacks on business interests.  
86 U.S. Embassy Mexico Mexico’s 2008 Investment Climate Statement - Part 2 of 2 Cable Reference 
000152 (22nd January, 2008) Link: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08MEXICO152&q=epr%20mexico Accessed 01.10.12 
87 U.S. Consulate Monterrey San Luis Potosi Growing Economically but not Enough to Provide 
Needed Jobs Cable Reference: 000100 (27th February, 2008) Link: 
Paul Ashby: NAFTA-Land Security: The MI, Transnational Threats, and U.S. Security Projection in Mexico  
PhD Thesis 
University of Kent 
 
200 
Whatever the veracity of these claims, the key is the U.S. response is not just to 
‘actual,’ universally agreed upon, bona fide threats (if such threats exist), but also to 
perceived and potentially plausible threats. The ability of the Mexican state to counter 
such threat scenarios, whether they stem from drug trafficking or other potential 
security contingencies and destabilising influences, is at the heart of the U.S.’ security 
policies in Mexico and the growing bilateral security relationship.  
 
There is a further element to this threat stemming directly from CN concerns. In 2008 
former Ambassador Anthonio Garza warned that, “Deteriorating security conditions 
throughout the country will further erode the electoral chances of moderate leaders in 
Mexico and could eventually open the door to less democratic challengers.” Garza 
acknowledged that the left in Mexico had been harmed by the protests of the PRD 
following the fractious knife-edge election of Calderón, and consoled that no Chávez 
was, “waiting in the wings”. However he did contend that, “The more immediate 
threat to political stability comes from narco-traffickers and other organized crime 
elements who challenge security and cause the government to divert precious 
resources to fight rampant crime throughout the country.” This threat could 
potentially be magnified by the looming energy crisis spurred by PEMEX’s 
dwindling oil reserves and the exhaustion of the Cantarell oil field, and its apparent 
lack of capital ability to invest in the highly challenging technological projects 
required to boost production and discovery.88 As Mexico’s federal government relies 
on oil revenues for 40% of its budget,89 this is a potentially very serious slow-motion 
economic crisis. Garza cautions that, “Mexico will likely endure a protracted fight 
against the cartels with detrimental effects on foreign investment, tourism and internal 
stability. Without a formal strategy that reduces the country’s heavy reliance on oil 
revenues, security costs will bleed the Mexican treasury for many years to come”.90 
This is a recurrent theme in the Mexico cables. 
 
As the testimony of Thomas Shannon indicated, CN acts as a convenient access point 
for security integration for the U.S., but it is also an important element of a 
multipurpose security strategy for Mexico (constructed through that access point) 
precisely because drug violence is now amongst the threats to U.S. economic and 
strategic interests in that country (and indeed the region).91 This recurrent argument 
will continue to be reinforced as I proceed. For now, it suffices to reiterate the key 
argument of this section, namely that the policy justification for Mérida demonstrates 
that from the outset it represented a regionally-focused multi-purpose security 
                                                
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08MONTERREY100&q=investors%20mexico%narcoti
cs Accessed 12.10.12 
88 For more on this issue see, for example, Michael T. Klare The Race for What’s Left: The Global 
Scramble for the World’s Last Resources (Picador, 2012), p.19-22 
89 The figure cited in this particular cable. 
90 U.S. Embassy Mexico Economic Conditions in Mexico Cable Reference 000033 (7th January, 2009) 
Link: http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09MEXICO33&q=china%20mexico Accessed 
13.10.12 As we saw in the previous chapter, Mexican reforms have tried to address this federal reliance 
on oil profits, but this is likely to take a long time to succeed. 
91 However, this is not to argue that the GOM and its security forces have not used CN instrumentally 
to target political and civil society opponents (including insurgent movements), that the Mexican 
federal and local authorities and security forces have not attempted to silence dissidents and human 
rights complainants, that U.S. training and equipment has not been used in these efforts (whatever its 
intended use), and that the U.S. has not supplied certain aid to the GOM that has a social control 
purpose.  
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package, with clear ties to the intentions of NAFTA-land Security. Within this 
overarching framework there is a clear CN element, which was fairly heavily slanted 
towards militarised options in improving Mexico’s capacity to improve wide-
spectrum security. However, it also contained important social-institutional aid and 
reform that was designed to help fulfill long-term security and governance efficacies 
of several state institutions. I have traced this conclusion from Mérida’s conception, 
to its appropriation, through to its planned delivery. I now move onto the evolution of 
Mérida policies as the Obama administration moved into power. Does this assessment 
hold true through this period? Were the Obama administration’s priorities and goals 
any different to those of the Bush administration? Were the justifications of this 
administration any different, and how did they relate to actual policy? 
 
Mérida Under Obama: More of the Same? (2009-2012) 
 
Early Requests and Appropriations 
The Obama administration has continued to seek elevated levels of aid to Mexico 
through its tenure. Partially this was a working through of the appropriations and 
planning secured in Bush’s second term. Interestingly, the new administration’s first 
stand-alone budgetary request for Mexico was a $66 million supplemental to provide 
the Mexican Secretariat of Public Security and Federal Police (Secretaría de la 
Seguridad Pública - SSP)92 with three UH60M Sikorsky Blackhawk helicopters. 
Democrat-controlled Congress, instead appropriated $420 million in the FMF and 
INCLE accounts in the FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act. Congress removed 
any human rights conditionality from the FMF funds to provide aircraft to SEMAR 
that made up $260 million of the appropriation, but kept it on INCLE aid.93 The 
administration’s second Mérida request was for $450 million in FY210. Again this 
was requested entirely through the INCLE mechanism. The INL Budget Guide for 
that year couched the request in very familiar terms. Connecting the Mexican and 
Central American elements of the MI to reinforce the regional focus and ‘border 
projection’ element of the package, the document states: 
 
 The overall objectives of the assistance are to break the power  
and impunity of criminal organizations; strengthen border, air, and  
maritime controls from the Southwest border of the United States  
to Panama; improve the capacity of justice systems in the region to  
conduct investigations and prosecutions; consolidate the rule of  
law, protect human rights, and reform prison management; curtail  
criminal gang activity; and reduce the demand for drugs  
throughout the region.94 
 
                                                
92 This state institution was one of the key elements of Calderón’s security reforms, as it took over 
responsibility for Mexican ‘internal security’ from the often-controversial Secretariat of the Interior 
(Secretaría de Gobernación - SEGOB). However, in the latest round of musical chairs with regard to 
Mexico’s security policy, the Peña Nieto administration formerly shifted ‘internal security’ powers and 
remit back into SEGOB in January 2013. 
93 Specifically maritime helicopters and CASA air and maritime surveillance planes. Seelke Funding 
and Policy Issues (2009 and 2010) p. 5 It is interesting to consider what part politics played in this 
larger appropriation, with a Democrat in the White House and a Democrat controlled Congress in 
place.  
94 Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Affairs Fiscal 
Year 2010 Program and Budget Guide (Washington D.C., 2009) p.29 My emphasis. 
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Discussing Mexico specifically, the distinction between Mérida and other U.S. 
security and domestic priorities was again non-existent. The INL Guide focused on 
“Border and Port Security” and repeated previous years’ justifications in terms of, 
“detection and interdiction of illicit narcotics, contraband (including explosives and 
weapons), trafficked/smuggled persons and individuals seeking to enter the United 
States to conduct terrorist activities.”95 Those concerns over the ‘border paradox’, 
which animated U.S. policymakers through the 90s and more pressingly after 9/11, 
again appear. The request seeks to ensure, “More effective and rapid screening of 
cargo and vehicles […] for contraband, illicit drugs and smuggled aliens” and, 
“reduced delays of legitimate traffic moving north towards our common border.”96 
Whilst these overall aims were once again unaffected by the legislative process, actual 
figures were again reduced. Eventually Congress appropriated $210.3 million in the 
FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act. Members argued the extra funding 
provided in the 2009 act made up for the shortfall from the Obama administration’s 
original request.97 Again funding was divided, although the vast majority 
($190million) went through INCLE, and it was all subject to the 15% conditionality 
(minus institution-building, anti-corruption, judicial reform and ‘rule of law’ aid).98 In 
any case, the FY10 Supplemental Appropriations Act saw Congress appropriate a 
further $175 million in the INCLE account (all with the 15% stipulation), taking 2010 
funding to $385.3 million.99 A table clearly setting out these mounting different 
appropriations up to this point in Mérida’s history is provided below: 
 
Table 2: Mérida Appropriations by end FY2010 (in millions of $) 
 
The Beyond Mérida Framework 
However whilst Mérida funding remained high under Obama, the Initiative did go 
through somewhat of a rebranding. In March 2010, following a meeting of the Mérida 
High-Level Consultative Group (itself a creation of the Initiative), the two 
administrations publicly announced the ‘Beyond Mérida’ framework.100 This 
announcement reflected the less public release of the DoS’ Congressional Budget 
                                                
95 ibid p.311 
96 ibid 
97 Seelke Funding and Policy Issues p.6 
98 Seelke and Finklea MI and Beyond (Jun 2010) p.27 However Congress did not specify the amounts 
for these activities in this piece of legislation (Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-
117, 123 Stat. 3034 (2009)) so the amount under conditionality would have depended on how the DoS 
actually used the money.  
99  Seelke and Finklea MI and Beyond (August 2011) p.9, 35 
100 ibid p.19 




FY2010 (1) FY2010 
(2) 
INCLE 263.5 246 160 190 175 
FMF 116.5 39 260 5.3 0 
ESF 20 15 0 15 0 
Total 400 300 420 210.3 175 
    Overall Total 1505.3 
Sources: Seelke Funding and Policy Issues p.6; Seelke and Finklea MI and Beyond (Jun, 2010) p.7  
*Please note that the FY2008 includes the FY2009 Bridge - see Table 1 above 
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Justification for Foreign Operations, published a fortnight prior, which outlined that 
Mérida would re-focus from providing military hardware, to building and 
strengthening several Mexican state institutions in FY2011. To do this, the ‘Beyond 
Mérida’ agenda would concentrate, on “four pillars of cooperation”.101 In discussing 
the policy evolution, Secretary of State Clinton outlined these four pillars as, 
“disrupting the capacity of the criminal organizations, reforming and strengthening 
security and justice institutions, creating a 21st century border that advances citizen 
safety and commerce, and building stronger, more resilient communities that can 
resist the influence of the cartels”.102 Whilst there was an institution-building element 
in what we could crudely call ‘Mérida 1’, the oft-repeated justification behind this 
new agenda was that it would more definitively focus on building institution 
capacities, and concentrate renewed efforts to tackle socioeconomic problems that 
were argued to underlie Mexico’s drug-related security crisis.103  
 
Of course, preparations for this shift in focus were underway well before these official 
pronouncements. A cable from October 2009 detailed bilateral discussions under the, 
“rubric of a ‘Beyond Merida’ joint planning effort.” The four-pillar strategy was 
already in place at this point, so clearly discussions pre-dated even this cable. The 
discussion focused on the fact Calderón had “officially tapped” CISEN Director 
Gueillermo Valdez to coordinate Mexico’s side of the discussions, showing the high-
level importance that continued to be attached to the MI, and the role of Mexico’s 
intelligence service in the strategy.104 Further cables show that this was not just a 
rhetorical exercise. In an information piece for the Secretary of State prior to her 
meeting with her Mexican counterpart, new Ambassador Carlos Pascual105 pinpointed 
the strategic thinking behind the fresh policy approach. Whilst praising interdiction 
efforts and the important groundwork laid down by ‘Mérida 1’, he stated that, “we 
[the U.S.] recognize the limitations on confronting criminal groups without the 
effective institutional backing to support the lasting disruption of these elements. We 
must help Mexico build its most key institutions with seamless integration of 
operations, investigations, intelligence, prosecutions, and convictions.” Effectively, 
then, ‘Beyond Mérida’ was more of an evolution of the security policy initiated by the 
Bush administration, and it was still targeted on improving Mexico’s state security 
capacities. Pascual continued, “We also need to develop new programs to build an 
intelligence capability, foster the Federal Police's own institutional development and 
                                                
101 U.S. Department of State Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 2011 
(Washington D.C. 2010) p.96 
102 U.S. Department of State ‘Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton: Remarks with Mexican 
Foreign Secretary Patricia Espinosa’ (March 23rd, 2010) 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/03/138963.htm Accessed 18.10.12  
103 For example, Seelke and Finklea The MI and Beyond (Aug 2011) p.21-30 
104 U.S Embassy Mexico Valdez, Tello Peon Team Up on Beyond Merida Cable Reference 002913 (7th 
October, 2009) 
Link:http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09MEXICO2913&q=beyond%20merida%20mexic
o Accessed 16.10.12 
105 Pascual was a key progenitor of Mérida’s new direction one of the big-name scalps for WikiLeaks, 
as his frank assessments of Calderón’s government’s achievements on tackling organized crime were 
argued to have lost him his job. Pascual resigned under intense pressure from Calderón, who took 
umbrage at Pascual’s claims of institutional inefficiencies and rivalries in Mexico. However there were 
also theories Pascual’s relationship with the daughter of a prominent PRI leader had been an additional 
factor. Associated Press ‘U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Resigns over WikiLeaks Cables’ Guardian 
(March 20th, 2011) http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/20/us-ambassador-mexico-resigns-
wikileaks Accessed 15.06.11 
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training capacity, promote swifter implementation of judicial reform, and prompt 
greater inter-institutional coordination and cooperation”.106  
 
Comparatively more resources have been poured into institutional and socio-
economic aid programs in the Obama administration, whilst official Mérida military 
equipment transfers have been scaled back. Appropriations and requests in 2011, 
2012, 2013 and 2014 were lower than for the three previous years, and more skewed 
to ‘Social and Economic Aid’, especially for wider support for justice sector reform 
already under way. The INL Budget Guide for FY2011, as a typical policy document, 
highlights that the program for that year, “builds on efforts begun under the Merida 
Initiative, with a shift away from expensive equipment and towards supporting 
Mexican government institutional reforms and strengthening rule of law”.107 The aid 
figures bear that assertion out. In the original INCLE request for FY2011 $78 million 
and $20 million was proposed for ‘CN’ and ‘Transnational Crime’ respectively, 
whilst ‘Rule of Law and Human Rights’ and ‘Good Governance’ were due to receive 
$144 million and $35 million.108 Whilst these categories are broad, they represent a 
shift in focus. In the FY2011 appropriation Congress spread $143 million of Mérida 
funds over the INCLE, FMF and ESF accounts, of which $105 million was deemed as 
economic / social aid (with $87 million of the $117 million from the INCLE account 
being reported as part of the Rule of Law and Human Rights programme, the rest as 
military / police aid in ‘Counternarcotics).109 Compare this with the FY2010 Budget 
Guide, where almost 90% of the requested $459,325,000 INCLE funds were for CN 
“interdiction”.110 In FY2012 $281.8 million was appropriated, of which $201.8 
million was demarcated as economic and social aid.111 The table below sets out the 










                                                
106 U.S. Embassy Mexico Your Meeting with FM Espinosa at UNGA Cable Reference: 002766 (23rd 
September, 2009) Link: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09MEXICO2766&q=beyond%20merida%20mexico 
Accessed 21.10.12 My emphasis 
107 U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Fiscal 
Year 2011 Program and Budget Guide (Washington D.C., 2010) p.170 
108 ibid p.173 These are broad categories of course. Although its not all that simple a task, I try to add a 
little more detail below. 
109 U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Fiscal 
Year 2013 Program and Budget Guide (Washington D.C., 2012) p.222  
110 DoS INL Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Guide p.319 Congress of course altered these amounts through 
appropriation, see above. 
111 Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The MI and 
Beyond Congressional Research Service, April 2014) p.7; Security Assistance Monitor: Mexico Aid 
Data http://www.securityassistance.org/data/program/economic/Mexico/2008/2015/is_all/ Accessed 
frequently 
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Table 3: Mérida Appropriations by end FY2012 (millions of $) 
Account  FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 
INCLE 263.5 406 365 117 248.5 
FMF 116.5 299 5.3 8 N/A* 
ESF 20 15 15 18 33.3 
Total 400 720 385.3 143 281.8 
    Overall Total 1930.1 
Sources: 1 See above and Seelke and Finklea Mérida and Beyond (Apr 14) p. 7  
* As explained below, FMF money was moved out of official Mérida appropriations in this year. 
There are some semantics involved here. There is not all that much of a definitional 
leap involved in separating CN from some of the activities covered in the Beyond 
Mérida recalibration. Indeed DoS officials told the U.S. GAO that the four pillars 
framework would apply to all law enforcement and CN interaction with Mexico, 
through Mérida officially or otherwise.112 However there was an emphasis on ‘de-
militarising’ the CN effort. Thus the 2011 INL Budget Guide stated that the 
institutional pillar of the Beyond Mérida strategy would support, “Law enforcement 
training and professionalization at the federal level, and increasingly at the state and 
local level,” which would, “enable the military to stand down from its law 
enforcement and counternarcotics role.”113 It also suggested the focus was on bringing 
drug enforcement cases more effectively through the criminal process from 
investigation to trial, an understandable goal given Mexico’s aforementioned criminal 
impunity rate. This included aims to improve human rights observance, evidence 
collection, using evidence for oral trials and anti-corruption through training and 
equipment, as well as continued support for judicial reform begun under the ‘original’ 
MI (in support of Mexico’s move in this direction).114 There was also funding for 
demand reduction and community projects in especially violent and problematic cities 
like Tijuana and Ciudad Juárez.115 Thus whilst we may still justifiably label these 
efforts as CN in their own way, as expensive equipment transfers to the police and 
military began to wind down, these Beyond Mérida tranches began to more heavily 
support (relatively speaking) institutional reform and improvement in Mexico.  
 
However, it is crucial to stress that despite the policy shift (or, more accurately, 
evolution) Mérida is still driven by U.S. security concerns and interests. These 
interests are themselves underpinned by a clear U.S. interest in achieving broad 
stability and security in Mexico, through the Mexican state apparatus, not least to gird 
the shared investment and trade environment created through NAFTA. Some 
particularly helpful cables released by WikiLeaks highlight this point. In a meeting 
concerning Mexico’s competitiveness in June 2009, President Calderón justified his 
CN strategy as, “a way of strengthening the rule of law and providing legal certainty 
for local and foreign investors.” The same cable discussed the problem of ‘Security’ 
and ‘Rule of Law’, outlining that, “The government's challenge has been to overhaul 
and rebuild Mexico's security institutions, as there cannot be economic development 
                                                
112 GAO Merida Initiative p.7 
113 DoS INL Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Guide p.171-172  
114 ibid 
115 For example see Diana Negroponte ‘Pillar IV of Beyond Mérida: Addressing the Socio-Economic 
Causes of Drug-Related Crime and Violence in Mexico’ Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson 
Center (May, 2011); Seelke and Finklea MI and Beyond (Aug 2011) p. 28-30 
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without trustworthy institutions”.116 In another very telling cable, John D. Feeley117 
outlined that the U.S. saw institutional ineffectiveness and the Mexican state’s long-
term resistance to transparency (especially in the Mexican army [SEDENA]) as 
barriers to achieving U.S. strategic goals in this light. It states, “Mexican security 
institutions are often locked in a zero-sum competition in which one agency's success 
is viewed as another's failure, information is closely guarded, and joint operations are 
all but unheard of.” It goes on to assert that the U.S. needs, “to ensure that we help 
Mexico build its most key institutions with seamless integration of operations, 
investigations, intelligence, prosecutions, and convictions.”118 In this context it makes 
clear that the Mexican military alone could not achieve crucial security aims when it 
came to the CN element of Mérida, and the federal police would have to continue to 
be bolstered, girded against corruption, and professionalised.    
 
The continuity is highlighted in Congressional Budget Justifications released by the 
DoS. Whilst they are not the most remarkable or arcane words in U.S. diplomatic 
language, it is interesting to note that the 2011 Budget Justification recalled the SPP 
in asserting that, “The security and prosperity of the United States is directly linked to 
Mexico.”119 This section of the Budget Justification also discusses how the U.S. will 
invest in higher education and health programs to help reduce the numbers of those in 
Mexico who seek to leave for the U.S. for better opportunities, but also, “help 
mitigate social inequity and the pressures that drive youth to criminal activities.”120 
Whilst of course these Budget documents utilise a broad brush to summarise a huge 
number of global activities, it is also revealing to see how the U.S. DoS categorises 
broad goals with regard to Mexico in this period. The MI is placed under the larger 
heading of ‘Peace and Security’. Also under this heading are several aid programmes 
that are not officially part of the MI, including in ‘Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, 
Demining, and Related Programs’ (NADR), the aforementioned EXBS, and IMET. 
There is deep interconnectivity between these programmes and those that are 
officially parts of the MI. We can begin to see the joined-up logic between aid 
programmes in service of the NAFTA-land Security agenda.  
 
Thus, this particular section of the FY2011 request states that an aim within the 
NADR is to use ‘Anti-Terrorism Assistance to, “deliver cyber security training to 
Mexican federal law enforcement to allow them to better counter and investigate 
cyber related threats and assist the GOM Attorney General’s Office and the Public 
Security Office in their efforts against drug trafficking.”121 There is further material 
here that is worth exploring at length. With regard to the projection of U.S. HS 
                                                
116 U.S. Embassy Mexico GOM Focuses on Mexico’s Competitiveness Cable Reference 001841 (26th 
June, 2009) Link: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09MEXICO1841&q=investment%20law%20mexico%2
0of%20rule Accessed 22.10.12 
117 Then Deputy Chief of Mission in Mexico, managing the implementation of the MI. 
118 U.S. Embassy Mexico Scenesetter for the Opening of the Defense Bilateral Working Group, 
Washington D.C., February 1 (29th January, 2010) Cable Reference 000083 Link: 
https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=10MEXICO83&q=institutions%20merida%20mexi
co Accessed 29.07.14 
119 U.S. Department of State Congressional Budget Justification Foreign Operations Annex: Regional 
Perspectives Fiscal Year 2011 (Washington D.C., 2010) p.725 
120 ibid 
121 ibid p.726 
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concepts to Mexico, the document outlines that through the EXBS programme122 the 
U.S. intended to, “help the GOM [Mexican government] to procure radiation 
detection equipment for Mexico’s largest ports and computer equipment to ensure real 
time access to U.S. information on suspicious travelers.” There is a clear sense of 
border security depth within ‘NAFTA-land’ being expressed here. On the protection 
of critical North American infrastructure, there was an aim to provide assistance to, 
“improve GOM capability to protect critical petroleum assets in the Bay of 
Campeche.”  Of course this has great consequence for U.S. interests in energy 
security. On a more general note, the outlining of EXBS goals in this Budget Request 
notes how it will play a “critical role in enhancing military-to-military relationships 
that are critical in developing partnerships for the security of North America.123  
Meanwhile, the section on IMET states that its training would help Mexico counter 
trafficking of “all kinds”, whilst enhancing “interoperability”.124  Whatever the 
intention of putting these different programmes together was, it reveals a truth about 
the inter-relatedness of U.S policy towards Mexico in terms of the wider goals of 
NAFTA-land Security.  
 
Clearly this strategic aim is continued under the Beyond Mérida framework. The 
FY2012 Budget Justification again included Mérida under the ‘Peace and Security’ 
heading and alongside aid mechanisms that were not strictly part of the MI. In 
addition, despite a real pecuniary shift to institution-building over equipment transfers 
to security forces, the Mexican military is still paramount in U.S. thinking. Thus, 
IMET funds, amongst other goals, were justified as being used to, “improve and 
expand the military’s capacity to fight transnational crime.”125 Linking the terrorist 
threat with cartel activities, the NADR aid for this year is slated to include improving 
Mexico’s ability to protect VIPs. The Justification explained that as, “organized crime 
syndicates have increasingly targeted political figures, this VIP protection training is 
vital.”126 Within the EXBS’ purview, Mexico’s, and NAFTA’s, southern border is 
again an area of concern, and therefore, “Enhancing enforcement will also be a 
priority on Mexico’s southern border chokepoints in partnership with and to leverage 
the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection efforts on the 
northern (U.S.) border.”127 An EXBS document expresses the impetus provided by the 
MI to encourage Mexico to engage on other issues of concern to the U.S, 
fundamentally underlining the interconnectivity of policy around the overarching 
regional logic. Stating that initially EXBS efforts were slow, it praised the progress 
made since 2007, and that, “The U.S.-sponsored Merida Initiative, helped to set the 
conditions for development in the nonproliferation arena in Mexico, and the 
Department of Energy’s [DoE] Megaports and Second Line of Defense [SLD] 
programs, in concert with Merida, also complemented the EXBS program and 
facilitated its success.”128 
 
                                                
122 Funded through the NADR mechanism.  
123 All quotes here from ibid 
124 ibid 
125 Congressional Budget Justification Foreign Operations Annex: Regional Perspectives Fiscal Year 
2012 (Washington D.C., 2011) p.795 
126 ibid 
127 ibid p.796 
128 U.S. Department of State EXBS Newsletter, Volume II, Issue 3 (Washington D.C., July 2011) 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/170969.pdf Accessed 29.05.14 My emphasis 
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The wider rationale here is clear. Diplomatic cables through the 2007-2010 period 
continually emphasise that not only are U.S. economic links with Mexico crucial 
through trade and energy, but the future competitiveness of North America as a whole 
will be key to mutual economic growth. One cable neatly summarises the 
interconnectedness of the U.S.-Mexico economy. After stressing that, “As we 
institutionalize the security agenda [with Mexico] we will also need to give more 
attention to the economic and social agendas” (again, exactly what the SPP was about, 
and now taken up in the HLED in reaction to Peña Nieto’s reform agenda), the cable 
continued: 
  
Efforts to strengthen mutually beneficial competitiveness in 2010  
will focus on identifying new cross border production  
opportunities, spurring innovation, building a modern 21st century  
border, and supporting an energy and environment agenda that is  
atop priority for the Calderon administration and offers huge  
potential for future investment and economic development. Our  
economic recovery and Mexico's go hand in hand, and U.S.  
export-led successes are depending increasingly on partnering  
with Mexico's manufacturing capability.129 
 
There is a global significance to ‘North American competitiveness’. “Given the 
challenges from China and other emerging economies, it is essential for Mexico and 
the U.S. to align views in order to establish a framework for sustainable growth”.130 
Security is viewed as a key prerequisite for investment, competitiveness, and 
economic activity, and Mérida and associated security engagements is designed, as 
we have seen, to improve security in a number of areas, including CN. This brings us 
right back to the priorities of the SPP. As Shannon contested in 2008, the SPP of 
course combined a, “very strong commitment to free trade” with a view to, 
“deepening the economic relationship but also protecting it” and thereby ensuring, 
“that by linking security and prosperity we are in a position to protect a common 
economic area.”131 Understanding the NAFTA area as key to U.S. economic strategic 
thinking, helps us to understand further why the U.S. was so keen to “armor” it, and 
why Mérida carried the torch for these priorities as the SPP stalled. 
 
Maintaining this focus in our understanding of Mérida is especially important as we 
consider the genuine but subtle changes in official policy justifications around the 
Beyond Mérida security package. Official documentation was more uniformly 
focused on the CN element of Mérida, separating it out as focused on CN compared 
to the more wide-ranging assistance provided in the Bush era,132 and the FMF 
                                                
129 U.S. Embassy Mexico U.S.-Mexico Relations: Progress in 2009, Challenges in 2010 Cable 
Reference 000202 (21st January, 2010) Link: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=10MEXICO202&q=beyond%20merida%20mexico 
Accessed 21.10.12 My emphasis 
130 U.S. Embassy Mexico New Finance Secretary Meets with Ambassador, NSC Cable Reference 
000198 (21st January, 2010) Link: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=10MEXICO198&q=china%20mexico Accessed 
21.10.12 
131 DoS Archive ‘Discussion on the Security and Prosperity Partnership’  
132 For example, whereas the DoS INL Program and Budget Guide in FY2008 and 2009, 2010 
discussed terrorism and port / border security, the FY2011 document focused on the ‘four pillar’ 
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component of Mérida was moved out from the Initiative to stand alone in aiding both, 
“homeland defense and counternarcotics efforts”.133 It appeared that the U.S.’ 
concerns during Obama’s Presidency had shifted to the increasing levels of drug 
violence in Mexico, and / or the administration was keen to show that Mérida was 
now a dedicated CN operating framework. This sense was brought most publicly to 
the fore by Secretary of State Clinton’s comparison of the situation in Mexico to an 
insurgency.134 Diplomatic cables, meanwhile, referred to the ‘drug war’ as just that: a 
genuine armed conflict.135 Other cables demonstrated alarm at the “guerilla-like 
tactics employed by La Familia [Michoacana]” in their battles with federal forces in 
the state of Michoacán, highlighting, “the ability of this crime syndicate to not only 
mobilize bands of its members quickly in response to an event but also conduct 
operations with tactical precision”.136 Other areas were witnessing the continuing 
growth of military like tactics in the ‘drug war’ in Mexico.137 There was also growing 
direct threats to U.S. interests in Mexico through this period. Cables warn of 
intelligence that cartels were planning to target the U.S. Consuluate in Monterrey138 
and Border Patrol reports that they were facing increased violence.139 These were not 
specious threats; on March 10th, 2010 (the same month ‘Beyond Mérida’ was 
announced) two U.S. consulate workers, and the partner of a consulate worker, were 
                                                
Beyond Mérida approach attuned to CN and aiding Mexican institutions better deal with the security 
crisis and its fallout. This has continued in later Budget Guides.  
133 U.S. Department of State Executive Budget Summary: Function 150 & Other International 
Programs: Fiscal Year FY2012 (Washington D.C, 2011) p.113 Note that the DoS had used the exact 
same description in FY2011 (after the launch of Beyond Mérida), and FMF funds were included in the 
Initiative. U.S. Department of State Congressional Budget Justification Volume II: Foreign Operations 
Fiscal Year 2011 (Washington D.C., 2010) p.128  
134 Frank James ‘Obama Rejects Hillary Clinton Mexico-Colombia Comparison’ NPR News 
(September 9th, 2010) http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2010/09/09/129760276/obama-rejects-
hillary-clinton-mexico-colombia-comparison Accessed 03.08.13 U.S. Undersecretary for the Army 
James Westphal also publicly opined on his fears of insurgency in Mexico and the potential “takeover 
of a government that’s right on our border.” Mexican government officials publicly rebuked the 
remarks. Nacha Cattan and Stephen Kurczy ‘Mexico Drug War an ‘Insurgency’? US Officials Gaffe 
Sparks US-Mexico Row’ The Christian Science Monitor (February 10th, 2011) 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2011/0210/Mexico-drug-war-an-insurgency-US-official-s-
gaffe-sparks-US-Mexico-row Accessed 30.08.12 
135 U.S. Embassy Mexico Your Meeting with FM Espinosa  
136 U.S. Embassy Mexico La Familia Continues Rampage in Michoacan Cable Reference 002093 (17th 
July, 2009) Link: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09MEXICO2093&q=familia%20la%20mexico 
Accessed 21.10.12; U.S. Embassy Mexico La Familia Cartel Retaliates for Arrest of High-Ranking 
Leader Cable Reference 002039 (13th July, 2009) Link: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09MEXICO2039&q=familia%20la%20mexico 
Accessed 21.10.12 
137 For example ‘satchel IEDs’ were used in an attack on police stations in Nuevo Laredo, overheard by 
Consulate officials U.S. Consulate Nuevo Laredo Nuevo Laredo Emergency Action Committee Meeting 
Cable Reference 000056 (27th February, 2010) 
https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=10NUEVOLAREDO56&q=bombing%20car%20m
exico Accessed 08.07.14 
138 Secretary of State Diplomatic Security Daily Cable Reference 117930 (5th November, 2008) Link: 
https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=08STATE117930&q=bombing%20car%20mexico 
Accessed 08.07.14 This specific threat came from los Zetas, specifically by Miguel Ángel Treviño 
Morales (arrested in 2013), but was amongst others mentioned in the cable.  
139 U.S. Consulate Tijuana Report from La Frontera: Border Patrol’s Battles with Traffickers Cable 
Reference 000883 (22nd August 2009) Link: 
https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=09TIJUANA883&q=bombing%20car%20mexico 
Accessed 08.07.14 
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shot dead in Ciudad Juárez.140 Taking these changes and developments in 
conjunction, one could be encouraged to think that Mérida had shifted further towards 
the ‘pure’ CN policy it had been (most publicly) touted as, albeit one motivated by 
U.S. interests in promoting Mexican stability and responding to increased violence. 
 
Nonetheless, the logics of bilateral security re-engagement remained clearly multi-
focused in scope, and cables and other documents continue to affirm this fact. For 
example, the importance placed on generalised improved border security, especially 
in Mexico’s south, remained a primary concern. Another diplomatic cable outlined 
that then Mexican Undersecretary for Population, Migration and Religious Affairs 
Alejandro Poire Morena141 told U.S. officials that his government sought to ensure 
that it could, “foster greater formality, increase security levels, impose more customs 
controls, and expand cooperation with the neighboring governments” on the “porous” 
Southern border. It added that, “He looked to cooperation with the U.S. under Merida 
to deliver essential training and infrastructure equipment.”142 Another cable noted the 
concerns here went beyond CN, indicating that, “USG and GOM officials noted the 
entrance of Somalis, Eritreans, and even Iranians through the southern border”.143 
This is reflected in policy documentation once again. A Beyond Mérida Fact Sheet 
released by the DoS in September 2011 still refers to the helicopters provided to 
various police and military institutions in Mexico as being able to support, “rapid 
transport of personnel for counternarcotics and other security operations.”144 
 
Nevertheless, there is a qualitative change here in how these wider goals were 
pursued. Essentially what the U.S. is increasingly doing in Mexico is akin to low-level 
state building, or at least state support. Though this has run through the policy’s 
history from its inception, it has been made more explicit in the Obama administration 
(though of course not explicit in the sense of actually using that term). The focus on 
building the military, judicial, institutional and developmental capacities of the state 
(and, in cities where social projects have been undertaken civil society)145 
increasingly looks like a sustained effort to bring several state capacities up-to-speed 
                                                
140 Marc Lacey and Ginger Thompson ‘Two Drug Slayings in Mexico Rock U.S. Consulate’ New York 
Times (March 14th, 2010) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/15/world/americas/15juarez.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 Accessed 
08.07.14  
141 Poire would go on to become Mexico’s Interior Minister, an important position with regards to the 
‘drug war’, following the death of Francisco Blake Mora in a helicopter crash in November 2011. Mora 
was the second Interior Minister to die in an aviation accident, prompting conspiracy theories in 
Mexico. 
142 U.S. Embassy Mexico Presidential Security Assistant Brennan Stresses Commitment to Deeper 
Cooperation Cable Reference 003634 (28th December, 2009) Link: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09MEXICO3634&q=beyond%20merida%20mexico 
Accessed 15.10.12 
143 U.S. Embassy Mexico DHS Secretary Napolitano’s Meeting with President Calderon, February 17 
Cable Reference 000111 (18th February, 2010) Link: 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=10MEXICO111&q=investment%20law%20mexico%20
of%20rule Accessed 12.10.12 
144 U.S. Department of State ‘The Merida Initiative: Expanding the U.S./Mexico Partnership Fact 
Sheet’ (September 19th, 2011) http://www.state.gov/r/pa/pl/172874.htm Accessed 08.08.14 My 
emphasis 
145 DoS Congressional Budget Justification FY2011 p.96; U.S. Department of State Joint Statement of 
the Merida Initiative High-Level Consultative Group on Bilateral Cooperation Against Transnational 
Criminal Organizations (Washington D.C., 18th September, 2012)  
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with a modern, capitalist, liberal democracy. Mexico’s profound socio-economic shift 
to an open, competitive neoliberal economy from an economy previously organised 
around capitalist, state-led development, and the further consequential transition from 
single-party, corporatist PRI rule to a nominal electoral democracy, was not matched 
by complementary reforms of Mexico’s state institutions. As many have convincingly 
argued, the continuation of the deep-rooted authoritarian, secretive, client-based, 
bureaucratic culture of several Mexican institutions that grew through 70 plus years of 
single party rule into the ‘democratic’ era, combined with the accelerated 
concentration of elite wealth and economic power that has proceeded under Mexico’s 
‘neoliberalisation’, has directly fed (and fed off) corruption, inefficiency, 
socioeconomic inequality and vulnerability, and, in turn the drug-fuelled security 
crisis.146  
 
What we must conclude with at this point is that Mérida and its associated bilateral 
security engagement remains a multi-purpose security-led approach, and is based on 
the long-term U.S. interests detailed throughout. In this sense, Mérida under Obama 
was indeed ‘more of the same’. Reinforcing this conclusion further, the U.S. military 
was significantly stepping up its role and aid distribution in Mexico. Under older, 
non-Mérida mechanisms, the DoD was expanding its involvement in Mexico, 
especially in military-to-military training. The type of training provided not only 
continued the clear militarisation of Mexico’s CN strategy (despite ‘Beyond Mérida’s 
claims), it also bolstered NAFTA-land Security through a myriad of courses that took 
in CN, but also CT, maritime security, border security, base defense, air 
reconnaissance, airspace defense, infrastructure protection, and more. Thus we can 
connect DoD actions in the Mérida era with the broader policies of influence seeking 
post-NAFTA, and more pertinently post 9/11. In many ways, the Pentagon’s role in 
training and aid provision acts as the web that connects the various elements of the 
multi-purpose security package together. This will become clearer as we encounter 
the specifics of these military programs. However it is worth taking a chronological 
step back at this juncture to consider how the U.S. military was conceiving its broad 
role within Mérida and wider U.S.-Mexican security integration.  
 
The Military View: A New Security Relationship & The Role of NORTHCOM 
 
As we saw previously, military officials were discussing increasing security 
arrangements with (and aid to) Mexico well before the MI was announced. As we also 
saw, much of this discussion was generated through U.S. NORTHCOM, the 
Operational Command created in the wake of 9/11. Just to refamilarise ourselves with 
this context, in March 2004, then U.S. NORTHCOM and NORAD commander Ralph 
E. Eberhart told the Senate Armed Services Committee that his commands were, 
“leveraging existing relationships with the Mexican military” and “pursuing efforts to 
expand assistance to Mexico using counterterrorism and counterdrug funding”.147  
                                                
146 See previous chapters, and for further examples Jo Tuckman Mexico: Democracy Interrupted (Yale 
University Press, 2012) p.2-6; Magaloni ‘Mexican Criminal Justice System’ p.89-106; Paul Kenny and 
Mónica Serrano ‘Introduction: Security Failure Versus State Failure’ in 
Paul Kenny, Mónica Serrano, and Arturo Sotomayor (eds.) Mexico’s Security Failure: Collapse into 
Criminal Violence (Routledge, 2011) p.1-25 and ‘The Mexican State and Organized Crime’ in ibid 
p.29-53; Watt and Zepeda Drug War Mexico p. 141-178, 188, 214 
147 U.S. Northern Command ‘Statement of General Ralph E. Eberhart, USAF, Commander North 
American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command Before the Senate 
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Just prior to the announcement of Mérida on October 3rd, 2007 another 
NORTHCOM/NORAD commander, General Renuart, spoke highly of his recent 
discussions with Mexican military officials in which, “We had the opportunity to talk 
about the challenge of narcotics as a threat to the government and to the citizens of 
Mexico and how the United States can partner with Mexico to help defeat those 
threats”.148 In this light the consistent praise for the positive outcomes of the MI from 
NORTHCOM and the wider DoD is very interesting. In a January 2013 interview 
with NORTHCOM’s director for strategy, plans and policy Army Major General 
Francis G. Mahon the American Forces Press Service repeated that, “The Merida 
Initiative opened the door to increased engagement”.149 Thus the U.S. began to see 
some of its aims and methods undertaken in the years leading up to Mérida, built 
around pulling Mexico into regional security arrangements, bear fruit. Mérida is 
integral to this wider process. USNORTHCOM’s descriptions of its activities bolster 
this argument still further. 
 
NORTHCOM, the MI, and NAFTA-Land Security Projection 
Unsurprisingly, then, following Mérida’s official announcement, both 
NORTHCOM’s policy role in Mexico, and the tendency of its officials to highlight 
and discuss that role, increased considerably. In March 2008, General Renuart 
referred to the MI as, “an opportunity with our critical neighbor to jointly confront the 
threat of narcotics trafficking and organized crime” as he urged Congress to enact the 
aid package.150 However, Renuart also discussed the wider security relationship with 
Mexico, and related policy there to global U.S. strategies. He stressed how 
NORTHCOM’s Theater Security Cooperation strategy had fostered improved 
relationships with Mexico’s military, and provided the context in which U.S. officials 
could ‘improve’ their Mexican counterparts “understanding” of NORTHCOM’s 
homeland defense mission. Renuart also praised Congressional measures that had 
allowed the Command’s ability to “build partner capacity” in Mexico to, “effectively 
counter threats such as terrorism and narcotics trafficking”.151 He thus encouraged 
more Congressional moves to make it easier for the DoD to improve capacities 
through aid to partner nations, claiming, “Building partner capacity is fundamental to 
our national security strategy and will make our nation safer”.152 In the interview cited 
above, Francis Mahon was summarised as insisting, “The bottom line - for the Merida 
Initiative and for all other theater security cooperation - is about building partnership 
capacity”.153 
 
                                                
Armed Services Committee’ (March 24th, 2004) 
http://www.northcom.mil/News/Transcripts/032504.html Accessed 13.09.12 
148 U.S. Northern Command ‘Remarks by General. Gene Renuart Homeland Defense Symposium, 
Colorado Springs, 3rd Oct 07’ (October 3rd, 2007) 
http://www.northcom.mil/News/Transcripts/100307_a.html Accessed 13.09.12 It seems likely that the 
talks referred to here were part of final Mérida negotiations and planning. 
149 Donna Miles ‘Northcom Pursues Closer Engagement with Mexico’ American Forces Press Service 
(January 22nd, 2013) http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=119074 Accessed 27.07.13 
My emphasis 
150 ‘Statement of General Victor E. Renuart Jr. USAF Commander United States Northern Command 
and North American Aerospace Defense Command’ Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
110th Congress (March 6th, 2008) p.23 
151 ibid My emphasis 
152 ibid 
153 Miles ‘Northcom Pursues Closer Engagement’ My emphasis 
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In a particularly revealing document provided by NORTHCOM to Congress in 
October 2009, General Renuart once more emphasises NORTHCOM’s role in helping 
to, “build long-term partnership capacities and defense strategies to counter shared 
transnational threats and security concerns”.154 These transnational threats are not 
fully defined - again, drug trafficking is mentioned, but amongst a number of other 
security concerns. The document discusses the fact that multiple SEMAR activities, 
such as, “interdiction of maritime transnational threats, protection of cruise ships and 
ports used by foreign visitors, as well as the protection of critical infrastructure” 
show, “that the U.S. and Mexico share many areas of mutual interest that are vital to 
the security of each country and the continent”.155 Once more, the sense that U.S.-
Mexico security cooperation envisions North America as a shared security space that 
must be defended, in line with the SPP and border / security projection, comes 
through strongly. The document outlines that, “USNORTHCOM's long-range security 
cooperation vision focuses on establishing a continental defense architecture where 
the U.S. works with its neighbors in deterring, preventing, and if necessary, defeating 
mutual threats”.156 
 
To reiterate, drug trafficking is conceptualised amongst the threats the shared security 
space faces. However, as well as being a threat, drug trafficking is also presented as 
an incredibly useful instrument allowing NORTHCOM to prize open the previously 
recalcitrant Mexican military to improve bilateral military relations and understanding 
to help tackle a variety of continental security issues, in line with the arguments we 
saw Cope make in Chapter Five: 
 
The greatest enabler for security cooperation with Mexico is the  
focus on defeating violent criminal drug trafficking networks and  
battle for control of areas in Mexico that are currently  
ungoverned. This focus provides USNORTHCOM with a unique  
opportunity to significantly increase military-to-military  
cooperation, which focuses mainly on building the  
counterterrorism and counterdrug capabilities of the Mexico  
Armed Forces.157 
 
The message of this drug-provided opportunity, the sense of a HS being shared across 
borders, and the use of the amorphous ‘transnational’ threat is further driven home in 
the final sentences of the document, “The success of our mission to protect the U.S. 
relies heavily on the effectiveness of our neighbors. We have an unprecedented 
opportunity presented by the Mexican government to help them defeat the growing 
transnational threat to both of our homelands”.158 The testimony of NORTHCOM 
commanders has largely suggested that this unique opportunity has been seized. In his 
Posture Statement in 2009, General Renuart claimed that, “Our relationship with 
Mexico has never been better and continues to strengthen every day” and that it 
                                                
154 U.S. Northern Command USNORTHCOM’s Interaction with the Mexican Military: Congressional 
Fact Sheet (October, 2009) 
155 ibid 
156 ibid My emphasis 
157 ibid my emphasis 
158 ibid 
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involved, “open, frequent, and frank discussions on how we can improve our 
collective security from common threats”.159  
 
More current testimony from NORTHCOM commanders further confirms that U.S. 
security relations with Mexico have significance beyond CN and the current drug-
fuelled security crisis. Speaking again to the Senate Armed Services Committee in his 
final posture statement in 2010, General Renuart was unambiguous in discussing the 
strategic, durable interests being secured through CN interactions: 
 
It is important to recognize that while we are currently working  
with Mexico to develop and strengthen its military’s capability  
to defeat the drug trafficking organizations, our long-term goal  
is to establish an enduring relationship - built upon trust and  
confidence—so that we can cooperate in the future on other  
mutual security issues.160  
 
NORTHCOM testimony provides a publicly available record of some of these, “other 
mutual security issues”. For indicative recent examples, the 2012 Posture Statement 
of current NORTHCOM commander General Charles H. Jacoby Jr. discusses 
maritime security at length. He cites joint exercise QUICKDRAW, “a tactical-level 
exercise that tests the capability of U.S., Canadian, and Mexican maritime forces in a 
joint response against illicit activity threatening North American Maritime Security.” 
He also points to North American Maritime Security Initiative (NAMSI), “an 
information-sharing and cooperation arrangement among USNORTHCOM, Canada 
Command, the Mexican Navy and the United States Coast Guard”.161 Mexico’s 
southern border is also focused upon.162 The policy detail I discuss below shows that 
not only does military training provided by the DoD speak to these security goals, but 
that it does so through CN channels, and connects up with official Mérida policy.  
 
Again, in keeping with the argument throughout, this is not to deny the CN element in 
NORTHCOM and DoD thinking. There are real reasons cartels and the wider drug 
related security crisis in Mexico threatens U.S. economic and strategic interests. The 
military’s approach on this is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, there has been a 
definitive focus on the applicability of asymmetrical warfare techniques to Mexico’s 
drug gangs. Again, in this sense, links with Afghanistan have once more been made. 
                                                
159 ‘Statement of General Victor E. Renuart Jr. USAF Commander United States Northern Command 
and North American Aerospace Defense Command’ Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
111th Congress (March 17th, 2009) A note of interest here. Shannon K. O’Neil reported that whilst the 
U.S. DoD consistently reported that bilateral military relations were the best they had ever been, a 
senior military official told her that to say this was his “policy”, despite the fact that “in his estimation, 
it was not”. However, I think through Chapters Four, Five, and Six I make a strong case that the 
military-to-military relationship, whilst still marked by insufficiencies from the U.S. perspective, has 
never been closer. The comment is more likely to be reflective of frustration that is not closer still. See 
Shannon K. O’Neil Two Nations Indivisible: Mexico, the United States, and the Road Ahead (Oxford 
University Press, 2013) p.165-166 
160 ‘Statement of General Victor E. Renuart Jr. USAF Commander United States Northern Command 
and North American Aerospace Defense Command’ Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
112th Congress (March 11th, 2010) p.26 My emphasis 
161 ‘Statement of General Charles H. Jacoby Jr. United States Army Commander United States 
Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command’ Before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, 113th Congress (March 13th, 2012) p.19 
162 ibid p.20 
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In an interview with U.S.A Today in June 2010, General Renuart claimed that, 
"We've learned and grown a great deal as we've conducted operations against 
networks of terrorists and insurgent fighters [in Iraq and Afghanistan] […] Many of 
the skills that you use to go after a network like those apply ... to drug-trafficking 
organizations".163 Lest we consider this the personal view of an influential 
commander, the 2012 Posture Statement outlined that NORTHCOM were aiming to, 
“share [their] experiences in asymmetric conflict, to include intelligence-driven 
operations, law of land warfare, whole-of-government solutions and rule of law 
challenges” with Mexico.164 Again, although concrete information is hard to come by, 
special operations training, and training applicable to COIN situations (such as 
psychological warfare [PSYOPS], information operations, and foreign internal 
defense) is being provided to Mexico. Such tactics are in keeping with the assessment 
that at some level Mexico is facing a military threat and has to battle to regain (or 
gain) control of ‘ungoverned space’. 
This is a good point to provide a brief overview of the ‘material’ role played by the 
DoD (through NORTHCOM) within the MI. Importantly, we also need to consider 
the role it plays in supporting Mérida’s goals that clearly complements the Initiative, 
but is separate to the official policy. The MI is administered mainly through the U.S. 
DoS. However the DoD does work as an ‘implementing agency’ on the FMF 
accounts, through which of course a lot of the hardware to Mexico has been provided, 
especially in terms of aircraft (15 as of April 2014).165 It has also provided the 
majority of the military training provided to Mérida in recent years. Again, more 
detail is coming, but for now let’s look at the numbers. The following table attempts 
to provide a simple overview of the breakdown of direct DoD funding to Mexico 
between 2007 and 2012. It uses a variety of the more detailed information from DoD 















                                                
163 Jim Michaels ‘U.S. Military Works with Mexico to Fight Drug Traffickers’ USA Today (April 6th, 
2010) http://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=michaels+renuart&ie=UTF-
8&oe=UTF-8 Accessed 08.08.12 
164 ‘Statement of General Charles H. Jacoby Jr.’ (2012) p.19  
165 Seelke and Finklea Merida and Beyond (April 2014) p.32 As previously mentioned FMF is no 
longer included in official Mérida totals. 
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Table 4: Direct DoD Assistance to Mexico 2007-2012 ($) 
Fiscal Year CN Assistance Other Assistance Total Assistance 
2007 15,508,000 1,000,000 16,508,000 
2008 12,171,000 13,213,493 25,384,493 
2009 34,164,000 329,580 34,493,580 
2010 71,625,000 4,614,646* 76,239,646 
2011 84,690,000 1,142,977† 85,832,977 
2012 70,660,816 1,952,480* 72, 613,296 
Total 288,818,816 22,253,176 311,071,992 
 
Sources:  Security Assistance Montior website. U.S. DoD Section 1209 and Section 1203(b) Report to Congress 
on Foreign Assistance Related Programs for Fiscal Years, 2008, 2009 and 2010 (Washington D.C. 2012); U.S. 
DoD Section 1209 and Section 1203(b) Report to Congress on Foreign Assistance Related Programs for Fiscal 
Year 2011 (Washington D.C, 2012); U.S. DoD Section 1209 and Section 1203(b) Report to Congress on Foreign 
Assistance Related Programs for Fiscal Year 2012 (Washington D.C. 2013)166 
 
* These figures includes aid under Section 2561 of Title 10, United States Code, which covers DoD supplied 
humanitarian assistance. Assistance includes aid for firefighting capabilities, flood preparation and prevention, 
Urban Search and Rescue and dealing with hazardous materials (including at the Border Points of Entry)  
† This figure includes aid under Section 166a (b) 6 of Title 10, United States Code. Again this relates to 
humanitarian relief, but in this authority for “urgent or unanticipated” situations. Again it was used here for “fire-
fighting support”. See 1029 and 1023c citations for Table above. 
 
What is clearly notable here is the increase in funding from the DoD in the Mérida 
period, with the vast majority being provided in CN channels. The real jump comes in 
2010 of course, and we should keep this very much in the forefront of our minds 
when we consider the ‘Beyond Mérida’ strategy of the Obama administration, and its 
claims to move away from military aid towards institutional programmes and 
governance solutions. The continued and growing active role of the DoD in Mexico is 
emphasised by the Department itself. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Counternarcotics and Global Threats William F. Wechsler told the Senate Armed 
Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities that to 
support Mexico in training, equipment, intelligence and indirect help in, “counter-
narcoterrorism” missions, as well as southern border security and interaction there 
between Mexico and its Central American neighbours, the DoD would allocate 
approximately $51 million in FY2011 to support Mexico.” He continued to make 
clear, “This allocation is a dramatic increase from previous funding levels for Mexico. 
Before 2009, for example, funding for Mexico was closer to $3 million a year.”167 
                                                
166 It should be noted that these figures are accurate to the best of my knowledge, but there are some 
potential problems with acheiving accuracy in terms of DoD aid. We look at this briefly in the Policy 
Detail section. 
167 ‘Statement for the Record: William F. Wechsler Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Counternarcotics and Global Threats’ Before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging 
Threats and Capabilities Counterterrorism, Counternarcotics, and Building Partnership Capacity 112th 
Congress (April 12, 2011) p.7 It is not clear why the discrepancy exists in the totals here compared to 
the information gleaned from the 1209 reports above and below, Wechsler possibly was discussing the 
role of his agency (the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense [DASD] for 
Counternarcotics and Global Threats [CN&GT] operating under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities and the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy, but then as he makes clear all DoD CN aid is administered through the DoD 
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The DoD also provides further evidence of the U.S. official concern over the direct 
destabilising effects of drug-related violence in its Counternarcotics & Global Threats 
Strategy, stating that, it would “support interagency efforts to surge support to meet 
the growing emergency” in the country.168 
 
Of course the dollar amount provided directly by the DoD is still relatively small 
compared with the official Mérida funding channelled through the DoS. However, 
focusing on the finances of DoD assistance can be misleading. For example, when we 
consider who specifically has trained military personnel in Mexico in this period,169 
we can see how important the DoD programs are. Of the Mexican military personnel 
trained by the DoS, DHS and DoD between FY2007-10, the DoD trained 85%. The 
table below illustrates these stark differences: 
 
Table 5: DoD and DoS Trainees Mexico 2007-10 
Fiscal Year DoD Trainees DoS Trainees DHS Trainees Total 
2007 484 39 104 627 
2008 879 27 58 964 
2009 590 125 1 716 
2010 649 85 0 734 
Total 2602 276 163 3041 
 
Source: DoS U.S. Foreign Military Training Reports 2007-2011 These totals represent those who completed 
training within a Fiscal Year, rather than when the funding for this training was appropriated or provided. 
NORTHCOM were also early and eager adopters of the new official parlance of TOC 
in the Mexican context. The DoD and NORTHCOM work with understandings of the 
threat within and emanating from Mexico as part of a larger problem presented by 
networked, transnational and ‘narco-terrorist’ actors.170 NORTHCOM Commanders 
have highlighted that they consider there to be links between TOC and terror. For 
example, Admiral Timothy J. Keating told the Senate Armed Services Committee in 
2007 that, “Federal laws and policies allow us to support law enforcement agencies 
by conducting operations to deter and prevent transnational threats” and that within 
this there was a special focus, “on terrorist organizations with a nexus to drug 
                                                
Counternarcotics Central Transfer Account (CTA) (p.2) The other possibility for future totals could be 
that they were upgraded. 
168 U.S. Department of Defense Counternarcotics & Global Threats Strategy (April, 2011) p.14 
169 Information on military trainees is in fact easier to come by than wider training figures (police, 
prison guards etc.), even though the latter forms such a large part of the MI. I discuss this further 
below. 
170 For example see the mission of Joint Task Force North, a component of NORTHCOM based at Fort 
Bliss in El Paso, Texas. It was recalibrated as NORTHCOM came into being, officially expanding 
beyond CN to assist, “federal law enforcement agencies protecting U.S. borders from transnational 
threats, which ‘include international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
delivery systems for those weapons and organized crime.’” Steve Bowman Homeland Security: 
Establishment and Implementation of the 
United States Northern Command (Congressional Research Service, August, 2006) p.3 Its mission is 
currently described as, “support[ing] Drug Law Enforcement Agencies in the conduct of Counter 
Drug/Counter Narco-Terrorism operations in the USNORTHCOM theater of operation to disrupt trans-
national criminal organizations and deter their freedom of action in order to protect the homeland.” 
Joint Task Force North ‘Joint Task Force North Mission’ 
http://www.jtfn.northcom.mil/subpages/mission.html Accessed 06.08.14 
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trafficking.”171 Commander Winnefeld began uniformly using ‘TCOs’ - Transnational 
Criminal Organisations - to describe his adversaries in Mexico early in his tenure. His 
2011 Posture Statement outlined that, “The TCOs are vicious, well-financed and 
heavily armed […] By fighting one another and the government for the impunity to 
pursue their illicit trade, the TCOs are confronting Mexico with a complex, but not 
unprecedented, blend of trafficking activities and challenging security problems”.172 
Current NORTHCOM commander General Jacoby has repeated this definition and 
discussed the TCO threat in a similar manner, stating that, “TCOs represent a 
globally-networked national security threat.”173  
Thereby the U.S. military discourse on the nature of the threat in Mexico mirrors the 
official adoption of the Strategy to Combat TOC in 2011. Discussing the DoD’s 
Counternarcotics and Global Threats Strategy, the Department’s own strategy 
document for countering transnational threats, William F. Wechsler told the the 
Senate Armed Services Subcommittee hearing cited above that it would, “more 
clearly align our efforts with President’s National Security Strategy, [and] the 
National Drug Control Strategy”.174 That aforementioned strategy claims that, “The 
emergence of amorphous, adaptable, and networked threats has far-reaching 
implications for the U.S. national security community”. It points to the example of, 
“An adversary destabilizing a friendly country with intent to penetrate our sovereign 
borders to fuel illicit trafficking activities”, a clear allusion to Mexico in the context 
of new, transnational threats.175  
Bringing the Policy Up to Date: 2013-2014  
 
Like most of the Obama administration’s legislative agenda in recent years, continued 
Mérida funding has fallen afoul of the Congressional ‘deadlock’ on Capitol Hill.176 
Appropriations through 2013 and 2014 were severely delayed and achieved through 
consolidated and continuing Acts, as regular appropriation activities were caught up 
in the bipartisan fight over federal spending, deficit reduction and debt-ceiling 
limits.177 However, whilst Congress may have been severely delayed in 
                                                
171 ‘Statement of Admiral Timothy J. Keating’ (2007) p.12-13 
172 ‘Statement of Admiral James A. Winnefeld Jr. U.S. Navy Commander United States Northern 
Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command’ Before the House Armed Services 
Committee 113th Congress (March 30th, 2011) p.5 
173 ‘Statement of General Charles H. Jacoby Jr.’ (2012) p.17  
174 ‘Statement for the Record: William F. Wechsler’ p.3 
175 DOD Counternarcotics & Global Threats Strategy p.3 
176 Of course one’s position on this might be politically informed, but I use scare quotes here as it looks 
to this author less like deadlock and more like a political-ideological attempt to undermine the Obama 
administration and assert (Republican) Congressional power, as well as being the product of the last 
round of Congressional elections in which a number of ambitious political hardliners with a 
conservative voting base entered Congress. Of course the ‘strategy’ has also involved a fight within the 
GOP.  
177 Of which the fallout included the Budget Control Act of 2011 and mandated budget sequestration. 
For a useful summary of this ongoing ‘process’ (or perhaps debacle would be more accurate), see 
Dylan Matthews ‘The Sequester: Absolutely Everything you Could Possibly Need to Know, in One 
FAQ’ The Washington Post (February 20th, 2013) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/20/the-sequester-absolutely-everything-
you-could-possibly-need-to-know-in-one-faq/ Accessed 15.07.13 Regarding the strategic political 
element of this, for their part the Obama administration has made great pains to highlight the great pain 
sequestration would bring, and blamed the situation on the GOP or Congress. However Bob Woodward 
Paul Ashby: NAFTA-Land Security: The MI, Transnational Threats, and U.S. Security Projection in Mexico  
PhD Thesis 
University of Kent 
 
219 
appropriations, it has also essentially followed the DoS’ Budget requests in terms of 
numbers since FY2012, whilst managing to re-highlight the issue of human rights in 
Mexico.178 Here is a breakdown of Mérida appropriations up to FY2014:  
 
Table 6: Mérida Appropriations Up to FY2014 (in millions of $) 
Account FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 
(est) 
INCLE 263.5 406 365 117 248.5 195.1 148.1 
FMF 116.5 299 5.3 8 N/A N/A N/A 
ESF 20 15 15 18 33.3 32.1 46.1 
Total 400 720 385.3 143 281.8 227.3 194.2 
      Overall 
Total 
2351.6 
Sources: Seelk and Finklea Merida and Beyond (2014) p. 7 
In addition, the 2015 DoS Budget Request reduces the funding for the MI to its lowest 
yearly level since its inception, with ‘only’ $80 million for INCLE, and $35 million 
for ESF, for a total of $115 million. Were U.S. aims consistent in the most recent 
years of Mérida?  
 
Mérida Rationale in a New Context 
In terms of the stated rationale of the continuing MI, the terms expressed in the DoS’ 
Budget Justifications were very familiar, to the point of standardisation. The Initiative 
still works around the four pillars of ‘Beyond Mérida’. In FY2013 the MI was once 
again grouped with other aid programs under the broad rubric of ‘Peace and Security’ 
assistance, wherein alongside the specific efforts to tackle ‘TCOs’ through INCLE 
monies, the EXBS programme continued to look to improving Mexican import and 
export controls at ports, and the NADR sought to assist in, “building effective border 
security measures, including land, air, and maritime border security, in order to 
prevent terrorists or other criminals from entering or transiting Mexico en route to 
other countries, particularly the United States.”179 Institutional support, especially for 
justice sector reform, also continued as Mexico moved towards a deadline for 
implementing jury trials in 2016.180 Whilst similar priorities are expressed in the 
FY2014 and FY2015 budgets, some subtle changes are also notable. The ‘Peace and 
                                                
has claimed that the sequestration element of the Congressional deadlock was designed by the 
Democrats as a bargaining tool to avoid U.S. default in 2011. Bob Woodward ‘Obama’s Sequester 
Deal Game-Changer’ The Washington Post (February 22nd, 2013) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/bob-woodward-obamas-sequester-deal-
changer/2013/02/22/c0b65b5e-7ce1-11e2-9a75-dab0201670da_story.html Accessed 15.07.13 Also see 
PolitiFact.com ‘Hagel Says Congress Responsible for Defense Cuts, Not Obama’ PolitiFact (March 
5th, 2014) Accessed 10.08.14   
178 The numbers for 2014 remain an estimate at the time of writing, but this estimate largely correlates 
with the FY2014 request. However in the ESF account there is in fact an increase from $35 million 
requested for FY2014 to $46.1 million. This would appear to be a DOS internal reconfiguring of funds, 
as no specification for funding to Mexico in terms of figures is given in the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act 2014. See DoS Regional Perspectives FY2014 p.683; DoS Regional Perspectives 
FY2015 p.681; Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-76, 128 Stat. 5 (2014) Led once 
again by Senator Patrick Leahy, Congressional acquiescence to the monetary amounts requested by the 
Executive has been tempered in the most recent appropriations by new human rights conditionality.  
179 DoS Regional Perspectives FY2013 p.819 
180 ibid p.819-820 
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Security’ sub-section is gone, and Development Assistance is pushed to the top of the 
aid programs explained. Plus, of course, the request for FY2015 is much reduced.181 
 
This reflects the change in administration in Mexico, and a renewed focus on 
economic interaction between the two NAFTA countries.182 There is a practical 
element to this; as the DoS Justification for FY2015 explains, there has been a delay 
in Mérida funds being allocated by Mexico as the new Peña Nieto administration 
reviewed Mérida whilst it formalised its policies.183 According to the DoS, it has since 
completed this process, and Mérida funds are flowing once again, alongside an 
increased domestic security spending commitment on the part of Mexico.184 This 
helps explain the reduction in the INCLE request for FY2015.185 However, the PRI 
administration has also sought to actively change Mexico’s international image from a 
country associated with drug violence to an emerging economic powerhouse. Peña 
Nieto’s election campaign ran on a security policy that emphasised improving citizen 
security over cartel kingpin takedowns and narcotics eradication and seizure,186 part 
of a wider stated focus on the domestic economy and Mexico’s continuing social 
challenges. He formally announced more detailed elements of his administration’s 
strategy in February 2013. These changes included (yet another)187 institutional 
overhaul, plans for the creation of a national gendarmerie, and increased funds for 
social projects aimed at tackling the perceived root causes of crime.188  Nieto and the 
PRI have also employed a national and international PR strategy, hiring firms to 
‘promote’ Mexico to the world (and its investors), and effectively moving the national 
conversation away from the security crisis afflicting significant parts of the country to 
structural changes in Mexico’s political-economy.189  
                                                
181 DoS Regional Perspectives FY2014 p.683-688; DoS Regional Perspectives p.681-687 
182 With the proviso of course that economics can never be truly severed from security, and vice versa 
183 It also appears the U.S. took the opportunity to initiate reviews and evaluations. See DoS Regional 
Perspectives FY2014 p.687-688 Indeed it seems that some of this process was bilateral, see the 
testimony of Assistant Secretary for the INL Brownfield in The Future of U.S.-Mexico Relations 
Hearing Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Serial 113-167) 113th Congress (May 20th, 
2014) p.16 
184 DoS Regional Perspectives FY2015 p.684 
185 Brownfield testimony in The Future of U.S.-Mexico Relations p.33 The Assistant Secretary stated 
he expected funding to rise again. 
186 Albeit these changes were not all that well drawn out. Hope refers to them as “adjustments” rather 
than an overhaul, of which more below. Alejandro Hope ‘Peace Now? Mexican Security Cooperation 
After Felipe Calderón’ Working Paper Latin America Working Group (January, 2013) p. 1, 6 He did 
promise, however, to cut violence by 50%. See David A. Shirk ‘2013: The State of Security in Mexico’ 
Woodrow Wilson Center Mexico Institute (2013) p.2 
187 The cyclical reconfiguration of Mexican security institutions in response to various corruption 
scandals, and U.S. pressure, is covered well up to the early 2000s in Laurie Freeman & Jorge Luis 
Sierra ‘Mexico: The Militarization Trap’ in Coletta A. Youngers & Eileen Rosin (eds.) Drugs and 
Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy (Lynne Rienner, 2005) p.263-302 The 
institutional overhauls undertaken by Calderón are covered and placed next to Presidents Zedillo and 
Fox’s reforms in Daniel Sabet ‘Police Reform in Mexico: Advances and Persistent Challenges’ in Eric 
L. Olsen, David A. Shirk and Andrew Selee (eds.) Shared Responsibility: U.S.-Mexico Policy Options 
for Confronting Organized Crime (Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center and the Trans-
Border Institute at the University of San Diego, 2010) p.253-263 I look at Peña Nieto’s changes a little 
more below. 
188 Associated Press ‘Mexico Unveils New Strategy in War on Drugs and for Preventing Crime’ 
Guardian (February 13th, 2013) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/13/mexico-strategy-drug-
war Accessed 13.05.14  
189 For example see Tania Lara ‘Mexican National Media Have Reduced Coverage of Crime and 
Violence, says Report’ Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas (April 10th, 2013) 
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A further change in context has been a more robust attitude from Mexico towards 
U.S. involvement in its actions against drug trafficking. There are also some 
correlated signs of renewed distrust and friction within the bilateral relationship on 
security issues. Priest reported in April 2013 just how incredibly close U.S.-Mexican 
interaction had become, especially in targeting leading figures within the cartels, and 
how the Péna Nieto security plan would involve the scaling back of this interaction.190 
Another report suggested that the Peña Nieto administration was concerned with how 
the U.S. had, “burrowed too deeply into its bureaucracy” under the Calderón 
administration, and “wanted to regain some control.”191 Both these reports cite 
anonymous U.S. officials frustrated in a decrease in extraditions, reduced access to 
Mexican security institutions, and Mexico deciciding who receives sensitive 
intelligence.192 An indicator of these changes is provided in the reduction of U.S. 
agents in Mexico, reported to have decreased by 60% since 2012.193 Part of this is the 
result of Peña Nieto’s institutional changes, whereby his administration has re-
centralised ‘public security’ issues away from the SSP into the Secretariat of the 
Interior (Secretaría de Gobernación - SEGOB) - which also houses the CISEN 
intelligence services. This effectively undoes 12 years of reform under the PAN 
administrations of 2000-2012 by dissolving the SSP as an independent institution, and 
revivifying centralised governmental power in security areas.194 This change is the 
                                                
https://knightcenter.utexas.edu/blog/00-13495-mexican-national-media-have-reduced-coverage-crime-
and-violence-says-report Accessed 12.04.13; Bill Conroy ‘Mexico’s Peña Nieto Hires US Propaganda 
Firm’ The Narcosphere (July 22nd, 2012) http://narcosphere.narconews.com/notebook/bill-
conroy/2012/07/mexico-s-pe-nieto-hires-us-propaganda-firm Accessed 23.07.12 There was particular 
controversy over a very positive TIME story on Peña Nieto’s reforms. Bill Conroy ‘TIME Magazine’s 
Pay-to-Play Puff Piece on Mexican President Provokes Widespread Ridicule in Mexico’ The 
Narcosphere (February 17th, 2014) http://narcosphere.narconews.com/notebook/bill-
conroy/2014/02/time-magazines-pay-play-puff-piece-mexican-president-provokes-widesprea Accessed 
01.03.14 The implication or specific charge of these stories, backed with significant evidence, is that 
the aim is to ‘bury bad news’. Shirk has referred to this and Mexican security changes as an ‘ostrich 
strategy’ whereby the violence problem is not confronted, and public perceptions can be manipulated. 
Shirk quoted in Damine Cave ‘Drug War Apparently has Mexican President’s Attention’ (August 18th, 
2013) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/19/world/americas/drug-war-apparently-has-mexican-
presidents-attention.html?_r=1& Accessed 12.08.14 
190 Dana Priest ‘U.S. Role at a Crossroads in Mexico’s Intelligence War on the Cartels’ The 
Washington Post (April 27th, 2013) http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-role-at-a-
crossroads-in-mexicos-intelligence-war-on-the-cartels/2013/04/27/b578b3ba-a3b3-11e2-be47-
b44febada3a8_story.html Accessed 28.04.13 
191 Joshua Partlow ‘A Different U.S.-Mexico Partnership Under President Peña Nieto’ The Washington 
Post (February 18th, 2014) http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/a-different-us-mexico-
partnership-under-under-president-pena-nieto/2014/02/18/dd356ac8-98d7-11e3-b88d-
f36c07223d88_story.html Accessed 17.06.14  
192 The opinions often come from DEA agents. The situation was not helped when Rafael Caro 
Quintero was released on a technicality by a state court in Jalisco in August 2013. Quintero is wanted 
in the U.S. for his alleged involvement in the kidnap, murder and torture of DEA agent Enrique ‘Kiki’ 
Camarena. There is, at the time of writing, a potential of a $5million reward offered by the DEA for 
information leading to his arrest. 
193 Gustavo Castillo García ‘Disminuye Estados Unidos 60% número de agentes en sus oficinas de 
México’ La Jornada (August 10th, 2014) http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2014/08/10/politica/006n1pol 
Accesed 10.08.14 
194 Washington Office on Latin America ‘One Year After Enrique Peña Nieto’s Election’ WOLA (July 
2nd, 2013) http://www.wola.org/commentary/one_year_after_enrique_pena_nieto_s_election Accessed 
14.07.13; Christopher E. Wilson; Eric L. Olsen; Miguel R. Salazar; Andrew Selee & Duncan Wood 
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root of reduced access and influence for U.S, agencies, and policy analysts have 
expressed fears about the consequences of greater centralised control.195  
 
The MI and NAFTA-land Security: The Rationale Continues 
Despite a changed context in Mexico, a renewed focus on the economic aspects of the 
integrative relationship, and a more assertively independent Mexican administration, 
the rationale behind U.S. policy remains largely intact. I can highlight this in two 
inter-related ways. Firstly, the security relationship, despite recent changes, continues. 
In fact, in many ways Peña Nieto’s strategy shift has thus far proved a ‘dog that didn’t 
bark’.196 Hits on cartel leaders have continued,197 most dramatically exemplified of 
course by the capture of alleged Sinaloa cartel leader Joaquín ‘El Chapo’ Gúzman 
Loera, but also (amongst others) alleged top capo of los Zetas Miguel Ángel Treviño 
Morales (Z40). U.S. cooperation was apparently key to both arrests, and they were 
both carried about by SEMAR, whom the U.S. has touted as the most cooperative 
Mexican security force.198 Alongside the continued use of military units in these high-
level operations, Peña Nieto has deployed the Mexican military to the continually 
violent states of Michoacán, Tamaulipas and Guerrero, all areas Calderón repeatedly 
deployed his troops to.199 Perhaps a more accurate assessment of Peña Nieto’s 
strategy would be that he has not tried to stop the U.S. backed ‘drug war’, but to stop 
                                                
New Ideas for a New Era: Policy Options for the Next Stage in U.S.-Mexican Relations (Woodrow 
Wilson Center, Mexico Institute, May, 2013) p. 22-23; Sabat ‘Polce Reform in Mexico’ p.253-263 
195 Nathan P. Jones ‘Mexico Drug Policy and Security Review’ Small Wars Journal (January 11th, 
2013) http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/mexico-drug-policy-and-security-review-2012 Accessed 
08.07.14; ‘Peña Nieto’s New Security Strategy: We Need to Talk’ Small Wars Journal (January 8th, 
2014) http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/peña-nieto’s-security-strategy-we-need-to-talk Accessed 
08.07.14 Jones is a postdoctoral fellow at the James Baker III Institute for Public Policy. Also see Hope 
‘Peace Now?’ p.7 
196 WOLA ‘Peña Nieto’s Election’; Shirk ‘State of Security in Mexico’ p.3 
197 Albeit without the media fanfare of public parades of the accused that happened under Calderón.  
198 Patrick Radden Keefe ‘The Hunt for El Chapo’ The New Yorker (May 5th, 2014) 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/05/05/the-hunt-for-el-chapo Accessed 06.05.14; Patrick 
Corcoran ‘What Z40’s Arrest Tells Us About Mexico’s Security Policy’ Insight Crime (July 22nd, 
2013) http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/what-trevinos-arrest-tells-us-about-pena-nietos-
security-policy Accessed 13.08.13; U.S. Embassy Mexico Mexican Navy Operation Nets Drug Kingpin 
Arturo Beltran Leyva Cable Reference 003573 (17th December, 2009) 
https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=09MEXICO3573&q=mexico%20semar Accessed 
14.05.13 
199 Joshua Partlow ‘Mexican Army Has Taken Control of Major Port in Effort to Combat Drug Cartel’ 
The Washington Post (December 1st, 2013) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/mexican-army-has-taken-control-of-major-port-
in-effort-to-combat-drug-cartel/2013/11/30/ee768458-523b-11e3-9ee6-2580086d8254_story.html 
Accessed 09.08.14; Nacha Cattan and Eric Martin ’22 Killed in Western Mexico Shoouthout in Test 
for Pena Nieto’ Bloomberg (July 24th, 2013) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-24/22-killed-
in-western-mexico-shootout-in-test-for-pena-nieto.html Accessed 07.08.14; CNN México ‘El Ejército 
Toma la Seguridad de dos Municipios de Guerrero’ CNN México (30th May, 2013) 
http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2013/05/30/el-ejercito-toma-la-seguridad-de-dos-municipios-de-
guerrero Accessed 08.08.14; Council on Hemispheric Affairs ‘iS Tamaulipas Becoming Peña Nieto’s 
Ciudad Juárez?’ Council on Hemispheric Affairs (May 27th, 2014) http://www.coha.org/is-tamaulipas-
becoming-pena-nietos-ciudad-juarez/ Accessed 08.08.14 Some of these deployments appear to be 
partly motivated by the rise of ‘self-defense groups in Guerrero and Michoacán, a complex 
phenomenon I don’t have the space to cover here. See Patricio Asfura-Heim & Ralph Espach ‘The Rise 
of Mexico’s Self-Defense Forces: Vigilante Justice South of the Border’ Foreign Affairs 92, 4 (July 
August, 2013) for an introduction. 
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talking about it.200 This is not to downplay those areas of real friction and change 
mentioned above, but to consider them in light of the continuity of Mexico’s 
aggressive and militarised CN strategy and the still high levels of U.S. involvement in 
that. As Shirk noted in the New York Times the deeper connections established and 
ossified in the MI are now difficult to ‘walk back’.201 This is in fact a key aim within 
NAFTA-land Security, representing the extension of regional hegemonic relations 
into security areas, mirroring the ‘lock-in’ of economic logics under NAFTA.  
 
In addition, the underlying rationale of U.S. policy remains intact, and state officials 
continue to make this clear. The ‘four-pillar’ Mérida framework remains the paradigm 
under which both governments continue to work.202 Reinforcing DoS Budgetary 
Requests, Assistant Secretary of the INL Brownfield described that following the 
evaluative pause undertaken as the Peña Nieto administration bedded in, there was 
now “$438 million worth of 78 new programs” agreed with the Mexican government 
under the MI. The focus on NAFTA’s perimeter - Mexico’s southern border with 
Belize and Guatemala - was as strong as ever. Assistant Secretary Brownfield 
responded to a question on Mexico’s southern border security by outlining that it: 
 
…is already an area where we have agreed on several specific  
projects that total nearly $11 million in terms of assistance and  
equipment that would support the ability of the Mexican  
Government to link together their drugs, customs, border, and  
police personnel on their border with Guatemala and Belize.203 
 
This focus is justified or mentioned in terms of allaying Congress’ concerns and 
questions about the U.S.-Mexico border and its security. However Assistant Secretary 
Brownfield made clear that the aim here was motivated by the fact that, “the 
overwhelming majority of the bad stuff that starts in South America and eventually 
enters the United States crosses that southern border before it crosses the border with 
the United States”.204 Finally, Brownfield provided a useful and succinct summary of 
the ‘21st Century Border’ and how it aims to overcome the ‘border paradox’ through 
inspection equipment, “that allows your authorities to verify what is coming through 
or to the border in a way that does not create 50-mile backlogs and 2-week delays in 
order to cross.”205 When we combine this with some of the specific aid we have seen 
above it clearly fits into a ‘layered’ HS paradigm that attempts secure open trade. 
USNORTHCOM commander Jacoby also provided a similar but somewhat deeper 
logic at a different Senate hearing: 
 
Defending the homeland in depth requires partnerships with all of  
our neighbors -- Canada, Mexico and the Bahamas. Our futures  
are inextricably bound together, and this needs to be a good thing  
in the security context. The stronger and safer they are, the stronger  
our partnerships, the safer we all are collectively. And this creates  
                                                
200  
201 Shirk referenced in Cave ‘Drug War Apparently Has Mexican President’s Attention’ 
202 The Future of U.S.-Mexican Relations p.16 
203 ibid p.40 
204 ibid 
205 ibid p.49 
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our common competitive security advantage for North America.206 
 
Clearly, then, North American security remains an integral element of U.S. thinking, 
and the MI continues under the aims already set out in this chapter. As I argued in 
Chapter Five, nascent developments around the Bilateral HLED and Mexico’s 
liberalising reform programme, which themselves are based on the remarkable 
economic dynamics of NAFTA and long term goals on issues like North American 
energy, have only served to deepen U.S. interests in ensuring North America’s 
security. Within wider developments in U.S. strategy to reinvigorate ‘global’ trade 
liberalisation with initiatives like the TPP, North America and North American 
production looks increasingly strategically placed to act as a holistic productive 
engine as well as a regional marketplace. The MI is crucial in this context as a direct 
delivery vehicle for security aid that seeks to protect the North American economic 
space, and a wider framework for cooperation on deeper security integration between 
the U.S. and Mexico. It has, therefore, taken up the baton from the SPP, and 
interconnects with other bilateral and North American policy initiatives designed to 
‘secure the openness’ of North America under a incipient NAFTA-land Security 
framework. I now show this in further detail still by looking at some of the indicative 
policy detail ‘on the ground’. 
 
 
Indicative Policy Detail: Training & NAFTA-land Security in Action 
 
I have built this section around some indicative examples that show how Mérida 
intersects with wider programmes that are clearly attuned to provide greater security 
for the North American economic space. These examples are port and critical 
infrastructure security, Mexico’s border security in a broad sense (both southern, 
northern and around the NAFTA zone perimeter), and the militarised approach to 
cartel violence. Moving through particular subject areas like this allows the 
interconnections between official Mérida assistance and wider security assistance 
mechanisms to be brought out without getting too bogged down in bureaucratic detail. 
However a generalised introduction explaining in brief how aid under the MI works is 
a necessary starting point.  
 
DoS Remit & Programmes  
The DoS is the managing and lead implementing U.S. government agency for the MI. 
U.S. Aid, the WHA and the INL all are involved ‘lower down the chain’ at the 
operational level of Mérida, and the U.S. Embassy in Mexico also plays a key role. As 
we saw, funds are provided through three aid mechanisms in the MI; the FMF, 
INCLE and ESF accounts. However, since FY2012 FMF has not been part of the 
official MI, and was in fact implemented by the DoD (it may be that the separation 
occurred for this very bureaucratic reason).207 In any case, other DoS programmes 
interact with the MI, and the wider goals of NAFTA-land Security. For example, I 
have shown how IMET, the EXBS and the FMF programme itself all lend themselves 
                                                
206 Jacoby quoted in U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command Hearing Before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee 113th Congress (March 13th, 2014) p.5 It is worth noting that the frustration 
of the two commanders (U.S. Southern Command [SOUTHCOM] commander General John F. Kerry 
was also in attendance) regarding sequestration and a perceived lack of resources is palpable at this 
hearing. 
207 I reached out to some experts on this point but was unable to find a definitive answer on the switch. 
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to wider missions around North American security. The FMF request for 2014 states 
that it aims to, “provide resources to help the Mexican military play a crucial, 
supporting role to civilian security forces in the fight against transnational criminal 
organizations.”208 The only way to truly understand the repetition we have already 
encountered through and across these aid programmes is to consider U.S. assistance 
holistically within NAFTA-land Security. This same conclusion also extends to some 
DoD administered funding mechanisms that I have not considered in as much detail 
thus far. 
 
DoD Remit & Programmes 
Whilst the DoD was involved in implementing FMF accounts, it is officially only a 
supportive partner to Mérida, not involved with planning, administering or overseeing 
any Mérida aid. However, we have already seen that this ‘supportive’ role extends 
further than the brief description suggests, and it is in this section that this will be 
truly bought to the fore. Thus under a number of Congressionally mandated 
authorities, the DoD has been stepping up its role in Mexico. This is in line with more 
global trends, as U.S. assistance moves increasingly under the DoD’s purview. The  
FAA’61 and AECA ’76 (as amended) are the legislative bedrock of U.S. foreign 
assistance as provided by the DoS. The FAA’ 61 originally legislated for foreign 
assistance solely as the responsibility of the DoS. However, by designating the DoD 
as the “lead agency” in countering narcotics entering the United States from abroad in 
1989 (under U.S. code 10 U.S.C. 124), Congress opened a channel, separate from the 
FAA ‘61 and outside of the DoS, through which the DoD could engage with other 
nations in stopping these illicit flows. This was an important moment for U.S. foreign 
assistance, creating an aperture for the DoD to enter what had previously been DoS 
areas of responsibility. In 1991 Congress legislated for the first program that would 
allow the DoD to use its own budget for a military foreign assistance program 
(Section 1004 Counterdrug Assistance) to train and equip foreign militaries in CN. 
Other DoD counterdrug programs followed - Section 1031 in 1996209 and Section 
1033 in 1997.210 As we saw after 9/11 Congress authorised the CTFP in 2002211 and 
Section 1206 Train and Equip Authority in 2005.212 
 
Section 1004, Section 1206, CTFP and Section 1033 have all been used in Mexico, 
with 1004 being the most active programme. The GAO stated in 2010 that these 
authorities, “provide […] support to […] foreign agencies with counternarcotics 
responsibilities” and that the aid is, “separate from that provided under Mérida.” 
However separating these programmes out from Mérida, even in a more 
bureaucratised sense, in fact becomes impossible when we delve into the Delphian 
world of the U.S. Foreign Military Training Report (FMTR). The FMTR shows the 
                                                
208 DoS Regional Perspectives p.685 
209 Specifically for Mexico, expired 1998. 
210 Initially a similar short-term program for Colombia and Peru, since extended through 2013 and now 
available to 35 countries.  
211 Become permanent law in 2004 
212 George Withers, Adam Isacson, Lisa Haugaard, Joy Olsen, and Joel Fyke ‘Ready, Aim, Foreign 
Policy: How the Pentagon’s Role is Growing, and Why Congress - and the American Public - Should 
be Worried’ Center for International Policy, Latin America Working Group, Washington Office on 
Latin America (March, 2008) p.4-8 It should be noted that Congress blocked certain provisions that the 
Bush administration pushed for, including more than halving the funds available for Section 1206 from 
the levels desired (ibid p.5). 
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extent of DoD training in Mexico.213 In fact, as I highlight here, the training role of 
the DoD is in a very real sense the glue that binds the MI to the NAFTA-land Security 
project. I can illustrate this in a crude way by looking at the overall figures for 
military trainees in Table 6 below. Of course this does not capture the very large 
numbers of non-military trainees that have received U.S. instruction through the MI. 
There is a lack of easily obtainable, collated and clear information on non-military 
Mérida training (a troubling issue in terms of oversight and an informed citizenry, and 
one that makes life difficult for the researcher).214 Nonetheless the official figures that 
show the increased number of non-Mérida military trainees gives us a keen insight 
into the militarised element of what Mérida forms a significant part of, the NAFTA-
land Security project. Moreover, looking past the numbers and at training detail 
shows the deep connective points between this military training, Mérida, and wider 
U.S. goals.   
 
The following table set out total numbers of military trainees from FY2007 to 
FY2013 (Table 6). It includes all trainees because the fundamental argument here is 
that we should see this in holistic terms, as per the thesis’ core claims. Relatively few 
Mérida trainees appear here (again, Mérida’s training is mostly non-military), but the 
training both actually and potentially connects up with official Mérida aid, and more 
pertinently reflects the same goals as Mérida i.e. the improvement of Mexico’s 
security capacities in line with the aim of improving its security producing abilities 
‘across the board’. The majority of this training is thus aimed at better protecting 
Mexico’s political economy, and thereby North America’s, as well as projecting the 
U.S. security outwards. It should be noted that:  
 
! I have used the figure provided in the FMTR under the courses themselves, rather 
than the summary figure at the beginning of the report. There are occasionally 
discrepancies between the two. 
 
! Table 6 uses FMTR information. In recent years (2012-2013 and 2013-2014 
reports) this has been divided into two volumes, with the second including 
ongoing training and planned training. I use Volume I here to only include 
completed training, but this means totals may be different from those indicated. 
 
                                                
213 Specifically U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense Foreign Military Training 
Joint Report to Congress Fiscal Years 2007 - 2008: Vol I: Country Activities (Washington D.C, 
January 31st, 2008) Section IV-VI p.85-91; U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense 
Foreign Military Training Joint Report to Congress Fiscal Years 2008-2009: Vol I (Washington D.C., 
2009) Section IV-VI p.104-116; U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense Foreign 
Military Training Joint Report to Congress Fiscal Years 2009-2010: Vol I (Washington D.C., 2010) 
Section IV-VI p.114-127; U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense Foreign Military 
Training Joint Report to Congress Fiscal Years 2010-2011 Vol I (Washington D.C., 2011) Section IV-
VI p.142-156; U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense Foreign Military Training 
Joint Report to Congress Fiscal Years 2011-2012 Vol I (Washington D.C., 2012) Section IV-VI p.79-
85; U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense Foreign Military Training Joint Report 
to Congress Fiscal Years 2012-2013: Vol I (Washington D.C., 2013) Section IV-VI p.69-77; U.S. 
Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense Foreign Military Training Joint Report to 
Congress Fiscal Years 2013-2014: Vol I (Washington D.C., 2014) Section IV-VI p.62-70 
214 Through the research I tried to glean as much information as possible from disparate sources. The 
best detailed information on non-military training is provided in the Congressional report Common 
Enemy  
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! This information also may not be exhaustive in terms of numbers because sections 
of the FMTR are classified.  
 
! Separating out official Mérida trainees is difficult, but they are most likely to be 
represented by the INL and DHS / U.S. Coast Guard totals (though the DoD also 
has USCG ties).215 
 
With those caveats in mind (and information on programmes cited in Table 6 in 
footnote below),216 here is the table: 
 
Table 6: Military Trainees in Mexico FY2007-2013 
 
 
Sources: DoS / DoD U.S. Foreign Military Training Reports 2007-2014  
 
Some important points immediately leap out at us from this information. First of all, 
what is underlined here is the unprecedented level of U.S.-Mexican military 
interaction in comparison to the discussion in Chapter Four. In addition, 92% of the 
military training provided to Mexico in this period has come through the DoD, and 
this means the vast majority of military training is extraneous to Mérida. This once 
again emphasises the jump in military training as ‘Beyond Mérida’ was supposed to 
be moving the Initiative away from militarised solutions. Section 1004 is extremely 
important here, providing almost 75% of the overall total. Only Colombia, Thailand 
and Afghanistan have comparable levels of 1004 training.217 It is therefore crucial to 
                                                
215 See footnote 212 
216 Of those DoD programmes not briefly explained elsewhere in this thesis, ‘Service’ refers to ‘Service 
Academies’, through which student exchanges between the U.S. Military, Naval, and Airforce 
academies and the equivalents in a particular nation are organised; ‘Exchange’ refers to a similar 
process but outside of the Academy structure and within the professional military. This includes 
‘PMEs’ - Professional Military Exchange  - but for a reason unknown to the author a separate PME 
section is provided in the 2013-2014 FMTR; ‘Regional’ refers to the DoD’s ‘Regional Centers for 
Security Studies’, where academic military courses are undertaken or provided. The William J. Perry 
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies hosts and arranges Mexican activities; ‘ALP’ refers to the 
‘Aviation Leadership Program’, funded by the U.S. Airforce to provide training to pilots from “less 
developed, friendly nations”. Of the DoS programmes here not already referred to elsewhere, GPOI 
refers to the ‘Global Peace Initiative’ DHS / USCG funding appears below, but the USCG operates as a 
partner to the DoD and DoS here. The USCG has no foreign funding authority so funding comes from 
various DoS / DoD programmes. For further information see DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training 
Report FY2013-2014 p.II-1 to II-7 
217 Tens of thousands of Colombians were trained under Section 1004 from 1999 to 2007 (the Plan 
Colombia period, although levels have dropped since then). Although fitfully, Afghanistan has had 
large numbers of personnel trained under this authority. Thailand has steadily high numbers of trainees, 
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note at this point out that any provision of assistance or training under Section 1004 
must legally be within a CN remit. The DoD summarises the legislation as allowing it 
to: 
 
  […] provide support for the counternarcotics activities of U.S.  
and foreign security forces and law enforcement agencies,  
including for maintenance and repair of equipment,  
transportation, training, providing infrastructure, detecting  
and monitoring drug trafficking, establishing command,  
control, communications and computer networks, aerial and  
ground reconnaissance, and provisions of linguist and  
intelligence analysis services.218  
 
This will be important as we move on, because we will see that the almost 8000 
trainees under Section 1004 from FY2007 to FY2013 now have skills that pertain to 
CN, but that those skills are also applicable to multiple situations.  
 
Also, whilst all of these programmes comprise military training of course, there are 
interesting points to note on who is getting what training. SEMAR has been trained 
under the DHS / USCG strand of aid in, for example, anti-smuggling operations.219 
Meanwhile the SSP has received extensive training in areas related to helicopter 
operations, repair and maintenance, likely to support the UH-60 Blackhawks received 
by the Federal Police.220 This reflects how training connects up with Mérida’s goals, 
provides the necessary expertise to use Mérida equipment, and how it girds and 
supports a militarised approach across Mexican institutions. However, to get to the 
importance of this, I need to look at what this training comprises in more detail in 
some specific areas. This will show definitively how interconnected these various 
training programmes are, and make it even clearer how much more accurate it is to 
consider the MI as part of a NAFTA-land Security undertaking. 
 
Interconnected Aid: Three Key Areas of NAFTA-land Security  
 
Port & Critical Infrastructure Security 
I showed above how the MI intersected with EXBS programme in supporting its 
effort to monitor and prevent the flow of WMD and more conventional weaponry. 
This also joined up with the ‘Megaports Initiative’ as part of the SLD framework 
within the DoE. As a National Nuclear Security Administration factsheet points out, 
“The Second Line of Defense Megaports Initiative is a key component of a multi-
agency, multilayered, defensive network that strengthens the overall capability of 
partner countries to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in special nuclear and 
other radioactive materials at key international seaports.”221 However the wider drive 
                                                
and Peru and Ecuador also have respectable amounts. Interestingly Lebanon has emerged as a high-
level recipient, with 2400 trainees in FY2013 (ibid Section IV-IV p.36) See Security Assistance 
Monitor website for further information. 
218 DoD Section 1209 / 1203(b) Report p.4 
219 DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2007-2008 Section IV-VI p.86-87 
220 DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2011-2012 Section IV-VI p.80-82 
221 U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of the Second Line of 
Defense Megaports Initiative (Washington D.C, 2010) p.1 Thus, also connected to this effort are, for 
example, the CBP’s ‘Container Security Initiative’ and ‘Secure Freight Initiative’. However the former 
has not been accepted by Mexico, not least as it involves direct deployment of U.S. CPB at foreign 
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to monitor and prevent illicit trafficking into and through Mexico as part of the 
layered HS and NAFTA-land Security approach also intersects with this specific aim. 
Thus Mérida equipment inspection equipment was provided in support of the EXBS 
and SLD mission. Discussing the completion of the Megaports Initiative at four 
Mexican ports (including at Mazanillo, Colima, Mexico’s busiest port), U.S. Embassy 
Deputy Chief of Mission Laura Dogu affirmed “Here […] we find equipment donated 
by the United States under the Merida Initiative, the Megaports Program, and the 
Export Control and Related Border Security […] Program, as well as Mexican 
customs and navy personnel who have benefitted from specialized training provided 
under these programs.”222 In 2011, 711 individuals were trained in the use of Non 
Intrusive Inspection Equipment (NIIE) also provided under Mérida, including 
personnel from SEMAR, SEDENA, SSP and the Servico de Administración de 
Tributaria (SAT - Mexico’s tax and customs body).223 Unfortunately it is not clear if 
all this training was undertaken under Mérida funds or otherwise.224 
 
There is also wider focus on port security more broadly conceived. Ports are 
obviously strategic in many senses. Economically, they are key because of the trade 
that comes through them, and, logically, this means their physical security is also 
important. They are also (and relatedly) important as monitoring sites. The FMTR is 
full of courses pertaining to port security and inspection, much of it (unsurprisingly 
given how this aid is overwhelmingly from the DoD) coming outside of the MI 
proper. For example, in FY2010 a Mobile Training Team (MTT) course in “Container 
Inspection” was undertaken for 24 SEMAR pupils under Section 1004. Even though 
this course could clearly be catered towards drugs interdiction, it also can be attuned 
to the specific requests/needs of the host nation, to potentially include, “primary 
dangerous goods shipping regulations, radioactive shipments, explosive shipments, 
shipboard stowage and segregation of dangerous goods, multi-agency strike force 
operation planning and execution, government/industry partnership training, safety 
awareness training, and dangerous goods material communications for response 
personnel”.225 The same course was provided to 22 more students in FY2011.226 Thus 
we begin to see the multi-applicability of Section 1004 funds.  
 
Similarly to the ‘Container Inspection’ course, FY2008’s Section 1004 course in ‘Port 
Physical Security’ has a stated CN component, but also, “provides tools” to its twenty 
students to help them promote general security and, “deter theft”. Students also 
complete a task in, “developing a physical security plan within a port area assessed 
during the physical security survey or port vulnerability assessment exercises.”227 
                                                
ports, and the latter has been scaled back. Instead the U.S. and Mexico have worked on building 
Mexico’s internal capacity. 
222 U.S. Embassy Mexico ‘U.S.-Mexico Cooperation Strengthens Port Security and Capacity to 
Intercept Weapons of Mass Destruction’ (Mexico City, July 24th, 2012) 
http://mexico.usembassy.gov/press-releases/us-mexico-cooperation-strengthens-port-security.html 
Accessed 25.07.12 
223 U.S. Embassy Mexico U.S.-Mexico Border Cooperation Under the MI: 
Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment: Fact Sheet (Mexico City, May, 2012) 
224 There is not a clear reference in the FMTRs - presumably the SEMAR and SEDENA training 
should appear here. 
225 DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2009-2010 Sec IV-VI p.151-152; Sec V. p.154 
226 DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2010-2011 Sec IV-VI p.84 
227 DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2008-2009 Sec IV-VI p.114; Sec V p.156 Another 
20 students completed this course under the CTFP arrangement. ibid Sec IV-VI p.104 
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This has a potential CT applicability. Much more clearly designed for CT though is 
the ‘MTT Port SEC [Security] Risk Assessment Tool (PSRAT) Seminar’. PSRAT 
was the risk assessment security model developed after 9/11 by the USCG. The GAO 
summarised the model as, “a rudimentary risk calculator that ranked maritime critical 
infrastructure and key resources […] with respect to the consequences of a terrorist 
attack and evaluated vessels and facilities that posed a high risk of a transportation 
security incident”.228 17 SEMAR personnel took this course in FY2013.229 The Naval 
Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS) has trained 
49 officers for Patrol Craft operations in both riverine / littoral and coastal 
environments (as well as other supportive courses) since FY2010.230 Again, whilst 
there is an obvious CN rationale to this kind of training that should not be ignored or 
thought of as a ‘pretext’ - multi-applicability is key. The NAVSCIATTS description 
for the riverine course states it will provide training for officers to, “safely and 
effectively plan and execute patrol craft operations in riverine and littoral 
environments supporting interdiction, counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics 
operations.”231 The U.S. Navy deploys Patrol Boats in variegated missions, including 
to, “escort other ships, provide maritime security,” and “protect infrastructure”.232 
Coastal oil infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico and delta environments in Campeche / 
Tabasco spring to mind here in terms of Mexican infrastructure protection and CT, 
although it remains necessary to confirm whether those trained were then deployed in 
this context. Riverine forces do, however, operate on Mexico’s southern border.233 
 
Continuing on this CT theme, in FY2010, 29 SEMAR members undertook a ‘Naval 
Law Enforcement Seminar’ under 1004, seemingly conducted by the Naval Criminal 
Investigative Service (NCIS).234 These have continued through FY2013.235 The NCIS 
exists to investigate crime within the U.S. Department of the Navy, with its primary 
(but not only) focus on CT in terms of protecting Naval forces from attack.236 
Reflecting the emergent strategy against TOC, the NCIS ‘Strategic Vision’ document 
                                                
228 U.S. Government Accountability Office Coast Guard: Security Risk Model Meets DHS Criteria, but 
More Training Could Enhance Its Use for Managing Programs and Operations (Washington D.C., 
November, 2011) p.9 Interestingly the USCG now operates the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Mode 
(MSRAM) for the same purposes, which is supposed to be more robust.   
229 DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2013-2014 Sec IV-VI p.68 
230 ibid p.69; DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2010-2011 Sev IV-VI p. 152; DoS / 
DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2011-2012 Sec IV-VI p.84; DoS / DoD Foreign Military 
Training Report Sec IV-VI p.76 
231 U.S. Department of the Navy Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School ‘Patrol 
Craft Officer Riverine’ http://www.public.navy.mil/nsw/navsciatts/html/course-PCO-R.html Accessed 
21.11.13 The same description is provided for the Coastal course. 
232 Hendrick Simoes ‘Challenges, Close Quarters and Camaraderie: Inside the Navy's Coastal Patrol 
Mission’ Stars and Stripes (May 4th, 2014) http://www.stripes.com/news/challenges-close-quarters-
and-camaraderie-inside-the-navy-s-coastal-patrol-mission-1.281260 Accessed 15.08.14 The Mexican 
Navy has been updating and adding to its patrol boat fleet, for example in a contract with Dutch firm 
Damen, who also provide ships to the USCG. Damen ‘Fourth Damen Stan Patrol for Mexican Navy 
(August 22nd, 2013) http://www.damen.com/en/news/2013/08/fourth-damen-stan-patrol-for-mexican-
navy Accessed 12.10.13  
233 U.S. Department of Defense Section 1209 and Section 1203(b) Report to Congress on Foreign 
Assistance Related Programs for Fiscal Year 2012 (Washington D.C., May 2013) p.23 
234 DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2010-2011 Sec IV-VI p.152 
235 DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2011-2012 Sec IV-VI p.84; DoS / DoD Foreign 
Military Training Report FY2012-2013 Sec IV-VI p.75; DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report 
FY2013-2014 Sec IV-VI p.68 
236 Such as that which befell the USS Cole in harbour at Aden in October 2000.  
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outlines that,  “The growing nexus of crime, terrorism, and conflict will require a 
special focus on irregular threats and insurgencies”, with the implication that they 
must focus on enhancing cooperative relationships to obtain and share relevant, time-
critical information with decision makers.” On terrorism, it states in terms by now 
familiar that it, “will aggressively seek to develop partner-nation counterterrorism 
capacity by building on our existing law enforcement relationships. The training 
NCIS provides partners and allies plays an important role in combating terrorism 
through the Theater Security Cooperation program.” Whilst we should exercise 
caution in assuming this to be directly applicable to this training (especially given the 
lack of information provided by the FMTR), it is plausible to assume this wider 
rationale is relevant. In any case, the conflation of security issues around TOC is 
again relevant here. There is a focus on how, “Transnational criminal elements exploit 
maritime security weaknesses to further their criminal enterprises”, and that partner 
capacity building in response can, “promote the rule of law by countering terrorism, 
weapons proliferation, piracy, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities”.237 These 
priorities are also supported by other aid mechanisms, for example with courses in 




Of course much of the above also comes under a broad heading of border or HS. It is 
clear that as part of NAFTA-land Security the U.S. has aimed to export HS  and 
mindsets and capacities to its neighbour. Unsurprisingly some of the NIIE and 
associated training provided under the MI has been deployed to Mexico’s southern 
border. The Mexican military’s role here is high-profile enough to be mentioned by 
CRS Reports, although they miss its depth and connection to Mérida.239 DoD reports 
reveal the interconnections between Mérida and military training and activity. In 
addition to support for border riverine operations,240 the DoD has highlighted how 
Section 1004 funding has supported the extended military deployment of Mexican 
marines at the Guatemala / Belize border to help, “conduct operations against TCOs”. 
The Report points out that these forces will have secure communications and the 
ability to communicate with the UH-60Ms donated via the President's Merida 
Initiative to the Mexican Navy.”241 Again the joined up, pan-institutional nature of the 
MI as part of NAFTA-land Security construction is underscored here. However, we 
also need to understand the importance of broader concepts of HS projection, layered 
defense and perimeter security for NAFTA. Indeed, courses specifically regarding 
‘Perspectives on Homeland Security and Defense’ have been provided by the William 
J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies since FY2009, under CTFP and 
Exchange mechanisms.242 Again, military training and wider training supports more 
holistic conceptions of NAFTA-land Security, both directly through Mérida, and 
otherwise in separate but interconnected and complementary programmes. The 
                                                
237 U.S. Department of the Navy Naval Criminal Investigative Service Strategic Vision: Global Support 
to Global Challenges (Quantico, 2010) 
238 DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2010-2011 Sec IV-VI p.143 
239 Seelke and Finklea Merida and Beyond (Apr 2014) p.22 This is not, however, as new a 
development as the authors claim, as we have seen throughout.  
240 DoD Section 1209 /1203 (b) FY2012 p.23 
241 U.S. Department of Defense Section 1209 and Section 1203(b) Report to Congress on Foreign 
Assistance Related Programs for Fiscal Year 2011 (Washington D.C, 2012) p.24 
242 For example, DoS / DoD Foreign Miliary Training Report FY2009-2010 Sec IV-VI p.118 
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deployment of Mérida NIIE’s and their operators is thus not restricted to border 
spaces, for example. In fact they are spread throughout Mexico and set to expand. The 
following graphic lifted from a report on NIIE programmes highlights this reality. The 
aim to construct ‘border depth’ throughout and around Mexico through constructed 






Fig 1: Current and future deployment of NIIE through Mexico 
Source: U.S Embassy Mexico Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment  
There is an expansive principle behind the exportation of HS thinking to Mexico, in 
line with the priorities expressed in Chapter Five. There is a clear focus on monitoring 
all manner of traffic - from the individual on the ground (perhaps most difficult) to 
shipping and aviation on a grand scale. In terms of direct connections to Mérida, there 
is a litany of courses at a higher operational level that support Mérida’s efforts to 
provide equipment for more efficient pan-institutional information sharing, and direct 
equipment like the four CASA-235 surveillance aircraft supplied to SEMAR under its 
equipment tranche. The MI’s aid in NIIE and surveillance capabilities reflects its 
initial aims to improve Mexican border, air, and maritime controls, but this cannot be 
achieved just through equipment alone. Instead a deeper knowledge base is necessary 
to undertake what is fact a complex and challenging mission. Therefore expertise in 
aviation and maritime monitoring and planning is clearly a focus of U.S. funding. 
Outside of the official Mérida purview, but clearly within these same logics of 
NAFTA-land Security and supportive of Mérida’s goals within that overarching 
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framework, Section 1004 funds and training has supported aviation security 
capabilities of Mexican institutions, again allowing the country to better track 
narcotics traffic, but also establish much greater operability on wider spectrum 
awareness, and interoperability with the U.S within NAFTA-land Security.  
 
Thus, the DoD trained a number of pilots for aircraft traditionally associated with 
surveillance and reconnaissance missions. Again considering 1004 training, 25 pilots 
from Fuerza Aérea Mexican (FAM - the Mexican Air Force) and SEDENA received 
training from Flight Safety International on the Embrear-145 model, of which Mexico 
currently operates three aircraft; one EMB-145 AEW&C (Airborne Early Warning 
and Control) and two EMB-145 MPs (Maritime Patrol). The Brazilian conglomerate 
Embrear, from whom SEDENA negotiated the purchase of these planes in 2001, 
describes the EMB-145’s as, “the backbone of Mexico’s […] Aerial Surveillance 
System (SIVA- Sistema de Vigilancia Aérea)”.243 SIVA is an integrated air and 
ground radar system, focused on Mexico’s south-eastern border with Belize and 
Guatemala.244 Embrear explains that its planes will allow Mexico to track air and sea 
targets effectively.245 The DoD also trained 22 C-26 Metroliner pilots. The C-26 is a 
multipurpose transport/reconnaissance aircraft (depending on specifications), and the 
U.S. has modified several for CN operations in its own airspace. The U.S. transferred 
four modified C-26s to Mexico in 1997, officially to improve its CN capabilities.246 
Finally, 46 SEMAR pilots took a MTT course in FY2007 entitled ‘E2C TRNG’. This 
appears to be for the E2C Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning and surface surveillance 
aircraft. SEMAR operates three such units, which were purchased from the Israeli Air 
Force in 2004.247  
 
SEDENA, SEMAR and FAM personnel have taken courses in areas such as ‘Air 
Intelligence’, ‘Theater Air Operations’, and attended the Air War College at Maxwell-
Gunter Air Force Base (AFB) Montgomery, Alabama. The ‘Theater Air Operations’ 
course, which was provided to one SEDENA and two SEMAR pupils, is described as 
aiming to, “provide Air Force Security Assistance Training (AFSAT) for international 
officers in the advanced knowledge and skills needed to perform air battle manager 
                                                
243 Embraer ‘Embraer Airplanes Chosen by Mexico for Surveillance Program’ Embraer Press Releases 
(March 1st, 2001) http://www.embraer.com/en-US/ImprensaEventos/Press-
releases/noticias/Pages/AVIOES-DA-EMBRAER-SAO-SELECIONADOS-PELO-MEXICO-PARA-
PROGRAMA-DE-VIGILANCIA.aspx Accessed 23.08.12; Embraer ‘Embraer Attends AeroExpo in 
Key Mexican Market’ Embraer Press Releases (April 8th, 2005) http://www.embraer.com/en-
US/ImprensaEventos/Press-releases/noticias/Pages/Embraer-apresenta-na-Labace-seu-novo-executivo-
para-a-aviacao-corporativa.aspx Accessed 23.08.12 
244 Jane’s World Air Forces: Summary (Mexico) 2012 http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-World-
Air-Forces/Summary-Mexico.html Accessed 24.08.12  
245 Embraer ISR Systems: Emb-145 Multi-Intel 
http://www.embraerdefensesystems.com/english/content/isr_systems/emb_multi_intel_state_of_art.asp 
Accessed 01.09.12; Embraer ISR Systems: Emb-145 AEW&C 
http://www.embraerdefensesystems.com/english/content/isr_systems/145aewc_state_of_art.asp 
Accessed 01.09.12 
246 In August 2011, the DoD’s Counter Narco-Terrorism Program Office (CNTPO,) included system 
checks of Mexico’s C-26 fleet as potential opportunities in an umbrella contract for private security 
contractors.  
247 Oddly however, this was the plane that, according to the DoS at least, was due to be ‘retired’ and 
replaced by the CASA-235’s provided under Mérida (Guns, Drugs and Friends, p.20). It therefore 
remains a possibility that this training may be applicable to other aircraft, or related to something else 
entirely. The author could not find a suitably plausible match, however. 
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duties in an air operations center (AOC) environment.”248 As a TAOC or Tactical Air 
Operations Center course the focus is again on monitoring depth of the airspace. The 
U.S. Air Force summarises the role of an air battle manager as one that pulls in 
multiple aspects of air operations; training, expert awareness of national strategy, 
establishing, “control of the battle space” and, put simply, “executing the entire 
theater air operation”.249 This course may dovetail with Mexico’s E2C Hawkeye fleet 
- the ’plane is described by its manufacturer as an, “airborne early warning and battle 
management aircraft”.250 Two SEDENA officers were trained in ‘Air Intelligence.’ 
This course incorporates familiarity with mapping and charting, gathering and 
disseminating information (with special emphasis in the course description on 
‘targeting’), and culminates in exercises that, “encompass order-of-battle construction 
for air, ground, naval, and electronic systems, pre-mission preparation and planning, 
post-mission debriefing, and a commander’s crisis situation briefing.”251  
 
A number of personnel, both SEDENA and SEMAR, were trained in ‘Intl Air 
Weapons Dir Trng’.252 The FMTR does not provide any information on this course, 
but it seems likely it is Air Weapons Director Training. This position is described by 
the U.S. Air Force as one of a “combat controller” whom works aboard surveillance 
aircraft to, “monitor radar to tell pilots where the enemy is so the right aircraft may be 
targeted during a mission”.253 Similar and higher-level courses were provided under 
other aid programs. For example IMET funds were used to train students at Air 
Command and Staff College and the Air War College, as well as in the Air 
Intelligence course.254 Underlining the aims of these efforts, in January 2013 the U.S. 
and Mexico conducted a joint operation where the monitoring and tracking of a 
dummy rogue aircraft passed from U.S. authorities to Mexican ones.255 Whilst an 
official arrangement for North American aviation security that includes Mexico is still 
perhaps some way off, the U.S. clearly seeks to aid Mexico improving its airspace 
control as part of NAFTA-land Security, and this logic is both within the MI and 
bolstered by wider training. U.S. strategy appears to be more in line with John A. 
Cope’s suggestions in Chapter Five, whereby Mexico retains control over its security 
arrangements, but does so in line with the U.S.’ regional security priorities post-
9/11.256 
                                                
248 DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2009-2010 Section IV-VI p. 127; Section V p.225; 
DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2010-2011 Section IV-VI p.154  
249 U.S. Air Force Careers: Air Battle Manager http://www.airforce.com/careers/detail/air-battle-
manager-abm/ Accessed 25.08.12 
250 Northrop Grumman:  E2C Hawkeye 2000 
http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/e2chawkeye/ Accessed 27.08.12 
251 DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY 2009-2010 Sec IV-VI p.119; Section V p.220-221; 
DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY 2010-2011 Sec IV-VI p.146 
252 For example, see DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY 2009-2010 Sec IV-VI p.122 
253  2nd Lt. Erin Tindell ‘Weapons Directors Provide Situational Awareness’ U.S. Air Force (November 
17th, 2004) http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123009186 Accessed 26.08.12  
254 DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY 2009-2010 Sec IV-VI p.115 
255 Miles ‘Northcom Pursues Closer Engagement with Mexico’  
256 John. A Cope ‘A Prescription for Protecting the Southern Approach’ Joint Forces Quarterly 42, 3 
(2006) p.17-21 Voices from within and without of military academia have advocated that North 
American Areospace Defense Command (NORAD) be extended. Maj. Lawrence Spinetta (USAF) 
‘Expanding North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD): A Strategy to Engage Mexico’ Air and 
Space Power Journal (June 2005) http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-
s/2005/2tri05/spinettaeng.html Accessed 23.06.13; James Jay Carafano, Jena Baker McNeill, Ray 
Walser and Richard Weitz ‘Expand NORAD to Improve Security in North America’ The Heritage 
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Maritime security through improved management and monitoring is also supported 
through these programs. Of course the CASA-235s provided by Mérida to Mexico are 
specifically meant to help SEMAR better monitor Mexico’s waters, but again wider 
training shows the broader, all-purpose logic behind this goal. Training is supportive 
of NORTHCOM’ move into the maritime security arena, and the NAMSI. We have 
already seen that coastal, riverine and port security has been an important feature of 
U.S. military training. Added to this is the higher level expertise training necessary 
for the coordination and interoperability key to achieving improved maritime security 
on the U.S.’ terms. In FY2011 50 SEMAR members took part in an MTT in Maritime 
Expeditionary Operations, whilst 41 participated in a ‘NAVOCEANO’ course.257 This 
refers to the Naval Oceanographic Office, which describes its mission as providing, 
“the warfighter the best available knowledge of the maritime battlespace. This 
includes tailored oceanographic, hydrographic, bathymetric, geophysical and acoustic 
products and services that aid in safe navigation and effective mission planning.”258 
Several ‘Int’l Maritime Officer’ courses have been undertaken,259 with the course 
description stating it, “provides professional military study in the organization, 
planning, management and operation of a multi-mission maritime force” where, 
“Marine safety topics include marine environmental response, safety and occupational 
health, pollution response techniques, contingency planning, marine licensing, and 
commercial vessel inspection”.260 IN FY2008 18 SEMAR personnel received Naval 
Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) training, a NATO-led programme 
to improve coordination between military and commercial shipping for mutual benefit 
in security and expedited passage.261 Again this is key undergirding for increased 
maritime security operations on the part of SEMAR. 
 
The overall sense here is of training being used to improve Mexico’s capacities far 
beyond CN as a sole mission. Instead the weight of evidence continues to mount that 
the overarching aims are based around NAFTA-land Security and the priorities that 
were expressed under the SPP. The MI clearly locks into that. In truth I have only 
scratched the surface of the 10,000 courses plus that have been provided, but even in 
this indicative snapshot the idea that Mérida is simply a CN package, or that it is 
separate to much wider goals within North America, becomes untenable. Nonetheless, 
there is still a CN specific element to this aim. I now turn to this as a final example, 
looking at how the U.S. continues to militarise and support militarisation of CN in 
Mexico as part of NAFTA-land Security. 
 
A Militarised Drug War 
We have seen that the Obama ‘Beyond Merida’ strategy rethink was tempered by a 
continued, growing role for the U.S. military. Drilling down into the details of the 
various training courses provided by the DoD helps strengthen this conclusion. 
                                                
Foundation (July 27th, 2010) http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/07/expand-norad-to-
improve-security-in-north-america Accessed 13.07.14  
257 DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2011-FY2012 p.84 
258 U.S. Department of the Navy: Naval Oceanographic Office 
http://www.public.navy.mil/fltfor/cnmoc/Pages/navo_home1.aspx Accessed 17.08.14 My emphasis 
259 For example, see DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2013-2014 Sec IV-VI p.64, 68 
This course has been provided under both 1004 and IMET streams. 
260 DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2009-2010 Sec V p.118 
261 DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2008-2009 p. 113-114;  
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Firstly, with regard to Mexico’s CN strategy, the use of military concepts and 
methods is being strongly supported by the U.S. Secondly, it is also clear that whilst 
there is an obvious CN rationale for much of this training, it also supports wider U.S. 
goals. The courses provided by the DoD have a far more extensive ‘security’ 
applicability than simple drug interdiction. Many of the courses have multipurpose 
potential for a number of security contingencies. This is most obvious in the 
numerous references to “terrorism” that litter the training descriptions provided in the 
FMTR, but viewed as a whole this supports the U.S. goal of improving the Mexican 
military’s capability to produce and maintain wide-spectrum security and stability, 
and deepens and expands a militarised approach to Mexico’s continuing drug-related 
violence. 
 
This section broadly explores this, with a focus on the U.S. support for militarised CN 
approaches. Firstly, however, it is important not to overstate the case here. Again as 
we saw above Mérida money and focus did move into ‘civilian’ institutions under 
Beyond Mérida. Also the lack of information on Mérida training can create a false 
impression that military training is where all, or the most important, action happens. 
Even with the limited information that is available on direct Mérida training it is clear 
that very significant numbers of trainees have participated in courses with a more 
‘civilian’ applicability. One of the most useful reports on Mérida as a whole (in terms 
of numbers and detail of training) shows that thousands of participants from across 
Mexico’s state institutions (and civil society) have undertaken “capacity building 
events” in areas such as “Victim Protection and Restitution”, “Trafficking in 
Persons”, “Citizen Participation Councils”, “Money Laundering Courses” ‘Evidence 
Preservation and Chain of Custody” and Firearms Trafficking,262 as well of course as 
the border security and police training we have already encountered. I have already 
discussed the deep focus on judicial reform within the MI. This institutional aspect 
needs to be kept in mind in any consideration of U.S. contemporary aid to Mexico. 
 
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the U.S. is supporting Mexico’s continued 
militarisation of its CN efforts. Critics pointed out the large equipment transfers in the 
early days of the MI were based on military weaponry, especially airpower to 
improve Mexican mobility. However the far less public Section 1004 funding and 
training is once again key to this story, alongside other U.S. DoD mechanisms. First 
of all, 1004 funding joins up with Mérida here. Whilst pilot and maintenance courses 
that could support Mérida equipment like the UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter are also 
undertaken under INL funding streams,263 the DoD and its contractors used 1004 
funds to train a number of pilots and navigators, for a number of different ’planes and 
helicopters. This included several training, refresher training, and maintenance 
courses for SEDENA and SEMAR on the UH-60.264 One of the main training courses 
(UH-60 AVR QUAL SPANISH) included, “instruction in aircraft systems, navigation 
and command instrument systems, combat skills, flight training, mission planning, 
and safety”, as well as high-tech night equipment training.265 It’s important to note 
that ten of these courses were provided in FY2007, prior to the official start of Mérida 
                                                
262 Common Enemy p. 24-38 
263 For example see DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2013-2014 Sec IV-VI p. 65 
264 For example see DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2008-2009 Sec IV-VI p.114-115; 
DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2012-2013 Sec IV-VI p.76  
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funding, and Mexico operates some older Black Hawks. However the knowledge base 
being prepared also seemingly tallied with preparations for the provision of the newer 
equipment.266 10 SEDENA personnel took pilot courses for Bell helicopters, 
including training that was outsourced by the DoD to the Bristow Group 
Corporation’s premises at the Bristow Academy.267 Again, to reiterate, both of these 
helicopter types have been provided to Mexico under the MI.  
 
Mexico has also purchased Black Hawks directly. Their manufacturer, Sikorsky, has 
entered into an agreement with Mexico’s helicopter service provider, and a regional 
executive for the company described Mexico as representing, “a large and growing 
market”.268 Underlining this sentiment and the continued deep involvement of the 
U.S. in Mexico, in April 2014 the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) 
announced the sale of 18 Blackhawk UH-60Ms to Mexico at the cost of $680million. 
A further five were announced in June 2014 for an additional $225million.269 These 
purchases would run through the Foreign Military Sales programme (FMS) and thus 
would be supported by continued U.S.-Mexican cooperation to ensure training and 
expertise were up to speed in Mexico, but it already works with a base of expertise 
built up through training programmes like Section 1004 and the MI. The figures 
include extras such as navigation systems, night-vision goggles, M134 7.62mm 
machine guns, and radios.270 Reports have speculated that the sale is destined for 
FAM because of the lack of equipment specific to SEMAR, but what seems clearer is 
their planned use in CN operations.271 This at least is the rationale provided by the 
DSCA, who state the   
proposed sale will:  
 
[..] contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the  
United States by helping to improve the security of a strategic  
partner. Mexico has been a strong partner in combating organized  
crime and drug trafficking organizations. The sale of these  
UH-60M helicopters to Mexico will significantly increase and  
strengthen its capability to provide in-country airlift support for  
its forces engaged in counter-drug operations.272  
 
                                                
266 DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2007-2008 Sec IV-VI p. 91  
267 U.S. Embassy Mexico ‘Mérida Initative at a Glance: Law Enforcement Achievements’ 
http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/eng/merida/emerida_factsheet_lawenforcement.html Accessed 
30.08.12 For information on the Bristow Academy see here: http://www.heli.com/  
268 David A. Lombardo ‘Sikorsky Expands Black Hawk Service in Mexico’ AINOnline (February 22nd, 
2012) http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ainmxreports/2012-02-22/sikorsky-expands-black-
hawk-service-mexico Accessed 26.02.12 
269 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency News Release: Mexico: 
UH60M Black Hawk Helicopters (April 21st, 2014); U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency News Release: Mexico: UH60M Black Hawk Helicopters (June 24th, 2014)   
270 ibid 
271 Gareth Jennings ‘Mexico Requests UH-60M Black Hawk helos’ HIS Jane’s 360 (21st April, 2014) 
http://www.janes.com/article/36831/mexico-requests-uh-60m-black-hawk-helos Accessed 22.04.14; 
Sarah Kinosian ‘Mexico Prepping to Buy More Black Hawks: Settling in for a Lengthy Fight in Drug 
War?’ The Christian Science Monitor (April 29th, 2014) 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2014/0429/Mexico-prepping-to-
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Finally, the contractors involved - Sikorsky and General Electric Aircaft Company - 
are of course going to benefit financially in the short and long-term as the relationship 
with Mexico is deepened. 
 
The DoD has trained a number of airplane pilots on a number of different aircraft too. 
10 personnel received refresher simulator training for the Lockheed C-130 transport 
plane,273 and we have already seen training for C-26 planes. Moreover, 
complementing these pilot programs are a whole host of technical and support 
modules designed to maintain and sustain Mexico’s aviation capabilities, again 
including the equipment provided, and due to be provided, under the MI. Courses 
range from aircraft electricians, avionics technicians, loading specialists for C-130 
transports, specialist engine expertise, aircraft safety management, corrosion control, 
and airbase warehouse logistics. It is clear that in this instance 1004 and wider 
training works in tandem with Mérida in providing the personnel expertise required to 
ensure that the equipment provided to Mexico is properly serviced and used. The 
repetition of many of these courses, which often appear in each particular FY, reveal 
an objective to build a deep knowledge and capability base within the three Mexican 
military institutions that responds not only to contemporary security issues (including 
CN), but improves future performance and allows easier bilateral cooperation, and 
military sales, in the long-term.  
 
Of course much of the military rationale for increased helicopter capability in Mexico 
is to improve Mexico’s ability to conduct rapid and mobile military operations against 
CN targets in a variety of environments - from urban to mountain to rural. When 
assessing the almost 10,000 courses provided by the DoD to individuals in Mexico as 
covered by the FMTR, the sense that a deep culture of militarised CN is being 
inculcated in Mexico’s military security forces becomes inescapable. Of course, this 
can be seen to a good extent, ‘publicly’. For example, the MI has been highlighted as 
providing the mobility to Mexican forces to undertake expansive operations in restive 
states like Michoacán. The PF have deployed UH-60s in counterdrug missions, and 
SEMAR have also utilized their Mérida supplied hardware in this context. The U.S. 
Army described in October 2011 how UH-60Ms that had been specially modified 
before their delivery to Mexico were integral to a SEMAR mission to arrest nineteen 
alleged Zetas members.274 Surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft also have a clear 
potential usefulness in tracking and potentially helping intercept drug shipments 
flown, smuggled or shipped into and across Mexican airspace and territory, and 
providing training in piloting and utilising such equipment fits in with the DoD’s 
assessment that 1004 allows them to aid in, “establishing command, control, 
communications and computer networks, aerial and ground reconnaissance”.275  
 
In addition, and more specifically, operations targeting kingpins, explicitly referred to 
as ‘high-value targets’ (HVTs)276 involved elite SEMAR units trained by the DoD.277 
                                                
273 For example, DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY 2008-2009 Sec IV-VI p.109 
274 Kristen Kushiyama, ‘US Army Modified UH-60M Used in Arrest of Alleged Members of Mexican 
Drug Cartel’ U.S. Army (October 17th, 2011) 
http://www.army.mil/article/67396/US_Army_modified_UH_60M_used_in_arrest_of_alleged_membe
rs_of_Mexican_drug_cartel/ Accessed 27.08.12  
275 DoD Section 1209/1203b FY2008-10 p.4  
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In the case of Arturo Beltran Leyva (a top drug capo), a diplomatic cable fills out the 
public information stating that: 
 
[…]the arrest operation targeting ABL [Arturo Beltran Leyva]  
began about a week prior to his death when the [U.S.] Embassy  
relayed detailed information on his location to SEMAR. The  
SEMAR unit has been trained extensively by NORTHCOM over the  
past several years. SEMAR raided an identified location, where  
they killed several ABL bodyguards and arrested over 23  
associates, while ABL and Hector [his brother] escaped.  On  
Monday, the Embassy interagency linked ABL to an apartment  
building located in Cuernavaca (about an hour south of Mexico  
City), where ABL was in hiding.  SEMAR initiated an arrest  
operation on Wednesday afternoon, surrounding the identified  
apartment complex, and establishing a security perimeter. ABL's  
forces fired on the SEMAR operatives and engaged in a sustained  
firefight that wounded three SEMAR marines and possibly killed  
one.278    
 
This kind of operation allows one to understand the continued training in the kind of 
specialist small-unit combat tactics that we see under 1004. For example the course in 
‘COUNTERDRUG OPS-SPANISH’ undertaken at WHINSEC at Fort Benning 
involves, “advanced marksmanship with both rifle and pistol; precision operations in 
urban environments; riverine operations; development of intelligence packets in 
support of counterdrug operations; intelligence preparation of the area of 
operations”.279 59 SEDENA personnel were trained by NORTHCOM in FY2011 in 
‘Target Site Exploitation’,280 whereby military units engage in, “systematically 
searching for and collecting information, material, and persons from a designated 
location and analysing them to answer information requirements, facilitate subsequent 
operations, or support criminal prosecution.”281 In FY2012 and FY2013 a specific 
MTT on “Urban Operations” was provided to 164 personnel in Mexico.282  
 
Also in FY2013 U.S. Army North (ARNORTH) and the Texas Army National Guard 
undertook a number of specialist courses in nighttime infantry operations. U.S. Army 
North (under the Combatant Command of USNORTHCOM) states that its primary 
focus within its Theater Security Cooperation remit, as part of the U.S. Army’s wider 
                                                
Matching Interdiction Patterns to Specific Narcoterrorism and Organized-Crime Contexts’ Brookings 
Institute Paper (October 1st, 2013) http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/10/01-matching-
interdiction-patterns-narcoterrorism-organized-crime-contexts-felbabbrown Accessed 02.09.14 
277 On SEMAR involvement in the arrest of El Chapo, see Keefe ‘The Hunt for El Chapo’ 
278 U.S. Embassy Mexico Mexican Navy Operation Nets Drug Kingpin Arturo Beltran Leyva  
A marine was killed in this operation, and after his funeral four members of his family were 
assassinated in his mother’s home in an apparent reprisal. 
279 18 SEDENA trainees and 4 SEMAR personnel attended this course at Western Hemisphere Institute 
for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC - formerly the SOA) between FY2007 and 2013, excluding 
FY2011. In that year, it appears that 33 SEDENA took it in an MTT organised through the Security 
Assistance Training Management Organization (SATMO), which is connected to the John F. Kennedy 
School of Special Warfare. See FMTRs 
280 DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2011-2012 Sec IV-VI p.85 
281 U.S. Department of the Army Site Exploitation Operations: FM 3-90.15 (July 2010) p.1-1 
282 DoS / DoD Foreign Military Training Report FY2012-2013 Sec IV-VI p.76; DoS / DoD Foreign 
Military Training Report FY2013-2014 Sec IV-VI p.70 
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goal to, “shape the global environment to empower allies and partners to succeed”, is 
to improve Mexico’s security “capacity” so as to add another “layer of protection” to 
the U.S. homeland. This is seen as especially important as, “Presently, transnational 
narco-trafficking organizations and associated criminal elements are a significant 
challenge for both nations” and efforts to combat transnational elements are closely 
bound with those of the theater security cooperation process with Mexico and are part 
of the mission to defend the homeland in depth.”283 ARNORTH’s activity in Mexico 
has increased, as evidenced by the FMTR and ARNORTH themselves.284 A 
contingent of Mexican Marines (MEXMAR) were invited to a train with the U.S. 
Marines under a Junior Office Development Course funded through 1004 funds, 
where the “Mission” was described as being designed to, “improve the leadership 
capabilities inherent in their [MEXMAR] officer corps with increased combat 
leadership, tactical planning, individual warrior skills and weapons employment 
proficiency” which would in turn “enhance the relationship between the Mexican 
Marine Corps and the United States Marine Corps.”285  
 
On a more generalised level the DoD has provided several courses that relate to 
increased interoperability and asymmetric warfare more generally, without 
necessarily being, from the U.S. point of view, about CN in the traditional sense of 
interdicting drugs. Various courses prepare the Mexican military in force protection, 
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), ‘antiterrorism’, base protection and 
a whole host of other activities. Taken in the context of the deployment of the 
Mexican military around Mexico that I have already covered, the continued, 
increasing high levels of training of Mexico’s military suggests its role in CN is 
deepening to the point of permanency. The recent U.S. announcement that Mexico 
wants to buy over 3000 Humvees under FMS, to, “significantly increase and strengthen 
its capability to provide in-country troop mobility to provide security” in the drug war 
context suggests the Mexican government (Peña Nieto’s no less) doesn’t see the 
military returning to the barracks all that soon.286 These are not the actions of two 
governments keen to scale back military involvement in CN. There are murkier 
aspects to this militarisation too. One thing that is notable from the FMTR is the 
conflation of threats in the Mexican context, and the DoD’s definition of the Mexican 
security crisis as a military one requiring a military solution, whatever the wider 
strategy may be.  
 
Thus, courses are provided in some interesting areas. A handful of courses were 
conducted under 1004 that made reference to ‘Counter Narcoterrorism’. Although 
unfortunately information on these courses is limited in the FMTR,287 WHINSEC 
described its ‘Counter Narco-Terrorism Information Analyst Course’ (provided to a 
                                                
283 Association of the United States Army U.S. Army North/Fifth Army: Building Relationships for a 
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number of Mexican students) as one in which trains, “selected military officers, 
noncommissioned officers, and selected law- enforcement agents, at the operational 
analyst level, on their duties and responsibilities when working in a counter narco-
terrorist-operations environment.”288 1004 training has also been provided in 
PSYOPS, which has been used in COIN contexts elsewhere, and a course entitled 
‘Spec-Ops Combating Terr-MET’ (25 students).289 This appears to be (based on its 
course number) the Joint Special Operations University’s ‘Special Operation 
Combating Terrorism Course’. It is described with no reference to ‘traditional’ CN 
whatsoever, instead focusing on the aid the course provides to U.S. Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) and combatant commanders to, “cultivate joint 
SOF [Special Operations Forces] and interagency subject matter experts while 
strategically building and leveraging a global network of international SOF personnel 
in accordance with the Global War on Terrorism strategic goals.”290 This course was 
also provided under CTFP (5 students).291 As Rosa points out, there are large 
questions about what exactly the DoD is doing with regard to a lot of these courses, 
and how they are being applied in the Mexican context.292 Importantly, a 
NORTHCOM spokesman told her that his Combatant Command’s specialised 
training was, “in the spirit of the Merida Initiative objectives and fully supports the 
U.S. whole-of-government effort to work closely with Mexico”.293  
 
Courses in subjects like ‘Terrorism and Counterinsurgency’, ‘Responses to 
Transnational Criminal Organizations’, and ‘Terrorism and Crime in Latin America’ 
have been undertaken within CTFP and Regional Center arrangements. The posited 
intersection of crime-terror-insurgency, and the specter of TOC, now appears directly 
in DoD training. Whether it is particularly accurate or useful to conflate threats in this 
way in terms of dealing with them is therefore in some ways moot - this is what is 
happening. Furthermore warfare concepts are clearly being applied in grander terms 
to Mexico’s security issues. The William J. Perry Center routinely runs large 
‘NationLab’ exercises, which are constructed alongside partner nation institutions and 
the respective U.S. Embassy, in order to provide a simulated response to a security 
issue for these stakeholders.294 In 2012 a “wargame” NationLab was run between 
representatives and students from Mexico, the U.S., Canada, and Guatemala that was, 
“designed to provide hands-on learning in the formulation of national policy, and the 
formulation and adaptation of strategy in the shared regional fight against 
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transnational organized crime, including coordination between countries and 
government ministries.”295  
 
Finally, rather ominous direct links between Iraq, Afghanistan, the GWOT and U.S. 
training in Mexico exist: 
 
Using 1004 support, our Army Service Component Command  
(ARNORTH) developed a senior-leader training program entitled  
Asymmetric Conflict Executive Seminar (ACES), which provides  
Mexican military leaders with the tools they need to succeed in  
Mexico's national campaign to counter TCOs by covering many  
of the lessons learned from U.S. experiences in Iraq and  
Afghanistan.296 
 
A further indication of a potential link between Iraq and Afghanistan was the putative 
interest of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in extending their secretive 
targeting operations to Mexico and its traffickers.297  
 
A Justified Military Approach? 
The breakdown provided above suggests that a) the U.S. is providing training to 
Mexican military personnel that fulfils a wider military remit than CN assistance (and 
vice-versa with the terrorism programmes), in seeming contradiction of some of the 
legislation that actually funds the training and/or b) the U.S., through the DoD, has 
effectively designated TCOs as terrorist and / or military actors in some capacity 
(despite not formally doing so in, for example, its Foreign Terrorist List) and/or c) is 
applying COIN and other low-intensity conflict doctrines to the Mexican drug war 
context, and training Mexican military personnel accordingly. I would in fact suggest 
all three are happening, but that (c) means that the implications of (a) can be 
obfuscated somewhat, given the nature of the violence in Mexico. The problem for 
the researcher is that in the Mexican context these suppositions are prima facie at 
least plausibly justifiable, given that in some areas the cartels and their activities do 
represent a militarised threat. Thus, despite the fast and loose discourse that hypes the 
threat of cartels and collapses definitional categories, much of the military training 
and Mérida equipment has a plausible CN applicability, and I have already shown 
how it has been used in CN contexts. The specialist expertise involved in maintaining 
and using the equipment provided by Mérida, including the focused skills involved in 
air intelligence, leadership and aviation warfare, is of course the necessary addendum 
to the perhaps more high-profile equipment provision and piloting training.  
 
However, it is clear that whilst this training has a clear usefulness to Mexico’s 
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counterdrug missions, it is very much in line with an increasingly militarised CN 
response. Further, this deep training commitment is potentially helping to build a 
long-term counterdrug mindset within the Mexican military. The repetition and 
volume of courses that promote sustainable military capabilities ostensibly in CN, and 
plug into long-term strategic systems within Mexico such as SIVA, belie the supposed 
temporality of the Mexican military’s counterdrug role that has been promoted by 
U.S. defense officials and U.S. policy documents. This has potentially harmful 
implications that may in fact be counterproductive for U.S. goals within NAFTA-land 
Security. In addition, troubling questions remain about the nature of some of the 
training actually being provided by the U.S., and that aforementioned conflation of 
threats. If asymmetrical warfare responses honed in Iraq and Afghanistan are being 
used in Mexico, what effect are they having? The answers to this question are 
extremely difficult to ascertain given the secrecy of some of the training, and the 
inherently clandestine and murky nature of Mexico’s security crisis and its actors. 
What is clear is that the CN element of the NAFTA-land Security drive is far more 
‘robust’ than the Beyond Mérida strategy would have us believe. Whatever the merits 
of the institutional improvements being undertaken at several levels within the 
Mexican state, the DoD is deeply implicated in the MI and security projection into 
Mexico, as well as the associated tackling of the cartels themselves.  
 
These more troubling aspects speak to my sub-questions as to whether the MI can be 
said to be working. Firstly, there is vexing question of the MI’s ‘kingpin’ strategy, 
which the military strategy supports. Knocking out ‘HVTs’ has been convincingly 
linked to power vacuums and struggles within Mexico’s trafficking world, which in 
turn worsen levels of violence.298 It could be that the U.S. is satisfied that drug 
trafficking groups exist, but are not ‘allowed’, as it were, to reach beyond certain 
levels of power without triggering a robust security response. This would be in line 
with the Strategy to Combat TOC’s aim to turn national security problems into 
criminal ones. However if the kingpin strategy is adding to violence, this would 
appear to contradict U.S. goals in stabilising the situation in Mexico more broadly. 
The second concern remains the human rights situation ‘on the ground in Mexico’. 
There are in-built mechanisms in U.S. assistance that are meant to ensure human 
rights standards, and Mérida has both aims and safeguards added by Congress to 
achieve this too. Human rights training is a component of the military training courses 
themselves. Nonetheless human rights abuses remain inherent in certain areas of 
Mexican security (e.g. police torture), and they spiked as security forces rolled out 
across Mexico. The direct risk remains that training will be provided to and used by 
abusers within the security forces. There is also the continued high likelihood that 
some Mexican security forces themselves will become corrupted. The still more 
insidious risk is that a militarised ‘drug war’ is one in which violence and abuse is 
more likely, as society-security force relations are distant and frayed. 
 
Thirdly, relatedly, and perhaps most disturbingly of all, the question of desertion from 
the military and police forces remains pertinent. Mexico’s military and police 
desertion rate, not to mention the continued purges of corrupt police forces, provide 
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potential recruiting pools for traffickers.299 The U.S. has undoubtedly enjoyed success 
in how it has pulled SEMAR into NAFTA-land Security as a trusted and professional 
partner, and maybe hoping that similar results can be achieved with, for example, 
SEDENA. However the risk remains that the skills being imparted to security forces 
will end up being employed by or for traffickers and trafficking. All of these worries 
and blocks on success connect up with a fourth concern, which is whether there is a 
logic of violence involved in using militarised methods to meet the trafficking threat. 
Cartels have already proved willing to fight the state, as well as each other, and 
improve their paramilitary capacities to do so.300 In the complex context of Mexico’s 
security crisis, is the U.S. ‘fuelling the flames’ by enjoining further, deeper 
militarisation and the designation of TCOs as a threat akin to terrorism and 
insurgency, even if there is some plausibility to this defintion? If so, this has serious 





In this chapter I have traced Mérida’s formation, legislative history, implementation, 
and change across its lifespan. In the second part of the chapter I engaged in more 
granular analysis of some of its detail, and connected it to the related elements in 
other aid programmes. I argued they are key not only in supporting and 
complementing Mérida, but also in making it ‘work’. Through this process I have 
shown that the MI expresses many of the same policy goals and logics as the SPP. 
When understood within this context Mérida is clearly a core component of the drive 
to create ‘NAFTA-land Security’. As the highest-profile element of this, Mérida has 
not only provided large amounts of funding and equipment on its own CN terms, but 
has also helped strengthen the NAFTA-land Security framework in various ways. 
Firstly, and most directly, it has put the policy ‘meat on the bones’ of the SPP, 
fleshing out the skeletal North American security framework with tangible policy 
programmes and progress. Secondly, it has helped push forward U.S.-Mexican 
interaction and cooperation in other areas. The roots of this effort lie in the deepened 
interests in an increasingly important North American economy, powered by the 
dynamo of NAFTA and shown to be vulnerable by 9/11. We can trace a process from 
the deepened U.S. security interest in Mexico after NAFTA and the tentative military 
engagement in the 1990s through to today’s unprecedentedly close bilateralism, 
although it has taken the crisis of Mexico’s drug violence to unlock some of the doors 
for wider U.S. involvement in Mexican security. Whilst this is not a linear, 
teleological, or perfectly executed strategy stretching back through administrations, it 
does reflect the burgeoning and ossifying of U.S. interests in Mexico.  
 
                                                
299 56,000 military deserters were reported under Calderón’s tenure alone. Edward Fox ‘Mexico 
Military Sees Over 56,000 Desertions Under Calderon’ Insight Crime (April 9th, 2012) 
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/mexico-military-sees-over-56000-desertions-under-calderon 
Accessed 12.04.12 For a chilling account of a Mexican sicario (hitman) who claimed to use his police 
training and protection in his brutal life see Molly Molloy and Charles Bowden (eds.) El Sicario: The 
Autobiography of a Mexican Assassin (Nation Books, 2011) 
300 Again, the account of Kenny and Serrano is instructive. Kenny and Serrano ‘The Mexican State’ 
and Paul Kenny and Mónica Serrano ‘Transition to Dystopia’ p.54-85 in Kenny, et al Mexico’s 
Security Failure 
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Thus, despite some of the complications I point to in the final stages of this chapter 
(and explore a little more in the Conclusion), the analysis here and in Chapter Five 
reveals the continuing rationale for the MI within NAFTA-Land Security. Combining 
this depth analysis with the historical narrative, and placing it within the context of 
the historical-materialist framework, provides a stronger and more satisfactory 
explanatory purchase on contemporary U.S. policy with Mexico. The MI and 
NAFTA-land Security, seen in this light, are more explicable in their underlying 
drivers, and in their aims, continuation, and perceived efficacy. NAFTA-land Security 
now forms a notable feature of U.S. regional hegemony, and bolsters that hegemony 
further. Mexico is increasingly locked into a security relationship with the U.S. that 
has durability beyond specific administrations, as shown by the consistency of the 
U.S. effort through shifting U.S. and Mexican governments. The U.S. seeks to bolster 
its own HS and protect its strategic interests within North America’s political 
economy through a regional security architecture. By the same token, however, the 
understanding of hegemony offered in this project helps us understand that NAFTA-
land Security, and wider regional and bilateral relations, cannot be reduced to a 
command-and-control system operating from the U.S. metropole which only ever 
smoothly attains U.S. goals.  The U.S. aim is for Mexico to conduct NAFTA-Land 
Security at an increasingly autonomous level, where the U.S. acts as an encouraging 
tutor. This means that Mexico can still display independence inimical to U.S. 
preferences, and again some of the actions of the Peña Nieto administration provides 
the evidence here.  However, within the hegemonic power logics of North America, 
operating importantly at an economic level within logics of capitalist social relations, 
that independence exists within genuine parameters.  
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Is Mérida Working? 
 
“…could you tell me how we measure the success, any one of you, of the program? It 





This chapter summarises the findings and overall contribution of this research project. 
It connects what I have argued and uncovered herein to the explicit research questions 
set out in the Introduction, and summarises briefly how these findings relate to some 
of the wider debates the project touches upon in terms of North American 
regionalism, U.S. foreign policy, and U.S. hegemony. The implicit but core U.S. aim 
revealed through this analysis, namely to more fully open up Mexico’s security forces 
to wider U.S. influence in order to pull them into a NAFTA-land Security framework, 
is currently being met. Mexico, as U.S. military officials have stated, has never been 
more open to U.S. influence within its security sector. I have shown how the U.S. is 
actively constructing a regional security architecture - NAFTA-land Security - that 
Mexico is a participant in. This has been both in part achieved through and extended 
and deepened U.S. regional hegemony. However once we move down from this 
overarching level things start to get more complex. Violence continues in Mexico. 
Human rights observance in Mexico’s security forces is still shockingly poor. The 
aims of Beyond Mérida to institutionalise better rule of law approaches over military-
led CN are clashing with the reality of DoD training. In this concluding chapter I open 
up, very briefly, some of these tougher questions. Having established this, I consider 
future directions the research could take, based around some of the gaps in the project 




Summary of Findings: The Birth of NAFTA-land Security 
 
This thesis has shown that the MI is a multi-purpose security package designed to 
improve Mexico’s security capacities on a number of indices and in a number of 
areas. CN is a crucial part of this, largely as a reaction to the rise of destabilising 
drug-related violence inside Mexico. Moreover, I have shown how the MI is 
enveloped within a wider goal to regionalise security in the North American economic 
space, and better protect that space and the U.S. itself through security projection to 
the NAFTA perimeter. The deeper motivations for the U.S. to pursue such a course lie 
in its political-economic / strategic interests; part reflective of a long-held aim in U.S. 
bilateral relations with Mexico (and of course beyond) to ensure the stability of a key 
political economy for U.S. interests, partly reflective of a new regional thinking based 
around securing the increasingly strategically important North American economic 
                                                
1 Congressman Payne (D-NJ) Committee question on MI See Has Mérida Evolved: The Evolution of 
Drug Cartels and the Threat to Mexico’s Governance Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the 
Western Hemisphere and Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of Committee on Foreign 
Affairs (Serial 110-60) 112th Congress (September 13th, 2011) p.61  
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zone, where interests and the compulsions to secure them have deepened through 
economic regionalisation processes connected to NAFTA. The result is the active 
NAFTA-land Security effort. In building to this argument, I showed that the extant 
literature had made important contributions to understanding the MI, but had not fully 
captured its wider goals. I then built a theoretical argument based around meta-
theoretical exploration of interests as product of complex, social structures. I built a 
picture of U.S. interests from this basis, and applied this to U.S.-Mexican historical 
relations to show how those interests motivated U.S. action. I then showed how more 
regional security logics, precipitated by 9/11 but with roots in that bilateral history 
and the deepening of interests through regionalisation, were established under a rubric 
of NAFTA-land Security, before undertaking the key analytical task of this project in 
showing how the MI fundamentally plugs into and extends the NAFTA-land Security 
effort. The MI has been crucial in aiding the U.S. in its key aims to engage Mexico’s 
previously recalcitrant military and military establishment on the security issues the 
U.S. is most concerned about, which has included Mexico’s drug-related security 
crisis, but also encompasses U.S. HS and the security of the North American political 
economy from variegated transnational threats. 
 
Thus, the historical materialist framework employed has helped the project arrive 
upon original conclusions to the research questions posed in the Introduction. Firstly, 
to examine the puzzle of why the MI continues despite the deteriorating security 
situation in Mexico, I argued we needed to ask the animating research question that 
comes prior to that puzzle, i.e. what are the U.S.’ aims in constructing and 
implementing Mérida? I have historically situated and contextualised the MI within 
the development of U.S. foreign relations and U.S.-Mexican relations. I also provided 
an argument for core political-economic animators as drivers of U.S. policy in the 
evolution of those relations. Those animators - strategic interests - have stemmed 
from complex social structures that are nonetheless heavily conditioned by capitalist 
socio-economics. U.S. economic expansionism, emanating from logics within 
capitalism and burgeoning U.S. economic success, led to the proliferation of key 
interests beyond U.S. borders that increasingly presented themselves as strategic 
realities that needed to be secured by the U.S. state. I have shown that the aims of the 
MI snake back to deep continuities in protecting political economic interests in 
Mexico, which itself is part of a much wider trope within U.S. foreign policy to 
ensure the stability of key political economies. However, in sum these logics became 
part of something much more grand strategic in scope. Over time, these processes 
have culminated in the U.S. seeking to encourage and secure economic and political 
openness on a global level, with this openness accruing material benefits to the U.S. 
The drive to openness has been underpinned by, and in part underpins, the U.S.’ 
position of economic and military primacy.  
 
The U.S. has, overall, tried to secure and bolster its position through hegemony, 
inviting others to spread, support and secure global economic openness, and locking 
in those economic and security logics through alliances, institutional arrangements, 
and aid flows. A complex mix of power relations also sustains hegemony as the hard 
reality and benefits of U.S. preponderance (and selective applications of coercive 
power), combining with the structural realities of increasingly globalised capitalism, 
constrains choices for other actors whilst enabling freedom of action for the U.S. This 
has a direct application to the case examined here. U.S. policies to further open the 
world to U.S. and global capital during the economic crises in the late 1970s and early 
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1980s were applied to Mexico almost as a ‘test case’. The processes unleashed 
culminated in NAFTA, which locked in institutional logics with regard to North 
America’s political economy. This deepened the U.S.’ regional hegemony by 
fundamentally tying the Mexican economy2 and its economic development to 
openness to the U.S. The economic regionalisation proceeding from this point 
deepened already significant U.S. strategic interests in Mexico to a regionally unique 
level. It also increased interdependencies and security vulnerabilities, including to 
forces that in part piggybacked on globalised and regionalised economies. 9/11 was a 
revelator not just in terms of highlighting U.S. vulnerability to motivated 
transnational actors, but also in the costs it imposed on the North American political 
economy. A firm focus on these developments from a historical materialist 
perspective allows us to understand why the U.S. increasingly seeks to better secure 
itself, the Mexican political economy, and North America holistically and regionally. 
In conjunction with the methodological commitment to historical narrative and then a 
depth policy analysis, I have also been able to show that the MI fundamentally plugs 
into that aim, in a manner that departs from extant analyses significantly.  
 
In addition, in North America - or NAFTA-land - we see a regional microcosm of the 
some of the absolutely fundamental aspects of the U.S.’ foreign policy and grand 
strategy, and the difficulties and debates that arise from those core aspects. This thesis 
has revealed that an increasingly important question for the U.S. is not just how much 
it can further open up the world to capitalism and the concomitant ideology of market 
openness, free trade and (albeit in a more limited sense) democracy, nor how much it 
can secure that arrangement, but also how it maintains its own openness to global 
capital, talent and ideas as transnational threats maintain an ability to have impacts 
beyond their obvious reach. More inchoately, it has touched upon how hegemony 
works in North America and, incidentally, beyond. Historical materialism also offers 
us a purchase here not afforded to other approaches. It can be extremely useful in 
pinpointing the importance of political economic questions in U.S. hegemony. 
However, it also gives us an explanatory tool to deal with the contradictions inherent 
in state strategies that have to cope with multifarious complexities that arise from 
capitalist economies and capitalist social relations. Prosaically, North America is 
likely to become more important to U.S. grand strategy, primacy, and hegemony 
through its strategic importance. More tentatively, it may offer lessons in terms of the 
threats that exist within increased global economic interdependence, and how the U.S. 
goes about securing both its apex position in global capitalism and that open 
economic system itself. There is a lot of scope here for further work, most especially 
in examining especially North American regionalism and U.S. hegemony within it, 
and relatedly, the Mexican and Canadian policy response and contribution to the 
development of NAFTA-land Security. This could be extended to examining how the 
U.S. is bolstering its hegemony through deeper security interaction beyond NAFTA-
land.  
 
However, the important point at this stage is to stress that in the sense of helping to 
open up Mexico’s security forces to U.S. interaction as a good in and of itself, and 
thereby augmenting U.S. regional hegemony and beginning to better cooperatively 
secure NAFTA-land, the MI and the regional security effort it is part of is working, 
                                                
2 Canada’s political economy was of course pretty much locked in by earlier free trade agreements and 
policy choices from the U.S. northern neighbour.  
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and that is why it continues. U.S. access and influence within Mexico’s security 
apparatus has never been stronger, perhaps best highlighted by the revelations 
concerning the level of U.S. involvement in Mexico’s CN operations, and the fact that 
the same approaches continue under Peña Nieto, despite promised changes. There is a 
sense now that Mérida has done for security what NAFTA did for economics, 
‘locking in’ Mexico to a particular arrangement - NAFTA-land Security - shaped 
around U.S. interests and reliant on heavy U.S. support. This, alongside associated 
actual policy progress in certain areas less immediately head-turning than the violent 
drug-related security crisis, is the key explanation for why the MI continues as a core 
part of the active and evolving NAFTA-land Security framework. This is the key 
original finding of this thesis. 
 
Human Rights and Citizen Security in NAFTA-land  
Nonetheless, the continuing violence in Mexico itself can neither be swept under the 
carpet, nor disassociated from the U.S.’ strategic goals. There is certainly a case for 
applying the classic questions of critical security to the MI and NAFTA-land Security 
- who and what is it for? My argument has revolved around tracing complex 
processes and analysing a wealth of policy documents to suggest it is first and 
foremost for the protection of NAFTA’s political economy, This means that CN, 
citizen security and even human rights are not unimportant to NAFTA-land Security, 
but neither are they the primary motivating factors for the policies pursued. If they 
were, Mérida would be an utter failure. However, the Initiative itself does have some 
clearly stated aims in those areas that it can be measured up against. From a 
normative perspective, I consider it extremely important to do so. In addition, even 
from the perspective of the U.S. itself, continued violence and instability in Mexico 
remains concerning for the very reasons I have already set out. One of the key 
subsequent goals that improved security interaction is supposed to achieve is 
improved stability, and continuing violence more generally belies progress on this. 
Perversely, Mérida, or at least the militarised strategy it supports, appears to be 
plausibly implicated in the expansion of violence in Mexico. Even more perversely 
this expansion also helps us explain why Mérida continues. Can it be that better 
security integration somehow trumps actual positive results in stopping violence? 
There are questions here for further research on the issue of whether the MI and 
NAFTA-land Security can be said to be working on these levels, as looked at a little 
more below. 
 
Aside from the questions for U.S. policy itself, there are normative ones to be asked 
about the MI and associated policies, especially regarding police and military training. 
In 2005 Freeman and Sierra wrote a disturbing and stinging rebuke of U.S. CN policy 
in Mexico. Focusing on several areas, they wrote that the already developed and 
developing militarisation of Mexico’s drug interdiction posed threats to the fledging 
democracy’s political transition, and skewed policies away from harm reduction in 
the U.S., and poverty reduction and institutional reform in Mexico.3 These concerns 
have become all the more pertinent since this point. As I have shown, the Mexican 
military is still fundamental to the CN effort in Mexico. It is being geared up to 
aggressively take on the cartels using tactics taken from warzones - targeting of 
                                                
3 Laurie Freeman & Jorge Luis Sierra ‘Mexico: The Militarization Trap’ in Coletta A. Youngers, & 
Eileen Rosin, (eds.) Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy (Lynne 
Rienner, 2005) p.263-302 
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HVTs, PSYOPS, COIN, CT, urban operations, and so on and so forth. On one level, 
this means questions already asked about what effect this strategies are having on 
Mexico’s violence are still crucial.4 On another, past and current experiences that 
Mexico has experienced with corruption of security forces, and their problems with 
human rights, remain very concerning. This in turn feeds into whether MI and 
NAFTA-land Security as currently employed actually hampers stabilising efforts, 
which of course impacts on whether it can be said to be working. 
 
The media abounds with stories that would appear to corroborate the large-scale 
corruption of Mexican security institutions with frequent instances of wide ranging 
purges of municipal or local police, disbanding of short-lived institutions, and most 
recently, the firing of the entire municipal police force in Veracruz.5  The possibility 
of the Mexican army allowing the Sinaloa and Juárez cartels to “diminish each others 
strength” in Juárez, with a favouring for a Sinaloa Federation victory, was taken 
seriously enough by the U.S. consulate in the city to report it back to Washington.6 
This was detailed along with claims that the military may have met with former Zetas 
who went onto set up a paramilitary self-defence force in the city, along the lines of 
similar groups in Colombia.7 Los Zetas themselves are persistently described as being 
former U.S. special forces military trainees from the GAFE programme, including by 
U.S. security agencies, as are rogue Kaibiles personnel from Guatemala who have 
apparently worked with them.8 Corruption charges continue to be brought against 
military personnel and, despite the claims of Security analysts that the army is less 
corrupted than Mexican police institutions (which may indeed be true) high profile 
cases have emerged in the past.9 This is an indicative snapshot a long way from being 
an authoritative overview. 
 
Given this context, looking at what the U.S. is doing to try and ensure human rights 
observance in Mexico is important. Firstly, it should be noted that a number of 
training courses provided to the Mexican military contain human rights elements, and 
indeed courses specifically on human rights are also provided through the MI and by 
the DoD itself.10 The DoD is acutely aware of its past issues with human rights in 
                                                
4 See Eduardo Guerrero-Gutierrez ‘Security, Drugs, and Violence in Mexico: A Survey’ 7th North 
American Forum (Washington D.C., 2011) p.66-67 for the strongest expression of this argument. 
5 Freeman and Sierra ‘Mexico’; Associated Press ‘Mexican Authorities Disband Veracruz Police Force 
in Bid to Stem Corruption Guardian (December 22nd, 2011) 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/22/mexico-veracruz-police-force Accessed 22.12.11  
6 Geoffrey Ramsey ‘Cable Suggests Mexican Army May Have Worked with Juarez Paramilitary 
Group’ Insight Crime (March 28th, 2011) http://www.insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/717-
cable-suggests-mexican-army-worked-with-juarez-paramilitary-group Accessed 27.12.11  
7 ibid 
8 Bill Conroy ‘State Department Looking for U.S.-Trained Zetas in all the Wrong Places’ The 
Narcosphere (January 24th, 2011) http://narcosphere.narconews.com/notebook/bill-
conroy/2011/01/state-department-looking-us-trained-zetas-all-wrong-places Accessed 15.07.12 As the 
this article makes clear, there is no direct, incontrovertible evidence that Zetas members were U.S. 
trained. 
9 Jose de Cordoba, & David Luhnow ‘Mexican Army Officers Detained for Cartel Payments’ Wall 
Street Journal (June 15th, 2009) http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124510705768916735.html Accessed 
10.01.12 Chief amongst these is the arrest of General José de Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, who briefly 
headed the Instituto Nacional para el Combate a las Drogas, effectively the military’s drug tsar role, 
before his arrest and conviction for taking bribes from the Juárez cartel in 1997.  
10 See the various U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense Foreign Military 
Training: Joint Report to Congress documents Mexico sections for further information here. Also see 
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Latin American training. In addition, and relatedly, the Leahy Laws remain in effect, 
whereby any assistance is prohibited to “any foreign security force that is credibly 
believed to have committed a gross violation of human rights” under the FAA ‘61 and 
AECA (i.e. DoS programmes) and DoD training is prohibited under similar 
circumstances. Very recently regarding the time of writing, the DoD provisions have 
been strengthened to preclude equipment provision.11 Finally, as we saw in Chapter 
Six, Patrick Leahy himself has also led efforts to attach specific human rights 
conditionality to the MI.12 Nonetheless, there are gaps here that should invite caution 
and pause when reflecting what impact U.S. policy may be having, and what its 
oversight can achieve.  
 
Human Rights Oversight on Foreign Assistance: Persistent Gaps 
Under the FAA ’61, the DoS retains responsibility for the coordination of counterdrug 
assistance. As CRS researchers have pointed out, DoD programs are intended to, 
“generally complement” the work of the DoS in countering drugs. However, as the 
researchers go on to state, the “independent authorities” that empower DoD assistance 
programs create a situation whereby those programs, “are not necessarily integrated 
into the policy planning and the budgeting process for State Department-led 
counterdrug assistance programs”.13 In other words, the authorities under which DoD 
aid is provided have created a level of independence for the Pentagon vis-à-vis the 
DoS on both budget and policy of foreign counterdrug assistance. This independence 
also extends to reporting and Congressional oversight requirements, which are less 
stringent than those the DoS faces. Whilst elements of the FAA ’61 do apply to DoD 
programs, such as the need to supply information for the annual FMTR to Congress, 
Withers et al argue that the oversight role played by the Armed Services Committee’s 
for DoD programs is not sufficiently robust.14 Finally, Seelke et al state that because, 
“DOD counterdrug assistance is obligated out of global accounts and the agency is 
not required to submit country-specific requests to Congress for its programs, 
obtaining recent data on DoD programs and plans […] can be difficult”.15  We can 
                                                
Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida 
Initiative and Beyond (Congressional Research Service, April 2014) p.31 
11 Nina M. Serafino, June S. Beittel, Lauren Ploch Blanchard and Liana Rosen “Leahy Law” Human 
Rights Provisions and Security Assistance: Issue Overview (Congressional Research Service, January, 
2014) p.1 
12 Seelke and Finklea U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation (2014) p.29-31Funds have been blocked 
under these provisions on two occasions. Recently Sen. Leahy also blocked around $225 million in 
Mérida funding, but although human rights were part of the reasoning, an aide reported there was also 
concern (and frustration) at a lack of operational progress, strategic planning and insufficient reporting 
(apparently a 2-3 page document was provided by the DoS on the entire rationale for the MI). Laura 
Carlsen ‘Leahy Freeze on Mexico Drug War Funds will Save Lives and Money’ Truthout (August 9th, 
2013) http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/18080-leahy-freeze-on-mexico-drug-war-funds-will-save-
lives-and-money 03.09.14 
13 Clare Ribando Seelke; Liana Sun Wyler; June S. Beittel and Mark P. Sullivan Latin America and the 
Caribbean: Illicit Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs (Congressional Research Service, May 
2011) p.20 
14 George Withers, Adam Isacson, Lisa Haugaard, Joy Olsen and Joel Fyke ‘Ready, Aim, Foreign 
Policy: How the Pentagon’s Role is Growing, and Why Congress - and the American Public - Should 
be Worried’ Center for International Policy, Latin America Working Group, Washington Office on 
Latin America (March, 2008) p.5 
15 Seelke et al U.S. Counterdrug Programs p.21 This may also offer us some explanation for the 
confusing differences in reported levels of DoD assistance across different sources, a problem we will 
encounter throughout. There is simply a deficit of clear and stringent requirements for Congressional 
and civilian oversight of DoD programs. 
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thus see the level of operative independence the DoD has been authorised to wield by 
the U.S. legislature, and better understand why information on their activities can be 
hard to come by. This is the first alarm bell with regard to oversight of the DoD’s role 
in Mexico. 
 
The independence stems from DoD programs establishment through different 
legislative channels than DoS programs. Their authority is derived through the 
National Defense Authorization and Defense Department Appropriation Acts 
(hereafter NDAA and DDAA) and more recently (due to Congressional deadlock) the 
Consolidated Appropriation Acts, rather than the broader FAA ’61. U.S. foreign 
assistance is thus increasingly bifurcated along two separate avenues, and increasingly 
larger amounts are flowing through the avenue that runs via the Pentagon. We can see 
the potential significance of this split in terms of legal limitations to funding. Whilst 
DoD foreign assistance is subject to the “Leahy Law” we have discussed above, it has 
in the past been a markedly different version that is enacted through the Defense 
funding channel, most pointedly in the fact that equipment could still feasibly (and 
legally) be provided to human rights abusing units. This meant provision of 
equipment, equipment repair, arms sales and joint exercises could conceivably have 
continued to be supplied to units complicit in human rights abuses under Section 1004 
(and other DoD programs) without falling foul of the legislation (as pointed out by 
Stokes).16 In addition, the language of previous Leahy provisions on DoD aid 
suggested responsibility lay with the DoS to share information rather than the DoD 
acting on its own to identify abusers. In 2012 the relevant language stated aid should 
be prohibited if, “the Secretary of Defense has received credible information from the 
Department of State that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights”.17   
 
Under the current version of Leahy changes have been made, but differences remain. 
Prohibitions have been extended to equipment, and the language puts more onus on 
the DoD. However, it is still weaker and vaguer language than the DoS iteration. The 
DoD can effectively override restrictions if the intended recipient nation has ensured, 
“all necessary corrective steps have been taken” regarding abuses. The provisions are 
subject to a waiver should the Secretary of Defense and State decide “extraordinary 
circumstances” render it necessary to proceed with training.18  The requirements upon 
DoS programs are intended to involve a much higher level of vetting, investigation 
and archiving of unit human rights abuses in potential foreign aid beneficiaries, and 
an onus to make any results from these procedures, “publicly available, to the 
maximum extent practicable.”19 This is not the case for the DoD version. According 
to the legislative language, the onus is on the DoS to gather, retain and share 
information on human rights abuses with the DoD and others, whilst the DoD should 
share information with the DoS on human rights violations, “in a timely manner”.20 
When this is taken in conjunction with the fact that reporting requirements and 
                                                
16 Doug Stokes America’s Other War: Terrorizing Colombia (Zed Books, 2005) p.97-98 
17 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 Pub L. No. 112-74 Stat. 785 (2011) Further, “The 
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall ensure that prior to a decision to 
conduct any training program referred to in subsection (a), full consideration is given to all credible 
information available to the Department of State relating to human rights violations by foreign security 
forces.” 
18 Serafino et al “Leahy Law” p.7-8  
19 ibid 
20 ibid 
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congressional oversight are also less stringent under this DoD track assistance, many 
analysts are concerned about the continued risks and ramifications of DoD foreign 
assistance, especially for human rights.21 
 
Section 1004 Counter Drug Funding provides a case in point here. 1004 is not subject 
to the same legislative/Congressional oversight, requirements or limitations as 
training or aid programs based in State Department budgets. In terms of oversight and 
reporting requirements, the DoD was only required to provide significant information 
to Congress covering the program almost ten years after its introduction. Under 
Section 1022 of the NDAAs of 2001 and 2002, a report to Congress was required of 
the DoD detailing, “its support of counter-drug activities of foreign governments,” 
specifically covering  “(1) The total amount of assistance provided to, or expended on 
behalf of, the foreign government. 2) A description of the types of counter-drug 
activities conducted using the assistance. (3) An explanation of the legal authority 
under which the assistance was provided.”22 This ‘DoD Foreign Counterdrug Activity 
Report’ was not legally required between 2003-2005, before being reinstated in the 
2006 NDAA. Despite being the only specific overview of the DoD’s counterdrug 
initiatives, information provided therein continues to be extremely limited even taking 
into account it is subject to optional classification. For example, in the reports 
between 2006-2010 Mexico is only mentioned once, in the provision of the single 
figure of around $89 million in counterdrug support in FY10, that itself doesn’t tally 
with other DoD/DoS reports.23 The DoD has been providing counterdrug assistance to 
Mexico through this entire period. 
 
However under a variety of other legislative arrangements the DoD is obliged to 
report on more general ‘foreign assistance activities’, which brings in 1004 material. 
As mentioned above, a good deal of information on Counter-Drug Assistance appears 
in the FMTR, as required by Section 656 of the amended FAA ’61. However, this 
report continues to be subject to extensive classification, and indeed is still far from 
complete in terms of detail on training programmes, whilst being inconsistent. 
Sections 1209 and 1203(b) of the 2008 and 2010 NDAA respectively required reports 
on a number of DoD foreign assistance programs, including 1004. The report 
required, “the dollar amount, type of support, and purpose of each foreign–assistance 
related program carried out by the Department of Defense.”24 FY2007’s report was 
extremely limited, but the FY2008-2010 report, and those thereafter, do contain 
greater information that I have provided herein. Nonetheless, it should be noted that 
this report is also afforded the opportunity for a classified annex. In addition, this still 
does not mean the information is what is required for a sufficiently informed public. 
The fact a researcher spent four years picking through the elements of various reports 
and could still only surmise, for example, that COIN and CT may be being applied to 
                                                
21 Withers et al ‘Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy’; Laura Lumpe with Frida Berrigan, Kurt Biddle, John 
Gershman, and Ingrid Vaicius ‘U.S. Foreign Military Training: Global Reach, Global Power, and 
Oversight Issues’ Foreign Policy in Focus (May, 2002) 
22 National Defense Authorization Act of 2000 Pub L. 106-398 114 Stat. 1654 
23 U.S Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2005 Foreign Counterdrug Activity Report (Washington 
D.C. 2006); Fiscal Year 2007 Foreign Counterdrug Activity Report (Washington D.C. 2008); Fiscal 
Year 2008 Foreign Counterdrug Activity Report (Washington D.C. 2009); Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign 
Counterdrug Activity Report (Washington D.C. 2010); Fiscal Year 2010 Foreign Counterdrug Activity 
Report (Washington D.C. 2011 
24 For example, The National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 Pub L. 110-181 122 Stat. 3 (2008) 
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Mexico, with hardly any information on what many of specific training courses 
contain, should be alarming. 
 
Also, as we have seen, legally Section 1004 is only subject to the DoD versions of the 
“Leahy Law.” Partly as a result of the weaker requirements placed upon Section 1004 
as a DoD administered arrangement as detailed above, and its limited reporting 
requirements, the program has attracted some controversy in its history. This is not 
least due to its extensive use in Colombia despite ongoing human rights concerns 
about state security forces.25 In a real-world example of the potentials of the two-
strand funding channels that now exist in U.S. legislation, Withers et al detailed that 
military assistance continued to flow to Colombia via the Pentagon even as the DoS 
was withholding funds. Those same analysts feared that without a re-consideration 
and public scrutiny of the DoD’s assistance channels, and its then proposed role in 
Mexico associated with Mérida, similar human rights issues as had been encountered 
in Colombia could continue to arise with programs like 1004.26 These fears have to a 
certain degree been borne out, regardless of the recent changes to Leahy laws. Whilst 
Congress has withheld Mérida funding in response to Mexico’s overall deteriorating 
human rights performance with regard to the provisions set out in the Supplemental 
Appropriations Act and subsequent law,27 DoD funding remains unaffected as it not 
officially a Mérida component. The DoD channel has never stopped flowing. 
 
 
Areas for Further Research  
 
In this section I wish to highlight those areas I would like to take the research forward 
into, and also those areas that were not dealt with due to limits of space and focus. I 
have already noted how a deeper engagement with regionalism and regional 
hegemony in North America could prove fruitful, as could a more expansive analysis 
of U.S. security aid in the contemporary context within the theoretical and 
methodological frameworks I have employed here. This wider list of areas is more 
attuned to the case itself and its more granular detail. It is of course meant to be 
indicative rather than exhaustive, but it covers most of the major points. 
 
Critiquing the Policy 
  
I think the foremost aim that would animate the continuation of this research would 
be to undertake a more wide-ranging critique of the policies currently being pursued 
in Mexico. The work I have undertaken in this project gives me a very solid 
grounding in offering an expansive, thorough and well supported conception of what 
the MI policy and NAFTA-land Security is intended to do, based on a theoretical 
examination of why it is intended to protect the NAFTA economy and U.S. interests 
in it, U.S. HS, and stability in Mexico. I have also already opened up more complex 
areas incipiently here - the limits, contradictions, and human rights concerns within 
NAFTA-land Security. Nonetheless, there is scope to take the analysis further still, 
especially in terms of asking a) whether, or to what extent, it is working b) who is it 
working for and c) why is it limited in achievements on citizens security, human 
                                                
25 Stokes Terrorising Colombia p.98 
26 Withers et al ‘Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy’ p.6-7 
27 See footnote 12 above 
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rights, and tackling cartels. Especially pertinent here would be a deeper exploration of 
the militarised training that has been undertaken by the U.S., especially the 
application of CT and COIN military paradigms to what is supposed to be a CN 
problem, through aid channels that are strictly supposed to be CN. Elite interviews 
designed to ascertain how much policymakers and strategists consider Mexico’s crisis 
to be a unique COIN issue would build on the hints that there is some official 
treatment of the problem as such. This would also give a better base to judge the 
causal relationship between the MI and NAFTA-land Security, an argument made 
strongly in some Critical literature but through implicit evidence. 
 
However, the MI is hard to grapple with when it comes to policy in detail. First and 
foremost, the information provided by the U.S. government on the MI and the wider 
policies it intersects with is patchy and incomplete, and this is even truer of associated 
policies like training provided by the DoD. This is an issue I have flagged up 
throughout the project. In addition, the research design, aims and level of analysis of 
this particular thesis focused mostly on a theoretical appraisal of U.S. interests in 
Mexico, and a macro policy analysis of how Mérida fitted with them. Thus looking at 
how and where specific Mérida money has been applied would provide a good 
research opportunity to fill out some of the gaps herein. Some different research aims 
and methods may help here, for example (again) elite interviews, research in and on 
Mexico itself (using official Mexican government sources), more disaggregated data 
for spending in states and cities (if available) and so on. This would also help to 
corroborate or complicate the analysis, taking it in different directions and adding 
even more depth. 
 
One particularly interesting issue is the impact of Mexican drug violence on 
investment. There are suggestions the relationship here is more complex than it first 
appears (i.e. violence always lowers investment).28 Whilst the argument that a lot of 
what motivates the U.S. with regard to CN is the destabilising effect of drug violence 
is a strong one, a more disaggregated, detailed approach to this issue, looking at the 
interactions between investment and violence, and even potential connections to 
where Mérida money or U.S. trained security forces have been deployed (for 
example) is a potentially very exciting area for further research. This would in fact 
greatly complement a more critical examination of the MI and NAFTA-land Security. 
Of course data may still be challenging to come by, and research in Mexico on this 
particular topic involves both a potential personal safety risk, and the ever-present 
challenge of picking trough truth and fiction in Mexico’s drug war context. 
 
Canada & NAFTA-land Security 
 
Perhaps the biggest ‘elephant in the room’ when it comes to this thesis’ arguments is 
the fact I have been discussing ‘NAFTA-land Security’ throughout, without focusing 
explicitly on Canada. There are some reasons for this ‘occlusion’. As a reminder, the 
focus has been the MI, and the conclusion that something much more regionally 
focused was going on came about through an analysis of the MI specifically. In 
addition, whilst I do consider the U.S. to be interested in NAFTA-land Security 
holistically, there is simply nothing like the level of security concern within Canada 
as there is in a still developing, recently (formally) democratised and fractious 
                                                
28 See Chapter Three, footnote 183 
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Mexico, as I have noted herein. Therefore, whilst it may seem odd to make claims 
about ‘NAFTA-land Security’ when dealing with bilateral issues, I have proceeded 
with the understanding that two bilateral policies can still add up to a compounded 
trilateral one, and therefore the ‘trilateral’ (or, perhaps better, regional) logic behind 
the MI is not denuded by focusing on U.S.-Mexican relations. Indeed, this actually 
better suits the U.S.’ ability to maintain control over the North American space and 
set security on its terms, and any further research would be undertaken with this 
hypothesis in mind.  
 
Nonetheless there are some interesting points on Canada, and adding this to the study 
of NAFTA-land Security is another area of potentially fruitful further research. Just 
by way of an indicative starting point, it is clear the U.S. very much includes Canada 
in ‘North American defense’, and there is an interesting story to tell about how the 
U.S. has further incorporated Canada into this, with Canadian agency here much 
stronger with regard even to the design of the Security and Prosperity Partnership. 
The National Security Strategy of 2010 discusses Canada thusly: 
 
Canada is our closest trading partner, a steadfast security ally, and  
an important partner in regional and global efforts. Our mutual  
prosperity is closely interconnected, including through our trade  
relationship with Mexico through NAFTA. With Canada, our 
 security cooperation includes our defense of North America and  
our efforts through NATO overseas. And our cooperation is critical  
to the success of international efforts on issues ranging from  
international climate negotiations to economic cooperation through  
the G-20.29 
 
There are other specific areas to look at. Canadian firms are heavily involved in 
Mexican mining, and thus could stand to benefit from NAFTA-land Security 
arrangements (interestingly a point that ties back to investment’s relationship with 
violence). The growing focus on Arctic security, as anthropogenic climate change 
causes Arctic sea ice to melt or form less readily opening up the region to commercial 
exploitation and shipping, could be added to the North American security matrix. In 
short, even if I do so on an exclusive bilateral basis (matching the policy efforts for 
the most part), Canada needs to be understood within the NAFTA-land Security 
framework. Also on this note, how Central America will be affected or pulled into 
this orbit is a very interesting question, considering that drug related violence in some 
of the countries in the region is much, much worse than in Mexico, and there are 
effects cascading across the region as a result. 
 
Contextualising the Policy 
 
Whilst I provided a singular case study in this project, I consider the policy in Mexico 
to be reflective of some wider trends, and to indicate some potential sustained 
directions in U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy. Regarding the first point, 
contemporary security aid to Mexico provides a highly specific version of what 
Reveron has referred to as “exporting security”, whereby the U.S. builds “partner 
capacity” of a dizzying array of states (and ties their security to the U.S.’ largesse) in 
                                                
29 U.S. White House National Security Strategy 2010 (Washington D.C., May 2010) p.42 
Paul Ashby: NAFTA-Land Security: The MI, Transnational Threats, and U.S. Security Projection in Mexico  
PhD Thesis 
University of Kent 
 
257 
order to better ensure global stability.30 Although of course I have argued here for a 
deep continuity in that goal, the levels of global engagement are growing. The CRS 
notes with regard to ‘Leahy Laws’ that, “U.S. Administrations have increased 
emphasis on expanding U.S. partnerships and building partnership capacity with 
foreign military and other security forces.”31 Relatedly, we can clearly connect the 
policies and interests in Mexico to the concern more widely over TOC. Again, 
Mexico provides a very specific case because of NAFTA and the interconnectedness 
of the North American economy. Research could therefore make these links more 
strongly comparatively, or look at other important cases. Central America again 
springs immediately to mind here. Of course they are also uniquely affected by 





This project has shown that the MI is in fact a part of something far more expansive, a 
North American security framework that seeks to layer security over and across the 
NAFTA zone to protect. However disturbing questions remain about the effect this is 
actually having on what is a genuine security crisis in large swathes of Mexico. It is 
even possible that U.S. policy within NAFTA-land Security arrangements is 
contributing to citizen insecurity and violence. Nonetheless, the policy is set to 
continue, as the primary goals are based around U.S. interests. These may, 
unfortunately, outweigh progress on security, stability and human rights in Mexico for 
its actual population. 
                                                
30 Reveron, Exporting Security 
31 Serafino et al “Leahy Laws” 
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